Revising military doctrine: Why states adapt to armed groups threats despite conventional superiority? The Case of Israeli Military Doctrine Adapting to Asymmetric Threats from Hamas (2008 –2023)

Prepared by the researche :Buthayna Rushdi Shtaiwi – Researcher in Political Science and International Relations; Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul.

DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH

Journal of Strategic and Military Studies : Twenty-ninth Issue – December 2025

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin

:To download the pdf version of the research papers, please visit the following link

https://democraticac.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%E2%80%93-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1-2025.pdf

• ORCID: 0000-0002-2374-3515

Introduction

Military doctrine represents a fundamental pillar of any state’s national security, as it defines the intellectual, strategic, and operational framework that guides military and security decisions during both peace and wartime. It encompasses not only the principles of force employment but also the broader philosophy that shapes national responses to threats, crises, and conflicts. Although states possessing military and technological superiority are theoretically expected to have a greater capacity to impose power equations and achieve decisive outcomes in conflicts, contemporary reality reveals a contrasting phenomenon. Even highly advanced states frequently undertake revisions or modifications of their military doctrines despite possessing conventional superiority and sophisticated deterrence capabilities. This paradox raises fundamental questions about the evolving nature of warfare, the transformation of strategic thought, and the adaptability of national security frameworks, particularly in an era marked by the rise of non-traditional threats and the increasing influence of non-state actors.

The twenty-first century, especially in the Middle East, has witnessed the emergence of unconventional actors characterized by high tactical and ideological flexibility, operational creativity, and resilience. Classical military superiority alone has proven insufficient to guarantee decisive victory, as demonstrated by the persistent ability of groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to challenge states with overwhelming conventional power. These actors have adopted innovative and cost-effective strategies—including asymmetric tactics, the use of tunnels, rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber capabilities, and information warfare that exploit the vulnerabilities of technologically advanced militaries. The rise of these actors has compelled states to reconsider traditional military doctrines, originally designed for conventional interstate wars, and to explore adaptive approaches that integrate flexibility, intelligence-driven operations, and anticipatory planning.

With the increasing pace of modern transformations in the nature of armed conflicts, particularly between states with clear military and technological superiority, it has become important to distinguish between traditional military doctrine, designed for wars between states, and the doctrine for confronting non-state actors, such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, neither significant technological advancements nor the sheer number of troops and military munitions can guarantee decisive victory in complex conflicts, especially in the Middle East, which has experienced decades of geopolitical and security conflicts where political, social, and even ideological considerations intertwine with the military calculations of states. This development has opened the door for Israel to reassess the Decisive Component in its military doctrine, reflecting the evolving nature of unconventional threats posed by non-state actors.

In the Israeli context, military doctrine has historically served as a central pillar of national security since the establishment of the state in 1948. It was grounded in principles such as deterrence, the projection of combat into enemy territory, and achieving rapid and decisive victories. These principles were closely tied to Israel’s perception of its limited strategic depth, the need to preempt threats, and its reliance on qualitative and technological superiority to offset numerical inferiority. However, the post-1967 era and the decline of conventional interstate wars in the region, coupled with the emergence of highly organized non-state actors, exposed the limitations of Israel’s traditional doctrine. Urban warfare, guerrilla tactics, and protracted asymmetric conflicts now require more adaptable, intelligence-driven, and multi-dimensional operational approaches than the doctrine initially envisioned.

This study specifically focuses on the decisiveness component of Israel’s military doctrine between 2008 and 2023, examining how it has been revised in response to asymmetric threats. Decisiveness here refers to the ability to make rapid, effective decisions, impose operational and strategic will, and achieve tangible outcomes in conflict situations. The research analyzes how Israel adapted its operational planning, resource allocation, and strategic objectives to contend with Hamas’ asymmetric strategies, including the use of tunnels, rockets, and hybrid warfare methods. By focusing on the decisive component, the study seeks to illuminate how Israel navigates the tension between conventional superiority and the unpredictable nature of non-state actors.

The research examines five major confrontations between Israel and Hamas during this period: Operation Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, Protective Edge, Guardian of the Walls, and Iron Swords. These case studies provide an empirical basis to trace the evolution of Israeli military thought, assess the effectiveness of its deterrence and defense mechanisms, and evaluate the lessons learned in adapting doctrine to asymmetric challenges. Methodologically, the study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach, employing the case study method alongside the analysis of official military and security documents, research reports, and specialized literature. This approach allows a holistic understanding of the intellectual, strategic, and political mechanisms driving doctrinal evolution.

The significance of this study lies in its contribution to understanding the strategic flexibility of Israel’s military doctrine, particularly the shift from traditional decisive operations against conventional armies to managing complex asymmetric conflicts. It highlights the role of technological innovation, adaptive strategies, and multi-dimensional deterrence, and provides an analytical model for examining how states with overwhelming military power respond to agile and ideologically motivated non-state actors capable of reshaping the balance of power. The study also contributes to broader theoretical discussions on modern warfare, asymmetric conflict management, and the evolving interplay between conventional militaries and unconventional adversaries. Following the introduction, Chapter Two moves to the theoretical framework and literature review, where it examines previous studies related to the components of military doctrine and the transformations experienced by states with overwhelming military and technological superiority when facing unconventional threats. The chapter focuses on explaining key concepts, including military doctrine, non-state actors, and asymmetric warfare. It then proceeds to clarify the concept and structure of the Israeli military doctrine within the security and military circles and among Israeli experts. Subsequently, the chapter presents studies that concentrate on the core of the research, namely the decisiveness component within the military doctrine, and explores the transformations and changes it has undergone through the five wars between Israel and Hamas. Finally, it highlights the research gaps concerning the study of the decisiveness component as a fundamental element within the Israeli doctrine.

