الرئيسية / أخبار عالمية / Dimensions of Israel’s Foreign Policy toward Latin America and The Arab- Israeli Conflict
Dimensions of Israel’s Foreign Policy toward Latin America and The Arab- Israeli Conflict
اسرائيل

Dimensions of Israel’s Foreign Policy toward Latin America and The Arab- Israeli Conflict

 

By/ Mustafa EmadShabib

Supervised By/ Dr. Elsayed Ali AboFarha

Democratic Arab Center

Abstract:  

The study aims at understanding the new Israeli foreign policy towards Latin America. The study includes the important reasons and motives for carrying out new goals in Latin America. Evidences on reality would be like when Israeli Prime Minister “Netanyahu” went to some Latin countries in the first official diplomatic visit by Israeli Prime Minister there. His visit came as a start in execution of new Israeli foreign policy towards Latin countries because inside most of them right- wing parties have tied powers.

The problem of the study considered  in the difficulty of knowing the dimensions and of this new Israeli foreign policy as Israel never have one role in its foreign policy, and if that foreign policy will have impact on Arab- Israeli conflict.

The researcher used the national interest approach to describe the development of the relations between Israel and some Latin America countries since the creation of Israel in 1948 and also to describe the aspects of the new foreign policy.

The study is divided into two sections; the first section is dealing with the Israeli foreign policy towards Latin America with explaining its dimensions. The second section is analyzing the results of this foreign policy on Arab- Israeli conflict.

Conclusion of the study: the researcher reached to important results, on the economic level; Israel’s object of that foreign relation to increase Latin’s purchasing of Israel’s technological and military products. On the political level; Israel gains lots of supporting voices in political organizations and in the international system especially in the Arab- Israeli conflict.

Key Words: Israel, Latin America, Foreign Policy.

Introduction:

Israeli Prime Minister “Netanyahu” begins a new chapter in Israel’s foreign policy in Latin America. He started official diplomacy relationship between Israel and some Latin countries. “Netanyahu” visited Mexico, Argentine and Colombia where he also met Paraguay’s president “Manuel Santos”. Latin America includes more than 1 million Jews most of them reside in Argentine. So, Latin America is considered important to Israel.

The first relationship ties Latin America with Israel was when Latin Americahad voted 13 in favour and 1 against with 6 abstentions in the UN General Assembly for the 181 Resolution in 1947 to divide Palestine into two states; one for Jews, another for Arabs.[1] Latin America’s voting was the crucial one for the creation of Israel as if it had been against or abstained for the resolution, it wouldn’t be any Jew state.

  Israel is trying to gain more friendly states from all over the world. Latin America is fertile land for Israel to fulfill new political requisites particularly in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Also Netanyahu went for economic relations, military, logistic, etc. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the Israeli- Latin’s relations seem to be officially weak. “Shimon Perez” was the last Israeli official to visit Latin America in 2009. Netanyahu’s visit is important as he want to gain support of Latin countries in the international organizations. He wants to strength the ties with Latin countries as most of their systems are ruled by right- wing parties’ ideologies. So, they would start to approach to cooperate with the U.S. So, rationally, they would also to foster relations with Israel. That Israeli- Latin approach is useful for all. Latin countries will increase their economic and military power. Israel will increase their power in those countries to compete Turkey and Iran good relations inside Latin America.

Section One: The New Israeli Foreign policy Towards Latin America

Theoretical Frame Work: How Foreign Policy changes?

  As it is known that foreign policy means, a government’s policy or plan dealing with other countries, for example in matters relating to trade or defense.[2]So, each independent state participating in the international system puts its foreign policy to serve the domestic policies. Foreign policy is a mirror of the domestic policy. Domestic policy is the root for the foreign policy. As the state’s system appears stable and strong, as the foreign policy been as a mirror of the domestic conditions.

