



Democratic Arab Centre



# Journal of Afro- Asian Studies

The journal deals with  
the field of Afro-Asian  
strategic, political &  
economic Studies

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## **Circular Economy: A New Pathway to Sustainability in Africa**

Samar H. Albagoury

Faculty of African Post Graduate Studies, Cairo University

### **Abstract:**

Circular Economy concept is increasingly gaining attention in environmental and economic literatures, industry and policymakers' agenda as a new way to achieve sustainable development and to balance the economic and environmental sustainability in both developed and developing countries. Circular Economy could be considered as a new economic model that replace the traditional linear economic model, in which raw materials are used to make a product, and after its use any waste is thrown away, to a non linear circular model based on recycling and reusing of materials, in which there is almost zero waste. It aims to stimulate economic growth while reducing pressure on environment and natural resources. This paper aims to identify the status and recent applications of circular economy in Africa, by first gives a conceptual framework of circular economy and its relationship with sustainable development, and its status in Africa both on macro and micro levels. And then analyse its potentials and opportunities in Africa and the existing barriers that may hinder the adaptation of that economic model through PEST analysis. The paper found that although Africa has huge potentials to implement circular economy especially considering waste management which is not fully utilized yet, there is still no clear notification for circular economy in governmental planes and development strategies, circular economy practices is widely exists in African societies but mostly by informal actors. The paper also found that in order to implement circular economy as a new pathway to achieve sustainable development a lot of constraints and barriers (economic, social and

technical) needed to be addressed with a comprehensive plane that paved the way to implement circular economy.

**Key words:** Circular Economy, Sustainability, Africa.

### **1. Introduction:**

Traditional economic development approaches usually associated with natural resources depletion and causes severe ecological and social impacts. In order to move into more sustainable economic system, a recent approach for overcoming the current linearity of product lifecycles is the Circular Economy. Circular economy suggests keeping materials available instead of disposing them, and thus closing the loop of materials within the product lifecycle. The economic growth in an economy applying circular economy is no longer achieved by producing more products, but by keeping them available for longer time.

Although the idea of materials cycles has been discussed since the early stages of industrialization, it appears to the surface again by the current discussion on climate change issues and sustainable development. Unlike traditional recycling approaches, circular economy approach focus on product, component and material reuse, remanufacturing, renovation, repair, cascading and upgrading as well as sustainable energy utilization through the product value chain using cradle-to-cradle life cycle approach (Korhonen, 2018).

In the African context, the African population is growing in a relatively high rate, putting an accelerating pressure on its natural resources. And the risks of recent environmental issues as climate change and its impacts become a real threaten to African countries since the majority African population still heavily depend on natural resources and traditional agricultural sector in their living. All of these factors making circular economy a reasonable strategy that could help African countries to achieve sustainable development with an efficient use of their natural resources.


This paper aims to answer the question of whether circular economy could be a new pathway to achieve sustainable development in Africa or not? to analyse the

possibility of applying circular economy as an economic development strategy in African continent, by first defining the concept and identifying its scope and dimensions, then presenting some countries' experiences in implementing circular economy. And then showing the status of circular economy in African countries and the main opportunities and barriers may face African countries in their transformation to this new economic model using PEST analysis which is a strategic planning tool used to identifies the Political, Economic, Social, and Technical factors that affect the implementation of circular economy as an alternative development pathway in Africa.

## **2. Circular Economy Definition:**

The term Circular Economy is used for the first time in Pearce and Turner book “Economies of Natural Resources and the Environment”. In this book, the authors argue that the traditional linear economy is not helping in the recovery of materials and energy and is turning the environment to a waste reservoir. And that the only way to preserve material and energy is by adopting a closed-loop system and named it: Circular Economy (Pearce, 1990).


Circular Economy could be considered as a new economic model to replace the traditional linear economic model, in which raw materials are used to make a product, and after its use any waste is thrown away, to a non-linear circular model based on recycling and reusing of materials, in which there is almost zero waste. It aims to stimulate economic growth while reducing burdens or pressure on environment and natural non-renewable resources. This includes lowering material inputs and minimizes waste generation (Moraga, 2019). The following figure shows the different between linear and circular economy models.



In this context, Circular economy could be distinguished from any other linear economy model by two main characteristics: *Slowing resource loops* and *Closing resource loops*. Slowing resource loops in circular economy is achieved through the design of long-life goods and product, where product and service life extended through maintenance, repairing and remanufacturing. Accordingly, the utilization period of products is extended and/or intensified causing the slowdown of the flow of resources. On the other hand, closing loops meaning that the loop between post-use and production is closed, because the waste is turned back into the production process as secondary resources. (Bocken, 2016)

Circular Economy could be seen as a new economic model aims to rationalize resources uses by following what is called the 3Rs principle: Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle. It aims to reduce resources uses, product reuse and utilize the waste (Chunrong, 2011). Some literatures add additional R: for Recover, as shown in figure (2), while others go further to 6Rs and 9Rs by adding to the previously mentioned 4Rs: Rethink, Repair, Refurbish, Remanufacture, and Repurpose. But in implementation the 3Rs & 4Rs are the only forms appears in policy framework: 3Rs in China, and 4Rs in European Union circular economy plans for example. (Kirchherr, 2017).

Figure 2: 4Rs framework of Circular Economy




Source: Adopted from: Kirchherr, 2017



Although the previous aspects or dimensions of circular economy are clearly identified in Circular economy literature, there is still no single and widely agreed definition of this concept. However, The most comprehensive definitions that combined the Circular Economy dimensions and scope and relate it to sustainable development are found in (Kirchherr, 2017): *Circular Economy is the economic system in which “end-of-life” concept is replaced with reducing, alternatively reusing, recycling and recovering materials in production, distribution and consumption process to achieve sustainable development with its sub-dimensions: environmental quality, economic prosperity and social equity. It operates in micro level (products, companies, consumer), meso level (con-industrial parks) and macro levels (city, region, nations).* And in (Korhonen, 2018) who define Circular Economy as: *A sustainable development strategy aims to reduce the common production-consumption systems’ linear material and energy flows by applying materials cycles, renewable and cascade-type energy flows. It combines high value material cycles with more traditional recycling and developed systems approaches to the cooperation of producers, consumers and other societal actors in sustainable development process.*

In this context circular economy could be distinguished from green economy as strategies to achieve sustainable development. Actually, green economy could be seen as a part of the circular economy since it usually focuses on the clean production process that is environmentally and economically efficient, but the after-production practices that appear in the circular economy model does not explicitly included in the green economy.

In the absence of a single agreed definition for circular economy, measuring or monitoring its applications became more and more complicated. However, the European Commission recently developed a monitoring framework for Circular Economy, in which circular economy model is divided into four subsections: production and consumption; waste management; secondary raw materials; and competitiveness and innovations. As shown in figure (3), each of these sections is measured through a group of indicators, giving all together a framework of the implementation level of circular economy. (European Commission, 2020).



### 3. Circular Economy in Practice:

Although the circular economy model is still relatively new, some countries already choose to include it in their strategies to reduce the environmental deterioration and achieve sustainability. China is the first country adopted circular economy concepts in its governmental policies since 2012. Targeting a successful and effective implementation of circular economy, Chinese government implement circular economy horizontally within industries, urban infrastructure, cultural, environmental, and social consumption systems, and vertically on micro level (enterprises), meso level (industrial parks), and macro level (cities and regions). China transformation strategy toward circular economy was through the “Twelfth five-year plan for national Economy and Society Development” that aims to promote green development and circular economy in China. It targeted to increase resource productivity by 15% over the five-year period.

European Union (EU) adopted circular economy in 2015 as a part of the EU's 2020 strategy initiative to shift European economy towards a more sustainable direction. In this context, the EU policies include legislative proposals on waste, with long run targets to reduce land-filling and increase recycling and reuse. It also includes an action plan to support the circular economy practices in each step of the value chain from production to consumption, repairing and remanufacturing, waste management, and insuring material fed back into the economy (Scoones, 2019).

The Netherlands also adopted circular economy concepts within its governmental program aimed to the fully adaptation by 2050. The government select five economic sectors and value chains to switch to circular economy: Biomass and food; Plastics; Manufacturing industry; Construction sector; and Consumer goods. (Valavanidids, 2018)

On the micro levels, Sweden adopted the Extended Producer Responsibility Scheme (EPR) in car industry, which adds environmental costs during the product lifecycle, into the market price of the product. And this extra money is transferred to Car Scrapping Fund, funding the dismantling process. thus it makes the producer responsible for the waste of the product life cycle using financial incentives, either combined with reuse, buyback or recycling initiative (Mativenga, 2017). While in Japan, the end-of-life vehicles (ELV) system includes a recycling fee collected by the Japan Automobile Recycling Promotion Centre. By this system, Japan manages to achieve 95% recovery of automotive shedder residues (Mativenga, 2017).

To sum up, two notes could be mentioned from these examples. first: there is no case of fully implementation of circular economy on macro level even in china which is the first country adopt this model and even in other countries that include it in its sustainability planes. Second; the above mentioned case studies are all developed countries, there is still no clear implementation of circular economy in developing or less developed countries neither on micro nor on macro levels.

**4. Circular Economy Prospects in Africa:**

While the environmental factors may be the main motivation for transforming to circular economy in developed countries, the economic potentials associated with circular economy could be a great motivation for transforming to circular economy in developing and less developed countries especially in Africa. Circular economy has the potentials of decreasing cost of production, reducing exposure to price fluctuations, enhance renewable energy using, decreasing the depletion of raw materials, and creating more value added in manufacture sector by the reusing, recycling activities (Desmond, 2019). In this way, Circular economy is considered as an alternative approach to achieve sustainable development in Africa. However, the African economies are still operating mostly on a linear model basis of extraction, production, use and dispose, whereby all products will irreversibly reach their end of life.

There are huge potentials for circular economy, knowing that African waste management market for example is growing significantly, with an average waste collection rate of only 55%. Most of municipal solid waste collection services in many African countries are inadequate. With an average of 57% of municipal solid waste in Africa being biodegradable organic waste, the bulk of the waste is dumped. About 90% of the waste generated in Africa is disposed of to land, typically to uncontrolled and controlled dumpsites. Only about 4% of the waste generated in Africa is recycled, often by informal actors. (Mordor Intellidence, 2019)

Although the concept of circular economy is still new and not clearly stated in the sustainable development planes of African countries, the circular economy practices is actually existing and wildy spread in the continent. Industrial repairing and remanufacturing industries such as Sume/Kumasi automotive cluster in Ghana have been operating successfully for decades even before the concept of circular economy is exists (Desmond, 2019). But these practices are still not related together in manufacturing supply chain to build a full circular economy model and most of these practices actually are done within the informal sector.

Circular Economy policies and regulations are still limited in African countries, the regulations and legislations in Africa are only focus on one or more aspect of circular economy: as green economy, and/or waste management. But there is no complete plane or framework of circular economy implementation. Even in Africa 2063 Agenda, while concepts as green and blue economy are explicitly mentioned in its inspirations and sub-visions, only some practices and principles of circular economy is included and there is no clear mention of this economic model in the agenda. The agenda implementation plane (2014-2023) outlines specific goals to be achieved during the first ten years, including reference to the expected transformation of waste management and targeting recycling rate to reach 50% regarding urban waste by 2023.

The following table shows some of the African policies and initiatives that could be related to circular Economy both on national level and on regional level.

**Table 1: Circular Economy policies and initiatives in Africa**

Country	Policy / initiative and year	Implementation Agency	Policy goals
South Africa, Rwanda, and Nigeria	The African Circular Economy Alliance (ACEA), announced at COP23 in Bonn in November 2017	World Economic Forum & the Global Environment Facility in collaboration with the governments of South Africa, Nigeria and Rwanda.	to link projects and programmes in Africa and stimulate momentum towards the transformation to circular economy
Ethiopia	Climate Resilient Green Economy, 2011	Ministry of Environment	Reduce impact of climate change through renewable energy
Ghana	Ghana goes for Green Growth, 2010	Ministry of Environment	Sustainable Development and Equitable Low Carbon Economic

			Growth
Kenya	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action – Circular Economy Municipal Solid Waste Management Approach for Urban Areas, 2016	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources	Diversion of waste from disposable sites towards recycling
Namibia	Green Economic Coalition Dialogue, 2011	Ministry of labour and Social welfare	Economic Development, Job Creation and CO <sub>2</sub> Reduction.
Nigeria	Extended Producer Responsibility Programme, 2013	National Environmental Standards Regulations Enforcement Agency	Minimisation of industrial waste and promotion of recycling.
Rwanda	Plastic Bag Law 57, 2008	Ministry of Natural Resources	Prohibition of manufacturing importation, use and sale of polythene bag.
South Africa	National Environmental Management Act, 1998	Ministry of Environment	Minimisation of waste, pollution and use of natural resources

Source: (Desmond, 2019)

The previous table shows that, although there are a growing trend in Africa related environmental issues and the importance of circular economy practices, the full adaptation of such economic model is still missing may be because this full implementation need a structural change n the country investment priorities and manufacturing systems, it need modernization of the industrial sectors in those countries that already suffer from being lagged behind the modern production technologies, the next section will discuss in more details the opportunities and barriers of circular economy implementation in Africa.



As mention earlier, circular economy practices and activities actually exists in many African countries on small or large scales, in formal and informal sectors. The following table shows some examples of circular economy practices in Africa on micro level.

**Table 2: Circular Economy practices in Africa**

<b>Circular Economy Practice</b>	<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Benefit</b>
Prioritise regenerative resources	Biomimicry, South Africa	SPACE Project – water & waste treatment solutions in Langrug informal settlement using Biomimicry principles to clean up the grey water, storm water and solid waste challenges
Design for the future	Mazzi Can, Uganda and Tanzania	Durable plastic to streamline the collection, storage, and transport of milk from smallholder farmers.
Incorporate Digital Technology	COLIBA, Ivory Coast	Waste management mobile phone application in five schools in Ghana, aiming to help users monetise their waste and satisfy the demand of recycling companies.
Collaborate to create joint value	Suame/Kumasi Vehicle repair cluster, Ghana Government/ World Bank, Tanzania	Collective efficiency prolonging vehicle life achieved by the 12,000 small workshops employing 200,000 workers Collaboration to develop more water-efficient practices among smallholder farmers.
Use waste as a resource	Sustainable heating, South Africa and Eco-Post, Kenya	Biomass (residual carbon-based waste such as wood, sawdust, grain husks, sisal,.. etc.) is burned in furnaces. The heat from the

		combustion is used to feed local industries with steam and hot water. The by-product is ash which farmers can use to enrich their soils. Approximately 2,000 new jobs created within four years of launch of the scheme.
Rethink the business model	Hello Tractor	Small-scale farmers request and pay for tractor services via SMS and mobile money.
Preserve and extend what's already made	Agbogbloshie, "Old Fadama" slum, Accra, Ghana Imported e-waste, Nigeria	Destination for locally generated automobile and electronic scrap collected from across the city of Accra. Approximately 70% of imported waste is refurbished, tested and sold on.
Remanufacture	Barloworld, South Africa	Caterpillar Parts repaired and refurbished with new guarantee.


Source: (Desmond, 2019)

### 5. Circular Economy Opportunities and Barriers in Africa:

Circular Economy could be considered as a new possible strategy to achieve sustainable development in Africa, it offers wide range of opportunities but still faces a wide range of barriers too. In this context, this paper uses the PEST too to identifies theses opportunities and barriers, according to this tool, the opportunities and barriers of circular economy are classified into Political, Economic, Social and Technical aspects besides the environmental aspects as follow.

**5.1: Circular economy opportunities and potentials in Africa:**

Circular Economy as a sustainable development strategy and as business model has a great opportunity in Africa and could be marketed easily to African population since its principles and practices are already been adopted in one way or another in the African communities specially by targeting its role in poverty eradication and in the small and medium businesses. Circular Economy in Africa has wide opportunities in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and waste management sectors as shown in figure 4. Those opportunities are highlighted in 2019 African ministerial conference on the environment on enhancing Circular Economy in Africa.



By using PEST analysis, the main opportunities or prospects of circular Economy in Africa are:

Economical and Political	The implementation of circular economy has the potential to create many employment opportunities to local communities. Since circular economy implementation need more investments and operators in new areas and fields as recycling and maintenance and refurbishment. These activities could be an opportunity not only for large firms and entities but also for small and medium enterprises. Thus, it creates more job opportunities (MacArthur, 2013).
	Circular Economy could increase firms' profitability by reducing production costs through sustainable supply chain and end-of-life managements, decrease input prices and reduce waste generation. Firms also could sell their wastes instead of disposing them generating more profits (Kumar, 2019).
Technical and Environmental	Circular Economy also enable the protection of natural resources by reduce the amount of new (virgin) raw materials used in the production and the utilization of waste and waste streams in the way that also reduce pollution generation. Such environmentally sound management practices offer operational and supply chain resilience and make it easier to penetrate into new developed markets. (Zhu, 2019).
	Circular Economy improves the utilisation of waste and waste streams, in the way that enable preserving natural resources, water, energy and minerals. Respectively, it increases the productivity of materials by rework and recycling, extends their life cycles and decreases the need for land-fill sites. It also reduce consumption of

	fossil fuel and the emission of greenhouse gases and toxic substances. Therefore contribute to climate change mitigation (Geng, 2008).
Social	Circular economy could enhance public health and environmental awareness. People become more aware about unsafe materials and prefer more environmentally friendly and safe products. (Park, 2010).

## 5.2: Circular Economy Barriers in Africa:


Although circular economy offers many opportunities for African countries, there are still a lot of barriers or constraints needed to be addressed in order to achieve the full potentials of this economic model in achieving sustainable development, those barriers could be classified into technical, economic and technical barriers as follow:

Economical/ Political and regulatory	Circular economy requires a considerable amount of upfront investment. And it has a long pay-back period. (Mangla, 2018). Correspondingly, with the lack of financial support mechanisms and tax incentives firms will avoid the implementation of circular economics. (Ezzat, 2016)
	Especially in African countries, circular economy may hinder the growth of African economies especially in countries that are dependent on the exports of natural resources. There is also the risk or concerns about health and environmental impacts of secondary materials such as e-waste that are imported into the countries (Desmond, 2019).
	Lack of data and statistics to build policies and planes for circular economy and conduct the market studies needed to start the new firms for circular economy activities.
	The lack of regulatory framework organizing circular economy practices within and between African countries as the regulation

	<p>for trade in waste for example and its environmental and health constraints.</p> <p>The lack of integrated circular economy plans as an integrated regional waste management plans for example that could promote sustainable business models, as mentioned during the regional meeting on integrated waste management in Africa, held in accra on June 2019.</p>
Technical	<p>Adopting Circular economy model need an integrated ecosystem capacity within the waste management hierarchy poses a great challenge for society, governments and productive societies as seen in figure (3). Especially in African countries, where infrastructure availability and waste valorisation rates are lower than those observed in developed countries. Therefore, the circular economy concept and its implementation in industry and country level is an approach to minimize and manage waste effectively and efficiently. (Paes, 2018)</p> <p>Lack of technology, techniques and expertise needed to fully implement circular economy model (Agyemang, 2019).</p> <p>The existing waste resources management systems in Africa are generally low-tech and they limit maximum utilisation of recovered materials. The land-filling and incineration activities also lack adequate technologies; as a consequence, these activities cause huge environmental losses which cannot be reverted back. Additionally, scavenger and decomposer companies lack capacity to create new fields due to existing policies (Kumar, 2019).</p>
Social	<p>Cultural, political and economic aspects, such as the utilitarian buying behaviour, and anthropocentric attitude toward waste disposal, unawareness of the customers and entrepreneurs, and lack of environmental laws and regulations (Gaur, 2019) (Sharma, 2019).</p>



He lack of environmental and health standards and regulations concerning recycling and reusing activities may reverse the effect of such model to be a real threaten to environment and cause a serious health issues in the African countries.



## 6. Conclusion and Policy Implications:

This paper investigates the circular economy as a new economic model to achieve the sustainable development in Africa, by first define the concept and its dimensions and then the prospects of circular economy in African contest followed by identifying the main opportunities and barriers of circular economy in Africa.

The transition to circular economy in Africa can contribute towards the achievement of sustainable development goals, particularly Goal 12 “Sustainable Production and Consumption”. The opportunities for accelerating circular economy principles in Africa are increasing but the barriers still exist.

The paper found that, in order to successfully implement Circular Economy, the implementation should start from micro level with firms and enterprises. Then, macro

level, since each level forms a basis for the following level and make it possible to develop a sustainable economic growth and development. This could be done through:

1<sup>st</sup>: Introduce financial and non-financial incentives that can support the transition towards the circular economy.

2<sup>nd</sup>: Establish strict environmental and sustainability requirements for firms and companies to overcome the resistance during the transition towards a circular economy model.

3<sup>rd</sup>: Support having indicators of progress those take into account the sustainability of that growth in an environmental and social context.

4<sup>th</sup>: Create a suitable legislative and regulations framework to support the transition towards circular economy.

5<sup>th</sup>: Enhance Research and invention in the 4Rs aspects of circular economy.

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**Risk Management in Healthcare: A review article****Mohamed Fathi Abdel Aal<sup>1\*</sup>, Haytham A. Ali<sup>2, 3</sup>**<sup>1</sup>M.Sc. Biochemistry, Zagazig University, Egypt<sup>2</sup>Associate professor of Biochemistry, Biochemistry Department, Faculty of Science, University of Jeddah, Jeddah, KSA.<sup>3</sup>Assistant professor of Biochemistry, Biochemistry Department, Faculty of Vet. Med. Zagazig University, Egypt.**Abstract**

It is recognised that Hospitals are increasingly complex organizations conducting with a critical and risky business that affects human lives. More than ever before, hospitals are bound to cope with a lot of risks ranging from financial to clinical and other hazards. Hospital management should be cognizant of these risks. Enterprise risk management approach as an intrinsic framework of healthcare organizations encourages to assess and address risks identified in the organizations to ascertain the probability of occurrence, the degree of impact to scope, cost, and quality. The process of prioritization is done in accordance with the risk assessment findings. The objective of risk management can direct healthcare organisations in order to proactively reduce the probability and impact of identified risks to a satisfactory level by establishing a culture founded upon assessment and prevention of errors and maximize value protection. Risk management is a major responsibility of all managers and employees and must be included in the structure and processes to support continuous quality improvement

**Keywords:** Risk management program, Clinical risk, Non clinical risk, Risk analysis, Risk evaluation, Risk avoidance, Risk mitigation, Risk management committee

**Introduction**

The health care industry relies on quality measurements and risk management activities. The risk cannot be avoided and exists in every human condition. Risk refers to uncertainties surrounding outcomes and future events. Risk is defined as an opportunity to loss or a probability of injury, loss of liability resulting from vulnerabilities that can be avoided through preventive actions (WHO, 2014). It is measured in consequences and probability terms. The heart of risk is uncertainty as you may not be sure if an event is likely to happen or not. Also, you may be unsure of its consequences would be if it did happen. Likelihood - the probability of an event to occur, and consequence - the impact / outcome of the event, are the two components that characterise the magnitude of the hazard.

Historically, studying the effect of error in medicine by patient safety researchers have adopted impact-based on definitions of medical error and its alternative conditions, limiting their focus to patients experiencing adverse outcomes or harm resulting from medical care (Thomas et al., 1999; Brennan et al., 1991). Possibly, this originate from principle of medical practice dating back to Hippocrates, "primum non nocere", which translates to "First, do no cause harm" (Veatch, 1989; Nightingale, 1863).

In addition, the manner in which patient safety has been defined enhances an outcome-based approach to define medical error. Patient safety: avoidance, prevention and improvement of adverse events or harms caused by the health care process (NPSF, 2005; Kohn, Corrigan,& Donaldson, 2000). Moser (1956) mentioned that in the first studies of patient safety in the 1950s, medical errors were largely regarded as "disease of medical progress" and dismissed as "the price we pay for modern diagnosis and treatment".

Modern medicine has done much in the medical fields led to complex forms of care processes. This results in a lot of chances for improving care, but also increases the dangers of adverse events and harm to the patient. The risks associated with patient care cannot be fully eliminated, clinical risk management plays a critical role in empowering hospitals to encourage patient safety (Vincent, 2006). According to WHO estimation in developed countries, 1 in 10 patients is susceptible to harm during



hospital care (WHO,2014). As reported by the AHRQ National Health disparities 2013, the harm rate related to hospital stay in the United States is 25.1 per 100 admissions (WHO, 2014).