Research puzzle

Despite Israel’s overwhelming conventional and technological military superiority, its repeated wars against Hamas in the Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2023 failed to produce rapid, decisive, and sustainable outcomes. Traditional Israeli military doctrine has long relied on decisiveness as a central component aimed at restoring deterrence and terminating conflict swiftly. However, Hamas’s use of asymmetric tactics—such as rocket warfare, tunnel networks, urban combat, and surprise operations—persistently constrained Israel’s ability to achieve these objectives. This raises a fundamental problem regarding the effectiveness and adaptability of decisiveness within Israeli military doctrine under asymmetric conditions.

 Objectives of the Study

This study aims to examine the evolution of the decisiveness component within Israeli military doctrine between 2008 and 2023 and analyze the impact of Hamas’s asymmetric tactics on Israel’s ability to achieve decisive military outcomes. In addition to Identify patterns of doctrinal adaptation across five major Gaza wars and Contribute to theoretical debates on military doctrine and asymmetric warfare through a qualitative comparative analysis.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in its contribution to both theoretical and empirical discussions on military doctrine under asymmetric warfare conditions. Theoretically, it advances understanding of how conventionally superior states adapt core doctrinal components when facing resilient non-state actors. Empirically, it provides a structured analysis of Israeli military operations against Hamas across five wars, offering insights relevant to policymakers, military planners, and scholars concerned with prolonged asymmetric conflicts.

Literature Review

Existing literature on military doctrine and asymmetric warfare highlights the theoretical framework underpinning the present study, aiming to explain Israel’s revision of its military doctrine despite its clear technological and intelligence advantages. Although military doctrine is often undefined, it is generally understood as a framework that links a state’s military power with its operational preferences and overall strategy, and dictates how the state would employ its military in war. Offensive doctrines, for example, demonstrate that doctrine influences both policy and grand strategy, and can be observed through statements by military officers, civilian-devised strategies, technologies, and military postures. This indicates that military doctrine is not static but rather an intellectual and strategic system capable of adapting to evolving threat environments and political and security conditions (Gallo, 2018, pp. 28–29).

Military doctrine plays a central role in shaping how military knowledge is developed and applied within civil‑military relations, particularly in the context of British defense policy and preparations for future war. It integrates the expertise of military and political elites with strategic planning to guide the use of force and achieve national security objectives. (Morgan‑Owen & Gould, 2022)

The conflicts of the twenty-first century, particularly those involving states and non-state actors such as Hezbollah, have exposed the limitations of traditional military doctrines that assume technological and material superiority. These conflicts highlight the necessity for military doctrine to adapt to asymmetric and hybrid warfare, incorporating guerrilla tactics, information operations, and broader socio-political considerations into strategic planning. Hoffman (2007) emphasizes that doctrinal innovation is essential for effectively guiding the use of force and achieving national security objectives in an era where conventional paradigms are increasingly challenged.

In this context, Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) are organized armed entities that operate independently of state control and pursue primarily political objectives. According to Geneva Call, ANSAs lack the legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties and include armed groups, de facto governing authorities, national liberation movements, and partially or non-recognized states (Geneva Call, 2023, p. 5). Similarly, the Centre on Armed Groups defines armed groups as any armed entity not recognized as a state, including organized groups operating outside state structures and using force to achieve political or ideological objectives (Centre on Armed Groups, 2023, p. 3).

Since its foundation in 1948, Israel has faced distinctive security challenges as a small state in a hostile regional environment. These circumstances fostered a military doctrine anchored in three central pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisiveness through offensive initiative. These elements have remained central in Israel’s strategic thinking, reflecting its efforts to neutralize threats through rapid mobilization and preemptive strategies (Institute for National Security Studies, 2025). Over time, and particularly during the five Gaza conflicts from 2008 to 2023, the emergence of unconventional threats necessitated a reevaluation of decisiveness. These conflicts underscored the importance of rapid decision-making, clear operational objectives, concentrated force application, and enhanced operational effectiveness.

Recent literature in national security studies highlights a fundamental shift in how contemporary threats are understood and addressed, particularly in environments where rapid and decisive military strategies are increasingly constrained. Murat (2022) argues that the concept of national security has expanded in scope and depth, with threat perceptions becoming more asymmetric, complex, and ambiguous. Consequently, traditional state-centered and military-focused security approaches are no longer sufficient, and states are adopting more comprehensive and multidimensional security models.

Contemporary literature in Israeli national security studies emphasizes that technological developments including cyber capabilities, advanced surveillance, and unmanned aerial systems play an integral role in maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge and shaping its military doctrine in response to non-traditional threats. (NSS, 2022). Contemporary strategic studies emphasize that the effectiveness of Israel’s security doctrine depends on the alignment between high-level political objectives and military goals, ensuring that military operations serve broader strategic purposes and respond to the evolving security environment (Alquds, 2025).