  Making foreign policy is a dynamic process, as foreign policy is changing according to many reasons. Parameters of foreign policy change are considered in academic researches. Parameters of foreign policy change, clustering them according to their nature (structural or conjunctural) and origin (domestic or international). Domestic structural parameters comprise the politico-institutional setting and advocacy groups in support of alternative foreign policy options. To change domestic political settings by looking at the authoritative decision unit and its insulation from political dependencies. Advocacy groups comprise adherents to an alternative political culture, socio-economic groups with divergent views and interests, and policy entrepreneurs in position to engineer foreign policy change. International structural parameters refer on the one hand to systemic changes that may bring about a foreign policy realignment and on the other hand the country’s role in the international system (e.g. participation in international organizations) that may activate foreign policy changes through socialization processes. Conjunctural parameters, either domestic or international, account for unexpected developments that may upset the existing status quo (i.e. death or succession of political leader, human disasters and humanitarian crises, international security crises, etc.)[3]

Israel’s Foreign Policy:

  Israel’s foreign policy is following the Judeo- Zionist ideology. The Zionist ideology beliefs in the centrality of Israel, coupled with considerations of raison d’état, maximize Israel’s sensitivity to the concerns of the Jewish communities in the diaspora. Such a finding is supported by the literature on other Diasporas. Reasons of state normally take precedence over other claims, including the status of diaspora communities.[4]  The concept ‘Jewish dimension’ is related to two fields. The first one is assuming that Israel is a Jewish state and most of Jews live in the Diasporas. So, it has a duty to save Diasporas’ interests all over the world. So, the relevant issue is, therefore, the analysis of Israel-diaspora relations in the area of Israel’s external relations. The relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora is in several ways different from other such two-sided relationships. Israel is a younger political entity than most of the diaspora’s political structures. The second is relevant to what extent are foreign policies influenced by factors such as national character, cultural heritage, and historic experience?[5]

  By time, Israel’s foreign policy has little change simultaneously coping with the existence of secular movements in Israel particularly in the new political parties. Secular parties like: (HATUNA and YESH ATID.) participate in coalition cabinet and share seats in the Knesset.[6] It is a reason to some changes in the foreign policy. Another aspect for foreign policy change applied in the case of Israel, there is a difference between ‘policy as design’ and ‘policy as practice’. ‘Policy as design’ means that policy is something that is deliberately created to achieve specific objects. In this sense, foreign policy becomes a plane of action. On the other hand, ‘policy as practice’ refers to actions to meet practical problems when they emerge in the international system. In this sense, foreign policy becomes the action itself.  So, Israel designs a policy, but does not practice it. There are many examples on this, While the ideology of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to only defense the country from external dangers, we saw IDF attacking “Hezbollah” in south Lebanon in 2006 and in the mid of 2016 Israel starts to join into the Syrian conflict by attacking the Syrian army in Golan. Another point, however, Israel supports the independence of Iraqi Kurdish, and in the same time it refuses to confine the Palestinian authority of self- ruling. So, we can say that Israel has not one direction in its foreign policy.

  According to statistical study in Israel in 2017, most of chosen people in the research are not satisfied with the way in which the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is currently fulfilling its mission, with an average of 4.81. Comparing to the last year, the satisfaction increased about 0.5.[7] This increase indicates the changes happened within the time of Obama administration which had not serve Israel’s situation in the international system specifically in Arab- Israeli conflict. The decrease of satisfaction in the last 3 years implying the weak way of the Israeli MFA pursuing its foreign policy. The 0.5 increase of 2017 in the satisfaction is a reflection of many reasons, “Trump’s Administration”, the strong relationships with Arab countries, Turkey, Russia, and finally with some Latin America countries specially the last visit of “Netanyahu” to Mexico, Argentine and Colombia.

Dimensions of Israeli Foreign Policy toward Israel:

  From the history of Israeli- Latino relations, once describe the Israeli foreign policy towards Latin America. Israel’s Foreign policy is considered in four dimensions. These dimensions are cultural and demographical dimension, geographical dimension, economic and technological dimension, and the military dimension.

  • Culture and demography:

  Before anything, it is important to put in mind that Israeli- Latino relationships depends on culture. The state cooperates with the diaspora communities for their welfare, supports the dissemination of Jewish education among them, endeavors to enhance their Jewish identity, and applies to them for assistance. Latin America contains about 1 million Jews; 300 thousand Jews live in Argentine. According to the late “Pinhas Sapir” after a visit to Latin American Jewish communities during 1974, Israel should be able to attract 20,000 Latin American immigrants yearly. It is therefore most disturbing for the Israelis that immigration to Israel from Latin America has been on a steady decline since 1973, from 4,500 in 1973 to 3,000 in 1974, and only 1,500 in 1975.[8]

In the same way that cooperation with the State of Israel can be very fruitful due to its knowledge-transfer programs, an even more spectacular and diversified result can be achieved by establishing areas of cooperation with Israel’s civil society, universities, research centers, hospitals, and leading companies.[9]