According to Chubb Healthcare, the challenges faced by hospitals in the United States because of the overall increase in the frequency of claims and the increase in larger awards in many states without cap on the magnitude of awards resulted in: (i) A renewed awareness about patient safety and medication errors; (ii) availability of insurance decline (iii) higher financial risks, (iv) premiums increase, (v) more selective by insurers (Singh & Ghatala, 2012).

Risk management activities have been introduced into the healthcare industry in response to increased costs of malpractice insurance. As of the 1970s, the risk management function consisted primarily of quality assurance nurses who report incidents and attend acute care hospitals, but there has been no proactive activity to prevent control activities (Kuhn&Youngberg, 2002).

Risk management is defined as the methodological process for identifying, evaluating and addressing potential and actual risks (Stoneburner, Goguen, &Feringa, 2002). One of the key elements of an effective risk management program is having sufficient scope to cover all potential sources of risk.

Hindsight bias happens when researchers work backwards from their knowledge of the event outcome. This linear analysis makes the road to failure seem as though it should have been expected or anticipated, although this is not the case. This determination is often made without any assessment of the systems or processes that may have contributed to the error (Biais& Weber, 2009).

**Risk Management program:**

Risk management can be useful in the following contexts (Alam,2016)

- a. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM): Organizational Risk Management from top to bottom including financial and business viability.
- B. Patient care
- C. Medical staff (ex: credentials, privilege, job description, staff insurance, training, medical coverage)

D. Non-medical staff (ex: job description, training, medical coverage)

e. Financial (budget preparation, cost analysis, insurance coverage)

F. Managerial /Administrative (ex: Job Description, Delegation of tasks)

G. Project risk management (ex: scope of service, time frame, cost, human resources, operational, procedural, technical, law and regulations)

H. Facility management and safety (ex: building safety, Hazardous Materials Management (HAZMAT), internal and external emergencies, fire safety, maintenance plan for medical equipment and maintenance plan for the utility system).

**The goal of risk management in health care is:** (ACHS, 2013).

1. Reduce the likelihood of potential events that have adverse consequences on consumers / patients, employees and organisation
2. Reduce the risk of death, injury and / or illness to consumers / patients, employees.
3. Encourage consumer / patient outcomes
4. Efficient management of resources
5. Legislative compliance Support to ensure organizational development.

**The objectives of the risk management program are:**

1) Develop systems to manage the reporting of adverse events, near misses, and potentially unsafe conditions. The incident reporting process is designed to achieve the following tasks: (Runciman, Edmonds,& Pradhan,2002)

1. Risk Identification.
2. Set the risk values.
3. Expectation loss.
4. Decision making upon objective steps to minimise the consequence on the patient and the hospital.

Reporting responsibilities include internal reports and external reports to regulatory, governmental or voluntary agencies. This includes establishing of the risk management policy and event reporting policies and procedures that should specify (ACHS, 2013):

**Who:** should report, communicate, and take action

**What:** should be reported by employees, managers, executives, and committees

**When:** Risk should be reported and when information is distributed to physicians, staff, executive committees and governance / board of directors

**Where:** information storage, communication

**How:** Tools and processes are used - for example risk assessment, risk registers, and any risk removal from the current risk register.

**Table 1: Good incident report elements (VHIMS, 2011)**

Element	Question to describe the incident
Who	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Who is reporting the incident?</li> <li>➤ Who is involved?</li> </ul>
What	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ What occurred? (Including details)</li> <li>➤ What are the incident characteristics?</li> <li>➤ What are the initial actions you have taken?</li> <li>➤ What is the severity rating of the incident (ISR) at the time of reporting?</li> </ul>
When	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ When did the incident happen?</li> </ul>
Where	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Where did the incident happen?</li> </ul>
How and why	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Why and how did the incident happen? What are the contributing factors?</li> </ul>

2) Assuring the data collection and analysis to monitor risks which may lead to serious adverse events

The incident monitor system includes the following: (ACHS, 2013)

- Confidentiality
- All staff Involvement
- A just culture (No Blame / No Shame)
- All employees' education and training
- Mechanisms to decrease staff fear of punishment
- Easy-to-use report forms that record detailed information regarding the incident
- Incidents investigation by involved employees and managers

- Capture the lessons learned and communicate them
- Widely discussing incidents and learning from information
- Implement system for benchmarking and Compare information with other organizations
- Take action to avoid reoccurrence and improve ways to prevent adverse events
- Integrating with the Organization's risk management system
- Evaluation.

Incident monitoring helps organizations to identify specific areas of interest and develop interventions. The implementation of Incident Successfully monitoring by health units was followed by individual employees' morale improvement (Runciman, Edmonds,& Pradhan, 2002). However, incidents are often under- reported.

### **Risk management structure:**

#### **1. Scope and main tasks**

The multi-disciplinary risk management program (RM) includes physicians and clinical support staff in all care areas, allied health professions, administrators, managers and others.

Operational risks may include :(Tita&Simpson, 2017)

- Clinical risk: These are risks associated with the provision of high-quality patient-centered care services.
- Non-clinical risks: These are the risks related to the environment in which patient care occur, including the use of facilities by employees, patients, contractors and visitors.

**Table 2: Examples of clinical and non-clinical risks (ACHS, 2013)**

Clinical risk:	Non-clinical examples
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medication errors</li> <li>• Effectively selection and use of clinical indicators</li> <li>• Morbidity and mortality meeting for discussion on reviewing</li> <li>• Clinical auditing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial risks, reputational risks, information governance risks,</li> <li>• Effective collection and use of relevant indicators of the organisation</li> <li>• Audits</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Screening of clinical incident reporting and adverse events.</li><li>• Medical Records Review</li><li>• Medical Emergency reviews</li><li>• Strategies of Medication Management for improving drug adherence</li><li>• Patient risk assessment (ex: patient fall, pressure ulcer, VTE).</li><li>• Peer review and peer supervision</li><li>• The use of complaints and feedback from patients and employees in effective way to improve the service.</li><li>• Clinical Studies, Evidence, literature and clinical research.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Monitor the differences in the budget</li><li>• Reports of project activity</li><li>• Procurement and product evaluation</li><li>• Minimization schemes to reduce risks of fraud</li><li>• Risk assessment and hazard identification</li><li>• Lost time injury frequency rate/reports</li><li>• Strategies for managing political change</li><li>• Safety strategies in the workplace</li><li>• Financial Management Strategies</li><li>• Emergency and disaster planning</li><li>• Redundancy i.e duplication of function of system</li><li>• Infrastructure and information technology capabilities and data entry</li><li>• Manpower Planning</li><li>• Credentials and privileges for all physicians</li><li>• Strategies for recruitment and retention</li><li>• Staff education and training programs</li><li>• Review and develop staff performance</li></ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintenance and replacement schedules for equipment.</li> <li>• Review of external contracts.</li> </ul>
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**Table 3: Quality and Risk Management Overlap (ACHS, 2013)**

Risk Management	Overlapping Functions	Quality Improvement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Accreditation compliance</li> <li>➤ Claims management</li> <li>➤ Consumer / patient relations and disclosure</li> <li>➤ Contract / policy review</li> <li>➤ Corporate and regulatory compliance</li> <li>➤ Mandatory event reporting</li> <li>➤ Risk identification, e.g. near-miss and adverse event reporting</li> <li>➤ Risk control, e.g. loss prevention and loss reduction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Accreditation issues</li> <li>➤ Analysis of adverse and sentinel events and trends</li> <li>➤ Board reports</li> <li>➤ Consumer / patient complaint handling</li> <li>➤ Consumer / patient education</li> <li>➤ Feedback to staff and healthcare providers</li> <li>➤ Proactive risk assessments</li> <li>➤ Public reporting of quality data</li> <li>➤ Provider credentialing</li> <li>➤ Root-cause analysis</li> <li>➤ Staff education and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Accreditation coordination</li> <li>➤ Audits / benchmarking / clinical indicators etc.</li> <li>➤ Best practice / clinical guidelines</li> <li>➤ Consumer / patient satisfaction</li> <li>➤ Improvement projects</li> <li>➤ Peer review</li> <li>➤ Provider performance and competency</li> <li>➤ Quality methodology</li> <li>➤ Quality of care reviews</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Risk financing</li> <li>➤ Safety and security</li> <li>➤ Workers compensation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>training</li> <li>➤ Strategic planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Utilization / resource /case management</li> </ul>
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
### 3. RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PROCESS:

**Table 4: Risk Management Process (AS/NZS 4360:1999)**

Establish the context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Identify the activity</li> <li>➤ What are the goals and objectives?</li> </ul>
Risk identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ What can occur?</li> <li>➤ How can it occur?</li> </ul>
Risk assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ How could risks happen?</li> <li>➤ What would be the impact if they did?</li> <li>➤ How could they be minimised?</li> </ul>
Evaluation and Ranking	<p>Evaluate options for risk reduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Determine costs of actions to reduce risks</li> <li>○ Identify procedures, which reduce the overall cost of risk</li> <li>○ Comparison of costs versus benefits</li> </ul>
Risk Treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoidance: stop providing services likely to generate risk</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce: Limit or control the likelihood and consequences of occurrence</li> <li>• Transfer: shift risk to another party to bear or participate in risks, through contracts, partnerships, joint ventures, etc.</li> <li>• Acceptance: Some risks may be small and acceptable.</li> </ul>
Monitor and review	<p>Monitor risk impact</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review outcome of action</li> <li>• Has the priority of risk changed?</li> </ul>
Communicate and Consult	Who needs to know, internal/external?

**Figure 1: Risk Management Framework****Step 1 - Select context**

Objectives: To identify the goals and objectives for risk identification and management (Department of Health WA, 2016).

Identify, assess and document potential risks. Mapping of the following should be considered: social framework of risk management (what are your stakeholders exposed to?) Identification of stakeholder objectives (do you want to ensure minimum

financial effect, program effect, etc.); what are available resources to alleviate Effects of risk? What structures do we have to face with expected scenarios that can happen? Context helps to identify the essentials and constraints of effective risk management within the organization (ACHS, 2013). Intensive care unit (ICU), (ER), ER (emergency room), blood transfusion services, CCU (coronary care unit), medication management including drug administration are areas of high-priority for risk management related to patient care (Alam, 2016).

### Step 2 – Identify the risks

Objectives: To identify all risks related to reaching the objectives identified in Step 1.


Clinical risk Identification needs staff to understand of the following elements: (Department of Health WA, 2016)

**Table 5: Clinical risk Identification**

The chief cause of the clinical risk that has the potential to result in injury.	•e.g. main cause: similar/look-alike & sound alike medications (LASA) dispensed from a hospital's pharmacy
The incident that could occur if the risk is not treated and the effect on the organisation or its stakeholders (internal or external).	•e.g. risk of improper medication being given to patient
what and why the presence of the clinical risk or hazard of the event Happening	•e.g. medications shortage, lack of inspection processes
Identification of the potential clinical risk outcome on the organization or its stakeholders.	•e.g. clinical incident where the patient is injured from being given a wrong medication
When and where the clinical risk or	•e.g. during medication dispensing or

hazard can happen.	administration of the medication
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**Figure 2: Possible methods of identifying clinical risks (Alam, 2016; Department of Health WA, 2016 ACHS,2013)**



### **Categorisation of risk** (Carroll, R, 2009)

Risk areas or domains, are simply a method used to segregate similar risks into manageable groups.

**Table 6:Risk Categories**

Operational / Clinical	Risks related to business operationsbecause of insufficient or failed internal processes, medical malpractice that affect patient safety.
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Financial / Business Continuity	Risks such as capital structure, credit and interest rate variation, exchange foreign currency and accounts receivables. These are risks that affect the profitability, cash position, access to capital, or external financial ratings through business relationships or the timing and recording of income and cost of operations
Strategic / Reputation	Risks of Brand, reputation and advertising, and business strategic risks. Failure to adapt to changing environment, changing customer priorities, comparative risk, clinical literatures.
Legal / Regulatory	including risks arising from product liability, management liability, non-compliance with laws, standards, rules and regulations, and intellectual property matters.
Technological / Projects	An area of more improvement in healthcare, including the risks associated with the assumption of new systems and technology (eg computerised physician order entry (CPOE), barcoding, electronic medical record (EMR), image archiving and communication system (PACS) , Robots, simulation, etc.).
Natural Disaster / Hazard	Risks caused by physical loss or

	impairment of assets, including risks arising from earthquakes, windstorms, floods, fires, etc. Traditionally insured risks associated with natural risks and business problems.
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### Step 3 – Analyse & Evaluate risks

Objectives: To determine the outcome of any controls and evaluate its risk rating (Department of Health WA, 2016).

**Table 7: Consequences assessment (HSE, 2008)**

Consequence Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Domain /Impact	Negligible/ insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme/catastrophic
Operational /clinical /type of Injury	Adverse event leading to minor injury not requiring first aid. No impaired functions	Minor injury or illness, first aid treatment required < 3 days absence or < 3 days extended hospital stay Impaired	Significant injury requiring medical treatment e.g. Fracture and/or counselling. Agency reportable, e.g. HSA, Gardaí (violent and	Major injuries/long term incapacity or disability (loss of limb) requiring medical treatment and/or counselling Impaired	Incident leading to death or major permanent incapacity. Event which impacts on large number of patients or members of the public. Permanent

		psychosocial functioning greater than 3 days less than one month	aggressive acts). >3 Days absence or 3-8 Days extended hospital Stay Impaired functions greater than one month less than six months	functions greater than six months	impairment of functions or incapacity.
Service User Experience	Reduced quality of service user experience related to inadequate provision of information	Unsatisfactory service user experience related to less than optimal treatment and/or inadequate information, not being to talked to & treated as an equal; or not	Unsatisfactory service user experience related to less than optimal treatment resulting in short term effects (less than 1 week)	Unsatisfactory service user experience related to poor treatment resulting in long term effects	Totally unsatisfactory service user outcome resulting in long term effects, or extremely poor experience of care provision

		being treated with honesty, dignity & respect - readily resolvable			
Legal/regulatory /Compliance with Standards (Statutory, Clinical, Professional & Management)	Minor non compliance with internal standards. Small number of minor issues requiring improvement	Single failure to meet internal standards or follow protocol. Minor recommendations which can be easily addressed by hospital management	Repeated failure to meet internal standards or follow protocols. Important recommendations that can be addressed with an appropriate management action plan.	Repeated failure to meet external standards. Failure to meet national norms and standards / Regulations (e.g. Mental Health, Child Care Act etc). Critical report or substantial number of significant findings and/or lack	Gross failure to meet external standards Repeated failure to meet national norms and standards / regulations. Severely critical report with possible major reputational or financial implications.



				of adherence to regulations.	
Objectives/Technological Projects	Insignificant cost increase Barely noticeable reduction in scope, quality or schedule.	<5% over budget. Delay in scheduled activities. Minor reduction in scope, quality or schedule.	10% over budget. Some delay in scheduled activities. Reduction in scope or quality of project; project objectives or schedule.	10-25% over budget. Significant project over – run. Major delay in scheduled activities. Failure to meet secondary objectives	>25% over budget. Major delay in scheduled activities. Inability to meet primary project objectives. Reputation of the organisation seriously damaged.
Financial Business Continuity	Interruption in a service which does not impact on the overall delivery of service user care or the ability to continue to provide	Short term disruption to service with minor impact on service/ user care.	Some disruption in service with unacceptable impact on overall service user care. Temporary loss of ability to provide service	Sustained loss of service which has serious impact on overall delivery of service user care or service requiring major	Permanent loss of core service or facility. Disruption to facility leading to significant ‘knock on’ effect

	service. Improvement actions required			contingency plans being involved	
Strategic/Adverse publicity/Reputation	Rumors, no media coverage. No public concerns voiced. Little effect on staff morale. No review/investigation necessary.	Local media coverage – short term. Some public concern. Minor effect on staff morale / public attitudes. Internal review necessary.	Local media – adverse publicity. Significant effect on staff morale & public perception of the organisation. Public calls (at local level) for specific remedial actions. Comprehensive review/investigation necessary.	National media/ adverse publicity, less than 3 days. News stories & features in national papers. Local media – long term adverse publicity. Public confidence in the organisation undermined. HSE use of resources questioned. Minister may make comment. Possible	National/International media/ adverse publicity, > than 3 days. Editorial follows days of news stories & features in National papers. Public confidence in the organisation undermined. HSE use of resources questioned. CEO's performance questioned. Calls for individual HSE officials

				<p>questions in the Dáil.</p> <p>Public calls (at national level) for specific remedial actions to be taken possible HSE review/investigation</p>	<p>to be sanctioned.</p> <p>Taoiseach/Minister forced to comment or intervene.</p> <p>Questions in the Dail.</p> <p>Public calls (at national level) for specific remedial actions to be taken. Court action. Public (independent) Inquiry.</p>
Environment/ Natural Disaster/Hazard	Negligible effect. Nuisance Release.	Minor effect of the facility. Limited hindrance of hospital services. On site release contained by organisation	Moderate effect of the facility. May affect some hospital services On site release contained by organisation.	Release affecting minimal off-site area requiring external assistance (civil defense, fire brigade, radiation, protection	Toxic release affecting offsite with detrimental effect requiring outside assistance. Many hospital services are curtailed detrimental

		n.		service etc.)	effect requiring external assistance
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**Table 8: Probability of Occurrence or Likelihood Score (Department of Health WA, 2016)**

		Clinical	Corporate	
Level	Likelihood Descriptor	Per Separations/ Occasions of Service  Likelihood Code “C” (Clinical)	% Chance during life of project or financial year for budget risk  Likelihood Code “%” (% Chance)	Time Scale for ongoing non-project activities or exposures  Likelihood Code “T” (Time)
1	Rare	1 in 100,000 or more	Up to 5%	Once in more than 10 years
2	Unlikely	1 in 10,000	6% – 30%	Once in 5 – 10 years
3	Possible	1 in 1,000	31% - 60%	Once in 3 – 5 years
4	Likely	1 in 100	61% - 90%	Once in 1 - 3 years
5	Very Likely	1 or more in 10	Over 90%	More than once a year

- Identify the type of risk that might affect your department/ service
- Calculate the risk score by multiplying the two scores (probability X consequences)

**Table 9: Risk Score Calculation**

Department / service.....			
Type of Risk	(1) Probability of Occurrence or Likelihood Score	(2) Consequence Score	(1x2) Risk Score
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Table 10: Mapping the Total Risks (HSE,2008)

	Total Risk Score					
	1	2	3	4	5	
	2	4	6	8	10	
	3	6	9	12	15	
	4	8	12	16	20	
	5	10	15	20	25	

Green (1-3)	Blue (4-6)	Yellow (7-14)	Red (15-25)
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Table 11: risk management action plan

Low risk	Acceptable and Manage by routine procedures
Medium risk	Tolerable and Manage by particular monitoring procedures or auditing systems.
High risk	This is serious and must be closely addressed. Action Plans should be

Extreme risk	prepared for the Extreme and High Risks Prepare action plans to reduce the probability and consequences of the extreme risks with a score of 15-25. Then move down the risk levels to the high risk with a score of 7-14.
--------------	--

Extreme risk	Risk mitigation measures	Responsibility	Completion date
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
High risk	Risk mitigation measures	Responsibility	Completion date
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

### Evaluate the risks

Objectives: To assess the action required by the level of risk specified in step 3, including evaluation whether management should be developed and / or risk could be escalated. Risk prioritization involves comparing the level of risk present during the analysis stage with pre-defined risk criteria and establishing a prioritised risks list for additional action (Department of Health WA, 2016). Risk registers are a tool that can be used to help prioritise risks and allocate resources appropriately (ACHS, 2013).

**Table 12: Example of a risk register (Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, 2004)**

N o	Ri sk are a	Risk descript ion	Acti on	Sever ity	Probabi lity	Risk Rati ng	Elimin ate, reduce or tolerat e	Sta rt date	D ue date	Co st	Responsi bility

Number (No)	A unparalleled reference number for each identified risk
Risk Area	How or where the risk has been identified
Risk Description	A description of the risks and their potential effect on the organization / persons
Action	The necessary action to manage the task
Severity	The degree to which interests of the organization / people could be affected by the risk realization
Probability	The probability of the realization of the risk
Risk Rating & Prioritization	Severity x probability
Eliminate, reduce or tolerate	decision-making depending on the



	identified risk management
Start date / Due date / Cost	Should be reviewed regularly
Responsibility	The authorised person for the risk management

#### Step 4 - Treat Risks

##### A) decision must be taken for the risk to either be:

**1. Avoidance (elimination):** includes not doing risky practices, ie, avoiding areas considered unsafe, etc. Avoidance reduces the possibility of loss to zero. For example, the hospital may choose not to provide obstetric services, thus avoiding the risk of a birth trauma. Avoidance strategies also include the removal of hazardous products or completely removal of potentially hazardous situations from the organization or a ban in a regional hospital for obese or heavy smokers (Department of Health WA, 2016; NuPITA, 2010).

**2. Reduction (Mitigation):** The various loss control strategies is intended to reduce the potential impacts of certain risks without fully accepting or avoiding them, thus emphasizing the reduction of the severity of losses. Loss reduction treatments include fast incident investigation, disaster continuity drills, emergency management plans, staff equipped with safety kits, emergency numbers must be kept, firefighting equipment, data backup, and equipping building structure with alarm systems and A fire sprinkler system. Also, a facility providing obstetrical services may develop a protocol to save the placenta from births for pathological review. Such pathological results become a defense tool in any subsequent claim against the practitioner. Although this process does not avoid poor outcome, it aims to minimise the potential financial consequences of such incidents on the organization or the practitioner (Carroll, 2009).

Accreditation agencies, such as JCI, have developed formal requirements for clinical loss prevention efforts, such as root causes analysis (RCA) and failure mode and

effects analysis (FMEA). Root cause analysis is a systematic process to identify the root causes of problems and approach to respond to them. Once the root cause analysis has been completed, the next step is to develop a quality improvement plan that addresses each identified root cause. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a prospective investigation aimed at identifying weaknesses and preventing future failures. FMEA is required annually by JCAHO and focuses on improving risky procedures such as blood transfusion, chemotherapy, and high-risk medications (Senders, 2004). Healthcare failure mode effect analysis (HFMEA) and hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA).

3. **Retention (Budget / Acceptance):** Acceptance of loss when it happens. This management strategy includes potential losses associated with certain risks and plans to cover the financial consequences of these losses. (i) risks that cannot be avoided, or transferred(ii) risks where the risk of loss is not significant and the potential consequences are within the institution's capacity to self-fund; (iii) quantifiable and predictable losses (iv) smaller risks (ex: missing eyeglasses) and that it may not be possible to purchase cost-effective insurance coverage. (Department of Health WA, 2016; Carroll, 2009).

4. **Transfer (insurance or hedging):** This can usually be done through another party (ex insurance, outsourcing services, etc). For clinical risks, this may take the form of transferring the entire activity to another hospital or provider. In some cases, clinical risk transfer may not be cost-effective to an external supplier who is less able to treat the risk. In such cases, health care providers must be aware of the hidden costs of risk transfer, for example high contract costs. (Department of Health WA, 2016; NuPITA, 2010).

### **B) Selection of the best risk management techniques:**

A risk management specialist may choose to employ any available set of risk management techniques to obtain desired results (Carroll, 2009).

### **C) Implementation of selected technologies:**

The implementation process includes both technical risk management decisions to be made by risk management professionals and relevant decisions taken by other

managers within the organization to implement selected risk management techniques (Carroll, 2009).

### **Step 5: Monitor& review and improve the risk management program**

The final step in the risk management process is to assess and monitor the effectiveness of the risk management program by assessing the adequacy and appropriateness of the techniques used to identify, analyze and process the risks. The *interdisciplinary* approach to evaluate the impact of risk management program activities on the various departments in organizations and ensures that additional opportunities to improve the risk management function have been fully studied (Carroll, 2009).

Closing Risk: While there is active management, the risk has an "open" status. With the completion of action and management of risk, after careful deliberation, changing it to either "monitor" or "closed" status. "Monitor" risks are subject to periodic review (Ex six months) to ensure that they remain as "as practicable" as possible. A "closed" status is set for risks that complete all required actions and do not require any further action, and are archived in a "closed record" for audit purposes (Carroll, 2009).