Several theoretical perspectives illuminate these doctrinal transformations. Deterrence theory underscores a state’s capacity to prevent adversary action by threatening unacceptable costs. In Israel’s context, deterrence has evolved into a multidimensional construct psychological, technological, and operational especially relevant when engaging non-state actors whose behavioral logic differs from conventional armies. (Mazarr, 2020; Byman, 2011; INSS, 2025)

Analysis of Israeli national security highlights that institutional learning and military adaptation are pivotal in enhancing the effectiveness of the Israel Defense Forces. Lessons drawn from previous conflicts are used to reinterpret threats, integrate new operational concepts, and refine tactics. Israel has exemplified this approach by developing subterranean warfare capabilities, establishing multilayered air defenses, and improving command and control systems following repeated confrontations in Gaza (INSS, 2025; Potomac Institute, 2008).

Finally, strategic culture theory emphasizes that historical experiences, security narratives, and collective memory shape patterns of military thought. For Israel, early conventional wars cemented a culture emphasizing offensive initiative, rapid decisiveness, and technological superiority. These foundational elements have persisted, even amid unconventional threats, necessitating a reconceptualization of victory and decisiveness within asymmetric operational environments (Snyder, 1977; Betz, 2015; INSS, 2025).

Palestinian Resistance Movements and Strategic Adaptation

Undoubtedly, the developments, as well as the adjustments and revisions that accompanied the principles of Israeli military doctrine throughout the five wars Israel fought in Gaza, were an important factor in studying the adversary Israel faces Hamas as the primary actor among the Palestinian resistance factions in the Strip. Hamas clearly influenced the strategic modifications of the military doctrine, particularly in the context of asymmetric wars.

According to Shafiq Shuqair, a researcher at the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, the rise of Hamas to power changed the nature of resistance. The movement shifted from a form of resistance based on popular support to one rooted in authority and a broad social base. This transformation allowed Hamas to acquire greater maritime capabilities, including relatively medium and heavy weaponry, establish ammunition and weapons factories, and develop military logistics. This enhanced the movement’s operational strategies, particularly in mobilization, training, and planning, and reinforced the use of tunnel networks as a key element in combat operations, despite the widespread destruction of some tunnels that is difficult to fully estimate (Personal interview, November 15, 2025).

Shuqair also points out that Israel’s access to international backing, particularly from Western countries, represents a major weakness in the resistance’s strategy, enabling Israel to carry out what has been described as a “massacre” on October 7, 2023, targeting civilians in Gaza to pressure Hamas. The Israeli side adopted a destructive strategy, characterized by extensive destruction of land and population before any ground intervention, while Hamas and Palestinian factions operated according to the laws of war, whereas the adversary largely disregarded humanitarian constraints.

It is well known that Palestinian movements, especially Hamas, have incorporated ideological and religious motivations into their charters over the years of conflict with the occupation. Israel has attempted to use deterrence strategies to limit their activities, but the complete elimination of any resistance movement is impossible, especially when deep religious or ideological dimensions exist. The resistance relies on popular support and the legitimacy of its cause—factors that evolve over time. Even if a specific movement ends, changing circumstances generate new resistance, and the losses of the previous generation, combined with religion and ideology, transform into symbolic, moral, and spiritual strength for the next generation.

Thus, the concept of deterrence is relative and lacks a fixed form, representing a cumulative and situational process influenced by the changing power and capabilities of the parties. The Palestinian resistance has successfully challenged the traditional theory of deterrence, particularly concerning Israel’s ability to preempt threats. The “Flood” operation penetrated Israeli territory by land, sea, and air, capturing soldiers and settlers, and breached borders to allow civilian and Palestinian faction entry. Regardless of current Israeli measures to fully restore deterrence, achieving the same effectiveness quickly will be difficult (Shuqair, Personal interview, November 15, 2025).

Shuqair also emphasizes the importance of ideological and religious motivations in the Palestinian context, where steadfastness forms part of societal belief and the defense of land derives legitimacy from its perceived sanctity. Ideology sets red lines for any Palestinian concession in negotiations or war, motivating the society to act against occupation even in the absence of military or political organizations. It also creates an organic depth between Palestinians and the broader Arab and Islamic world, strengthening ties between Palestinians and the wider Muslim community.

The Palestinian resistance is also grounded in deep religious and ideological dimensions. Hamas, for instance, has integrated these motivations into its charters over the years of conflict with the occupation, making the complete elimination of any resistance movement impossible. The resistance relies on popular support and the legitimacy of its cause, and when a specific movement ends, changing circumstances generate new resistance, with the losses of the previous generation combined with religion and ideology transforming into symbolic, moral, and spiritual strength for the next generation. Shuqair emphasizes that the concept of deterrence is relative and dynamic; it is a cumulative process influenced by changes in the power and capabilities of the parties. The Palestinian resistance has succeeded in challenging the traditional Israeli theory of deterrence, particularly regarding Israel’s ability to preempt threats. The “Flood” operation enabled the penetration of Israeli territory by land, sea, and air, the capture of soldiers and settlers, and the breaching of borders to allow entry for civilians and Palestinian factions, demonstrating that Israeli deterrence is not absolute and that restoring it to the same level of effectiveness will be difficult and slow.

Furthermore, Ahmad Mawlana, a researcher in security studies, notes that the struggle of Palestinian factions is not based solely on material motives but also includes ideological and religious motivations, which evoke concepts of martyrdom and sacrifice, particularly in the absence of political solutions and legal avenues for claiming rights, as evident in the experience of the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo Accords.