–              Geography:

  This dimension is related to the Latino- U.S- Israeli relationship. Latin America positioned in south the USA and relates with it in the national security importance. As the USA maintains strong ties with the Latino countries, as Israeli- Latino ties appeared strong, too. After the rise of right-wing regimes, territorial organizations like; Latin America and Caribbean States, Union of South America Nations, and Pacific Alliance will be able to increase commercial exchange with Israel and the USA.[10]

–              Economy and Technology:

  History of Israeli- Latino relationship is effective in the economic and commercial exchange. Israel can also be a supplier of medicines and medical equipment, as well as an investor. For example, the pharmaceutical company “Teva”, which operates in sixty countries including Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru, has forty factories that manufacture drugs and pharmaceutical products, gives employment to about 50,000 people and has twenty one research and development centers. The country exports more than 70 billion dollars annually.[11]

  Israeli Technology products are the most commodities to be sold in Latin America. Israel’s image in the technical and scientific realms is excellent. Therefore, economic and technological ties between Israel and the United States would be useful for establishing links among high-tech Latin American companies, such as those in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico and Argentina, and Israel. This way is easier to gain access to venture capital that abounds in the United States, but it is in short supply in Latin America. It is also easier and safer to reach the big tech companies if associated to Israeli companies. [12]

According to statistics in 2016, the exports of Israel to Latin America equal 1,793,993 million dollars, while the imports of Latin America to Israel equal 1,032,812 million dollars.[13]

–              Military:

  The military dimension of Israeli foreign policy is represented in selling advanced Israeli military equipment to Latin America countries. After developing of Israeli military industry in the 1960s, Israel started to export it to Latin America countries. Actually, Israel was to initiate military relationships with some Latin countries including tyrannical and violating the human rights countries like Brazil in the military regime. The rising revolution movements and the left-wing regimes affected the military exports from Israel.[14]

In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Israeli military influence crumbled along with the military regimes in several South American countries during this period. With the return of a constitutional government in Argentina in 1983 there were no new arms deals signed with Israel.It was also reported at the time that, in an effort to make a break with legacy left by the junta,President “Alfosin” moved to totally cut off military contact with Israel.[15]  In Chile, arms deals slowed considerably with the end of the military government in 1989, but did not cease entirely.[16]

  Latin America represents a promising market for Israeli military exports, but the Israeli military exports decreased by 2017 from 604 million dollars in 2012 to 550 million dollars in 2016.[17]  This decrease may be because of Columbia. Columbia was the biggest country to import guns from Israel. Columbia signed peace with “FARCA Movement” and finished up the movement by turning into political party.[18] 

Israeli- Latin America Relations: 

  For various reasons, as a consequence of persecution in Europe or in the Ottoman Empire, Jews started going to Latin America in significant numbers. Originally, Jews settled in Surinam and Curacao, where the Dutch were more tolerant. Then, gradually, Jews moved to Latin America, especially after the creation of the republics since Brazil was also a favorite destination for the Jews (the first Latin American synagogue was founded in 1636 in Recife.)[19]

Thanks to Brazilian representative “Osvaldo Cruz” who voted in the UN General Assembly for the 181 Resolution in 1947 to divide Palestine into two states; one for Jews, another for Arabs and to finish the British Mandate in Palestine. Osvaldo’s voting was the essential one for the creation of Israel as if he hadn’t voted for the resolution; it wouldn’t be any Jew state.[20]

 In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel’s relations with countries in the region were strengthened, due in no small measure to joint programs in which Israel shared its experience and skills in areas such as agriculture, medicine, organization of cooperatives and rural, regional and community development. Thousands of Latino trainees participated in study programs in Israel during this time. Developments during the 1960s and 1970s, however, led to a lessening of support for Israel within the countries of Latin America. This hardening was apparent mainly within the United Nations and its affiliated bodies.[21]The 1973 war affected the Israeli- Latino relations. Cuba boycotted all the relations with Israel. “Vidal Castro” announced that after the Non- Aligned Movement conference in Algeria.

In the 1980s, some Latino countries like; Argentine, Chile, and Peru joined the Non- Aligned Movement. In addition to that, they became left- wing countries. The domestic change in Latino systems lead to boycott Israel and confine the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLM), and also lead to decrease Israeli exports to Latin America.