**Table 13: Types of outcome measures (Wolff & Bourke, 2002)**

Effects	Examples
Effects on safety and risks	<p>Reducing the frequency or severity of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fall incidents</li> <li>• Pressure ulcer</li> <li>• Improper use</li> <li>• Medication errors</li> <li>• Unplanned re-presentation to department within 48 hours for same condition</li> <li>• Unplanned readmission to the hospital for same condition within 28 days of hospital inpatient</li> </ul>

	discharge <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Return to operating room within 7 days</li> <li>• Morbidity and Mortality rate</li> </ul>
Effects on incidents reporting and tracking	Frequency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Categories and severity</li> <li>• Enthusiastic to report</li> <li>• variation between practitioners(ex nursing staff or physicians)</li> </ul>

### **RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (Singh & Ghatala, 2012)**

It is well known that the structure of committee is necessary for the suitable and effective functioning of the risk management program. The Assistant Administrator for Quality management will chair the Committee of Risk Management which should have representatives from the following departments:

1. Quality Assurance
2. Blood Bank
3. Medical Audit.
4. Infection Control
5. Safety and Security
6. Accreditation
7. Education
8. Physicians
9. Nurses
10. Legal Counsel
11. Tissue Committee
12. Professional Liability Committee
13. Professional Practices Committee
14. Medical Discipline
15. Medical—Legal Committee

16. Antibiotic Use
17. Therapeutics
18. Pharmacy
19. Medical Records
20. Utilization Review Committee

The purpose of the Risk Management Committee will be to aid the Risk Manager in fulfilling the responsibilities to decrease patient harms, visitors, and staff, and financial loss to the hospital (Singh& Ghatala, 2012).

### **Conclusion**

Active risk management is advanced proactive approach plays a critical role in enabling hospitals to identify, analyze, monitor and manage risks. Risk management is an integrated part of health care that uses a number of disciplines to reduce the likelihood of organizational losses in health care. Proactive risk management allows an organisation to plan today for the worst-case scenario of tomorrow that jeopardize the ability of organization to maintain its mission.

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## Assessment of the Quality of School Health Education and Health Services in Governmental Schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates, Palestine.

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### Abstract

**Background:** This study is considered one of the most important studies that should be highlighted in order to raise the developmental level of the state in all fields, especially the educational institutions, since the child today is the man of the future and for this the government should pay great attention to his health.

**Objectives:** this study aimed at assessing the quality of school health education and school health services in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates.

**Methods:** The researcher used the descriptive analytical design in the study. Since population size is relatively small, the researcher considered the population as the sample of study (census), which consists of the school health coordinators in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates whose number (97 ). The researcher used a questionnaire for the school health coordinators whose number (97). The researcher verified the validity and reliability of study tool.

**Results:** The findings of the study indicated that the level of implementing school health education was very good level with weight mean 82.1%, moreover the level of implementing health services in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates was very good with weight mean 85.6%.

**Conclusions:** The field of school health education and school health services in the governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates needs some recommendations as Increaseing number of health seminars to educate students about physiological changes, appointing a resident nurse for each group of near schools to deal with emergencies occurring at these schools, support the school health team with modern equipment.

**Keywords:** Quality, school health education, Health services, Khan Younis , Rafah.

## **Background**

A **school** is an educational institution designed to provide learning spaces and learning environments for the teaching of students under the direction of teachers. Most countries have systems of formal education, which is commonly compulsory. In these systems, students progress through a series of schools .( *Roser, Max; Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban (2019)*).

The school health program is considered one of the most important components of the school and it's group of concepts, principles and systems provided to reinforce students health in the school age and reinforce society's health through schools (Abu Zaida, 2006). The school health has a group of interests including medical services fields, school environment fields, health education and canteen, nutritional fields. School health education is defined as a comprehensive health curricula. It is a blend of community, schools, and patient care practice; Health education covers the continuum from disease prevention and promotion of optimal health to the detection of illness to treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care, this concept is recently prescribed in current scientific literature as 'health promotion', a phrase that is used interchangeably with health education ( Glanz, et. al, 2008).

Health services is defined as the services to students to appraise, protect, promote health. These are designed to ensure access or referral to primary care, prevent and control disease and health problem, provide emergency care, provide a safe environment, and provide educational and counselling opportunities for prompting health (Maurer & Smith, 2013).

The school health services are offered to students in the first, seventh and tenth grades in the governmental schools in the Gaza Strip which totalling 400 schools. The

coverage rate for a medical examination was 96% in 2015-2016, the number of students who were examined was 63295 students out of 65996 students (MOH, 2016). The attention of the school health began after the Ministry of Education had taken charge in 1994, from the Palestinian National Authority, where there was a special department for school health in the directorates of education. A teacher has been assigned at each school to conduct medical supervision inside the school in addition to his work as a teacher and called school health coordinator.

The researcher carried out this study to assess quality school health education and health services provided to students and he hopes the responsible of school health programs in Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health could benefit from its results.

### **Materials and subjects**

#### **Study design**

The design of this study was a descriptive, analytical cross-sectional one. This method is appropriate for description of the status of phenomenon and its relationship and comparison between variables.

#### **Setting and period of the study**

The study was carried out in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates, the study was conducted during the period from April 2017 and end in November 2017.

#### **Study population and sampling**

The study population and sampling is consist of the school health coordinators in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates whose number (97 ) present in table(1).

**Table (1):** The number the school health coordinators and their response .

	Rafah schools	East Khan Younis schools	West Khan Younis schools	Total
The number of school health coordinators	35	37	32	104
Response	34	33	30	97

Percent of response	(97)%	(89)%	(93)%	(93)%

### Study instruments

The researcher used a structured questionnaire for collecting data, the researcher used Likert scale of 5-points to prepare structured questionnaires according to literature review and researcher experience in school field.

Data analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 24) for statistical analysis. Data was collected in the period 23/8/2017 to 10/10/2017.

### Ethical considerations.

The researcher was committed to all ethical consideration required to conduct a research. Ethical approval was obtained from General Administrator of School Health in Ministry of Education and Higher Education. Also, an official approval was obtained from General Directorate of planning in Ministry of Education and Higher Education. Moreover, an official approval was obtained from Directorate of Education Rafah, also an official approval was obtained from Directorate of Education east Khan Younis, and an official approval was obtained from Directorate of Education Khan Younis.

### Results

Table (2) shows the distribution of participant's characteristics according to their sociodemographic characteristics. There are 40.2% of study participants have age between 36 – 45 years and 33.0% have age above 45 years. Regarding the distribution of study participants according to their gender, (61.9%) of the study participants were females while 38.1% were males. There are 88.7% of the study participants married and 11.3% were not married. Regarding to educational level, 88.7% of the participants had a BSc certificate while 3.1% higher degree, about 55% of the participants had experience more than 10 years while 4.1% less than 5 years. There are 48.5% of study participants work in girls school and there are 36.0% work in boys school. Regarding

the distribution of study participants according to their directorate, (35.1%) of the study participants were work in Rafah while 34.0% in Eastern KhanYounis and 30.9% in Western KhanYounis.

**Table (2):** Distribution of the study participants according to their demographic data

Items	No.	100 %
<b>Age</b>		
Less than 35 years	26	26.8
From 36 to 45 Years	39	40.2
More than 45 Years	32	33.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	37	38.1
Female	60	61.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Not Married	11	11.3
Married	86	88.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Education Level</b>		
Diploma	8	8.2
Bachelor	86	88.7
High Degree	3	3.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Experience Years</b>		
Less than 5 Years	4	4.1
From 5 to 10	40	41.2
More than 10 Years	53	54.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Type of School</b>		
Boys	35	36.0
Girls	47	48.5
Mix	15	15.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Directorate</b>		
Eastern KhanYounis	33	34.0
Western KhanYounis	30	30.9
Rafah	34	35.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table (3):** Distribution of the study participants according to their responses about Topics by mean, median and standard deviation.

Topics	weighte	Median	Std
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	<b>d Mean (%)</b>		
Topic 3: Field of Health Education	82.1	82.7	10.1
Topic 1: Field of School Health Services	85.6	87.4	8.9
Total	83.85	85.05	9.5

**Table (4):** Distribution of the study participants according to their responses about  
Topic 2: Field of Health Education



Phrase	Mean	Weight Mean	Std	T	Sig.	Rank
There are lectures that are given to students about the most important diseases and health problems.	4.4	87.0	0.6	22.323	0.000	3
Awareness leaflets and health guidance manuals are distributed to students.	4.3	85.0	0.7	17.736	0.000	5
The school health team is provided school with written instructions to deal with emergency cases and accidents.	4.1	81.8	0.9	11.778	0.000	8
There is awareness effort to schools about common diseases.	4.4	88.2	0.7	18.991	0.000	2
There are awareness seminars held for teachers and students.	4.1	82.8	0.8	15.030	0.000	7
Meetings are held with parents of students and there are health seminars held for them.	4.0	79.0	0.9	10.062	0.000	11

Health events and days such as (World Health Day) are revived.	4.5	89.2	0.7	21.267	0.000	1
There are special programs presented about physical changes experienced by male and female students.	3.7	73.0	1.0	6.394	0.000	15
Phrase	Mean	Weight Mean	Std	T	Sig.	Rank
Psychological support is provided for students.	4.1	81.8	0.8	13.827	0.000	9
There is coordination with health institutions to provide the necessary health education for students.	4.2	83.2	0.6	18.392	0.000	6
There is cooperation between health coordinator and the art teacher to make wall paintings (murals) that convey health messages to students.	4.0	79.0	0.9	10.587	0.000	12
Health competitions are held among students.	4.0	79.0	0.8	11.615	0.000	13

The school library is provided with useful health books and publications for students.	3.8	76.8	0.9	9.282	0.000	14
Health courses are held for teachers about school health.	4.3	86.8	0.6	20.507	0.000	4
First aid courses are held for students.	4.0	79.6	0.9	10.844	0.000	10
<b>Total</b>	4.1	82.1	10.1	77.367	0.000	

**Table (5):** Distribution of the study participants according to their responses about Topic Field of School Health Services

Phrase	Me an	Weig ht Mean (%)	Std
There is a prior coordination with school when conducting examinations and giving vaccinations for students.	4.6	92.0	0.7
School Health Team in corporation with school health committee conducts comprehensive periodic medical examinations for all students concerned.	4.6	91.4	0.7
Oral and dental examinations are performed for students.	4.6	91.4	0.7
The list of checked and transferred students is prepared according to attached forms in the guide for health services.	4.6	91.2	0.6
The school health team prepares a monthly report about school visits and detected cases.	4.5	90.8	0.6
Vaccinations are given according to schedule of the ministry of health.	4.5	89.8	0.7
Information and examinations are recorded in a medical file for the student.	4.5	89.4	0.7
Vaccinations are recorded in the health file of the student.	4.5	89.4	0.7
Suitable place for the health check is prepared to ensure privacy of students during the check.	4.5	89.2	0.8

Student with infectious disease is excused from school attendance.	4.4	88.6	0.8
Examinations and vaccinations are sufficient for students.	4.4	88.6	0.8
Students are physically prepared for the health check.	4.4	88.2	0.7
Disease cases that detected from students are transferred to competent health centers and follow up therapy and discuss it with parents.	4.4	87.6	0.8
Absent students who have failed to obtain medical services are followed up.	4.4	87.4	0.7
Emergency diseases cases are followed up and suitable first aid is provided.	4.4	87.2	0.6
All appropriate precaution are taken to control infectious diseases when the first case at school occurs.	4.3	86.4	0.8
The school health team is committed to the time and place set for it.	4.3	86.2	0.7
Vaccinations are saved in the appropriate refrigerator.	4.3	85.0	0.8
Infection control measures are taken when vaccinations are given.	4.2	84.4	0.6
Students are psychologically prepared for the health check.	4.2	83.2	0.9
Ensure ask and investigate about the possibility of any infectious diseases during routine visit to schools.	4.2	83.2	0.9
The number of school health team is sufficient to conduct the process of examination for students without affecting their school achievement.	4.1	82.2	0.9
There is special care plan for students with special needs.	4.0	79.4	0.9
Family and local community participate in any activities related to the prevention of infectious diseases.	3.8	76.2	0.9
The medical history of the student and his/her family is recognized.	3.8	75.4	1.0
School health team uses modern equipment and suitable methods for detection and examination.	3.7	74.0	0.9
The acute disease (Diarrhea, cold, flu, etc ..) of students are followed up and treated.	3.7	73.2	1.0
<b>Total</b>	4.3	85.6	8.9

**Discussion**

The weighted mean of all topics was 83.8%, while the Topic 1: Field of school health education with weighted mean 82.1%, and Topic 2: Field of school health services with weighted mean 85.6%.

The researcher found that the weighted mean for topic of the field of health education was 82.1% and significant less than 0.05 which mean the participants agree about this topic. According to the results the highest paragraph was number (7) " Health events and days such as (World Health Day) are revived" with weighted mean 89.2% and significance less than 0.05, followed by paragraph number (4) " There is awareness effort to schools about common disease" with weighted mean 88.2%. While the lowest paragraph was number (8)" There are special programs presented about physical changes experienced by male and female students" with weighted mean 73.0% and significance less than 0.05, followed by paragraph (13) " The school library is provided with useful health books and publications for students" with weighted mean 76.8%. According to the result of this topic, the participant agrees and had a positive attitude about this topic.

In the present study, researcher found that the level of implementing health education in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates very good level with weight mean 82.1%. This is due to the interest of schools in the process of health education. Also the new curriculum includes many observations that concerning the health education. In addition to the students participation of in the design of appropriate means of health education.

These results are consistent with the results of (Jerjawi, 2011) who revealed that health education applied with very good level with weighted mean (83.45) and also consistent with the results of (Al-Ghazali, 2015) who revealed that health education applied with very good level.

On the other hand, these results are inconsistent with the results of (Badh, 2006) who showed that school health education applied with medium degree, with mean(

3.38) and percent 68%, due to some reasons. The lack of interest of some schools to apply the process of health education through its internal media is the first reason. The second reason the difficulty of coordination of some schools with the Ministry of Health and Education in the field of health education and the ineffectiveness of the Health Committee. Also these results are inconsistent with the results of (Serdaty,2014) who showed that school health education applied with weak degree with mean(2.03) %, because of absence of the role of parents in the schools and their lack of contact with the medical team. Moreover, these results are inconsistent with the results of(Atta, 2003) who showed little interest in health education.

And also the researcher found that the level of implementing school health services in governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates with level with weight mean 85.6%, this is due to several reasons. The first reason is the interest of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. Secondly, the full coordination between the two ministries, their concern to conduct the tests fully to detect diseases early and the existence of a plan of work for the school health team.

According to the results the highest paragraph was " There is a prior coordination with school when conducting examinations and giving vaccinations for students." with weighted mean 92.0% and significance less than 0.05, followed by paragraph " School health team in corporation with school health committee conducts comprehensive periodic medical examinations for all students concerned" with weighted mean 91.4%. While the lowest paragraph was" The acute disease (Diarrhea, cold, flu, etc ..) of students are followed up and treated. " with weighted mean 73.2% and significance less than 0.05, followed by paragraph " School health team uses modern equipment and suitable methods for detection and examination" with weighted mean 74.0%. According to the result of this topic, the participant agree and had a positive attitude about this topic.

These results are consistent with the results of (Jerjawi, 2011) who showed that school health services applied with high degree with weighted mean( 87.51) and also consistent with the results of (Serdaty, 2014) who showed that school health services applied with high degree with mean(3.72).

On the other hand, these results are inconsistent with the results of (Badh, 2006) who showed that school health services applied with medium degree, with mean( 3) percent 60% and also inconsistent with the results of (Atta, 2003) and (Al-Ghazali, 2015) who show that school health services applied with medium degree, because of lack of adherence to the periodic examination by some doctors and the great shortage of human and physical supplies.

**Conclusions:**

The field of school health education and school health services in the governmental schools at Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates needs some recommendations as Increaseing number of health seminars to educate students about physiological changes, appointing a resident nurse for each group of near schools to deal with emergencies occurring at these schools, support the school health team with modern equipment.

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**University Youth Interaction with the Libyan Crisis through  
Facebook  
-A Field Study on the Users of the BBC Arabic Channel and the  
"American Free Arabic" Channel's Pages-**

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**Abstract:**

The study aimed to identify the interaction of the researchers with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC' Arabic channel ' and the channel 'Al-Hurra American Arabic,' A descriptive method was used in sample scanning as a data collection tool, The field sample consisted of 400 individual students from Cairo and Minya universities who were followers of the Libyan crisis, on the BBC channel 'Arab' and the channel 'Al-Hurra American Arabic'. It turns around the existence of a statistical function correlation between the follow-up of the researchers to the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC 'Arabic' channel and the channel 'Al-Hurra American Arabi', and the forms of interaction with it,=. The value of the correlation factor ( $0.41^{**}$ ), a function at a level (0.01).

**key words:** Interaction, University Youth, The Libyan crisis, Facebook.

**Introduction:**

Interactivity via Facebook is a feature of news pages as it permits the audience to receive information and become a participant and producer of it at the same time. The patterns of receiving in addition to the forms of interaction with news contents of contemporary media are among the most important elements for the success and

circulation of the news article. In fact, the social networking site "Facebook" is an important means for exchanging information and news around the world. Social media has enabled journalists and broadcasters to broadcast live events with audio and video as they happen across the world especially the interaction with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel. In light of what has been mentioned, the current study will investigate: the extent of university youth interaction with the Libyan crisis through Facebook.

### Previous studies:

The researchers relied on the following studies on the interaction of Facebook: Basing on the study of Mahmoud Mohamed (2020), we look at the interaction of the respondents with the videos of the Lebanese movement in the two pages of the press programs today in the 'An-Nahar' channel, a reading in the German press in the DW Arabic channel. Then we have found that there is a significant correlation between the respondents' follow-up of the Lebanese movement's videos with the two pages of the "Today's" journalistic program, "An-Nahar", a reading in the German press on the DW Arabic channel, and the forms of interaction with them. The correlation coefficient value reached (0.41 \*\*), which is a function at the level of (0.01) (<sup>1</sup>),

**In the same context, the study Khaled Mustafa (2019) aimed** to monitor the forms of audience interaction with the official pages of Egyptian satellite channels via 'Facebook' and their implications for building its agenda, at audience's impressive admiration came first in the forms of interaction with the issues under study in the pages of 'Paper and Pen, Hamza Wasl' via 'Facebook' (65.5%) (<sup>2</sup>)

**Areen Zoghbi (2019)** main target is to know the priorities of the news in the Arabic-speaking news websites as reflected in the Facebook pages. The results demonstrate that the contents of the political news dominated the list of the contents of

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<sup>1</sup>Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed (2020). University youth interaction with the videos of the Lebanese movement on Facebook 'A field study', Research published in the Journal of Afro-Asian Studies, Number4, Germany: Berlin: The Arab Democratic Center, January 2020,p81.

<sup>2</sup>Khaled Mustafa Hassan (2019). Audience Interactivity with Egyptian Satellite Channels Pages via Facebook: A Study of the Implications of Interactivity on Building the Media Agenda, Unpublished Master Thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Information, Radio and Television Department.

the news in the Arabic-language news websites as reflected by the Facebook pages (20.8%) <sup>(1)</sup>, **Whereas, the study Abdul Hadi Borby (2018)** aimed to monitor and analyze the interaction of the users of the Facebook social network with issues of general concern on a Facebook page. Algeria is represented in the issue with the arrival of Mrs. Zahia bin Qara to the presidency of the People's Assembly. Abdul Hadi Borby's shows that the users interact admirably with the arguments and proofs about the arrival of Mrs. Zahia bin Qara to the presidency of the municipal people came by (80%), and that the comments on the arguments and proofs about the arrival of Mrs. Zahia bin Qara to the presidency came in the proportion of (50%), where we note that the participants and admirers do not engage in shock reactions involved with sarcasm.<sup>(2)</sup>,

**In a related context, the study of Nitish Kelvin Bisonot sought** to analyze (360) video clips about ethics and responsibility on social media on Facebook and YouTube. The research shows that Facebook helped the video journalist in asking questions related to ethics and responsibility on social media for the public (360) and capturing and broadcasting videos on the network, in addition to judging the credibility of video sources better <sup>(3)</sup>.

### **Comments on previous studies and ways to benefit from them:**

- It is clear from previous studies that Arab and foreign schools are interested in interactive video journalism through social media sites as it is a means that allows the user to interact with the media contents that include different topics and issues. Indeed, it is a property of the means and the user together, and among these studies

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<sup>1</sup> Areen Omar Al-Zoghbi (2019). Priorities of news in Arabic-speaking electronic news websites as reflected in 'Facebook' pages, research published in the Algerian Journal of Media and Public Opinion Research, Algeria: Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Sciences and Civilization, University of Laghouat, Department of Media and Communication Sciences, Volume 2, Issue 2, December 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Abdel Hadi Bourby (2018). Interactions of Facebook social media users with issues of public concern between representation and debate, research published in the Al-Hekma Journal for Media and Communication Studies, Algeria: Kunooz Al-Hekma Foundation for Publishing and Distribution, No. 13, Volume 13, June 2018.

<sup>3</sup> Nitish Kelvin Bissonauth(2017). 360--Degree Video Journalism: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT ANGLES OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND NEWS REPORTING, requirements for the degree of Master of Digital Media, Canada: Ryerson University, Faculty of Information.pp41.

is the study of Khaled Mustafa (2019) and Areen Al-Zoghbi (2019) Abd al-Hadi Burbi (2018), Nitish Kelvin Bissonauth (2017).

- The two schools differed in the sample, curriculum, goals and results, as the researcher benefited from previous studies in determining the study problem, its goals, hypotheses, questions, and samples. Actually, the theoretical frameworks of previous studies that were commented on in the current study relate to the extent of university youth interaction with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel.

### **The Research Problem:**

Through a review of previous studies, it becomes clear that interactivity in the pages of news channels via Facebook acquires a special importance for its users, as the public depends on it to extract information and news related to the Libyan crisis. This is also confirmed by the scientific literature relevant to the subject of the study and related to the forms of interaction of users with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free Channel. Therefore, the problem of the study revolves around a major question that says: to which extent do university youth interact with the Libyan crisis on Facebook? The study works to achieve its goals by answering this question

From this question emerges the following sub-questions:

- (1) What is the relationship between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of interaction with it ?
- (2) What is the relationship between the extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the degree of benefit from them?

### **Study hypotheses:**

To achieve the aims of the study and to answer its questions, the study hypotheses were in two main hypotheses, namely:

- (1) There is a statistically significant correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Free TV channel, and their interactions with them.
- (2) There is a statistically significant relationship between the extent of respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the Free American channel, and the degree of benefit from them.

### **The Significance of the Study:**

- The theoretical importance of research is due to the focus on the interaction of university youth with the Libyan crisis via Facebook, as it is an important media outlet that contributes to informing the public about the latest developments in the crisis at the local and global level.
- The applied importance of research stems from the fact that the public benefited from the sample news pages of the study in order to know about the latest developments related to the Libyan crisis and to look for the patterns of interaction of the public towards them, in order to reach new and innovative theories and perceptions within the framework of the relationship between the public and the new media.

### **Objectives of the study:**

The study aims to identify the following main goal: youth interaction with the Libyan crisis through Facebook.

#### **From this goal the following sub-goals are derived:**

- 1- Knowing the relationship between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel, and the forms of interaction with it.
- 2- Explaining the relationship between the extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Al-Hurra channel, and the degree of benefit from them.

### **The Sample of the Study:**

The study was conducted on a sample of (400) singles from Cairo and Minya University students who used the pages of the BBC Arabic channel, and the American Hurra channel between the ages of 18-20 years. The reasons for selecting the sample are as follows:

- (1) The researcher has chosen the sample of the Egyptian youth to describe the topic as a category and a segment that represents an active sector in the human society, in addition to the fact that young people in this period are eager to know the news related to the Libyan crisis that arouses their interests.
- (2) On social media, there are young people with different age levels, varied educational levels, and different genders which provide the researcher with a sample that adequately represents the indigenous community for young people within the community. Therefore, the study sample was distributed equally between both males and females between the pages of the BBC Arabic channel, and the American Hurra channel on Facebook. In order to identify the forms of the respondents' interaction with the Libyan crisis, it was taken into consideration when selecting the sample that it should be representative of males and females, and the following is a description of the sample according to demographic variables:

Table (1)

Sample description according to demographic variables (n = 400)

Demographic characteristics		Repetition	%
Type	Males	200	50%
	Females	200	50%
Age	18: 35	247	61.75%
	35: 40	153	38.25%
Educational level	Bachelor's	270	67.5%
	Postgraduate	130	32.5%
Geographical distribution	Cairo	200	50%
	Minya	200	50%
Residence	countryside	135	33.75%
	Attended	265	66.25%
Total		400	100%

The above table shows the followings:

- **In terms of type:** male and female use of the BBC Arabic page and Al Hurra American came on an equal percentage (50%), This is because both pages are an important source of public access to news related to the Libyan crisis under consideration on both pages.