Mawlana points out that Israel is a project supported by international powers, especially Britain, France, and later the United States, and has pursued the normalization of its international and regional relations. However, Israeli policies during the most recent war on Gaza prompted some countries, including European states, to impose sanctions on Israeli officials, potentially evolving into a form of isolation, returning Israel to the initial stage of regional and international ostracism.

Consequently, the main factor in Israeli deterrence during the latest 2023 war against Gaza was its readiness to carry out extensive retaliatory operations against civilians with unlimited U.S. support. Nevertheless, if attacks expand to other countries, these nations may cooperate to limit Israel, constraining its claimed ability to deter threats by eliminating them immediately upon emergence (Mawlana, Personal interview, October 1, 2025).

Conceptual Framework and Indicators

The cornerstone of Israeli security thinking since the 1950s has been achieving a swift and overwhelming victory that prevents prolonged attrition and restores deterrence. However, contemporary conflicts with non-state actors present fundamental challenges to this traditional conception of decisive victory (INSS, 2025).

Israeli military-security doctrine constitutes the intellectual and strategic framework that shapes the state’s defense and security policies. It defines how military, intelligence, diplomatic, and technological instruments are employed to achieve national security and ensure state survival within a hostile regional environment (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2019).

Military doctrine should not be viewed as merely a tactical manual or a set of battlefield rules. Instead, it functions as a conceptual system that links political objectives, strategic context, and military capabilities into a coherent framework for the effective employment of force. Changes in doctrine often reflect broader shifts in how political and military elites conceptualize security priorities (Posen, 1984; Gray, 2010).

The decisive component of Israel’s military is one of the traditional pillars of Israel’s security doctrine, alongside deterrence and early warning. According to Meridor and Eldadi (2019), this component is intended to bring armed confrontations to a prompt conclusion, thereby maintaining deterrence and preventing conflicts from developing into prolonged wars of attrition.

In the Israeli military doctrine, the Decisive Component refers to the capability of the armed forces to conduct operations in a manner that leads to rapid and clear outcomes, depriving the adversary of the ability or will to continue fighting. This component underlies the concept of decisive victory, which may manifest differently against conventional armies or non-state actors, as conceptualized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS, 2025, p. 15).

Asymmetric warfare is characterized by conflicts between actors with significantly unequal military and organizational capabilities. The weaker party resorts to unconventional tactics, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, insurgency, or other irregular operations, aiming to exploit the opponent’s vulnerabilities and achieve strategic objectives without engaging in direct conventional confrontation. This type of warfare highlights the strategic adaptation of weaker actors to overcome the limitations posed by their inferior conventional strength (Lele, 2014)

Methodology

This article examines the Decisive Component within the Israeli military doctrine during the period from 2008 to 2023, with a focus on the five wars Israel fought against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The main objective is to explain changes in the Decisive Component in response to Hamas’s evolving tactics. To achieve this, an analytical framework was developed based on four key indicators of the Decisive Component which are the degree of degradation of Hamas’s military capabilities, the reduction in Hamas’s willingness or capacity to continue fighting, the speed at which operational objectives are achieved, and the ability to prevent the immediate re-emergence of threats after the end of hostilities.

In this study, the indicators used to assess the realization of the Decisive Component in Israeli military doctrine were derived from the researcher’s interpretation of doctrinal objectives—including degrading enemy capabilities, weakening fighting will, shortening conflict duration, and preventing the enemy from restoring operational capacity. These indicators are analytical tools developed for this research and do not appear verbatim in any official document (INSS, 2025; IDF Doctrine, 2015–2020). This approach allows the study to operationalize the concept of decisive victory within an analytical framework.

In this study, the dependent variable is the assessment of the effectiveness of the Decisive Component, which constitutes a core element of Israeli military doctrine in the wars Israel fought against Hamas between 2008 and 2023. The independent variables include: the nature of unconventional threats posed by non-state actors, operational experience, and technological innovations. The study evaluates the Decisive Component in Israeli military doctrine by operationalizing concepts of decisive outcomes degrading enemy capabilities and will to fight based on general theories of military effectiveness (Biddle, 2004) and official Israeli doctrine (INSS, 2025). This allows an assessment of the effectiveness of the Decisive Component in achieving doctrinal objectives in the context of evolving threats such as Hamas.

In strategic literature on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the concept of mowing the grass is used to describe a military approach adopted by Israel in dealing with non-state actors such as Hamas. Coined by researchers Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, the term reflects the view that Israel faces a protracted conflict that cannot be resolved politically or militarily in a definitive way, and that the use of force in this context is not aimed at achieving impossible political objectives, but rather as a war of attrition strategy designed to weaken the enemy’s capabilities and create temporary calm through limited military operations before threats resurface. In this framework, military actions are employed after periods of restraint, relying on repeated interventions to generate relative periods of quiet along the borders (Inbar & Shamir, 2014).

This study employs a qualitative comparative analytical framework to examine how the effectiveness of the Decisive Component has changed in response to Hamas’s evolving tactics. The assessment of effectiveness is operationalized through the four analytical indicators introduced earlier, which measure the degradation of enemy capabilities, reduction of enemy fighting will, speed of achieving operational objectives, and prevention of immediate re-emergence of threats. The framework also considers how Israeli military and security institutions interpret the army’s performance in each war and the impact of Hamas’s tactical developments on Israel’s ability to achieve decisiveness according to the official conception of Israeli military doctrine.