In 1990s Israel had full diplomatic relations with all 33 countries in the region (except for Cuba) and is represented on the continent by 16 resident ambassadors and two consuls. The countries in the region have 17 embassies in Israel, including the only two embassies in Jerusalem El Salvador and Costa Rica and two in the Jerusalem area (Bolivia and Paraguay in Mevasseret Zion). Nicaragua appointed its first resident ambassador to Israel this year.

In 1997 the President of Colombia, who was also chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, the vice-presidents of Guatemala and Costa Rica, the foreign minister of Mexico, the defense minister of Argentina, many other ministers, parliamentary delegations from El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and Costa Rica, and others visited Israel. In most countries on the continent, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Zionism was marked with festive ceremonies in which government leaders participated; in three capital cities Guatemala, Santiago (Chile), and Montevideo (Uruguay) central squares bearing the name “Jerusalem” or “Israel” were inaugurated. Special events were also held this year to mark the 50th anniversary of the November 29 resolution, whose passage owed much to Latin American countries; the events included a special ceremony at the President’s Residence.

In 1999 aviation agreements were initialed with Argentina and Brazil. Many Israeli companies operate in construction, road building, agriculture, electronics, communications, and computers in Latin America Trade between Israel and Latin America totals close to $1 billion. The activity of the Institute for Israeli- Hebrew American Cultural Relations is anchored in cultural and scientific agreements between Israel and the countries of the region. Close to one thousand Latin Americans took courses in Israel this year. Israeli experts are stationed in Latin America on long-term missions to help with vocational education, agriculture; youth affairs, and sports, inter alia. Israel also extended aid to victims of natural disasters in Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. A project was launched to provide technical assistance to Central American countries, especially Guatemala, which requires rehabilitation due to the civil war that recently ended.[22]

Since 2000, the Israeli- Latino relations witnessed some changes in political and economic changes, resuming the economic relationships with Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. On the other hand, “Hugo Chavez” the Venezuelan president decided to withdraw the Venezuelan ambassador in Israel in 2006 in response to the aggression on Lebanon. In 2010, Venezuela and Bolivia announced their Israeli boycott because of the aggression on Gaza in 2008.[23] In 2013, “Netanyahu” announced that Israel targeted to strength economic relationships with the Pacific Alliance of Latin America countries which include Mexico, Columbia, Peru and Chile. This Alliance has good commercial relationship with U.S and Canada.[24]

In 2017, “Netanyahu” visited Argentine and Colombia. He also met Paraguay’s president Manuel Santos in Columbia. In Argentine, he met President “Mauricio Macri” and press for answers on two unsolved terror attacks in Argentina. “We are leaving now on a historic visit,” “Netanyahu” said as he departed. The visit signals a significant change in relations between the two countries that has been underway since President “Macri” replaced “Cristina de Kirchner”, who maintained a cold policy toward Israel while tightening relations with Iran. “Netanyahu” will also visit the Association Mutual Israeli Argentina building, which was attacked in 1994, killing 85 people, and where he will meet relatives of the casualties. Israel and Argentina have long accused Iran and “Hezbollah” of being behind the bombings.[25]  This visit is considered to strength the Israeli- Latino relationships, especially the increasing right- wing in some countries like; Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Paraguay which help strengthening economic, commercial and political relationships. Israel found a fertile land to sell more products than the European land.

This visit implies that Israel starts a new foreign policy towards Latin America. Israel wants to challenge the Iranian and Turkish economic powers there, and also implies the indeed Latinos economic relationships with the USA because during left- wing regimes, Latin countries faced economic pressure from the USA especially the oil exports. The new right- wing regimes will revive the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. So, besides the strong Israeli- Latino relationship, Latino- U.S relations are found.

  Notwithstanding, most studies of Israeli-Latin American relations seem to take the US-Israeli alliance for granted, as if it were analogous to the US-UK alliance. There seems to be a reluctance to acknowledge that the forging of this alliance was one of the greatest strategic successes in the history of Israel, one without which it probably would not have been able to survive. Indeed, in the research on Israeli-Latin American relations it is hard to find recognition of Israel’s dependent and peripheral status.[26] 

Section Two: Israeli Foreign Policy towards Latin America and Its Effects on Arab- Israeli Conflict:

History of Latino- Palestinian- Israeli in the United Nations:

   At an earlier stage, it has been suggested that Latin America’s pro-Arab or anti-Israel votes in the United Nations and other international forums do not necessarily imply a pro-Arab or anti-Israel policy on the real, bilateral level of relations. Despite their rhetorical and symbolic nature, however, they do suggest at least latent trends. Votes in the General Assembly do not explain policy and policy changes, but policy does give us some explanation as to why the votes were cast.[27]

  From the beginning, the factor that tilted the balance in establishing Israel’s existence as an internationally recognized independent state was the overwhelming Latin American support, it received the support of the twenty Latin American countries comprising one third of the then sixty-member UN General Assembly was crucial in either providing votes to assure the passage of UN resolutions in favour of Israel or in blocking the passage of hostile resolutions. In 1947, the United Nations vote partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state was 33 in favour and 13 against with 10 abstentions. Of these votes Latin America had voted 13 in favour, and 1 against with 6 abstentions.2 Resolution No. 273 (III) of May 11, 1949, admitting Israel to membership in the United Nations, was passed with 37 in favour, 12 against and 9 abstentions, with 18 Latin American states supporting the resolution, none voting against and only two abstaining.[28]

  On resolutions defining a Middle East settlement, most Latin American states had already shifted against the Israeli position by the end of 1974. The majority of Latin American countries agree on the following principles as a possible basis for peace in the Middle East region: (1) Acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and (2) Respect for the rights of the Palestinians is indispensable to the establishment of a permanent peace in the area.[29]

  During 1975 the Palestine Liberation Organization achieved recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people from a relatively large number of Latin American states. On November 10, 1975 the Latin American countries voted 13-3 with 9 abstentions to invite the PLO to participate in the peace efforts in the Middle East.[30]

Latin America rejected General Assembly Resolution 3379 defining Zionism as a form of racism by 10-5 with 10 abstentions. Among those voting in favour of the resolution, however, were Brazil and Mexico, the two major Latin American states who represent more than half of Latin America’s population. The others voting for the resolution were Cuba, Guyana and Grenada. Chile had voted for the resolution in the earlier committee vote, but when the vote came before the General Assembly. On November 10, it decided to abstain.[31]

  Resolution 2334 in Security Council passed by Egypt in December 2016, non- permanent members representative of Latin America; Venezuela and Uruguay agreed on the resolution.Resolution 2334 was agreed by 14 members of the Security Council and sustained by the USA.The resolution reaffirming the obligation of Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and recalling the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice.[32]

The New Israeli Foreign Policy and Arab- Latino Relations:

  The domestic structural change in some Latin America countries encouraged Israel to strength political ties. The rising right regimes is helping Israel to execute it is political agenda; the increasing numbers of supporting states in the international system especially in the international organizations. This turning Point is caused by the corruptions of the left- wing regimes and the territorial economic conflict. Although the international issues are not main aspect of these change points in the regimes, the ‘Golden Contract’ which the Palestinian- Latino witnessed became against the regimes’ new ideology. Countries like Brazil and Argentine are predicted to stand with Israel in the next UN Resolutions. However, Latin America countries’ situation usually refers to refuse the Israeli settlement and accept the Two- States Solution of the Arab- Israeli conflict’s solution.

  Netanyahu’s visit to Latin America will affect the Arab- Latino relations. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia are going to resume their relationships with Israel. Israel benefited from the good relationships with Chile, Columbia and Peru to approach its interest with the first three countries. The role and power of Zionist Lobby in Latin America is considered in the normalization the Israeli- Latino relations. 

Conclusion:

  The Israeli Foreign Policy depends on the Judeo- Zionist doctrine. Israel treats with external world to maintain Diasporas’ interests. To understand the background of the current ideological rift in Israeli society and the foreign level, it is important to put into consideration the role of the Zionist Lobby in each state to pursue the Zionist agenda in the interest of Israel.

  Foreign Policy change according to parameters. Revisiting the synthetic analytical framework in view of the empirical evidence, we should point out two important qualifications. First, as regards the sources of alternative foreign policy input, we need to be more cautious on their impact; they do not lead teleologically to foreign policy change but rather their input is filtered through the existing institutional and policy-making structures. For example, societal input may play a minimal role in a totalitarian regime or a policy entrepreneur in office may be coalition-bound or with a fragile governmental majority and thus not in position to initiate foreign policy change. Second, we should not a priori consider coalition governments to constitute an obstacle to foreign policy shift; actually, as the Israeli case suggests, foreign policy reorientation may forge a coalition, triggering rather than hindering change.