- **In terms of age:** the age of users of both the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel was as follows: From (18: 35) in the first place at (61.75%), according to the respondents' follow-up to the issue under study, followed by (35: 40) in second place at (38.25%). It is clear from the previous results that a category of (18:35) is the younger age group and the most likely to follow the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, this explains that the younger the age is, the more attention and follow-up to the case in question.
- **In terms of educational level:** the distribution of the vocabulary of the study sample according to the variable of the educational level reflected the different educational levels at Cairo Minya University which follows the issue under study on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Free Channel. Consequently, (Bachelor's) are found in the first position with a percentage (67.5%), then (Postgraduate Studies) in the second position with a percentage (32.5%). It is clear from the previous results that the category "Bachelor", "Postgraduate" is the most likely to follow up on the issue under study and interact with it on both the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free Channel. The findings also explain the extent of the respondents' awareness of the follow-up to the Libyan crisis, the higher the follow-up rate, the more interaction.
- **In terms of geographical distribution:** the distribution of the vocabulary of the study sample according to the variable of geographical distribution came equally for each of the governorates of Cairo and Minya. Each governorate has obtained (50%) of the total sample of the users of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Al Hurra channel.
- **In terms of residence:** the distribution of the vocabulary of the study sample according to the variable of residence for the users of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel were as follows: (Al-Hadr) is ranked first (66.25%), and it comes at second and last rank (Al-Reef) with (33.75%). It is clear from the previous results that the “urban” category is the most likely to follow and interact with the Libyan crisis, this is because the urban areas are densely populated from the countryside.

### The Limits of the Study:

- **Human frontiers:** The human limits of the study are represented in a sample of students from the universities of 'Cairo', 'Minya', who use the pages of the BBC Arabic

channel, and the American Hurra channel, between the ages of (18: 40) years, as they were applied during the year 2020 AD.

- **Spatial limits:** Restricted to the governorates of 'Cairo,' Minya, that was chosen because it relates to the place of study of the researcher as it represents the tribal side, while the governorate of Cairo was chosen because it represents the face of the sea.
- **Objectivity border:** the Libyan crisis is limited to the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Al Hurra channel on Facebook.

**Time limits:**

It is the period during which researchers conducted the field study on a sample of Egyptian youth using the pages of the BBC Arabic channel, and the Free American Channel, that is in the period from 1/1/2020 to 30/2/2020.

**Study tool:**

Questionnaire newspaper applied to an intentional sample of (400) individuals from the students of the universities of "Cairo", "Minya" From the users of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Al Hurra channel, And that is in the period between 1/1/2020 AD and until 2/30/2020 AD.

**Type and method of study:**

This study belongs to descriptive field research, which mainly seeks to know the interaction of university youth with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American free channel.

**Study variables:**

- **Independent variable:** youth interaction.
- **The intermediate variable:** Facebook.
- **Dependent variable:** Libyan crisis.

**The Cognitive Framework of the study:****Libyan crisis:**

It is a military campaign launched by the Libyan National Army that represents the Tobruk government to seize the western region of Libya. Ultimately, the capital, Tripoli, is under the control of the National Accord government (<sup>1</sup>)

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<sup>1</sup> BBC English (2019). "Libya general tells forces to take capital", Available at the following link by date 10/ April 2019.



## Interacting with the Libyan Crisis through Facebook:

Interact means the ability of users to communicate, dialogue and share with each other news articles that include topics and issues of common interest (<sup>1</sup>)

And Facebook is a social network that plays a pivotal role in broadcasting, reporting and circulating news among its followers (<sup>2</sup>). It is a network that allows its users to obtain information and news and interact with them through and comment on them (<sup>3</sup>).

Interacting with the Libyan crisis is a key feature of the electronic news media, as it allows its users to publicly record their reactions to a video or news article (<sup>4</sup>).

## Forms of interaction with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC, "Arabic" channel and the "American Free" channel:

There were many forms of interaction with the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Hurra channel, including:

### LIKES records:

It means showing affection for the content on the site and is available among friends, groups and channels (<sup>5</sup>).

### Interaction through Writing Comments:

It is a form of interaction available on the news pages of the social networking site 'Facebook' where users can write 'comments' about issues that interest them and

<sup>1</sup> Mahmoud Mohamed, Shaima Al-Hawary (2019). University student interaction levels **with** New Zealand mosque attacks via social media, research published in the Journal of Media Studies, Germany: Berlin, the Arab Democratic Center, Issue 8, February 2019.,p18.

<sup>2</sup> Al-Jilani Chrysanthemum, Mahloul Jamal, Rabih Zemam (2019). The role of social media in the February 22 Facebook movement of theorizing, framing and foresight, research published in the Journal of Media Studies, Germany: Berlin, the Arab Democratic Center, Issue No. 8, February 2019, p14.

<sup>3</sup> Rakoran Mustafa's Housewife (2018). Political marketing via social media, research published in the Arab Journal of Information and Communication, research published in the Arab Journal of Information and Communication, Saudi Society for Media and Communication, the sixteenth issue, November 2016 1438 AH, p20.

<sup>4</sup> Schmitz Weiss, De macedo goyce(2017). compressed dimensions in digital4media occupations: journalism in transformation, journalism: theory, practice, criticism, vol 10,NO 5,16SEPTAMPER,PP593,Avalibale at: <http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalspermission.nav>,receivedat:13-12-2017.

<sup>5</sup> Khaled Mahdi Hamed (2018). Treatment in YouTube channels and the extent to which the Egyptian public is aware of it, an unpublished master's thesis, Al-Azhar University, Media College, Radio and Television Department,p59.

then press the inter button, It also features to achieve the mechanism of interaction between users (<sup>1</sup>)

### Share:

It means the users' participation of the content provided by the news pages of the social networking site 'Facebook' and exchanged among the users via the user's e-mail or published on a joint group between the users or another social networking site (<sup>2</sup>).

### Honesty and Persistence:

The questionnaire newspaper was designed to verify the apparent honesty in the light of the aims and assumptions of the study. It was presented to a group of arbitrators in the field of media, The questions were designed in the light of previous studies related to the subject of the study, and the form was modified according to their observations, The questionnaire was also applied to a sample of users of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Al Hurra channel. This procedure took place in the period 1/1/2020 AD and until 30/2/2020 AD. The researcher relied on calculating the stability of the results of the questionnaire on the method of re-testing. The researcher, after collecting data, conducted a study on (5%) of the total field study items (20) individually using a parameter "Cranach's Alpha coefficient" which indicates that there is a high consistency between the respondents' answers and the following table, that shows us the calculation of the value of the stability factor for the questionnaire newspaper:

(2)

### Alpha Kronbach coefficient to measure the stability of the form

the field	Alpha Kronbach
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<sup>1</sup> Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed (2017). Interactive communication of users of news channel pages with social networking sites and their verified gratifications, unpublished Master Thesis, Minia University: Faculty of Specific Education, Department of Educational media Department, p57-58.

<sup>2</sup> Khaled Mahdi Hamed (2018). Treatment in YouTube channels and the extent to which the Egyptian public is aware of it, an unpublished master's thesis, Al-Azhar University, Media College, Radio and Television Department, p59.

	coefficient
Alpha Kronbach parameter for all paragraphs of the form	<i>0.91</i>

**The above table data indicates the following:**

- The value of the alpha Kronbach coefficient was high, as the value of the alpha coefficient for all paragraphs of the form (0.91). This means that the stability factor is high, indicating that there is no significant difference in the respondents' answer's as well as the validity of the questionnaire for application.

**Statistical Analysis:**

After completing the collection of field study data, the data was coded and entered into the computer, then it was processed, analyzed and extracted statistical results using the statistical package for social sciences program known as 'spss', By resorting to the following statistical treatments, tests and treatments, which are: " Ratios and simple statistical iterations of survey questions, Pearson correlation coefficient to find the severity and direction of the correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of interaction with it. It also emphasizes the fact of showing the relationship between the extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the Free American channel, and the degree of benefit from them.

**Results:**

The sample of the field study was represented in the 18: 40 age group of Egyptian youth. We included a sample of (400) individuals from the universities of 'Cairo', 'Minya'.

**Table (3)**

**Respondents follow the Libyan crisis on BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra**

**American channel (N = 400) (you can choose more than one)**

n	Follow-up of the respondents to the Libyan crisis	BBC Arabic channel page		Al Hurra channel page	
		Iteration	%	Iteration	%
1	Yes	370	92.5%	366	91.5%
2	No	30	7.5%	34	8.5%
<b>Total</b>		400	100%	400	100%

**The data of the previous table indicate:**

- The respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic page reached (92.5%), compared to (91.5%) for the American Free Channel page.

As for the respondents' failure to follow the Libyan crisis, they were as follows: (8.5%) for the 'American Free' channel page, compared to (7.5%) for the BBC's 'Arabic' channel page. It is clear from the previous results that: respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis is necessary, as it came in a high percentage on the BBC Arabic channel page. This is due to the presence of a well-known writer on Libyan affairs who enjoys the confidence and follow-up of the respondents. It thus attracted the largest audience and opened the way to enriching the interactive discussion on issues of public interest in the interactive pages on the web.

**Table (4)**

**The extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra America channel (N = 400)**

n	The extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis	Iteration	%
1	I follow in a very large degree	157	39.25%
2	I follow very much	114	28.5%
	I follow at unlimited times	129	32.25%

<b>Total</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>100%</b>
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**The data of the above table indicate:**

- Although there was a response (I follow very much) on the highest percentage of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel (39.25%), there is a difference in the two categories (I follow a large degree, I follow at unlimited times). It is clear from the previous results that the exposure to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel, and the American Al Hurra channel, among the respondents, has become something that they have within the exposure habits of the public or a ritual exposure when they can navigate the network.

**Table (5)**

**The degree of the beneficiaries' benefit from following the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel (N = 400)**

<b>n</b>	<b>The degree of benefit from following the Libyan crisis</b>	<b>Iteration</b>	<b>%</b>
1	I benefit very much	199	49.75%
2	I benefit greatly	152	38%
	I benefit a little	49	12.25%
<b>Total</b>		<b>400</b>	<b>100%</b>

**The data of the previous table demonstrate that:**

- The degree to which the respondents benefited from following the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra American channel, was as follows: (I benefit very much) in the first place by (49.75%), and comes in the second position (I benefit greatly) with (38%), then (I benefit a little degree) in the third position with (12.25%), It is clear from the previous results that the

vast majority of the respondents benefit greatly from following the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel. This is because interactive news pages aim to attract the largest audience and open the door to enriching the interactive debate about the Libyan crisis that arouses the public's interest.

**Table (6)**

**Forms of the respondents' interaction with the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel(N = 400) (you can choose more than one)**

n	Forms of interaction	BBC Arabic channel page		Al Hurra channel page	
		Iteration	%	Iteration	%
1	LIKEs records	133	33.25%	130	32.5%
2	Writing comments	139	34.75%	137	34.25%
3	Sharing work	128	32%	133	33.25%
<b>Total</b>		400	100%	400	100%

**The above results show that:**

- The respondents' preferences for using forms of interaction with the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel page were as follows: (Commentary) in the first place with a percentage of (34.75), and the use of the comment tool is due to the fact that it expresses the opinion of the public freely regarding the aforementioned issue, then (like records like) in the second position with a rate of (33.25%), and finally (the work of the participant Share) In third place (32%). The respondents use the participatory tool because it allows the issue to expand and multiply its audience from one location to another.

These results are compared with the results of the findings of Hisham Saeed's study (2015), whereby the phrase writing a comment got first (69.7%). Whereas in the current study, it came first.<sup>(1)</sup>.

**As for the page of the American Free TV channel, the respondents' preferences for using forms of interaction with the Libyan crisis were as follows:**

(Commentary) comes in the first place with a percentage of (34.25%), and the use of the comment tool is due to the fact that it expresses the opinion of the public freely regarding the aforementioned issue, then (the work of the participant Share) with a rate of (33.25%). The respondents also use the participatory tool because it allows the issue to expand and multiply its audience from one location to another, and finally (like records like) by (32.5%). These results are consistent with the findings of Maryam Noumar (2012), where the phrase “commentary tool” ranked first (25.2%).<sup>(2)</sup>. It is clear from the previous results that the respondents find that the interaction and tools on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel an important thing, because it helps in knowing their opinions and ideas regarding the Libyan crisis- resulting from the campaign launched by the Libyan National Army that represents the Tobruk government to seize the western region of Libya- which is controlled by the Government of National Accord.

**Hypothesis Validation Results:**

The first hypothesis that there is a statistically significant correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Free TV channel, and their interactions with them.

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<sup>1</sup> Hisham Saeed Fathi Omar Al-Burj (2015). The effect of using social networks via the Internet on the social relationships of the Egyptian family, unpublished Master Thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Information, Radio and Television Department, P130.

<sup>2</sup> Mary Maryman Nomar (2011). The use of social networking sites and its impact on social relations: a study on a sample of Facebook users in Algeria, an unpublished Master Thesis, Algeria: Al-Hajj University attended by Pante, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Media and Communication ScienceD, P133.

Table (7)

**The Relationship between the Respondents' follow-up to the Libyan Crisis on the BBC Arabic Channel and the American Free TV Channel and the Forms of Interaction with it**

Variables	Respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on MY pages BBC Arabic channel, and Al Hurra American channel		
	Significance level	Significance level	Value of t
<b>Forms of interaction</b>	0.05	0.01	**0.41

\* D at level (0.01).

\*\* D at level (0.05). The

data of the previous table indicate:

To validate this hypothesis, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure the severity and direction of the correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of interaction with it. The value of the correlation coefficient was (0.41 \*\*) that is a function at the level (0.01). Henceforth, this we accept the assumption that there is a statistically significant correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages, and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of interaction with it. This indicates that the more respondents follow the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra America, the higher the percentage of interaction is.

The second hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship between the extent of respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the Free American channel, and the degree of benefit from them.



Table (8)

**The Relationship between the Extent of the Respondents' follow-up to the Libyan Crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra American Channel, and the Degree of Benefit from them.**

Variables	The extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and Al Hurra America channel		
	Significance level	Significance level	Value of t
Degree of benefit	0.05	0.01	**0.45

\* D at level (0.01).

\*\* D at level (0.05).

The data of the previous table indicate:

To verify this hypothesis, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure the severity and direction of the relationship between the extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the degree of benefit from them. The value of the correlation coefficient was (0.45 \*\*) which is a function at the level (0.01), Thus, we assume that there is a statistically significant relationship between the extent of respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the Free American channel, and the degree of benefit from them. This indicates that the more follow-up, the greater the degree of benefit is.

#### **The results of the study in light of the hypotheses:**

After conducting the field study, we reached a set of results, the most important of which are:

- **The first hypothesis has been proven true** i.e. the presence of a statistically significant correlation between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of

interaction with it. The correlation coefficient value was (0.41 \*\*) which is a function at the level (0.01).

- **The second hypothesis has also been proven i.e.** the presence of a statistically significant relationship between the extent of the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic pages and the American Free TV channel, and the degree of benefit from them, The correlation coefficient value was (0.45 \*\*) which is a function at the level (0.01).

### Conclusion:

Through this study, the researcher tried to find out the extent of which university youth interaction with the Libyan crisis through the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the American Al Hurra channel as media platforms for presenting different opinions and ideas related to the Libyan crisis. What is the relationship between the respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the BBC Arabic channel and the American Free TV channel, and the forms of interaction with it?, as well as the relationship between the extent of respondents' follow-up to the Libyan crisis on the pages of the BBC Arabic channel and the Free American channel, and the degree of benefit from them? In effect, interactive media has a major impact in shaping the public's attitudes towards the Libyan issue, in order to reach new and innovative theories and concepts in the context of the relationship between the public and the new media. The study reached a set of recommendations, the most important of which are:

- Emphasizing the need for social media attention to broadcast various media contents that meet the needs of the masses of media organizations. In addition to conducting a survey to find out the public's satisfaction with the performance of the media institutions with regard to the contents they provide that interest him.
- The necessity of social media commitment to be neutral in presenting its news to know the opinion of the public towards provoking and presenting different ways to address it, As well as the necessity of conducting more studies related to the interaction with the contents of

social media, And in order to reach new and innovative theories and concepts in the context of the relationship between the public and the new media.

**Research proposals:**

**In light of the study, the researcher presents a set of proposals, namely:**

- Use social media to address racism issues.
- Using social networks to spread the values of tolerance.

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**Morocco's African policy after its withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity (1984-2001) : The new pillars and contexts.**

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**Abstract:**

Morocco's African policy has undergone profound changes concerning its tents and objectives since the independence in 1956 until nowadays. This paper focuses on the period between 1984 and 2001, in order to demonstrate the aspects of renewing principles and purposes of the kingdom's policy towards Africa. Since 1984 when Morocco left the organization of African Unity, the kingdom has continued to responsibility towards Africa. Morocco has been engaged within the African nations by reinforcing regional integration, promoting peace and socio-economic development. To investigate this issue, we conduct a research through the relevant academic papers and we adopt the historical analysis as a method of research. This later allows us to compare between the period before 1984 and the period after 1984 of the kingdom's African policy evolution. This methodology allows us also to define the principles that characterize the Moroccan policy at the period. In addition to this, this work sheds some light on the political and historical contexts that have influenced the making of the kingdom's ongoing African policy

**Key Words:** African policy – Morocco — Organization of African Unity– historical analysis- regional integration.

## Introduction

After the independence in 1956, Morocco had been engaged within the African countries in order to get their independence as well from European colonization implemented between the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century till the sixties and seventies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In this context, Morocco was one of the leading African countries which called for the decolonization in the continent. Therefore, the late king Mohammed 5 (known in Morocco as the leader of liberation) invited African independent countries to a conference to investigate the possibilities of supporting African people and nations under colonialism: *The Conference of Casablanca* in January 1961. It was high time for Morocco's good willing to fight new imperialism, maintain peace and security and promote economic and social development around the continent.

Two years later, Morocco was one of the co-founders of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963, which held the first conference in held Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. Among the goals of Morocco in supporting African nations and showing the principles of liberation, cooperation and fighting new colonialism was also to have the African endorsement concerning its territorial claims over eastern territories (now under the Algerian rule) and Mauritania which took its independence from the French colonialism in 1960.

Despite this unachieved goal, the kingdom continued its African policy on the basis of cooperation, maintaining peace and security, respecting the territorial integrity and the internal affairs of the African nations during the next three decades of the independence. This was clear from the commercial treaties signed with some Western African countries in the 70<sup>th</sup>. Besides, Morocco's military contribution in wars of *Shaba* (1977-1978) aimed to preserve the territorial integrity of Zaire ruled then by Joseph Mobutu.

Although these efforts done by Morocco in order to establish a prosperous and a safe continent, the Kingdom found itself in critical situation at the beginning of the 80<sup>th</sup>. This dilemma was caused by the western Sahara conflict between Morocco that from one had expanded its sovereignty in the region (after a successful Green March in 1975) that debars the Spanish colonialism and POLISARIO<sup>1</sup> front from the other hand that claimed the right in auto-determination and making its own state in western Sahara, known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

Again, as was the case during the sixties, Morocco's foreign policy in the 80<sup>th</sup> was attached to its territorial claims over the western Sahara. So the Kingdom's efforts then were oriented totally to convince the African countries with the legitimacy to practice its sovereignty in the region and therefore to abolish the integration of SADR to OAU.

However, the SADR backed up by Algeria and Libya could gain finally the African consensus and became a full member of the Organization of African Unity. This achievement of the separatist movement would not be a reality without the unilateral move of the general secretary of OAU in February 1982, Edem Codjjo, who allowed the leaders of SADR to take part in the deliberations of the thirty-eight session of the council of ministers that took place in Addis Ababa as a "state of full membership"<sup>2</sup>.

As a consequence of these changes, the Kingdom of Morocco which has been alongside with the African matters decided to withdraw from the OAU in 1984 as a

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<sup>1</sup> Polisario: Initially, the Polisario Front- A liberation group founded on May 10, 1973 by Mustapha Sayed El Ouali whose initial goal was to "Opt for revolutionary violence and armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi population can recover its total liberty and foil the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism", then completely changed its course of action, delivering an ambiguous statement in favor of full independence of the Western Sahara, during its second congress in August 1974. This announcement proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a government-in-exile in Algeria. The Polisario have since received the political, military and diplomatic backing of the Algerian regime against Morocco". See:

HASNAOUI Yasmine,"Morocco and the African Union: a new chapter for western Sahara resolution?",available on : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12679>, 2017, accessed : 01-04-2020 22:49 UTC

<sup>2</sup> ibid



protest against accepting a member which lacks the principles of a state, since it was not having any geographical space, population or sovereignty.

We understand now that the Moroccan foreign policy towards African nations from 1956 to 1984 was characterized by the dominance of its territorial claims (Mauritania and eastern lands in 60<sup>th</sup>, western Sahara during 70<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup>); in addition to its ambitions of seeing a strong, united and safe African continent.

**Research questions:**

The territorial claims of Morocco have been for over 30 years of its independence the main engine of its African and foreign policy until the withdrawal from OAU in 1984. Thus we raise the following questions:

- Did Morocco follow the same political method on its African foreign policy after 1984?
- Had the kingdom worked to diversify its African policy pillars after 1984?
- How could Morocco benefit from the regional and international environment after 1984 and during the decade of 90<sup>th</sup> in order to revive its position on the African arena?

**Objectives of the study:**

The main goal of this paper is to shed some lights on the profound changes that came to shape the Moroccan policy towards Africa as it is known now. In addition to understand the deep factors that contribute to create the modern aspects and dimensions in the Kingdom's policy towards its African allies and partners after quitting the pan africanism organization in 1984.

**Methodology and importance of the study:**

In order to elaborate this work, we have conducted a research between several documents and websites providing the last studies that deal with the same issue. These studies, documents and references deemed necessary and invaluable for this study.

With regard to the title, we can clearly observe the presence of the historical approach that we depend on throughout this research with the aim to highlight the great periods in the modern exterior policy of Morocco towards Africa after the independence. This approach serves as a link between the past and the present for a better understanding of the profound evolutions of the Kingdom's African policy.

It's very important to clarify that this paper deals with the contexts that have contributed in making the African policy of Morocco in a very critical time between 1984 and 2001 which coincides the last years of king Hassan 2 and the early years of the young king Mohammed 6's rule .

We think that this period is the key factor to understand the ongoing Moroccan activities on the African scene, in order to reinforce its presence in several parts of the continent. So, we consider this duration as the time of renewing the pillars and objectives of Morocco's African policy, and that's the reason why we focus on studying it.

### **The Study Axes:**

After studying many papers and researches dealing with the same issue, we suggest to tackle the subject study via 3 axes:

- First: working on the bilateral level after 1984;
- Second: Participating in promoting peace and security operations;
- Third: Integrating sub regional organizations and focusing on economic interests.

### **First: Working on the Bilateral Level after 1984.**

#### **1- Strengthening ties with Traditional Allies**

Since Morocco has lost its role in making the collective decision after the departure of OUA, this matter didn't stop the Kingdom to opt for another policy on the basis of bilateral relations especially with the allies from Western and central Africa.

According to the realism and pragmatism as principles of the new African orientations, Morocco has done tremendous efforts in order to preserve its traditional allies and partners. These efforts are clearly evident from the numerous treaties that had been signed with many African countries, especially with Senegal whose president ABDO DIOF visited Rabat in April 12<sup>th</sup>, 1987. After this visit, 4 agreements were signed between April 1987 and March 1991 concerning public health, public administration, social affairs and artisanal activities<sup>1</sup>.

Reinforcing these orientations, Morocco has led negotiations with other African countries in order to promote the bilateral cooperation. We mention in this regard, that relations were revived with Cameroon as they were before with the official visit of the president PAUL BIA to Rabat in April 14<sup>th</sup>, 1987<sup>2</sup>. In addition to this, Morocco has signed several agreements with Mali between September 1987 and March 1989 especially in the domains of commerce, public administration and education<sup>3</sup>.