A qualitative methodology was chosen over a quantitative one because decisiveness involves complex strategic behavior linked to politico-military decision-making and intelligence assessments, elements that cannot be captured by fixed quantitative measures. Furthermore, detailed data and statistics regarding Israel Defense Forces’ tactical operations in Gaza are often not publicly available.

Another reason for selecting the qualitative comparative analytical method is that each of the five Gaza wars has its own conditions, objectives, and operational environment, making a numerical approach insufficiently accurate for the available data. In addition, reliable secondary sources produced by Israeli military and security institutions provide detailed analyses and contextual interpretations for each war, offering a deep understanding of the strategic and operational nature of the Decisive Component and its connection to changes in Hamas’s tactics.

The study relies entirely on Israeli primary and secondary sources, including military reports, post-war investigations, academic and military research center studies, expert analyses, and assessments of military commanders. The analysis of the five wars was conducted by comparing the treatment of each war in Israeli sources through an examination of research center analyses, military studies, post-war reports, General Staff assessments, State Comptroller reports where available, and statements by military leaders and specialized researchers. The four analytical indicators of decisiveness degradation of enemy capabilities, reduction of enemy fighting will, speed of achieving operational objectives, and prevention of immediate re-emergence of threats—were applied to each war according to the information and interpretations provided in these sources, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Decisive Component in achieving doctrinal objectives in the context of Hamas’s evolving tactics. This study focuses on the period between 2008 and 2023 because it marks a phase of significant transformation in both Israeli military doctrine and Hamas’s combat tactics. The first major confrontation in 2008 followed Israel’s attempt to restore its deterrent capacity after the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Analyses of that conflict argued that serious problems in the Israel Defense Forces’ capabilities and conduct were exposed, revealing shortcomings in operational performance and doctrinal assumptions that shaped subsequent military thinking (Kober, 2008).

In subsequent conflicts with Hamas, including the 2012, 2014, and 2021 operations, Israel confronted a non‑state actor employing asymmetric and unconventional capabilities such as long‑range rockets and tunnel networks, illustrating challenges to traditional models of decisive military victory. Analyses conducted by Israeli national security researchers have highlighted the limitations of seeking a definitive military outcome and have contributed to doctrinal debates within the Israeli security and military establishment, including discussions about the campaign between wars as part of evolving security doctrine and the need to adapt national security doctrine to prolonged and asymmetric threats (Ortal, 2021; Ortal, 2022; INSS, 2025–2026).

In the most recent war between Israel and Hamas in 2023, structural challenges to achieving doctrinal decisiveness resurfaced. Subsequent Israeli assessments indicated that Hamas’s offensive and defensive capabilities—particularly during the surprise assault on 7 October 2023—exposed the limits of reliance on traditional deterrence and decisive victory models in an operational environment characterized by urban entrenchment and hybrid capabilities. Analysts at the Institute for National Security Studies highlighted how Israel’s deterrence posture faced critical questions after the attack (INSS, 2025), while Amos Yadlin, in a 2024 interview, emphasized the strategic implications of the October 7 shock for Israeli doctrine and the need to reassess assumptions about deterrence and combat effectiveness in asymmetric conflicts (Yadlin, 2024). The application of the four analytical indicators to this war highlights how the evolving operational environment affected Israel’s ability to achieve decisiveness according to its doctrinal objectives.

Analysis and Conclusions

This article examine the impact of Hamas’s tactics as a non-state actor on the Decisive Component within Israeli military doctrine, by focusing on the five most recent wars fought by Israel against Hamas in the Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2023. Accordingly, the Decisive Component is considered a core pillar of Israeli military doctrine, encompassing the ability to achieve rapid and clear outcomes, degrade enemy capabilities, impose combat will, and prevent the re-emergence of threats (Institute for National Security Studies, 2025, p. 15).

The article analyzes the Decisive Component as one of the fundamental pillars of Israeli military doctrine through its four analytical indicators, aiming to assess the extent to which each indicator is realized in response to Hamas’s evolving tactics—from rockets and tunnels to urban warfare. Additionally, the chapter presents a comparative analysis of the outcomes of the five wars, in order to identify patterns of influence and general trends in the relationship between Hamas’s tactics and Israel’s ability to achieve decisive.

The five wars fought by Israel against Hamas between 2008 and 2023 represent a clear example of the interaction between the asymmetric tactics of a non-state actor and the Israeli military doctrine, particularly the decisiveness component as a core element. Accordingly, this analysis will allow for examining how Hamas’s threats evolved and how Israel responded to them, as well as assessing the effectiveness of the decisiveness component in each war, in order to understand the strategic and operational changes over time between Israel and Hamas.

This article presents each of the five wars in their historical context and the circumstances that led to their outbreak, with a focus on what Israeli academic studies indicate regarding the nature of each conflict. The analysis will also examine the four indicators of the decisiveness component, namely: the ability to achieve swift and clear results, the destruction of the adversary’s capabilities, the imposition of combat will, and the prevention of the reemergence of the threat. At the end of each war’s presentation, a summary of the findings will be provided to illustrate how Hamas’s tactics influenced the decisiveness component as a key element of the Israeli military doctrine.

Therefore, based on the documented facts and data from previous studies and reports, Israel’s performance will be assessed according to the four indicators of the decisiveness component. This analysis reflects the author’s own evaluation of each indicator, illustrating how Hamas’s tactics interacted with Israeli military doctrine.