  Israeli foreign policy towards Latin America has changed due to the systemic change in most Latin countries. The rising right- wing regimes in Latin America to pursue new relationships and requisites more support in the international system. The rising right was a result of the left’s corruption and the economics’ weakness. So, they sought the tied relationships with the USA and Israel.

The only loser of the new Israeli- Latino approach is Palestine. The history of Palestinian- Latino relations appeared in a good way, but after the rising right in Latin America. Latinos are expected to support Israel in the in international system especially in the international organizations.

Figures:

  Total Jews Arabs
Not Satisfied (1-3) 30% 27% 44%
Not Very Satisfied 30% 30% 34%
Moderately Satisfied 27% 28% 22%
Satisfied 13% 15% 0%
Average 4.81 4.97 3.76

Comparisons with previous years:

  2017 2016 2015 2014
Average 4.81 4.31 4.03 4.80

                                                                              -Figure One –

–              The commercial exchange between Israel and Latin America in 2016( by thousand dollars):

Exports of Israel to Latin America Exports of Latin America to Israel
Brazil 747,230 Brazil 253,533

 

Mexico 380,541

 

Mexico 168,806

 

Chile 137,255

 

Uruguay 165,059

 

                                                                           -Figure Two-

–              Values of Israeli military exports to Latin America (2012: 2016):

Year Value in million dollars
2012 604
2013 645
2014 716
2015 577
2016 550

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[1]Those Latin Americans states voting for Resolution No. 181 were: Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cuba voted against the resolution and those abstaining were: Argentina,Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico.

[2]https://oxforddictionary.com,18/7/2017

[3]See Spyros Blavoukos, DimitrisBourantonis. Identifying Parameters of Foreign Policy Change: A Synthetic Approach. Athens: Sideris.

[4] See Milton Esman, “Diasporas and International Relations,” in Sheffer, Modern Diasporas in International Politics, p. 348.

[5]See EfraimInbar ,Jews- Jewishness and Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 166

[6]  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21073450, 20/11/2017

[7]  See The Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute. Look at figure 1

[8]See Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 19, 1975

[9]See Montaner, Carlos Alberto. Israel and Latin America: A Relationship To Be Developed

[10]For more information about autonomy and integrity in Latin America see,  Miguel González Indigenous Territorial Autonomy in Latin America: An Overview, Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, 2015

[11]See Dan Senor, Saul Singer. Start- Up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle.

[12] Ibid citation no. 10

[13]http://marsadamericalatina.com/index.php/etudes, 18/7/2017 (see figure2 )

[14]See Edy Kaufman, YoramShapira, Joel Barromi. Israeli- Latin American Relations.

[15]See  Buying into Occupation and War, The implications of military ties between South America and Israel Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign

[16]According to SIPRI: From the 1976 – 1980, there were 4 major arms transfers, from 1980 – 1989 there were12, and from 1990 – 2000 there were 5.

[17]  Numbers of exports are from the report of the military exports approach of Israeli Defense Ministry (IDF) in 2016 (see figure 3)

[18] See Gambetta, Diego and Steffen Hertog. Engineers of jihad: The curious connection between violent extremism and education. Princeton University Press,2016

[19] Ibid citation no. 8

[20]http://www.voltairenet.org/article154481.html,25/11/2017

[21]http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-s-cooperation-with-latin-america, 8/11/2017

[22]See  Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site: http://www.israel.org/MFA/AboutTheMinistry/Pages/Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs-%20The%20Year%20in%20Review.aspx, 8/11/2017

[23]https://alchourouk.com/236684/675/1/%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7.html , 27/10/2017

[24]http://www.al-masdar.net/%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%90-%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%90, 27/10/2017

[25]https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.811826, 27/10/2017

[26]  See On The Wrong Side of History – Israel, Latin America and the United States under a peripheral-realist perspective, 1949-2012

[27] See Regina Sharif, Latin America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1977, pp. 98-122

[28] All Latin American countries, with the exception of Brazil and El Salvador, voted in favour of Resolution 273 admitting Israel as a member state into the UN.

[29] Ibid citation no. 25

[30]General Assembly, Resolution no. 3375 of November 10, 1975

[31]  The Third Committee voted on October 10 to send the resolution to the General Assembly. For the Chilean reverse in its vote se October 30, 1975

[32]  Security Council, Resolution no. 2334 of December 23, 2016. See UN Resolutions: 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 452 (1979), 465 (1980), 476 (1980), 478 (1980), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), and 1850 (2008)

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