In the same context, Morocco has developed its presence in many other countries like Cote D'Ivoire<sup>4</sup>, Zaire, Niger and the Republic of Central Africa, and that by signing bilateral conventions that covered many domains of cooperation between 1985 and 1989.

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<sup>1</sup> BENI AZZA Abdelmalek, « les dimensions et les perspectives des relations commerciales maroco-sénégalaises » in YAHYA Abou lfarah et al « **La présence Marocaine en Afrique de l'ouest : Cas du Senegal, du Mali et de la Cote d'Ivoire** » publié par l'institut des études Africaines de Rabat, université Mohmed 5, 1997, pp 106-107

<sup>2</sup> EL MELLOUKI RIFFI Bouhout, « la politique Marocaine de coopération avec l'Afrique subsaharienne : 1960-1994 », in ABDALLAH Saff et al « **Le Maroc et l'Afrique après l'indépendance** », , publié par l'institut des études Africaines de Rabat, université Mohamed 5 , 1996, pp 77-78

<sup>3</sup> SAAF Abdallah, « Notes sur les relations entre le Maroc et quelques pays africains : le Mali, le Gabon, la Zaire », in ABDALLAH Saff et al « **Le Maroc et l'Afrique après l'indépendance** », , publié par l'institut des études Africaines de Rabat, université Mohamed 5 , 1996, p93

<sup>4</sup> BENI AZZA Abdelmalek, « les échanges commerciaux Maroc-Cote d'Ivoire », in YAHYA Abou lfarah et al « **La présence Marocaine en Afrique de l'ouest : Cas du Senegal, du Mali et de la Cote d'Ivoire** » publié par l'institut des études Africaines de Rabat, université Mohmed 5, 1997, pp 331-334

As a result of this dynamic activism with the Western and Central African countries between 1984 and 1989, Morocco could hardly avoid the consequences of the diplomatic isolation which it suffered from after the split with the OAU.

## **2- Normalization with Countries Recognizing SADR**

The reason which led Morocco to practice the “empty chair policy” since 1984 is the admission of SADR in the pan-African organization, which obtain an unconditional support from several African countries. The reaction of the kingdom towards these countries was a break of diplomatic relations with them, which worsened the isolation of Morocco in the continent.

However, this policy conducted by the country towards its rivals will change during the 90s, since the regional and international environment knew deep transformations especially on the political levels of many African and international nations.

In this context, we mention the re-establishment of relations between Morocco and some countries that have announced a hostile attitude towards the kingdom’s first affair: western Sahara, like Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Cap Vert and Nigeria<sup>1</sup>...

As a result, some countries withdrew their recognition of the SADR, notably Benin, Liberia, Togo and Swaziland since 1997<sup>2</sup>.

To understand the rapid events that allowed Morocco to penetrate the socialist countries and refresh its relations with them, the historical and political context should be taken into consideration; the context of 90s which was characterized by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The dissolution of the socialist bloc had contributed in decreasing the Soviet homogeneity in the African continent especially when the president Boris Eltsine took

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<sup>1</sup> BARRE Abdelaziz, “Les relations entre la Maroc et les pays d’Afrique Subsaharienne”, in LAURENCE Marfaing et al., “**Les relations Transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine**”, edition Karthala, 2003, p 73

<sup>2</sup> ANTIL Alain « le royaume du Maroc et sa politique envers l’Afrique Sub-Saharienne » étude publié par l’institut Français des relations internationales , novembre, 2003 , p 40

the decision in 1991 to cease any form of financial aid to the sub-Saharan countries and orient this money in order to resolve the intern crisis of Russia<sup>1</sup>.

The other results of the soviet collapse were evidently expensive, by the closing of 9 soviet embassies, 3 consulates and 13 cultural centers from Togo to Lesotho and from Burkina Faso to Sao Tmoé<sup>2</sup>.

Within this context, we grasp the Moroccan diplomatic activism on the African arena during the 90s, and we understand that the kingdom knew how to invest the new conditions into its favor, particularly Morocco was one of the Anti-socialist countries in Africa. This claim was clear from the 70s when Morocco sent a military aid to Zaire and explained it by the necessity to defend the territorial integrity of the country and to fight the Marxist guerrillas who threatened the stability of Zaire<sup>3</sup>

## **Second: Participation of Morocco in the Operations of Peace keeping in Africa**

The dissolution of URSS in the beginning of 90s led to hard transformations all over the world. Since 1991, the new wars which occurred in Balkans and Africa had ethnic and religious aspects.

The new era of the 90s was characterized by the increase of civil wars in Africa due to the deep political changes in many sub-Saharan countries. This reality creates a destabilization situation in numerous countries like Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cote D'ivoire, Liberia, RDC, Somalia and Rwanda. The latest was a field of the most dramatic events with the genocide against Toutsu tribes.

In this atmosphere, it was not acceptable to stay without a reaction even from international parties or the continental ones. This situation pushed the United Nations to interfere in many African lands with the aim to re-establish peace and security

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<sup>1</sup> ALEXANDRA Arkhangelskaya, « Le retour de MOSCOU en Afrique subsaharienne ? entre héritage soviétique, multilatéralisme et activisme politique », *Afrique contemporaine*, n 248, 2013/4, p 63

<sup>2</sup> idem

<sup>3</sup> BARRE Abdelaziz, "Les relations entre la Maroc et les pays d'Afrique Subsaharienne", p 74

within the regions affected by atrocious wars, using its military means known as peace keeping forces.

The UN peace keeping forces were made up of warriors coming from different countries. In this regard, Morocco appeared as one of the most interested African countries with the questions of peace and security in the continent. That's the reason which pushed the Moroccan officials to take the decision of promoting peace in the affected nations through contributing with men and arms in the UN's operations.

Morocco had demonstrated its engagement towards the security and peace issues in Africa in many past occasions. Thus, it had to continue the same paths during the 90s by taking part in UN interfere in Somalia which suffered since 1992 from a bloody war.

The Moroccan participation in "operation Restore Hope" was explained by human reasons. In this context Morocco sent a military contingent of 1250 person including a medical stuff<sup>1</sup>. This operation was known as "ONUSOM 1" which took place between April 1992 and March 1993. One year later Morocco participated again in the second mission to Somalia under the name of "ONUSOM 2"<sup>2</sup>.

The humanitarian dimension of the Moroccan participation in Somalia is clearly evident from the activities assumed by Moroccan contingent whose role was to protect the civilians and provide medical assistance via the field hospital which was established there.

In addition to this, Moroccan forces took part in two missions of UN in Angola under the name "UNAVEM 1" and "UNAVEM 2" between 1989 and 1996<sup>3</sup>. The main goal of these missions was to supervise the departure of Cuban forces, control cease

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<sup>1</sup> BARRE Abdelaziz, "Les relations entre la Maroc et les pays d'Afrique Subsaharienne", p81

<sup>2</sup> JEAN-YVES Moissoner et JEAN FRANCOIS Daguzan, «Les ambitions régionales Marocaines en Afrique Sub-Saharienne : une diplomatie royale », *Maghreb – Machrek* , N 240, 2019/2, p79

<sup>3</sup> idem

fire, provide humanitarian aids and create favorable conditions in order to facilitate the national reconciliation<sup>1</sup>

The Moroccan contribution in peacekeeping operations alongside the African nations during 90s under the umbrella of UN had institutionalized security cooperation between Morocco and its African allies. This cooperation is largely evident from hosting the African students who wanted to benefit from the Moroccan expertise and trainings in the different military schools and institutions alongside Moroccan officers<sup>2</sup>.

Morocco's engagement on the military level to make a safe Africa is explained not only with the humanitarian duties, but also by its intention to protect its investments and economic interests in west Africa where the most Moroccan companies have deepened their presence. Many of these companies are founded or co-founded by investors who belong to the ruling circle<sup>3</sup>, so it was necessary for them to contribute in the stability of African states in order to ensure the stability of their interests.

The economic interests were becoming slowly and steadily to form one of the most important exterior policy's pillars towards Africa from the end of the nineties until nowadays.

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<sup>1</sup> ليلي الإدريسي العزوزي، "البعد الأمني في العلاقات المغربية الإفريقية"، ورد في كتاب "أبعاد دول المغرب الكبير في إفريقيا : التحولات والتحديات"، إشراف وتنسيق كريمة الصديقي، الطبعة الأولى، المركز الديمقراطي العربي للدراسات الإستراتيجية والسياسية والإقتصادية، برلين، 2020، ص 13

<sup>2</sup> EL- KATIRI Mohammed, « From Assistance to partnership : Morocco and its foreign policy in west Africa », <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11519>, 2015, Accessed: 01-04-2020 22:51

UTC

<sup>3</sup> Idem

### Third: Integrating Sub Regional Organizations and Focusing on Economic Interests

The decade of 90s was marked by the beginning of “Globalization” which has pushed the world states to unify their efforts and cooperation in regional blocs<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, globalization has given the extreme importance to economic interests in the domain of international relations.

Responding to the challenges of globalization, Morocco worked with a new perception since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century according to principles of pragmatism and mutual benefits. This has led the kingdom to promote its economic presence in the continent on the one hand and try to integrate regional organizations on the other hand, with the aim to refresh its position after the failure of UMA<sup>2</sup>

#### 1- Integrating Sub Regional Blocs:

The sub regional blocs that Morocco has desired to join are: COMESSA, UEMOA and CEDEAO.

In 2001, Morocco joined the community of Sahel and Sahara states (COMMESA) known in the Arab world as SinSad (first letters of Sahel and Sahara in Arabic), which was founded in 1998 by an initiative of the Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi ( aimed to promote the economic development and fight poverty within the member states). For this reason, the establishment of BADC: African Bank for Development and Commerce as the financial mean of the community comes in order to meet the previous goals and create a future economic union between the members<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In 1992, the three countries of North America ( Mexico, USA , Canada) founded the ALENA group. In the same year, European countries members of economic community decided to create the European Union

<sup>2</sup> UMA :Maghreb Arab Union, was established in 1989 by five countries of north africa : Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia. But, the thorny problems between its members, especially between Morocco and Algeria concerning borders and western Sahara conflict led to the stagnation of the body until nowadays.

<sup>3</sup> STEFFEN Wippel, “Le renouveau des relations Marocaines avec l’Afrique subsaharienne: la formation d’un espace économique transsaharien?” in LAURENCE Marfaing et al, “**les relations transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine**”, edition Karthala, 2003, P 39



.Besides, members have established a peace observatory in order to preserve security and stability in the region.

The purpose of the Kingdom in joining this community is to promote its economic presence in this regional market which is characterized by abundance of population and natural resources, which will allow Morocco to merchandize the products needed in these countries.

In addition to this, keeping the border's security appears as one of the most important goal's for Morocco, since these countries are considered as its hinterlands. Thus, the security of kingdom is from the security of these countries, because Morocco will be the first affected by instability in the region, since it is the gateway of Africa towards Europe<sup>1</sup>.

Morocco has also shown its interest in dealing with the UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) since 2000, while the two parts signed a “*preferential agreement of commerce and investment*” in order to encourage the flow of investments between the two parts. However, the dream of making a free trade zone still too far because of the member's fear of serious consequences on their economy in case of Moroccan and European 's involvement to their markets<sup>2</sup>

The other community that Morocco hoped to join is the CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) which is more active entity than UEMOA on the geopolitical level because it represents a promising road for the Kingdom. This desire finds its way to be a reality when Morocco applied officially to join the CEDEAO on February 24th, 2017. Four months later, the CEDEAO officially agreed for the integration of the Kingdom in the organization<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> EL- KATIRI Mohammed, « From Assistance to partnership : Morocco and its foreing policy in west Africa », p 17

<sup>2</sup> STEFFEN Wippel, “Le renouveau des relations Marocaines avec l'Afrique subsaharienne: la formation d'un espace économique transsaharien?”, p 38

<sup>3</sup> JEAN-YVES Moisseron et JEAN FRANCOIS Daguzan, «Les ambitions régionales Marocaines en Afrique Sub-Saharienne : une diplomatie royale », p 80

By these efforts done by the state in the beginning of the 21st century on joining sub regional blocs, in order to promote its multilateral relations and economic exchange, Morocco could finally re-integrate the continental organization: African Union, in the end of January, 2017, after 33 years of absence.

This return to the large African homeland is the real demonstration of Morocco's belief and engagement towards the African issues and matters, despite the chronic differences that occur since the last three decades. It's also an opportunity for Morocco to show its good willing towards the development and stability issues in the African scene. It also translates Morocco's intention to overcome conflicts caused by western Sahara problem. The mutual benefits and the common challenges are becoming the basis of cooperation that Morocco defends to implement on the continental level under the slogan: south-south cooperation<sup>1</sup>.

## **2- Promoting economic interests:**

Since the mid- 90s another dimension of Morocco's policy towards Africa becomes a major principle of the Kingdom's exterior relations until nowadays: the economic dimension.

In this regard, we mention the intensification of economic relations with sub-Saharan countries which is evident through the increasing of bi and multilateral agreements; from 150 agreements in the first half of 90s to 270 agreements at the beginning of 2001. These agreements were signed during African leaders visits to Rabat, or while Moroccan officials visited different West African capitals.

For several years, Moroccan high diplomats and politicians haven't been in any visit to sub-Saharan country until the coming of the Prime Minister Abdurrahman Youssoufi<sup>2</sup> who has visited 5 countries from west and central Africa in 1999: Senegal,

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<sup>1</sup> For more informations, see : FOLASHADE Soulé-Kohndou, « Histoire contemporaine des relations sud-sud. Les contours d'une évolution graduelle », *Afrique contemporaine*, n 248, 2013-4, pp 108-111, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2013-4-page-108.htm> Accessed : 2-04-2020

<sup>2</sup> Abdurrahman Youssoufi (1924-2020) : Moroccan Socialist figure and one of the prominent opposition leaders, he worked all his life for democratization in Morocco, famous of been leader of the Moroccan government between 1998 and 2002.

Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Fasso, Guinea and Gabon. This visit was characterized by the presence of a businessmen group representing the private sector in the Moroccan official delegation. Thus, we understand Morocco's new orientations in order to make fruitful relations with its partners<sup>1</sup>.

During this visit many economic mixed commissions were reactivated or newly established with the aim to promote bilateral exchange and refresh investments movement between the two parts. This mission was accorded also to the "centre Marocain de promotion des exportations" whose job is to send trade missions to African partners, taking part in fairs and organizes exhibitions of sale<sup>2</sup>.

Been aware with the importance of reinforcing the economic exchange, Morocco has worked on transportation levels as means to refresh the exportations and importations movement. To approve this effort, Morocco has financed the construction of trans-borders road between Western Sahara and Mauritania which is in the same time Trans-African, inter-agherban and euro-African road. Besides, the Kingdom has invested in the domain of air transport via its known company "*Royal Air Maroc*" which plays an important role in linking between Morocco and West African capitals. In the same vein; Morocco has established many maritime lines, especially that one between Casablanca and Dakar since 2002<sup>3</sup>.

With these remarkable efforts, Morocco tends to increase the size of trade with African countries, but also to augment investments in different countries through the Moroccan companies representing the private and public sector. As a result, Morocco becomes the first African investor in West Africa and the second one on the continental level behind the republic of South Africa.

The main domains that receive the Moroccan direct investment in Africa are : Banking, insurance, building, cements, agriculture, infrastructure, telecoms. In this

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<sup>1</sup> ANTIL Alain, « le royaume du Maroc et sa politique envers l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne », pp40-41

<sup>2</sup> STEFFEN Wippel, "Le renouveau des relations Marocaines avec l'Afrique subsaharienne: la formation d'un espace économique transsaharien?", p34

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p36

regard, we mention the increasing role of different leading Moroccan companies such as : *Attijar Wafa Bank*, *BMCE Bank of Africa*, *Banque Centrale Populaire* in domain of banking. *Addoha* in domain of building. *Maroc Telecom* in the domain of telecoms. *OCP (Office Chérifien des Phosphates)* in the domain of agriculture and fertilizers<sup>1</sup>...

Strengthening the presence of Moroccan companies in Sub-Saharan Africa comes in the strategy of Moroccan decision makers in order to position Morocco as a hub and foothold for international companies with an interest in expanding across the African continent. This ambition becomes more realistic with the launch of *Casablanca Finance City* project in 2010 as a hub for French speaking Africa market. One of the many multinational manufacturers that have set up production units in Morocco have been attracted by possibilities of accessing African markets, it's the French automaker: PSA Peugeot Citroen which was attracted by the affordable skilled labor, but also by the potential for accessing sub-Saharan and middle-Eastern markets<sup>2</sup>.

## **Conclusion:**

At the end of this paper, we understand and appreciate the efforts done by the Kingdom in order to preserve its "African identity", especially after 1984 which symbolizes the long absence of Morocco on the pan-African organization. However, the management of the new situation was characterized by wisdom and rationalism of the Moroccan officials who have fully realized in depth the signals of the new era in 90s and the first decade of 21st century to take it as a platform to renew the basis and objectives of the kingdom's African policy.

With the ambition to maintain the Moroccan influence in west and central Africa notably, the Kingdom depends not only on its geographical position, but also on its historical ties with African communities that date back to centuries. This geographical and historical depth allows Morocco to make a new paradigm of cooperation based on

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<sup>1</sup> EL- KATIRI Mohammed, « From Assistance to partnership : Morocco and its foreign policy in west Africa », pp 11-14

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp 14-15

the mutual interests and challenges with African partners whatever their opinions about the western Sahara conflict are.

Focusing on the financial benefits in the age of globalization makes Morocco as one of the most prestigious continental partners of African countries. In addition to this, Morocco exploits all its expertise in different domains and puts it at the disposal of African countries which contribute in shining the reputation of the Kingdom as a defender of development issues of African societies.

The three pillars that we have discussed above are not the only principles of Morocco's foreign policy towards African countries, there are also the cultural and religious aspects that we consider it as soft power keys to expand Moroccan presence in the African continent. The analysis of the cultural and religious ties between Morocco and African countries will be the subject of a future paper.

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**The Relationship between the GDP, FDI, and Non-Oil Exports in the Saudi Economy - 1970-2019: Evidence from (VECM) and (ARDL) Assessment - according to Vision 2030**

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**Abstract:**

This study examines the long-term and short-term balance relationship of GDP, Foreign Direct Investment to the performance of nonoil exports in KSA within the framework of the export-led growth (ELG) hypothesis: Evidence from ARDL, VECM and a smaller evaluation according to Vision 2030. We performed an analysis for the period from 1970 to 2019 by an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model and checked the robustness of the results in the vector error correction (VECM) model. The co-integration and Toda - Yamamoto causality analysis are conducted by using two techniques of vector error correction model (VECM) and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL). The main findings are: Foreign direct investment can increase GDP growth rates by increasing non-oil exports in the Saudi economy according to the results of the Toda - Yamamoto Causality Test; and the GDP in the Saudi economy are affected by FDI and the rates of non-oil exports, in the long and short term, and the reason is the strength of the reserves of the Saudi economy. The contribution of this research is that the outcomes found by means of econometric models can be used for predicting and measuring GDP in upcoming years, can get a guideline from this research To the economic policy makers in Saudi Arabia. Also, the dynamic interaction among FDI, non-oil exports, and economic growth is investigated using the ARDL. The ARDL co-integration results showed that GDP, FDI and non-oil exports are co-integrated, indicating the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between them. Besides, the results for the relationship between GDP, FDI and Non-Oil



Exports are interesting and indicate that there is no significant from variables and vice-versa using Toda-Yamamoto causality.

**Keywords:** GDP, FDI, Non-oil exports, Stationary, Toda-Yamamoto Test, VECM, ARDL

### **1- Introduction:**

In view of the complex socio-economic and environmental factors Since the announcement of Saudi's Vision2030 in April 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has witnessed an economic, social and structural transformation as reforms have been implemented towards achieving the Vision's goals. Vision 2030 is supported by 13 approved programs. These programs aim to develop promising economic sectors and increase the productivity of existing pivotal sectors by raising government efficiency and stimulating the prosperity of communities. Vision 2030 aims to achieve comprehensive and diversified economic development, especially in the non-oil sector, to achieve economic growth and fiscal sustainability. Vision 2030 will increase job opportunities and female's participation in the labor market, improving the living standards of citizens (Ministry of Finance, KSA 2019, p13).

Every step made towards production base diversification can be considered a real achievement that we should build on continuously, especially in view of global competition. Every achievement in this area, regardless of how modest it is, also represents a direct safeguard for the future of the Saudi economy in general and the economic potentials that are inherent in this economy and working to diversify it.

The Kingdom's prevailing growth model depends mainly on oil revenues that are redistributed in the economy via government spending on goods, services and employee salaries. Part of this spending relates to citizens' wages and payroll in the public sector and is classified as a consumption expenditure, while another part of it relates to capital spending on development projects, infrastructure and social services. This kind of spending goes to the payment of private sector contracts and profits. After four decades of oil exports, this sector's activity is still concentrated in three main

areas: construction, services, and the importation and marketing of foreign products under Commercial Agency Law (Khalid 2015).

In applied econometrics, co-integration techniques and (ADRL) have become the solution to determining the long run relationship between series that are non-stationary, as well as parameterizing them to the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) . With this background, the objective of this paper is to examine and measuring the short and long-term equilibrium relationship between GDP, FDI and non-oil exports in the Saudi economy through standard modeling (ARDL), (VECM) and causal for Toda-Yamamoto (1995).

The motivation of this study is to address the following inherent problems observed in the literature. First, although the relationship between GDP, FDI and non-oil exports potentially relates to the incidence of to be linked to an economic growth in a particular economy, the trivariate linkage of GDP, FDI and non-oil exports has not been deliberated yet, especially in the framework of co-integration and Toda-Yamamoto.1995 causality, and VECM, ARDL. Moreover, no study linking the role of FDI in the non–oil export – growth relationship in KSA could be cited from available related literature.

## **2- Theories of Growth and Foreign Direct Investment:**

According to the endogenous growth theory, the main determinants of economic growth include factors such as economies of scale, increasing returns or induced technological changes in the production process. Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) developed a growth model explaining the relationship between FDI and economic growth within the endogenous growth theory. In this model, technological advancement is assumed to be the main driving force of economic growth. The creation of technological knowledge, the transfer of this knowledge and innovation are major engines for growth in these theories. New growth theories finds a bidirectional causality between FDI and growth. Factors that could explain this are as follows: the incorporation of new inputs and foreign technologies in the production function of host country, the increase in host country's existing knowledge through

training and development (Borensztein et al., 1998 and De Mello, 1999). Nonetheless, Dowling and Hiemenz (1982) contends that inflow of FDI is stimulated when there is rapid economic growth in the host country. This rapid growth creates an enabling environment and a self-assurance to foreign investors to invest in the host country. Additionally, high levels of capital requirements created as a result of sustainable growth coupled with the host country's need for FDI gives birth to a macroeconomic climate that attracts foreign investors. Hence, foreign direct investment and economic growth has a positive and bidirectional causality relationship.

Several studies have been conducted to measure the causal relationship between GDP, FDI in KSA (e.g. Mohmmmed, Tarek 2010, Mounir, Atef 2018, Khalid, 2013). However, most studies do not use the method of combining tests (ARDL, VECM and Toda - Yamamoto) to measure the causal relationships relationship between GDP, FDI in KSA.

### **3- Data, model and methods:**

#### **1.3 Data and empirical modeling:**

Data were collected the annual data for gross domestic product (GDP), FDI and non-oil exports from the International Monetary Fund. This study covers the annual sample period from 1970 to 2019. The descriptive statistics show that the standard deviations differ among variables. In addition, at the 5% significance level, we find that all variables are normally distributed (Jarque-Bera, Skewness and Kurtosis statistics) See Table No. (1).