In this article, the Decisive Component is assessed through four indicators, each of which is evaluated on a 1–5 indicative scale based on qualitative analysis of the wars’ events, documented outcomes, and supporting numerical data such as rockets fired, casualties, and the degree of damage inflicted on Hamas’s infrastructure. This approach enables systematic comparison across the five wars and facilitates tracing changes in the Decisive Component over time, without implying statistical measurement.

Comparative Analysis of the Five Gaza Wars (2008–2023)

1. Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009)

The report Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (CRS Report R40101) is a Congressional Research Service analysis prepared for Members and Committees of the U.S. Congress. It examines the Gaza conflict of 2008–2009, assessing its impact on civilians, unresolved issues, regional and international implications, and possible policy options for the 111th Congress. It discusses the initial launch of Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008, Israel’s military objectives, the conduct of air and ground operations, and the humanitarian and political aftermath of the conflict.

On the same day, Israel carried out large-scale airstrikes targeting rocket launch sites, weapons depots, command and control systems, as well as several tunnels used for smuggling and storage (United Nations, 2009, UNISPAL document auto‑insert‑208773). On January 3, 2009, Israeli ground forces, including infantry and armored units, began operations in multiple areas to undermine Hamas’s combat capabilities and reduce its rocket-launching capacity (CRS Report R40101).

During the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict, Hamas prepared a multi‑layered defense concept that integrated both urban warfare and fortified subterranean structures. The third line of defense was embedded within built‑up areas, where Hamas had constructed a complex network of tunnels for moving fighters and weapons, positioning snipers, and establishing ambushes, as well as booby‑trapped houses designed to slow and ensnare invading forces. At the same time, civilian structures such as schools, mosques, and housing were repurposed for military use, including weapons storage and fighting positions. This approach allowed Hamas to exploit the densely populated terrain of Gaza to confront a technologically superior adversary and to sustain prolonged resistance.

The launch of short-range Qassam rockets and medium-range Grad rockets, urban warfare and ambushes within built-up areas—especially during Israeli ground incursions—along with the use of snipers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), defensive tunnel networks, and decentralized command and control (Byman, 2011, p. 191)

On the other hand, Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), resulted in significant casualties on both sides. Approximately 1,440 Palestinians were killed, including a large number of civilians, while 13 Israelis lost their lives, including 4 civilians (CRS Report R40101, 2009). In addition, Hamas and allied groups launched around 650 rockets into Israel, with about 570 landing inside Israeli territory (Human Rights Watch, 2009; UNISPAL, 2009). These figures provide a quantitative context for evaluating the impact of Hamas’s tactics and the Israeli military response during the operation.

2. Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)

According to the Israel Defense Forces (2012) official account of Operation Pillar of Defense, the operation was launched on November 14, 2012, with the elimination of Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari and targeted strikes on over 1,500 sites in the Gaza Strip. The war lasted eight days, resulting in approximately 163 Palestinian deaths and damage to several Hamas military sites, while the movement continued launching rockets, including strikes that reached Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Palestinian armed groups launched roughly 650 rockets, of which about 570 landed in Israeli territory, demonstrating the ongoing threat posed by Hamas’s missile capabilities ((United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2013).

During this war, Hamas relied on short- and medium-range rockets with limited use of tactical tunnels, continuing intermittent attacks against Israeli forces. A notable feature of this conflict compared to Operation Cast Lead was that Hamas fired long-range rockets toward Tel Aviv for the first time, representing a significant expansion of its rocket capabilities (IDF, 2012).

Military studies and media analyses point out that during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), the Israeli Defense Forces relied heavily on stand‑off firepower and did not commit ground troops into Gaza, instead prioritizing aerial campaigns to weaken Hamas’s rocket capabilities and restore deterrence (The Times of Israel, 2015). Despite achieving tactical successes through intensive air operations during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Israel’s campaign did not translate into full strategic decisiveness, as rocket launches from Gaza continued throughout the conflict, indicating that tactical airpower alone could not permanently suppress Hamas’s offensive capabilities. (RUSI, 2012).

3. Operation Protective Edge (2014)

On 8 July 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge following an escalation in rocket fire from Gaza and the targeting of several Israelis near the Gaza border. The war began with intensive airstrikes targeting rocket-launching sites, weapons depots, Hamas offensive tunnels, and command-and-control centers (IDF, 2014).

During the 2014 Gaza War, Hamas’s tunnel network emerged as a significant tactical challenge to Israel. An internal IDF investigation after the conflict found that many combat units were not adequately prepared to deal with the threat posed by the tunnels; officers lacked a full understanding of their scale and significance before hostilities. This highlighted operational limitation and contributed to the IDF’s decision to expand ground operations into Gaza in order to locate and destroy the tunnel network. According to the Times of Israel, the army had known about the existence of attack tunnels but did not fully grasp their operational importance until they were encountered in combat. The lack of preparedness regarding the tunnels was cited as one factor that affected the conduct and duration of the war (Times of Israel, 2015).

During the 2014 war, Hamas relied on a combination of asymmetric warfare tactics, including the launch of short- and medium-range rockets against Israeli cities, the intensive use of offensive tunnel networks, and the execution of limited offensive operations within built-up areas, particularly along the border. These tactics enabled the movement to challenge Israel’s military superiority, especially during the ground phase of the war, as tunnels served as a primary means of maneuver, infiltration, and threatening advancing forces, while urban operations further complicated the Israeli army’s ability to achieve a rapid and decisive battlefield victory. Hamas employed tunnel-based ground operations during the 2014 war with the objective of abducting Israeli soldiers, as demonstrated most clearly in the Rafah incident (Popovich, 2014).

