Firas Elias
Throughout history, Iran has represented the greatest threat to the GCCcountries. Also, the issue of mutual trust is a crisis in itself in the relations between the two sides. The Iranian fear of the GCC countries is through the security and political ties that bind the GCC countries to the US.
Iran’s suspicions went even further when the GCC countries formed a security system that included Syria, Egypt and the Gulf states. Iran preciselyrefused that and considered itas an Arab coalition against it.
In fact, Iran has stood against any Arab and regional effort to establish security arrangements in the Gulf region outside its framework, based on an Iranian view that Gulf security is a collective responsibility of all its states, not a privilege granted to one party or another.
The debate over the safety options in the Gulf region has been going on, and Iran has believed that there is something to be said aboutin safety of the Gulf, but most likely no one will listen to Iran.
The question here is Iran part of the problem or part of the solution for the Gulf security? But the answer may be beyond this issue; now Iran is part of the conflict management process particularly after the current Qatari-Gulf crisis.
At present, Iran’s interference in GCC affairs has been unprecedented, and it has sought to find new approaches to dealing with the GCC through individual, rather than collective. Thus, recent developments related to the crisis in Qatar and its sisters revealed the depth of the Iranian influence on the GCC countries, and The crisis leads the recent Qatari-Iranian rapprochement.
The GCC countries, led by Saudi Arabia, have shifted their strategy of avoiding conflict and confrontation with Iran into a policy of deterrence and containment of Iranian influence in the Gulf region.
It can be saidthat the recent Qatari-Iranian rapprochement could form the basis of the broad Iranian-Islamic allyies such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Nahdha Party, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Islamic Party in Iraq. As well as the second sphere is the axis of resistance; the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Houthis, the popular crowd, the Bahraini Accord movement, and other Shiite groups which active in the region).
Thus, if we look at this political variability through which Iran moves, we can say that the Iranian geopolitics may pose a great challenge to the Saudi and American aspirations in the next stage.
The fact is that Iran can go beyond all the red lines in its foreign policy, as well as its relations with the Sunni and Christian organisations in the Middle East, does not make it difficult to strengthen relations with countries such as the Russian Federation, China, Latin American countries and North Korea.
Iran’s pursuit of all opportunities for rebuilding alliances in the Gulf region is deeply dependent on the differences between the Gulf states on the one hand and the extent of Qatar’s response to Saudi-American pressure.
The more Iran is involved in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, the more Iran will be tempted to go further with its regional project in the region.
Althoughthe recent convergence between Turkey and Iran about the crisis with Qatar is only a tactical, not a strategic, one and an attempt to seize opportunities and crises to indulge more in the region, and that what Iran is planning for decades