**Table (1): Descriptive Statistics:**

<b>Statistics</b>	<b>GDP</b>	<b>FDI</b>	<b>NOE</b>
<b>Mean</b>	6248396260.924869	262681065971.759	120124058821.1863
<b>Median</b>	874450102.521353	155950708152.6145	62431688637.29755
<b>Maximum</b>	39455863929.3334	766350347333.333	399419733333.3329

<b>Minimum</b>	-3732394367.24856	5377333333.33333	2731777777.77778
<b>Std. Deviation</b>	11082189552.44239	242696763626.1531	116249445647.022
<b>Skewness</b>	1.754655550165247	1.0329836795287	1.100208075358777
<b>Kurtosis</b>	5.039691293436434	2.562814741363974	2.883656753798241
<b>Jarque Bera</b>	34.32417702379836	9.290316831373444	10.11534789015713

### 2.3 Methodology:

As In time series econometrics, the starting point is to study the time series properties of the variables under consideration to avoid any spurious relationships between them. If the time series properties of the variables are satisfied, then possible long-term relationships or co-integration are likely to exist, The analytical procedure adopted in this study include: the specification of the empirical models, the concept of Toda-Yamamoto causality within a ARDL framework, Vector Error-Correction Modeling (VECM). The baseline empirical model is specified to capture the hypothesized relationship among the core variables namely GDP, FDI and non-oil export. In doing this, the endogenous growth theory is a useful guide. This theory emphasizes the role of exports in determining long-run growth via a higher rate of technological innovation and dynamic learning from abroad (Romer, 1986) (Lucas, 1988).

Figure 1 shows that Saudi GDP is increasing during the study period because the increase in the rates of FDI, non-oil exports and other variables, and both foreign direct investment and Non-Oil Exports increased during the study period. It was found that during the period 1990 and 2019 the increase and change was A quick and simple. The researcher finds that the change is consistent for all variables during this period.

Figure 1.1




Figure 1.2





Figure 1.3



### 1.2.3 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL):

The study draws on the ARDL approach that is proposed by Pesaran et al and subsequently it was modified by Pesaran, Shin and Smith by introducing the bounds testing approaches. We select this technique for two main reasons: First, it is effective in executing the short- and long-term relationships between the different variables that do not have the same order of integration - provided that such variables are stationary in level; I (0), and/or they are stationary in the first difference; I (1). Second, the ARDL approach can remove the problems associated with omitted variables and auto correlation. The model used for the application of the ARDL approach:

$$\Delta \text{GDP}_t = \alpha + \sum \beta_i \Delta \text{GDP}_{t-1} + \sum \lambda_i \Delta \text{FDI}_{t-i} + \phi \text{GDP}_{t-1} + \delta \text{NOE}_{t-1} + \eta_t$$

**GDP**= Gross domestic product

**FDI**= Foreign Direct Investment

**NOE**= Non-oil exports

( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\lambda$ ,  $\phi$ ,  $\delta$ )= Coefficients of variables

$\Delta$ = The first difference for the variables

$\eta$ = Random error

Although ARDL co-integration technique does not require pre-testing for unit roots, to avoid ARDL model crash in the presence of integrated stochastic trend of I(2), we are of the view the unit root test should be carried out to know the number of unit roots in the series under consideration. This is presented in the next section.

### 2.2.3 Vector Error Correction Models (VECM):

The VECM approach provides a systematic way to treat non-stationary variables in a simultaneous equation system, thus addressing the issues of simultaneity and non-stationarity. A brief discussion of these issues is followed by a description of the general form of the VECM, and included variables GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports of the Saudi economy during the period which is 1970-2019. Causality inferences in

the multi-variate framework are made by estimating the parameters of the following VECM equations.

$$\left[ \Delta GDP = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^m \beta_i \Delta GDP_{t-i} + \sum_{k=1}^0 \delta_k \Delta FDI + \sum_{l=1}^p \zeta_l \Delta Non-OilE + \theta Z_{t-1} + \varepsilon \right]$$

where (GDP) and (FDI) denote GDP and FDI respectively, (Non-OilE) is the Non-Oil Exports, and  $z_{t-1}$  is the error-correction term which is the lagged residual series of the cointegrating vector. The error-correction term measures the deviations of the series from the long run equilibrium relation.

### 3.3.3 Toda – Yamamoto (1995) Causality:

The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) method of Granger causality test is relatively more efficient in small sample data sizes and is particularly appropriate for time series for which the order of integration is not known or may not be necessarily the same, or the order of integration is more than two. Another advantage of this procedure is that it does not require the pretesting of the time series for cointegration properties so long as the order of integration of the process does not exceed the true lag length of the model. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology of Granger causality test by directly performing the test on the coefficients of the levels VAR, minimises the risk associated with possibly wrongly identifying the orders of integration of the series and the presence of cointegration relationship (Galies, 1997; Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001).

Modified Wald test (MWALD) for the causality test is used as proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) which avoids the problems associated with the ordinary Granger causality test by ignoring any possible non-stationary or co-integration between series when testing for causality. The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach fits a vector autoregressive model in the levels of the variables thereby minimizing the risks associated with the possibility of faulty identifying the order of integration of the series (Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001).

## 4- Empirical Results and Discussion:

### 1.4 Unit Root and Co-integration Tests:

Before I proceed with the ARDL bounds test, I tested for the stationarity status of all variables to determine their order of integration. This is to ensure that the variables are not I(2) stationary so as to avoid spurious results. According to Ouattara (2004) in the presence of I(2) variables the computed F-statistics provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) are not valid because bounds test is based on the assumption that the variables are I(0) or I(1). Therefore, the implementation of unit root tests in the ARDL procedure might still be necessary in order to ensure that none of the variable is integrated of order 2 or beyond. I employed ADF dickey-fuller test to obtain the order of integration of each variable as results shown in Table (2).

Relying on the results of the conducted unit root tests, we conclude that the studied time series are of Same order of integration. According to the results of the ADF test, we have variables (GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports) stationary in the first difference I (0).

**Table (2): Results of Unit-Root Test (ADF):**

<b>Variabl es</b>	<b>Level ADF test statistics</b>	<b>Lag s</b>	<b>First Difference ADF test statistics</b>	<b>Lag s</b>
<b>GDP</b>	0.849850	1	<b>-5.531369*</b>	1
<b>FDI</b>	-1.085793	1	<b>-5.579721*</b>	1
<b>NOE</b>	-0.736134	1	<b>-5.702097*</b>	1

\*,\*\* Denotes rejection at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Results of ADF unit root tests shown in Table 1, indicate that the hypothesis that the time series LGDP, LFDI and LNon-Oil Exports are stationary in the first difference can be accepted. Relying on the results of the conducted unit root tests, we conclude that the studied time series are of same order of integration. According to the results of the ADF, tests, we have all variables (GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports) stationary in the first difference I (0). has the order of integration I (1) based on the results of the ADF tests.



**2.4 ARDL Bound Test Critical Values:**

Maximum 4 lag is used to carry out the find cointegration relationship between variables. Minimum Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SBC) are used to determine optimal lag length. ARDL(1,0,4) is the optimal model for the cointegration analysis, and there is no autocorrelation problem in this estimated model. Besides, the calculated F-statistic of the model is founded as 30.85176.

**Table (3): ARDL Bound Test Critical Values:**

<i>k</i>	<i>F-statistic</i>	<i>10% Significance Level</i>		<i>5%Significance Level</i>		<i>2.5%Significance Level</i>		<i>1%Significance Level</i>	
<b>2</b>	<b>30.85</b>	<b>I(0)</b>	<b>I(1)</b>	<b>I(0)</b>	<b>I(1)</b>	<b>I(0)</b>	<b>I(1)</b>	<b>I(0)</b>	<b>I(1)</b>
		4.19	5.06	4.87	5.85	5.79	6.59	6.34	7.52

**Note:** k denotes the independent variables in the model (FDI, Non-Oil Exports).

The long-run co-integration relationship between GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports exists. So, the long-run coefficients of the model should be estimated. ARDL (1,0,4) is the optimal lag lengths for the long run model, and its estimation results are showed in Table (4). There is no autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and normality problem in the long-run estimation. The GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports is calculated as 1.00, and it is statistically significant at 10%. According to long-run estimation results, FDI, Non-Oil Exports affects GDP positively.

Table (4): Long-Run Estimation Results :

Independent Variables	Coefficients	Probability	
GDP(-1)	-0.989097**	0.0247	
NOE(-1)	0.483089*	0.0000	
C	-1.462408	0.9531	
Descriptive Statistics			
R2	0.98	Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	1.21 [0.31]
Adjusted R2	0.97	Normality (Jarque-Bera)	1.71 [0.45]
Autocorrelation (LM)	4.92 [0.42]	Durbin-Watson stat	1.68

**Note:** \*\* and \* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

Figures in the square brackets are p-values

### 3.4 VECM Short Run Coefficients:

After estimating the long-run model, an VECM should be estimated. ARDL (1,0,4) is the optimal lag lengths for the VECM, and its short-run estimation results are displayed in Table (5). This model also passed all the diagnostic tests such as autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and normality. According to results, GDP, Non-Oil Exports affects FDI in the current year positively as expected. However, its effects are negative in 3 st and 5thlags. The coefficient of  $VECM_t$  is estimated as -0.18, it is negative and statistically significant as expected. This result indicates that 18% of disequilibrium is corrected in one year.

Table (5): VECM Short Run Coefficients:

Variables	Coefficients	Standard error	t-ststistic
-----------	--------------	----------------	-------------

D(GDP(-1))	-0.750005	0.06998	-1.04946
D(GDP(-2))	1.376716	0.71466	1.91474
D(FDI(-1))	-1.802702*	0.71901	-5.82876
D(FDI(-2))	2.354218	0.98575	1.48301
D(NOE(-1))	1.117361**	1.58745	6.48761
D(NOE(-2))	-1.433752	1.48301	-1.99168
C	9.35E+09	1.7E+09	1.21108

$R^2=0.62$ .

$R^{-2}$  0.59

Durbin Watson stat = 1.68

Lagrange multiplier (Lag 1)=(0.2214), (Lag 2)=(0.3515), (Lag 3)=(0.7718)

Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey = 0.31

Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test=(0.4032)

Normality Jarque-Bera test=(0.3421).

\*Indicates significant at 1%;

\*\*Indicates significant at 5%;

VECM: Vector error correction model

The results show that GDP has long run relationship with FDI, Non-oil exports. Further, FDI, Non-oil exports positively and significantly affect GDP in the short run as well as in the long run.

#### 4.4 Toda – Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test:

After establishing that a co-integrated relationship between GDP, FDI and Non-oil exports exists, the study proceeded to also test for Toda - Yamamoto causality as introduced by Toda - Yamamoto (1995). Modified Wald test (MWALD) for the causality test is used as proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) which avoids the problems associated with the ordinary Granger causality test by ignoring any possible non-stationary or co-integration between series when testing for causality. The Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach fits a vector autoregressive model in the levels of the variables thereby minimizing the risks associated with the possibility of faulty identifying the order of integration of the series (Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001) .

So this final stage of our empirical analysis, we test for the causal relationship among our variables of interest according to Toda - yamamoto (1995) causality test.


**Table (6): Toda – Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test:**


<b>Null Hypothesis:</b>	<b>Wald test statistic</b>	<b>P-value</b>
<b>D(GDP) does not Cause D(FDI)</b>	2.083446	0.3528
<b>D(FDI) does not Cause D(GDP)</b>	2.772820	0.2500
<b>D(NOIE) does not Cause D(FDI)</b>	3.986331	0.1363
<b>D(FDI) does not Cause D(NOIE)</b>	5.343433	0.0491*
<b>D(GDP) does not Cause D(NOIE)</b>	7.140083	0.0282*
<b>D(NOIE) does not Cause D(GDP)</b>	18.03599	0.0001**

From table 6, we conclude that for GDP and inflows of foreign direct investment, there is an independent causal relationship between them. Thus, neither is there a causal effect flowing from GDP to inflow of FDI nor is there a causal effect moving from inflow of FDI to GDP at 5% level of significance. And there is a one-way causal relationship between foreign direct investment and non-oil exports. Finally, there is a bidirectional causal effect between Non-Oil Exports and GDP in KSA. Thus, at 5% level of significance, Non-Oil Exports has a causal effect on GDP.

#### CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (ARDL 1,0,4):

**Figure 2.1 CUSUM**



**Figure 2.2 CUSUMSQ**

The stability of the long run parameters were tested using the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and CUSUM of recursive squares (CUSUMSQ). The results are illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The results fail to reject the null hypothesis at 5 percent level of significance because the plot of the tests fall within the critical limits. Therefore, it can be realised that our selected ARDL (1,0,4) model is stable.

## 5- Conclusion:

**Conclusion** The paper discusses measuring the relationship between GDP, FDI and non-oil exports in KSA during the period 1970-2019. The long-run relationships between these variables are intriguing and are of acute interest to policy makers. Using the ARDL bounds-testing approach of co-integration, suggested by Pesaran et al. (2001), together with the VECM method, and Toda - Yamamoto 1995 Causality, the study reaches the following conclusions. The ARDL co-integration results showed that GDP, FDI and non-oil exports are co-integrated, indicating the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between them. The Toda - Yamamoto (1995), VECM results showed the presence of bidirectional causality between GDP, non-oil exports and a unidirectional causality from FDI and non-oil exports direct investment. A policy implication of this study is that non-oil exports can be considered to be the best policy variable to predict both foreign direct investment and economic growth in KSA. If policy-makers want to maintain sustainable economic growth and high foreign direct investment, they must focus on building non-oil exports in the economy in the longer

term. Such a policy could be also supported by infrastructure policy restructuring, especially in the non-oil exports sector, in line, for instance, with the suggestions of Pradhan and Bagchi (2013). This study would be a valuable addition to the growing body of empirical literature on relationship between macroeconomic variables, besides being useful to policy makers, investment community. They should watch out for impact of GDP, FDI in non-oil exports, and oil prices on volatility in the markets.

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**Cancellation:**

This study examines the long-run relationship between GDP, FDI and Non-Oil Exports foreign direct investment, in KSA for the time period 1970 to 2019. In order to assess the long-run relationship, the study used the tests Evidence from (VECM) and (ARDL) and evaluation from Toda - Yamamoto (1995) Causality test.

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**The Role of United Nations in the Libyan 17 February Revolution, until the Adoption of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of 17 December 2015.****By: Lobna Abdalla**

Course: PPAD 5199 - 01 Analysis of Role of the UN &amp; Arab League in Middle East Conflicts

Dr. Ambassador Aly Erfan

The Short Essay (2)

**Abstract**

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of February 2011, the anti-government protesters in Benghazi started to protest against Muammar al-Qadhafi, the former president of Libya who governed as the Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution from 1969 to 2011. Meanwhile, the Libyan regime started to use its weapons against the protesters. After a while, the regime lost state control over weapons and the fighting spread in the country. The regime no longer was the only entity that had the exclusive right to use force and weapons. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, al-Qadhafi was killed; hence, there was a vacuum in the authority. The protesters found themselves in a confrontation with the infighting in Libya. The fight between the two sides mushroomed sharply within the country. Ten days later from the beginning of the Libyan revolution “the United Nations condemned officially the violations of human rights”. This paper will discuss the role of the United Nations and the League of Arab Nations in Libya. The UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 played significant roles in Libya. To illustrate, Resolution 1970 was preparation for 1973 to take more measures to end the chaos and the spreading of weapons. The LAN’s resolution 7360 was a very crucial resolution in this conflict as this resolution supported the UNSC resolution 1973. The UNSC resolutions 1970, 1973, 2009, and the LAS’S resolution 7360 go in the same line; in other words, each resolution was a step that led to the next resolution.

**Key Words:** Libyan regime, state control, the United Nations, The UNSC resolutions

**Introduction:**

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of February 2011, the anti-government protesters in Benghazi started to protest against Muammar al-Qadhafi, the former president of Libya who governed as the Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution from 1969 to 2011 (Muhammad). Then, the protests spread to different cities within Libya on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February 2011. The protesters were inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, because of which the Tunisian president and the Egyptian president stepped down from authority. Meanwhile, the Libyan regime started to use its weapons against the protesters. After a while, the regime lost state control over weapons and the fighting spread in the country. The regime no longer was the only entity that had the exclusive right to use force and weapons. In other words, there was chaos in Libya as there was a spread of armed non-state actors. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2011, “the national transitional council assumed political leadership in the “liberated” areas” (Mattes, 2016, p. 60). On the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, al-Qadhafi was killed; hence, there was a vacuum in the authority.

The Libyan revolution, inspired by the so-called “Arab spring,” had great effects on the Middle East and North Africa region. By looking to the following events, we will realize that the term “Arab-spring” was misused and what happened in Libya is far away from “spring” at all. The protesters found themselves in a confrontation with the infighting in Libya. The fight between the two sides mushroomed sharply within the country. There were around 11,000 people killed and 50,000 people wounded from February till October (Mattes, 2016, p. 60). Ten days later from the beginning of the Libyan revolution “the United Nations condemned officially the violations of human rights” (Institute, 2017, p. 96). This paper will discuss the role of the United Nations and the League of Arab Nations in Libya. It will discuss the most crucial four resolutions that were taken by the UN and the LAS according to the chronological order. The next part will discuss the United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 (2011).

**The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011):**

The events and hostilities in Libya went so fast; as a result, the United Nations Security Council released resolution 1970 (2011). The resolution started with the negotiation between the United Kingdom and France. After the beginning of the Libyan revolution and the events that followed it, the United Kingdom sought to realize a resolution for the situation in Libya. The United States of America, the UK, and France consulted about this resolution. Then, this resolution circulated to the other non-permanent European members in the Security Council. In the end, all the countries in the Security Council voted in favor of this resolution on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 2011. This was ten days after the beginning of the Libyan revolution (Pouliot, 2014, pp. 898-900).

It is obvious that this resolution was drafted by the UK, USA, and France. The main reason for their intervention was oil. The events in Libya had a negative impact on the Libyan oil supply as Libya had stopped its oil production. Before the revolution, Libya produced over 1.6 million barrels per year, which formed two percent of the world's total oil production (Corradi, 2018). After the revolution, local groups started to use oil as a financial source and to press for their political demands (Lewis, 2018).

The Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) called to investigate and to identify those responsible in all violent acts against human rights in Libya. It recalled the Libyan authority to protect its population. Moreover, it called to terminate the violence and the Libyan regime to take steps to fulfill the population's demands, which were legitimate demands. One of the most important things in this resolution was to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, this resolution enforced an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze, and sanctions. There were two annexes in this resolution. The first annex listed sixteen people who were banned from travel because some of them were involved in violence against demonstrations or dissidents. Others were banned because of their close association with the regime. Muammar al-Qadhafi was listed in this annex because he was responsible for ordering repression of demonstrations and

human rights abuse. The second annex was about the asset freeze. This annex contained six people; five of these names were Qadhafi's four sons and his daughter (Council, Resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011).

There were some considerations about this resolution. First, the resolution recalled the Libyan authorities to protect its population, although the same authority used weapons against the demonstrators. Second, it called to terminate violence without talking about any negotiations or agreements between both sides in Libya. Third, it referred the situation in Libya to the ICC even though this resolution accused specific people of violence against protesters. Meanwhile, the Security Council should not accuse anyone of violence before the judgment of the ICC. The Security Council may say that there actually were relations between the aforementioned people in annex 1 and 2 and that they were involved with violence on the ground. Fourth, this resolution did not name any country to take responsibility to protect civilians. The next part will talk about an important resolution that was released by the League of Arab States after around twenty days from the UNSC resolution 1970 (2011).

### **The League of Arab States Resolution 7360:**

The League of Arab states played an important role in Libya by adopting LAS resolution 7360. The council of the Arab League was held on 12 March 2011 at the ministerial level in Cairo to react to the events in Libya. The resolution started to describe the case in Libya by saying that Libya is in a dangerous situation because of increasing violence and crimes from the authority side against the civilians. Then, it ensured the right of the Libyan people's demands on democracy and building their own country. After that, it emphasized Libyan unity, political independence, and the safety and security of Libyan citizens. It refused all forms of foreign intervention in Libya and emphasized that the failure to take necessary actions to end this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in Libya affairs (League, 12 March 2011).

Then, the Arab ministers in this council made important decisions. The first one was to call the Security Council to take the necessary measures to impose a no-fly zone and to establish safe areas to protect the Libyan people. The second decision was

to cooperate and communicate with the Transitional National Council of Libya. Moreover, they decided to provide Libya with urgent and continuing support (League, 12 March 2011). Syria refused this resolution because creating a no-fly zone might lead to foreign military intervention in Libya.

This resolution meant that the Libyan regime lost its legitimacy, and the Transitional National Council was the entity that supposedly was to rule the country after Qadhafi. This resolution supported the Security Council to take resolution 1973 and intervene in Libya to endorse a no-fly zone. The League of Arabs states' resolution 7360 rejected any foreign intervention in Libya, but it opened the door for foreign intervention in the case of failing to end the crisis. One of the reasons for the Arab states to take this decision was to end the Libyan crisis before more Libyan refugees leave their country for another Arab country that already is suffering from deterioration of the political and economic situation after "the Arab Spring." The next part will talk about the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 (2011).

#### **The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011):**

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of March 2011, the Security Council passed another resolution 1973 after voting with ten favorable votes, none against, and five abstentions (Pouliot, 2014, p. 902). The states that voted in favour of this resolution were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America. Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation abstained. On the one hand, the states that voted in favour of this resolution said that the reasons behind this resolution were the deterioration of the situation in Libya, the increase in violence, Libyan authorities' neglect of the Security Council resolution 1970, and the usage of heavy weapons and aircrafts against civilians. On the other hand, the states that abstained said that the use of military force would be ineffective. It is important to consider that there was little credible and clear information about the situation in Libya, specifically regarding the enforcement measures and how they will exactly be

carried out. The abstained states supported the ceasefire, the financial sanctions, and the dialogue to achieve the legitimate demands of Libyans. At the end, the Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) passed and adopted (Council, 17 March 2011).

Therefore, according to paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011), which gave the Security Council the right to take additional appropriate measures to protect human rights, the Security Council demanded to establish a ceasefire and to find a solution for the crisis in Libya by responding to the legitimate demands. In addition, it decided to establish a no-fly zone. This resolution continued the arms embargo, the ban on lights, and the asset freeze, which were all decided in the Security Council resolution 1970. This resolution added five entities in the annex of the asset freeze because they were controlled by Muammar al-Qadhafi and his family; furthermore, they are potential sources to fund his regime. The most crucial part of this resolution came under the title of “Protection of civilians.” This part says as follows:

*“4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;*

*5. ... the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;” (Council, 17 March 2011).*

This part authorized member states to take any necessary measures to protect civilians regardless whether the state would take this action individually or in a group,

or through an organization. Moreover, it did not determine a specific action that the countries can take as long as it prevented any occupation from foreign force on any part of Libyan ground. In other words, it did not determine the tools that should be used to protect civilians. It seemed that the word occupation is a political word, not a legal word. Rather, in the legal form, intervention and aggression are usually used. Furthermore, resolution 1973 recalled the Arab states to cooperate with the member states of the Security Council to implement paragraph 4 in the Security Council resolution 1973 (2011).

This resolution ended with a very important paragraph 29, which said that the Security Council “decides to remain actively seized of the matter” (Council, 17 March 2011, p. 6). This paragraph opened the door in front of the Security Council to take more action to follow up on the fast development of events in Libya. The next part will evaluate the implementation of the responsibilities to protect civilians in Libya. There was an Arab backing to this UNSC resolution by the League of Arab states’ resolution 7360. This resolution was derived from the Responsibility to protect. The next part will talk about this resolution in details.

### **The Responsibility to Protect in Libya:**

The idea of the (R2P) started at the end of 2001 by a report entitled “Responsibility to Protect.” This idea of (R2P) comes from the duty of the state to protect its population. In case the state is failing or unwilling to protect its population, the responsibility to protect lies on all states. In 2005, the member states in the United Nations committed to the responsibility to protect during the UN world summit meeting. (Nations, No date). This principle gave the member states the right to intervene to protect human rights.

The responsibility to protect addresses that “ *Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means ... The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to*



*use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis”* (Nations, No date).

It seems that the Responsibility to protect is broad enough to give the freedom to states to decide whether this case needs intervention or not. Moreover, it gives the freedom to the state to determine which action to take. In other words, it did not put any limits on the state's actions on using the power against other states. The only restriction on the state's decision while using the (R2P) is to act through the Security Council. This principle justified and opened the door for international military intervention in any state. Indeed, this principle can be used to conceal the state's interests to intervene in other states under the umbrella of human goals and protect population.