In contrast, Israel employed broad initial airstrikes followed by a limited ground incursion, focusing on destroying newly built tunnels, military installations, and rocket-launching sites in order to achieve tactical decisiveness and restore deterrence. However, Hamas’s adaptability, continued rocket fire, and retention of parts of its tunnel network reduced the effectiveness of full decisiveness according to the Israeli military doctrine.

On 17 July 2014, the ground phase began, with armored infantry forces entering various areas of Gaza to disrupt the tunnel network and curtail rocket capabilities (Jewish Institute for National Security of America 2015).

Human rights and academic assessments indicate that the war resulted in more than 2,200 Palestinian deaths—including civilians—along with widespread destruction of civilian and military infrastructure, and 73 Israeli fatalities among soldiers and civilians (UNOCHA, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014).

4. Operation Guardian of the Walls (2021)

The fourth war, which Israel called “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in May 2021, coincided with escalating tensions in East Jerusalem, particularly protests against the forced evictions of Palestinians from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood and repeated raids on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which sparked widespread unrest prior to the outbreak of military hostilities (Anadolu Agency Arabic, 2021). According to PalQuest (2021), Hamas launched rockets and projectiles toward Israeli territory, including Jerusalem and settlements surrounding the Gaza Strip, causing significant disruptions to daily life in parts of Israel. The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system intercepted a large portion of these rockets.

In response, Israel carried out extensive airstrikes targeting Hamas military positions, including its tunnel network, which was used as shelters, command centers, and fortified underground positions. (PalQuest, 2021)

During the May 2021 Gaza conflict, a total of approximately 256 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip, including civilians such as children and women, and 13 Israelis were killed as a result of hostilities. Many more were injured and widespread destruction occurred (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2021)

5. Operation Swords of Iron (2023)

The fifth war broke out on October 7, 2023, which Israel called “Operation Swords of Iron”, following a large-scale and surprise attack by Hamas from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns on a religious holiday, causing a strategic shock to Israeli security forces. The attacks included the launch of thousands of rockets, the use of cross-border assault units for the first time since the conflict began, and coordinated targeting of civilian and military sites (Al Jazeera, 2025).

In the early hours of the attack, fighting resulted in approximately 1,200 deaths inside Israel and the capture of more than 250 hostages taken to Gaza, making it one of the deadliest attacks in the country’s history (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023).

Israel responded by declaring a state of war and initiating extensive air and ground operations in Gaza, targeting Hamas military and security institutions, including tunnels and command centers. Civilians, health facilities, educational institutions, and essential services were also affected, resulting in a major humanitarian crisis (United Nations Security Council, 2023).

According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, over the course of two years, the conflict caused the deaths of 68,865 Palestinians and injured 170,670 others, including a high proportion of women and children, with the majority of Gaza’s population displaced and severe deterioration of health and food services (Al Jazeera, 2025).

During the October 7, 2023 attack, Hamas effectively exploited weaknesses in Israel’s overreliance on technology for border monitoring. The assault focused on taking advantage of vulnerabilities in smart surveillance systems, including cameras, sensors, and drones, which delayed the detection of attacker movements and allowed them to breach the border successfully. Hamas also launched an intensive rocket barrage to saturate the Iron Dome, reducing its capacity to intercept incoming rockets independently. The report emphasizes that the initial success of the attack resulted from the coordination of ground and rocket assaults while exploiting Israeli technological vulnerabilities, rather than from purely technological failure, highlighting the critical role of human operational decisions in the use of defensive technologies (Carchidi, 2023).

In response to Hamas’s surprise offensive, Israel rapidly transitioned to a wartime footing by activating reservists, declaring a state of readiness for war, launching a comprehensive aerial campaign against Hamas’s military infrastructure, and employing its Iron Dome defense system to counter the unprecedented rocket onslaught, even as challenges emerged in intercepting the volume of missiles fired (United States Congress, 2023).

In addition, Israel conducted limited ground operations inside Gaza to disrupt armed groups that had infiltrated across the border and to target military infrastructure, including Hamas’s tunnel network and weapons storage facilities. Israeli forces began targeting the Palestinian militant group’s extensive tunnel network and command structures as part of a next phase of the offensive, using both ground and air assets to locate and disable these strategic assets (Saul, 2023; Reuters, 2023).

Findings and Discussion

This comparative summary evaluates the Decisive Component, one of the core pillars of Israeli military doctrine, across the five wars fought by Israel against Hamas between 2008 and 2023. The scores assigned to each indicator reflect the extent to which Israeli military operations were able to achieve decisiveness in practice, based on qualitative analysis of documented military outcomes, Hamas’s tactical adaptations, and available quantitative data such as the duration of hostilities, continuity of rocket fire, casualty figures, and Hamas’s ability to rebuild its capabilities following the cessation of military operations. The variation in scores across the different cases demonstrates a gradual erosion in Israel’s capacity to achieve rapid, comprehensive, and sustainable decisiveness. While earlier conflicts produced partial tactical successes, later wars—particularly those characterized by the expanded use of tunnel warfare, long-range rockets, and coordinated multi-domain attacks—reveal increasing constraints on the effectiveness of the Decisive Component within Israeli military doctrine. Overall, the table highlights an inverse relationship between the evolution of Hamas’s asymmetric tactics and Israel’s ability to translate military superiority into decisive strategic outcomes over time.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that states with military and technological superiority, such as Israel, are not exempt from the need to reassess their military doctrine when confronted with unconventional threats posed by non-state actors. The five wars between Israel and Hamas during the period 2008–2023 served as a real test of the Israeli military doctrine’s adaptability, revealing that the decisiveness component—despite its centrality—underwent substantial revisions imposed by the nature of asymmetric conflict.