Meanwhile, the states started to implement the UNSC resolution (1973) in Libya. Fifteen NATO countries enforced the no-fly zone. NATO started to lead the operation in Libya, aiming to protect civilians, create the no-fly zone, and enforce the arms embargo. NATO started to conduct airstrikes on the areas that are governed by the government. Through the 36 weeks from NATO's operations in Libya, around 8,000 to 11,500 people were killed including al-Qadhafi (Lopez, 2015). The UNSC resolution gave the permission to use force against al-Qadhafi because he used the regime's weapons against the population. At the same time, the UNSC resolution neglected the fact that the protestors were armed and used violence. NATO started to extend its missions beyond protecting civilians and imposing a no-fly zone to target Libyan forces and support rebels that led to defeat al-Qadhafi's regime.

For the previous reasons, Brazil's United Nations delegation proposed the “Responsibility while protecting” to the UNSC in November 2011. That was after the end of the NATO operation in Libya. The Brazilian delegation argued that the NATO

operation in Libya needs clarity because it seemed that NATO went beyond protecting civilians to ousting al-Qadhafi's regime. This argument supported by India and South Africa. RWP aims to limit the using of R2P from state to intervene in other states; in other words, RWP seeks to prevent any state from overriding other states' sovereignty under the umbrella of protecting civilians (Avezov, 2013). Although the previous resolutions talked about the intervention to protect civilian, the next UNSC resolution 2009 sought to take a step towards peace by (2011).

### **The United Nations Support Mission in Libya:**

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2011, the UNSC adopted resolution 2009 to establish the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This resolution determined the objectives of the UNSMIL as follows: to restore public security, to enforce the law, to start national political dialogue, to restore the state's sovereignty over its institutions, to protect human rights, to support transitional justice, and to support economic recovery (Council, 16 September 2011 ). It seems that all the previous missions were general rules that lacked the mechanism on how to apply all these principles in reality. To illustrate, one of the most critical missions to the UNSMIL is how to start the national dialogue between opponents who carried the weapons to kill each other.

### **Conclusion:**

The UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 played significant roles in Libya. To illustrate, Resolution 1970 was preparation for 1973 to take more measures to end the chaos and the spreading of weapons. The LAN's resolution 7360 was a very crucial resolution in this conflict as this resolution supported the UNSC resolution 1973. At the same time, it emphasized that the LAS did not have effective tools to end the conflict in an Arab state. Hence, the LAS recalled the SC to intervene in Libya to put an end to this chaos and to protect civilians. As for the implementation of R2P, it needed more clarity to ensure that NATO did not exceed its mission.

I see that the UNSC resolutions 1970, 1973, 2009, and the LAS'S resolution 7360 go in the same line; in other words, each resolution was a step that led to the next resolution. As a result, I will analyze all these resolutions together as they were the most preferred alternative to intervene in Libya. I will analyze this alternative according to three criteria (political, Administrative, and technical).

One of the criteria to evaluate policy alternatives is political criteria. By looking to Libya, I found that most of the states accepted the previous resolution. Even the national transitional council accepted it. Also, the intervention in Libya went under the international principle (R2P) and according to the UN charter. The only thing is that these resolutions did not meet the real needs of the people to achieve democracy and freedom in Libya which formed the Libyan demands during their revolution. As for the technical criteria, the UN members had the required technology from military weapons to achieve their goals on imposing a no-fly zone. Also, all these resolutions meet the administrative criteria such as having the authority, resources, and support to implement this alternative. Although these resolutions met the majority of the good policy alternative criteria, it lacked transparency by declaring specific objectives and determining the mechanism of NATO's operations in Libya.

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**The Use of Force and its Role in International Law****The Author: Sayed Tantawy Mohamed Sayed****Master in Public International Law and PhD Researcher****Abstract:**

The important role that power plays in international relations has led to the emergence of schools of thought that explain international relations in the light of the concept of power, but despite the fact that power plays an essential role in international politics, it has become a means of achieving national values, and the competent bodies of the United Nations must be used fully. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security in order to increase the effectiveness of the principle of refraining from the use or threat of use of force in international relations. International security and settlement of disputes by peaceful means is not in accordance with the Charter.

**Key Words:** power, international relations, politics, values, security, charter

**Research Methodology:**

The researcher has relied on the descriptive analytical method, which depends on collecting data on a specific phenomenon and revealing its dimensions. The preamble to the UN Charter states that the peoples of the United Nations have committed themselves to stating "the conditions under which justice can be achieved and the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be achieved," and therefore the development and respect of international law remains a key part of the organization's work. The organization works in the field of

international law through the courts and multilateral treaties as well as the Security Council, which has the authority to deploy peacekeeping missions, impose sanctions and authorize the use of force in the event of a threat to international peace and security. These powers derive from the Charter of the United Nations, which is in itself an international treaty that has the force of enforcement and binding international law instruments on member states of the United Nations. The Charter codifies the main principles of international relations, from the sovereign equality of the state to the criminalization of the use of force in international relations.

**Introduction:**

Power is a natural phenomenon that has binded humanity since its existence on this earth. The form of the use of this force has developed directly and explicitly, especially military power, to an indirect use of force in the form of a threat, for example, or pressure in all its forms, which is usually called by means of coercion, for example, which does not amount to war, The international community has replaced great efforts to organize and define the prohibition of the use of force. These efforts were individually proportionate to the civilizational progress achieved by mankind. The more this progress increases, the more efforts are made in that way. Perhaps this is the reason why the civilized world has accessed increasingly deadly and more deadly and sophisticated weapons. War civilization on the one hand and on the other hand, because the phenomenon of resorting to force characterized by typically less urbanized societies while Tlji civilized societies to reason and wisdom in most dilemmas.

The important role that power plays in international relations has led to the emergence of schools of thought that explain international relations in the light of the concept of power, but despite the fact that power plays an essential role in international politics, but it has become a means to achieve national values, the competent bodies of the United Nations must be used fully The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the field of the maintenance of international peace

and security in order to increase the effectiveness of the principle of refraining from the use or threat of use of force in international relations. M and international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter. In particular, it should work to strengthen the role of the Security Council so that it can carry out its tasks fully and effectively. In this regard, the permanent members of the Council bear a special responsibility in accordance with the Charter. Despite the fact that the international community tried to limit aggression and frame the war and make it more humane, all when the United Nations Charter came up with a comprehensive plan to confront situations of threat or breach of peace, despite all of this was violated The principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations with the resumption of the case of legitimate self-defense, and this use also had negative effects even on the international situation in which wars and conflicts erupted, and this effect later followed the role of the United Nations so that it was unable to put an end to international disputes without access Depending on military power, this explains that the international community has become disorganized and solves its problems through military intervention, which has become among the problems raised at the level of international relations, which are problematic, contradictory and unacceptable, and contradicting the legitimate act issued by the Security Council. Otherwise, this does not mean accepting intervention without A mandate from the Security Council because an unlawful military act may have disastrous effects on the international system. The Security Council should be able to investigate the facts as required by the specific situation, in accordance with the Charter.

### **International Law on the Use of Force in Light of New Developments in the Americas:**

So far, the first weeks of 2020 have proven eventful for the international community. After a major opening between the United States and Iran that sparked a prolific debate over international law over the use of force, Juan Guaido traveled in late January across Europe to gather international support for his battle against the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The importance of this event cannot be overemphasized

for international law on the use of force. Indeed, during the past two years, some regional voices in the Western Hemisphere have hinted at the possibility of using force against Venezuela to overthrow the Maduro regime and restore democracy there. More specifically, a recent development that may pose a serious challenge to the United Nations Charter: the invocation of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance ("Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca" or "TIAR"), also known as the "Treaty of Rio" by a group of American states Against Venezuel.

TIAR is a collective defense pact under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It has been ratified by 19 American states (including the United States), and is a pioneer in such arrangements as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the case of Venezuela, to date, only the TIAR advisory body has authorized financial sanctions directed against the Maduro regime. However, Article 8 of the Temporary International Law has been "observed", which states, among other things, that force is used as a last resort without qualifications.

Although Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations states that "no enforcement action may be taken under regional arrangements or agencies without the permission of the Security Council", this provision is not mentioned in the first decision of the aforementioned organ on the situation in Venezuela. This publication examines whether there is a subsequent practice of a State that could, under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, lead to a new interpretation of Article 53 that would run counter to what is considered a clear text requiring the Security Council to agree to enforce actions taken by regional bodies.

### **Reality Errors when Using Lethal Force in International Law:**

In summary, we examined the error made when using lethal force in various sub-fields of international law: such a principle, in its purely subjective form, is the law of black letters in international criminal law. It is also rooted (even if not classified as such) in international human rights law and (somewhat less clear) in international



humanitarian law. However, international humanitarian law and international human rights law will require error for both honest and reasonable to be able to exclude responsibility. Both IHL and IHRL contain explicit preventive rules whose role is partly to determine the limits of reasonable error and thus permissible (for example in relation to goal verification.)

As we have seen, the question of truth is wrong in the law of war. However, as a matter of state, even if one thinks it is desirable, it will be difficult to say that the mistake of belief on legal rule is customary law. I cannot think of any country other than the United States that invoked such a doctrine, even implicitly. (Any such examples known to readers would be very welcome.) When the doctrine was invoked, as with Iranian flight 655, it was certainly not widely accepted by other countries. There is sufficient ambiguity in the state's response to the shooting down of that plane, Especially in the cold war atmosphere, where one cannot categorically exclude the possibility of such a rule. But he seems unlikely to do so. And if so, it could not be the purely subject matter of the ICL, which would be inappropriate in the context of the law of war by IHL and IHRL. With all this in mind, let us move on to dropping Ukrainian International Airlines flight 752 over Tehran, as we have seen in little way reminding of the USS Vincennes shooting down Iranian flight 655. There are many similarities between the two incidents, not least that they relate to the same two countries, if they are Different aspects of the story, and that both cases raise questions about a factual error. What is completely different is the broader context - the Cold War distorted everything that touched it. And I think it's fair to say that the social impact of international law is somewhat greater today than it was then. Thus, countries like Ukraine and Canada have already used legal language against Iran. President Zelinsky said: Iran has confessed to the Ukrainian plane crash. But we insist on a full confession of guilt. We expect Iran to confirm assurances that it is ready to conduct a full and open investigation, bring those responsible to justice, return the dead bodies, pay compensation, and make an official apology through diplomatic channel.

Likewise, Prime Minister Trudeau said that "Iran must bear full responsibility" for its actions.

This is exactly what Iran should do. You should not only listen to these other countries that claim their responsibility. She must listen to the voice of her ambassador while speaking in the Security Council Chamber to refuse to justify the American self-defense by dropping IR 655.

We believe that the responsible government, under the current conditions that caused it to destroy a civilian aircraft and its 290 passengers, must urgently take three steps: it must apologize to the families of the victims and to the peoples and governments concerned; it must accept the full responsibility for dropping the plane and providing compensation on the basis of Its legal and ethical responsibility; it must re-evaluate and review the policies that led to the downing of the plane and the killing (of its innocent passengers. S / PV.2821, 6).

Equally interesting is McCann. Indeed, I would argue that human rights law specifically - largely absent from discussions of the destruction of IR 655, regardless of one reference (of all people) the Syrian ambassador - is the law that fits dropping the Ukrainian plane. The most serious violation of international law here is not a violation of the Chicago Convention, but a violation of the human right to life, which, unlike the Chicago Convention, can never be prevented through the law of self-defense.

Just like the SAS soldiers in McCann, Iranian air defense officers sincerely believed that they had to work to avoid a threat to human life. As in McCann, they were wrongly told that this threat was certain - that American cruise missiles would be featured. As in McCann, they didn't have time to trade. As in McCann, the violation of the right to life does not stem directly from the soldiers' decision to use lethal force, but rather from systematic background failures of the highest Iranian authorities.

If Iran had closed its airspace to civilian traffic that evening, knowing full well that hostilities with the United States could escalate easily, the plane would never have been shot down. If Iran properly coordinated air defenses with civilian air traffic

control, the plane would never have been shot down. If Iran properly trained its forces at various levels, the plane would not have been shot down at all. Thus, even if Iran's real mistake that led to the destruction of the plane was sincere, it was not reasonable, and as such it would bear state responsibility for violating the human rights of the victims. This violation is exacerbated by the initial attempts of the Iranian authorities to obstruct the investigation and cover up the cause of the accident, which they happily stopped, but nevertheless led to a violation of the positive commitment to the effective investigation of illegal deaths.

This is how Iran should limit the compensation it provides - not as charitable payments as a gift, not (only) as compensation for countries like Ukraine or Canada, but only as consent to those individuals whose rights have been violated. By doing this, Iran must compensate its citizens in the same way as it does foreigners, on an equal footing with dignity. It must provide sufficient assurances to the international community that such a mistake, although it may be true, will never be repeated.

### **Manifestations of the Use of Force in International Relations and its Role in International Relations:**

In international relations, a set of practices are distributed, whether legitimate or unlawful, and through which aspects of this use can be determined, but these aspects differ and vary according to what is required by international events.

### **The First Paragraph: Intervention:**

#### **Definition of the Intervention:**

The interference in the main methods that countries used to use force in their international relations has been around since ancient times, and the concept of this idea

witnessed a great development according to the sacred European alliance, then the ideas related to it developed until it became an illegal manifestation of the use of force in the current era and some believe that The best way to define intervention is by defining non-intervention, and in this, Talirand says that non-intervention is a word that means what the intervention means.

As for Coast, he tries to provide an easier definition of the intervention, as he says the interference of a state in the affairs of another state whose aim it aims at, whether the target is humanitarian or inhuman.

Muhammad Talat Al-Ghunaimi believes that interference is the exposure of a state to the affairs of another country in an authoritarian manner and with the intention of maintaining or changing the current affairs of things.

As for Corevin, he believes that the interference is a state's breach of its power over another state with the intention of achieving a legal effect that other countries cannot compel the rest of them to do what they want to achieve. If the local authority meets attempts to intervene with armed resistance, the situation will turn to war.

## **2:The Concept of Intervention:**

Dr. Fritz Group believes that it is difficult or rather to try to define a definition of intervention based on his denial in an attempt to establish a definition of war, but despite the difficulty of establishing a comprehensive and preventive definition, a serious attempt must be made in this way. The best way to achieve this is to set and discuss the general framework for this definition, then try to develop the required definition, as Urs Schwartz is the first to put the first features of this general framework is that the purpose of the intervention is to maintain from the point of view of the intervention at least, to the status quo, whether it is From a political or legal point of view, secondly, the balance of power between the interventionist party and the other party is clearly in favor of the former, as it is unreasonable for a weak party to interfere in the affairs of a strong party, otherwise the oasis of war, and thirdly, the

intervention is a time-limited and means act and is practiced within the context of other public relations.

Finally, the interference takes place, whether or not it is claimed by the party concerned, because it is directed at influencing the political and social structure of the other side.

Thus, interference is a position or a permanent solution through which a state, an international organization, or a group of countries bypass the parties of the existing, accepted relationship. And it tries to impose its will on a country or group of countries in order to force it to do something, or take a specific position, whether it is political, moral or legal.

These above definitions address the issue of interference at the invitation of the other party, as there is no imposition of the will on the other hand, and thus this case emerges from the concept of interference and becomes aid, cooperation or implementation of a treaty or based on an obligation under the alliance and the like.

This and some tend to expand the concept of intervention to include very many images in the forms of relations, while others tend to give it a narrower concept and the intervention applies only to relations between countries and not between individuals, parties, political groups, organizations, private groups or between countries, and if they limit the interference before Groups that have nothing to do with countries accused of interference. This is represented by acts of infiltration, sabotage and gang movements. It is necessary to know the existence of such a relationship with foreign countries before the work can be described as interference.

**3:Objectives and objectives of the intervention:**

The declared ends of the intervention are often noble goals and supreme goals invoked by the intervening state, it may be in the form of spreading a specific ideology or a particular religious belief or maintaining the status quo against turmoil and chaos and the researcher can find the foundations of those ideas in the Holy Pact, [which was held based on Christianity to intervene against the revolutionary movements that were invading Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. And the idea of intervention remained in European countries even after the disappearance of the reasons for the establishment of the Holy Alliance and its extinction, as these countries were considered themselves at old times, especially after the year 1848 because they are the most civilized and humane countries in the world and that the Christian religion and civilization should prevail in the world, and therefore, the intervention in order to spread This religion, civilization and culture was a lofty goal that must be adhered to, which increased the belief in the weakness and wasting of the Ottoman Empire and the European state's ambition to restore the European areas that were under its control, such as Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia on the basis of helping its Christian population.

Intervention was also sometimes made in order to maintain national prestige or the lives of foreign citizens, as happened in China in 1900 when Arab countries sent military forces to maintain their embassy there from the revolution that erupted in China after the world split into two camps, so each camp has become Its own goals and justifications for intervention. The capitalist camp sees that the objectives of legitimate intervention are to spread Therefore, he spread communism and Marxist-Leninist ideas, encouraged libertarian revolutions, and countered revolutions, but the reality that we see today shows that both camps are trying to achieve their own self behind concealment of these declared values and goals. democracy, freedom and the right to self-determination while adding the socialist camp.

The legal arguments and foundations expressed by supporters of humanitarian intervention turn a blind eye to the reality of international practice and the actual position of the various international instruments related to the use of force. It is only through a balance between it and a number of basic principles established in international law such as the principle of prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of states, the principle that international conflicts must be settled peacefully and the principle of prohibiting the territorial integrity and independence of the state Politician.

The foundations of the trend in support of humanitarian intervention also include clear denial and waste of the General Assembly's decisions prohibiting the use of force in international relations, in a comprehensive definition under the United Nations Charter. Declaration No. 2625 on the principles of international law resulting in friendly relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations excludes from its scope the right to intervene and does not yet contain any provision related to humanitarian intervention that supports the recommendations of the General Assembly No. 3314 of 1974 regarding the definition of aggression in Article V of which is what was contained in The Declaration of Friendly Relations No. 2625 of 1974 stipulated that "no consideration whatsoever of his nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may be used as a justification for committing an aggression".

Legal foundations supporting the theory of humanitarian intervention deny the content of the ICJ ruling in the case of military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The court has raised the notion of military humanitarian intervention.

The court has made clear in this case that the use of force is not an appropriate method to ensure respect for human rights by states.

There is no correlation between the use of force and work to ensure respect for fundamental rights in other countries. Usually, the use of force even if it is purely for humanitarian purposes.

The court's ruling is categorical in its significance, and there is no way to interpret it or to describe it except as a complete and strict rejection of any claim that there is a right that allows states to use force in order to ensure respect for basic human rights. And this judgment cannot be seen as a date of the United States's failure to demonstrate the availability of humanitarian goals to do so. With its military actions, it is concluded from the practical practices of the countries related to Resolution 688/1991 that the humanitarian purpose was not the primary motive for this practice, and that the intervention is based only on the theory of humanitarian intervention only partially and at the beginning without any legal basis, but its basic argument in justifying its intervention is based on Z Security Council resolution, and then invoke self-defense theory of intervention does not excuse her not Draah her alone so the solo intervention, it is the image of the use of force based in his countries such as interventions north of the Atlas NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

## **5- United Nations Declaration on the Prohibition of Interference**

The United Nations General Assembly adopted a draft resolution in which it announced its intention to prevent interference, in the moratorium in which the year witnessed many instances of interference such as the United States of America's intervention in Vietnam, and this declaration was not a new pact against interference as it did not provide any new legal rules No more than an affirmation of the basic principles known to non-interference and he has pointed out.

The declaration, at the forefront of regional organization charters such as the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, also emphasized the decisions of the Bandunah Conference and the Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned held in 1961 in Belgrade that the



important part of this decision states that every country has the right to choose its political system Economic and social without any interference in any other country and no country has the right to interfere directly or indirectly for any reason whatever the internal and external affairs of any other country, so armed intervention and all other forms of inputs and threats are against the personality of the state or against its political system Economic or cultural is considered condemned, and all states should refrain from organizing and assisting the diversion and encouragement of armed activities of a terrorist or disobedient nature that aim to replace the government system of another country by force or by interfering in the internal disputes of another country. Nothing in this declaration should affect in any way whatsoever. The forms on the application of both the United Nations Charter to maintain world peace and security, especially those articles contained in Chapter VI, VII and VIII.

The essence of this declaration was adopted by more than one hundred countries is the condemnation of individual intervention of countries in all its aspects and forms. The focus on non-violation in the occupation of collective intervention by the United Nations body subject to individual intervention.

Finally, reference must be made to Article 52 of the Charter, which has given regional organizations the right to address issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security in their respective regions.

It is thus equal in the power to use the given collective intervention and the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity and they all have the possibility of collective intervention to maintain international peace and security and the forces affiliated with it have the advantage of wearing the clothing and the distinctive signs of the United Nations forces.

#### **6- Group Intervention and Individual Intervention:**

We have noticed that until the end of World War I, traditional international law recognized the right to intervene unilaterally, so that when certain conditions were provided, any state could take over the application of the law as it wished. As for the paragraph between the two wars, which witnessed the rise and fall of the League of Nations and the Permanent International Court of Justice, It can be considered as a period of transition, as doubts prevailed over the right of major powers to intervene, and after the emergence of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and international organizations, the intervention became dependent on two basic ideas:

1- Equality between countries, regardless of their size and influence, has become a basic rule. This is despite the political reality and the existence of the two giants, especially the United States of America, as they can no longer completely dominate the world. Any international legal rule does not apply equally to all states and is not considered a valid rule. Thus, the major countries have to hear the opinion of the smaller states, and to take it. The small countries and peoples that were weak and overpowered over their affairs and a colony have an impact on the United Nations and have an audible word and have a role. Great played in international forums.

2-The means to protect the interests of the state have evolved, expanded and improved a lot and countries are expected to benefit from the possibilities available to them by the United Nations to implement them and the idea of state sovereignty has become, it is a concept of non-interference almost absolute idea if viewed from the negative side, that is, the side of non-interference In the internal affairs of states, as for the positive side, the sovereignty of states has become limited in terms of the possibility of implementing the collective security system mentioned above.

Thus, interference by a single country with other affairs has become unanimous and unanimous. Considering that settlements and sometimes coercion remain necessary to some degree in the international environment, the solution lies in the idea of a solution and collective intervention, so collective intervention that takes place within the framework of an internationally recognized organization, To lead a joint

force formulating international peace and security can be considered legitimate and in international jurisprudence and contemporary international practice, interference is not considered legitimate unless it is carried out on behalf of the United Nations or similar organizations.

### **The Second Paragraph: Aggression**

Despite the horror of the war and its consequences for mankind, nature and life, the war is still acceptable in principle in international logic and international and governmental organizations and the definition of the crime of aggression is still awaiting its entry into the sanctity of the International Criminal Court. Some are like Eskimo and Andamanese, it is difficult to know how many peaceful peoples were destroyed because the option of peace was not universal, and the law of the jungle remained, giving the strongest the right to survival and domination.

#### **1- Definition of Aggression:**

The problem of defining aggression has occupied the wise and philosophers over the many centuries. The concept of aggression has emerged since the days of ancient Rome and historians of law return the term aggression to the Latin word *Aggressio*, i.e. aggression, and one of the oldest definitions was an attack by a stronger country on a weaker country to achieve the gains and interests and expansion in the limits and wealth of the aggressor. In the dictionaries of anthropology, humanities witnessed the expression of a group instead of a state, given that aggression preceded states.

Likewise, the main moral justification for war may be to protect the innocent from certain harm. St. Augustine wrote his book *The City of God* in the fifth century A.D. and his work had a great impact on the idea of a just war. He also stressed the need to build an integrated system of peaceful relations between people and not limit the topic to armed expression. Not only does true peace lie in the absence of armed conflict, but

in a peaceful system, unlike the absence of war, it does not necessarily mean that there is no conflict.

Mankind has created multiple forms to protect itself from aggression and the horrors of war, or at least from the horrors of self-assault, supply, belief, nature, and land in Arab society before Islam, so that Arabs invented the most sacred months, which are months in which war is prohibited for any reason, and for whatever justification it was to preserve souls and respond to aggression and search On the peaceful means of conflict resolution.

## **2- Acts of Aggression:**

The Charter of the United Nations came free of any definition of aggression, and this is due, in the opinion of some, to the desire to avoid defining the concept and the possibility that the definition does not come accurate and comprehensive, which leads to the aggressor benefiting from that.

In addition, the term aggression includes political, legal, military and logical aspects that are difficult to include in a single, comprehensive definition.