By analyzing the four indicators of the decisiveness component, the study shows that changes affected the speed of decision-making, clarity of objectives, force concentration, and operational effectiveness in light of the unconventional tools employed by Hamas, such as tunnels, short-range rockets, and surprise attacks—particularly the events of 7 October 2023. The findings indicate that adaptation was not merely operational but included a reassessment of deterrence and offensive strategies, as well as the development of hybrid approaches combining technological superiority with tactical flexibility.

References

• Al Jazeera. (2025, March 6). كيف غيرت حرب 7 أكتوبر مسار الاستخبارات الإسرائيلية؟ https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2025/3/6/
• Al Jazeera Net. (2025, July 26). تحولات العقيدة العسكرية الإسرائيلية.. من “الردع” إلى “الحرب الدائمة”. https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2025/7/26/
• Betz, D. J. (2015). Carnage and connectivity: Landmarks in the decline of conventional military power. Oxford University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190264857.001.0001

• Biddle, S. (2004). Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton University Press.
• Carchidi, V. (2023, October 23). The October 7 Hamas attack: An Israeli overreliance on technology? Middle East Institute.
• https://mei.edu/publications/october-7-hamas-attack-israeli-overreliance-technology
• Cohen, A. (2024). Lessons from the 2023 Gaza escalation: Intelligence and early warning failures. SSRN.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5549898

• Cohen, E. A. (2012). Israel and the bomb: How the Jewish state leveraged nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Columbia University Press.
• Cohen, Y., & White, J. (2009). Hamas in combat: The military performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Policy Focus No. 97). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
• Combating Terrorism Center. (2023). A classical analysis of the 2014 Israel-Hamas conflict. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-classical-analysis-of-the-2014-israel-hamas-conflict/
• Congressional Research Service. (2023). Israel and Hamas October 2023 conflict: Frequently asked questions. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47754
• Centre on Armed Groups. (2023). External version: Centre 2023–2025 strategy. https://www.armedgroupscentre.org/s/External-version-Centre-2023-25-strategy.pdf
• Gallo, A. A. (2018). Understanding military doctrinal change during peacetime (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences). https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161458859.pdf
• org. (2021). 2021 Gaza conflict. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/gaza-2021.htm
• Gray, C. S. (2010). The strategy bridge: Theory for practice. Oxford University Press.
• Geneva Call. (2023). Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs). Geneva Call. https://geneva-academy.ch/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/InBrief7_web.pdf
• Grosu, R. (2024). An academic approach of the military doctrine transformation in the context of asymmetrical conflicts. Strategic Impact, 90(1), 23–50. https://doi.org/10.53477/1842-9904-24-2
• Hershkovitz, S., & Riemer, O. (2025). Introduction: Rethinking strategic warning and intelligence failure in an era of global transformation. Intelligence and National Security, 40(5), 803–816.
• Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
• IDF Strategy. (2015). Israel Defense Forces strategy. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
• Ikani, N. (2024). Beyond the binary: A new typology for evaluating warning success and failure in strategic surprise. International Studies Review, 27(1).
• Inbar, E., & Shamir, E. (2014). “Mowing the Grass”: Israel’s strategy for protracted intractable conflict. Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(1), 65–90.
• Inbar, E. (2025, March 17). Time to revise Israel’s military doctrine. Journal of Strategic & International Studies (JISS). Retrieved from https://jiss.org.il/en/inbar-time-to-revise-israels-military-doctrine/
• Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). (2025). The State of Israel’s National Security Doctrine. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/policy-2025/
• Israel Defense Forces. (2012). Operation Pillar of Defense. IDF Official Website. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-pillar-of-defence/operation-pillar-of-defense/
• Israel Defense Forces. (2014). Operation Protective Edge. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-protective-edge/operation-protective-edge/
• Kober, A. (2008). The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance? Journal of Strategic Studies, 31(1), 3–40.
• Lele, A. (2014). Asymmetric warfare: A state vs non-state conflict. OASIS, 20, 97–111. http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=53163822007
• Mazarr, M. J. (2020). Understanding deterrence. In F. Osinga & T. Sweijs (Eds.), NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st century—Insights from theory and practice (pp. 13–28). T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_2
• Meridor, D., & Eldadi, R. (2019). Israel’s national security doctrine: The report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), ten years later (INSS Memorandum No. 187). Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
• Ortal, E. (2021). The Fly on the Elephant’s Back: The campaign between wars in Israel’s security doctrine. Strategic Assessment, 24(2).
• Posen, B. R. (1984). The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Cornell University Press.
• United Nations. (2009). Chronological review of events – January 2009. United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208773/
• United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2021, June 4). Protection of civilians report: 24–31 May 2021. https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/24-31-may-2021
• United Nations Security Council. (2023, October 24). Amid increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, Secretary-General tells Security Council Hamas attacks cannot justify collective punishment of Palestinian people. United Nations. https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15462.doc.htm
• Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (2019). Israel’s national security doctrine: Concepts, evolution, and challenges. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/461