It was envisaged during the preparations for the United Nations to leave the identification of aggression to the Security Council, and indeed the aforementioned Council has resorted on many occasions to the definition of aggression as the United Nations has not abandoned its attempts to define aggression, and the first serious attempt to do so was the proposal presented by the Union The Soviets in the fifth session in which he indicated that from any conflict of an international nature the state is considered an aggressor if it initiates the commission of one of the following: declaring war, invading the territory of another state with its armed forces, bombing the territory of another state, attacking ships and aircraft, landing or commanding

armed forces within State borders Others without their permission, resort to the naval blockade.

This project was referred to the International Law Mission, which decided to address the issue by adding the following: Article 2 of the proposed crime against humanity protocol (i.e. an act of aggression, including the use of the armed forces based on the state's authority against another state for any purpose other than self-defense Individual or collective, or in implementation of a decision issued by a competent United Nations body.

The issue was considered again at the sixth session of the General Assembly, where it was referred to the Sixth Committee, which was tasked with studying and defining the aggression. Several projects and decisions were presented before it, including a revised draft of the Soviet definition project. It will inevitably omit to mention some acts that can be classified as aggression, which causes the aggressors to commit hostile acts without being condemned.

Others see the necessity of setting a definition of aggression to guide states, in addition to that it is an important step in the progress of international law, in deterring countries that think of an attack and that an incomplete definition is better than not present and if there are defects it can be modified later on that approval did not take place With this ease, the Special Committee continued its efforts and discussion and finally managed to draft a resolution in this regard that was adopted by the General Assembly at the end of 1974, [17] the resolution defined aggression as the use of armed force by one state against the sovereignty of another country or its territorial integrity or political independence, or In any way that contradicts the mother's charter The United Nations as indicated in this definition.

Under this definition, the use of force by one of the states is a preliminary, if not conclusive, indication of the aggression, meaning that the Security Council can reach a contrary or opposite decision in light of the specific circumstances of the case.

Thus, regardless of whether or not the declaration of war exists, the following acts are considered hostile actions:

First: an invasion or attack by a state of its armed forces on the territory of another country or any military occupation, no matter how temporary it is caused by this invasion or any annexation using the armed force of the territory of another country or part of it.

Second: A country bombs, with its armed forces, the lands of another country, or the use of any weapons by one state against the lands of another country.

Third: The blockade of the ports or coasts of one state by the armed forces of another country.

Fourth: Any attack by the armed forces of one country on the land, sea, or air forces of another country.

Fifth: The use of the armed forces of one state within the territory of another state with the consent of the independent state in a manner that contradicts the conditions stipulated in the agreement or any determination of its stay in these lands until after the end of the agreement.

Sixth: A country is permitted to use its lands that have been put at the disposal of another country.

Seventh: Send gangs, irregular soldiers, or mercenaries armed by a state or its behalf, carrying out activities that involve the use of force against another country and with a degree of seriousness that amounts to the level of the aforementioned acts, or the State's participation in it greatly.

**- 3- The Effects of War Crimes and Aggression:**

International crimes are a violation of all norms and covenants. They also constitute legal and humanitarian obligations towards states and international organizations. Therefore, preventing and reducing crimes is the responsibility of everyone, especially the international community, especially what is mentioned in Chapter VI and Chapter VII Articles 39 and 50 which include taking all measures against international crimes. Especially the war crime and armed aggression committed against another country and empowering the Security Council with the powers necessary to take military or non-military measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 which contain the Security Council's actions in a manner that preserves international peace and security as it is legally not And the deputy may act on his behalf except within the limits of the authority conferred on that prosecution. The General Assembly of the United Nations has issued several decisions condemning the use of force, including the decision taken at its thirty-fourth session in 1986 regarding the condemnation of aggression and the legal aspect that obliges states to refrain from recognizing the legitimacy War, aggression and its consequences. In accordance with the Charter, states must refrain from providing aid that would maintain the situation created by those crimes. As for the individual responsibility for committing international crimes that accrue to persons, regardless of their characteristics or immunities, whether they are chiefs or military leaders.

It remains one of the tasks of civil societies at the global level to remain in a state of anticipation in order to isolate all the dangers of the crime of aggression at the level of public opinion. It is no secret that the countries that practice aggression today either boycott the International Criminal Court as is the case of the United States of America and Israel or restrict their powers other than what can be called The veto privilege that allows it to stop investigating any prosecution during a year, the existence of strong pressure groups to hold perpetrators of the crime of aggression accountable allows for legal accountability to be placed on the agenda of any independent judiciary in any democratic country with universal criminal jurisdiction with respect to international

legal norms The crime of aggression, which is the major serious crimes in human societies.

### **The Standard on Proportionality and the Distinction between Military and Civilian Targets:**

Giving the right to resist occupation is not absolute. Rather, it is subject to the above controls, and those requirements related to the law of war and international humanitarian law applicable to resistance movements, and all the military actions that it includes, because violating the rules of the two laws and failing to comply with their restrictions loses the right of resistance to its legitimacy, so all ongoing actions under it and because of it turn into terrorist acts, when the owners of this right condone those laws, or in the case of their arbitrary use of that right, and this This often leads to confusion and the difficulty in distinguishing between the two clearly and precisely.

One of the scholars presented two assumptions for this criterion and the response to it, as the first hypothesis was based on not recognizing acts of violence directed at military targets and fighters as terrorism, and the exception to this hypothesis is the possibility that attacking military targets and fighters at a certain point becomes a measure of Non-discrimination, as in nuclear war, becomes terrorism in terms of impact, if not intent.

The second hypothesis is attacks of indiscriminate violence that are deliberately directed at non-combatants, i.e. civilians and civilian objects, it is considered terrorism, and the exception to it is that the attack on civilians if it reaches a certain level of discrimination in choosing the target and the means here is not considered terrorism.

This means that armed resistance actions can be directed at non-innocent civilians, such as agents and spies who deal in favor of the occupation, as well as



civilian targets related to the management of the occupation that are not innocent in front of military resistance, which in these cases are legitimate and not considered terrorist.

**Third: The Criterion of Looking at the Relationship between the Warring Parties and the trait of victims:**

It depends on determining the status of the victims who fall as a result of the hostile military operations between the resistance movements and the colonists, that is, determining whether they are military or civilian, so the hostilities directed towards the first category are legitimate while they are otherwise if they were deliberately, mainly and directly directed towards the second category, so they are considered Accordingly, terrorism.

The situation of the victims should also be taken into consideration in relation to the conflict between the two parties and their relationship with the belligerents, in other words: it is necessary to know whether these victims are directly affiliated with the hostile party, or they are affiliated with a third party, and here the relationship of the latter to the belligerent parties must be examined, so if it becomes evident that the party The third is neutral and does not interfere directly or indirectly in the conflict between them, because all the victims belonging to it (the third party) and because of this conflict, is the result of illegal terrorist acts directed at them by one of the warring parties, and the perpetrator is responsible for these actions.

According to this opinion, if it turns out that a third party is not in a neutral position, but rather tends to one of the conflicting parties to support or provide political, military and material support and support, then he must bear successful consequences of this, especially if one of the warring parties considers this position to be hostile and participatory to the second party in His aggression and terror.

Some have gone - and we are with them - that this opinion is absurd when it gives a justification for targeting civilian victims, because their political systems or their decision-makers support one of the warring parties with all kinds of support, so

they hold innocent civilians the burden of their governments on the basis that they are the consequences of this bias, and therefore not They can be considered victims of terrorism, but common sense requires consideration of the warring parties, regardless of their status and the other parties, or their consent because, according to international law and the rules of legality, prejudice to innocent people who are not combatants or have a direct relationship to the conflict who belong to the authority of Occupation, colonial interference or any other aggression is considered a criminal act that comes out of the resistance range. Otherwise, we would give the justification according to this proposal to Israel, for example, to strike Arab civilians anywhere in the world, as long as all or most Arab and Islamic states support the resistance and support the liberation movement Palestinian nationalism, which enters us into a great confusion to distinguish between the legitimate actions of the resistance and acts of revenge and counter-retaliation, and therefore what the United States and Israel are doing today from what they claim is legitimate defense, is a terrorist act of the first degree.

**Standard on the Consideration of Responsibility in International Crime:**

Places of permissibility for acts that appear to be terrorist at first sight and before confirmation of their true requirements, and the thrust of that and by reference to the general rule, the international crime represents an illegal act, but it is not sufficient to say that such a crime occurred and the occurrence of the act constituting it just because it applies formally to the forbidden model In the legal text established and specified for this crime, as to reach this result it is necessary to ensure that this act applies objectively with the legal text, and that it does not take him or enter him under penalty of exception, he may respond to this text and he permits it in these exceptional cases regardless of He remains a criminal in other cases governed by the general rule.

This falls within legal, humanitarian, and social considerations, which set for each general rule exceptions in line with the circumstances and motives surrounding the perpetrator, and the most important example: the act of killing, which is considered a crime in the internal laws as a general principle prescribed, but the fact of killing as a

crime may come out of its formality in line with The legal text in the event of a reaction within the exceptions to that rule, so the act is transferred from criminalization to legalization and legitimacy when killing in self-defense within the limits set by law, so we will not be facing a crime even though the act applies formally to the text the offender has a legal.

We find that the same thing is repeated in relation to the rules of international law, for example: the fourth paragraph of Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force in international relations and between countries in violation of the provisions of this Charter, and this means in terms of the result that every use of force or Threatening to use it constitutes an international crime, and this leads to the assertion that there are cases of the use of force that are in accordance with the provisions of this Charter, and do not fall under the general rule contained in the mentioned paragraph, and this is what Article 51 of the United Nations Charter referred to when it stipulated the right of states Individual and c Rather, people, have recourse to the use of armed force in the case of legitimate self-defense if they are exposed to aggression or military occupation by another state or countries.

In this Charter, the application of a state of necessity, or compulsion of all kinds, is applied in which the perpetrator pays an emergency payment without prior notice, and he has no choice but to pay the damage or the assault against him, and this is a strong justification for committing the act depicted in the crime punishable by the text Legal, which raises the responsibility in cases of legalization.

These exceptional rules have been applied in the field - albeit in relative proportions, especially in light of international developments - through the actions of liberation and armed resistance movements that sometimes have to practice terrorism in a positive sense, which is based on controls of legitimacy in the face of aggression

or occupation, which leads when Especially the military necessities, including the implementation of terrorist acts in the stages of their struggles, in the face of their weak capabilities and their inability to engage in wide open battles with the enemy, or perhaps under the influence of political and media propaganda pressures that compel them to resort to such methods to spread their public cause clues.

From there, the international community and international public opinion were alerted to their attention, and on this basis the armed resistance movements deny criminal responsibility and material and moral coercion with terrorist acts, especially if they are in response to previous similar operations carried out by the occupation authorities and forces against the residents of the occupied territories, that is, through reciprocity. ([93.]

This opinion remains subject to substantive discussion if we want to return to the direction that gives the right to use force to the liberation movements, but with conditions related to not harming the innocent or endangering their lives, and the resistance movements to liberate the homelands should move away from such actions, and focus on resisting the aggressor on their homelands. And put the principle of distinction in mind and not lose sight of it, so that the aggressor states do not invoke this to stigmatize the actions of these movements with terrorist acts.

I think this is the situation that presents the problem of confusion between terrorism and resistance and the factor of legitimacy and illegitimacy, which distinguishes between the distinct and undifferentiated trends between the two images. Influence the attitudes taken here and there, through the stages of development witnessed by the international community, and the new changes that flow in the direction that imposes its perception of the world, which mixes concepts and upset the balance between what is sacred and what is profane, became clear on the extent of the impact of terrorism The international right of self-determination, as a sacred principle of human rights and humanitarian scale.

**General Framework Forbidding the Use of Force in International Relations:****Prohibition of the use of force:**

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations states that: "All members of the commission shall refrain from the threat of the use of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or otherwise that does not accord with the purposes of the United Nations".

Article 2, paragraph 4, literally stated that it is necessary to refrain from using force or threatening to use force against state sovereignty in any way that is inconsistent with the goals of the United Nations of maintaining international peace and security. The principle of the prohibition of force has gained use in international relations of legal force. The text prohibits all forms that the force used can take through the phrase "blocking territorial integrity or political independence of any country or otherwise that does not conform to the purposes of the United Nations, whether this force is direct or indirect." Such as political, military and economic pressures, but a discussion was raised about the implications of the concept of force contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, where a part of the jurisprudence was considered that the term force is the armed force that confirms the form of armed aggressions, i.e. military against the territorial integrity or political independence of the state, so it is not permissible. Considering military threats or media actually encourage and provoke internal unrest, acts of force, which requires the legitimate defense in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter.

A discussion was also raised about the scope of the use of force within the scope of the same article, and linking it to the state and no other organizational forms by pronouncing their international relations and the state's phrase in the text of the article, which is what excludes the organizations that are not available on the state's fundamentals "land, people, political power," especially movements. National liberation, which seeks to advance the level of the independent state by exercising its

people's right to self-determination. Thus, the use of force in the event that peoples exercise their right to self-determination is not prohibited according to the spirit of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, and failure to respect this principle is considered an aggression in which the state under which it is subjected is granted the right to return it within the framework of the legitimate defense of the state until the Security Council intervenes to take Measures to maintain international peace and security.

It also exacerbated the dispute between those who say that the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2/4 of the Charter and those who say that it is limited to only a manifestation of the use of force regarding the NATO alliance's military strength against Yugoslavia to settle the conflict, the use of force to this end is legitimate? As a result, force may be used where the purpose is not to surround the government or occupy or fragment the territory of the State.

## **2-Prohibition of War and Non-Use of Force in International Relations:**

The spirit of the Charter lies, therefore, it should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and its goals. In the first preamble, the preamble expressed the determination of Member States to save future generations from the scourge of war, which in one generation brought twice unspeakable sorrow to humanity. The fourth paragraph expressed the intention of Member States not to use Power and the spirit of the Charter Its goals are to save humanity from the scourge of war. Chapter VII of the Charter defined the provisions within which it is possible to resort to the use of armed force and affirmed that the Security Council has the unity of declarative authority if there was a threat to the peace or a breach of it or was an act of action Aggression, and if the Council decides to submit its recommendations or decide what must be taken in the measures in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41 and 42 for the maintenance of international peace and security, or to restore it to its normal, Article 39 of the Charter as Articles 42-51 of the only articles dealing with the actual use of force, and there is no charter The United Nations is any article

authorizing any of its members to use force unilaterally, except for the specific and restricted case stipulated in Article 51 which is the natural right of states, individually or groups to defend themselves, if an armed force assaults a member of the United Nations until it is taken The Security Council measures necessary to keep the peace International security.

Even if a state was forced to use this natural right, it should inform the Security Council immediately, and the Council then, according to its special powers in the province of Kosovo in 1999, so many countries and scholars and analysts expressed different and divergent legal positions. While another sect adopted a position that contradicted the illegality of the Atlantic process and that it involved a grave breach of the provisions of the United Nations Charter in general and Article 2/4 with it in particular.

What is similar today today, as the current dispute about Article 2/4 of the Charter of the United Nations is similar to the day that erupted in the first days following the adoption of the United Nations Charter, but the most important reason behind the intensification of the dispute over the interpretation of the text of Article 2/4 and about the scope of the ruling Contained therein. At that time, it represented the extent of the coverage of this text by other customary rules governing the use of force in international relations when the Charter was developed and enforced. Is Article 2/4 a reflection of the custom in force at that time, or does it imply a smallpox between what was in effect until 1940.

The linguistic formula in which the provision set out in Article 2/4 raises a set of important questions. Is it beneficial from the phrase “blocking the territorial integrity or political independence of any country or in any other way that does not accord with the purposes of the United Nations” that the ruling that prohibits the use of force is limited to its effect on In which cases the force is directed against the political independence of the state and against its territorial integrity? Does he and his

responsibilities prepare the right to take at any time what he deems necessary to take actions to maintain international peace and security or restore it to its quorum, and other than this restricted right? The Charter prohibits the use of force and requires all its members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, paragraph 3 of Article Two.

Violation of this principle is a retrogression and a return to the rule of force law in international relations.

### **3- Forfeiting others' lands by Force**

The United Nations Organization has issued many international resolutions that condemned the aggression and prohibited the seizure of the territory of others, describing it by force, as well as by stipulating explicitly the principle of the prohibition of the acquisition of the land of others by force on many occasions, including what was stated in Article Eight of the draft and the rights and duties of the countries that submitted them to the General Assembly In 1947, in which I took it, every country should refrain from recognizing the acquisition of territories resulting from the use or threat of force, as well as Article 11 of the draft Rights and Duties of States prepared by the International Law Commission. The Security Council issued Resolution No. 3256 on November 2, 1956 No. 3257 in November 1956, Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, Resolution 252 on May 21, 1968, and other decisions that affirmed the principle of prohibiting the acquisition of others' lands by force. At the same time, the International Court of Justice found it illegal to acquire any land through force or the threat of its use.

### **4- The Concept of Force Contained in the Charter:**

Article 2, paragraph 4, does not specify whether the force to which it refers is armed force or any other type of armed force or any other type of force.



Some believe that the intended force is the armed force only, considering that the application or use of this force is only through aggressive war, armed attack, or aggression committed by states using their armed forces or a group affiliated with them or supported by them.

And these are based on that by referring to the phrase armed force contained in the preamble to the Charter, although the aggression was not known when the charter was developed, and we will address that later. This means that there is nothing to prevent a country from resorting to reprisals or others that do not involve On the use of force if another country commits an act contrary to international law and another group of jurists considers that there is no legal reason calling for limiting the meaning of force to armed force only, but that this could be expanded to include economic pressure, or psychological or other actions and intercede their opinion that coercion Political and economic may be a threat to independence State politician, equivalent to the seriousness of the military threat.

From this view, the elderly, and there is a third party, including Brownley and Rosalyn Higgins, tend to the opinion of Kalsen, saying that power does not include non-military coercion practiced at a low level, and they mean using coercion sufficiently to restrict the freedom of the state's conduct against it, but affecting its national security, They believe that this is a matter that international business requires, so it is a legitimate business and is not considered an international crime but rather international harm.

If we want to adopt the concept of armed force, it is necessary to define what is meant by the weapon, does it mean explosives only?

Or weapons of prey, or is it all that causes the destruction of living things and property?

If we take the last concept, shouldn't the economic weapon also be considered devastating? It does not lead to starvation? Likewise, the psychological and media warfare that poisons thoughts and sows fear and dread, and so can psychological pressure, coercion and propaganda be considered a weapon because they destroy the soul and mind, and from this he sees Brownley.

It is necessary to determine whether the use of agents that do not include an explosion, destruction or heat constitutes a use of force, not as microbial, biological or chemical factors such as nerve gases.

He believes that the use of these factors as weapons can be considered a use of force based on the first two points, that the aforementioned factors are described as weapons and that their use is a kind of germ warfare chemical warfare and the second point is the most important that these weapons are used to destroy life and property and are often called weapons Mass destruction is also necessary to think of a description that might be called actions such as flooding a large area in valleys leading to enemy territory or setting fires in the woods and places at the border. Are such actions and measures considered a use of force or not? Does it lead to the destruction of life and property, or not?

Adopting either of the two ideas is of great importance in arranging results, because adopting the concept of force, that is, the interpretation of distress, will deprive the aggressing countries of the union of any measure in self-defense against any unarmed aggression and vice versa, and therefore we are of the opinion that extending the concept of force to include all political pressures Psychological and economic, in addition to the use of all other forms of force referred to previously because of its response to the interest of developing countries that have often been subjected to various pressures, and that the use of force may be direct or indirect, but the state is

responsible for resorting to the use of armed force The forbidden in the A charter whether it is fighting by its regular or non-developing forces or the security and police forces.

### **The Second Paragraph: Exceptions to the Prohibition of the Use of Force in International Relations:**

Given the state of total prohibition of the use of force in international relations as defined in the Charter of the United Nations as previously explained in the previous demand, as if all exceptions to the principle are in response to the unlawful use of force, but they differ in terms of source, purpose and conditions for their establishment, when exposed The state for an armed attack, the charter does not prevent the state's suspicion of using force in the form of individual or collective defense in self-defense, but this use is limited to defensive borders, until the defending state reaches the Security Council. And that the action of the Security Council in this way is not considered a defensive act but rather a coercive nature, and its goal is to maintain and restore international peace and security, but the primary criterion for distinguishing between the two actions is that the Security Council must be based on the mandate and must be frank and clear according to What is required by the rules of Chapter VII or the rules of Chapter VIII of the Charter, when it comes to a regional act, as for the act of self-defense, whether with him individually or collectively, or the act against a former enemy state, the matter does not need a mandate from the Security Council, where the right Once the victimized state is exposed to a state of armed aggression, you will Here we deal with the issue of legal self-defense or self-defense.

#### **1- Self-Defense:**

The important exception to which an explicit provision is made in the Charter of the United Nations as a departure from the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations is individual and collective self-defense.

So that all legal systems recognize the right to psychological defense, which is recognized as long as it is and remains so under the United Nations Charter, and Port sees that this right in primitive societies is in the hands of individuals and states to use it as they see fit. In mature and developed societies, the use of this right is within the authority of a global central organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, and yet the use of force for self-defense is an exceptional right in relation to the general prohibition of the use of force contained in the Charter, and in some cases it is appropriate to convert Countries use this right, regardless of the powers given to the world central organization, due to the existence of some coercive circumstances that directly affect the countries concerned, and they must protect themselves by themselves. So far, there has not been any generally accepted definition of the right to self-defense, even if there are attempts in this way.

Supporters of natural law such as Crochet, Bailey, Gentle, and Victoria see that the right to self-defense is one of the reasons for just war or that it is one of the just causes of war, and that natural law does not only support this right but rather orders states to exercise it, and in this Wolf says that any people should protect Himself and that the masses depend on individuals to secure the requirements of security and peace, but Port believes that the safest way to define self-defense is to enumerate or define the rights or matters that states resort to protect by the right of self-defense and he believes that these matters are the right to territorial integrity and the right to political independence And the right of the citizen group N and the right of the group of economic interests, whatever the matter is the essence of the right to self-defense, is the occurrence of something wrong with the state concerned, which achieves the responsibility of the wrong state.

## **2- The Nature of the Right to Self-Defense:**

All domestic laws of states regulate the right of individuals to defend themselves and the scope and scope of the use of that right varies according to the degree of maturity of the legal system that regulates it, as it was baptized in legal systems that

did not reach a large degree of maturity and left this right without restrictions while from the laws that reached sophistication and progress we find This right is restricted by many restrictions, and this matter may weaken it and reduce its importance.

It is established that the formal community authorities are the only responsible for protecting the rights of individuals within the community and have the inherent right to use force in accordance with the provisions of the law. Self-defense is considered an exceptional right and wanted on the general principle that prohibits the exercise of power within society. The right to self-defense is based on the existence of inevitable conditions that require conducting the first steps to protect the right and the soul with the knowledge of individuals, until the state's authorities enter, and on that For you, there is a near-consensus among legal systems to regulate this right.

If we look at the international community as a unit characterized by weakness and deficiency in its bodies that prefer to ensure the implementation of the law through coercion and that guarantee international rights recognized legally, we find that sovereign states are doing what they should do, according to the theory of dual job, so the right In self-defense is an important right of every member of the international community.

In the continuous development of the international community, we find that the tendency is to establish international bodies through which states cooperate in order to maintain international peace and security. To this end, states waive some aspects of their sovereignty, and this was accompanied by the threat in them in the United Nations Charter.

In addition, the discussions that took place during the elaboration of the Charter, including the desire for the organization to dominate all forms of the use of force, and therefore it became necessary to stipulate the right to self-defense and to organize it directly, which is what happened, as the Charter organized the right to self-defense in

Article 51, and returns The need to directly regulate that right and limit its scope that failure to do so would make the principle of refraining from using armed force Goa.

Whereas, the right to self-defense, regulated by the United Nations Charter, is an exception to the principle of refraining from the use of force, Article 2, paragraph 17, of the Charter of the United Nations.

### **3- Self-defense:**

Article 51 of the UN Charter states that the state has the right to collectively defend itself and that the aggressing states. To ask for aid from other countries to repel aggression, and that raised two questions. The first is: Is there an agreement between countries to request aid? The second is that is it permissible for a country to provide military aid without a request from the other country?

With regard to the first question, a dispute has been raised about the right of the state to seek assistance without a treaty, and some see the exclusion of the idea of the right of states to help each other without referring to the Security Council because that makes it second in terms of maintaining international peace and security, and others see that there are no restrictions on this right As it is contained in the Charter, so the absolute should keep it released unless it is specified.

Until there is a difference between the collective actions taken by the UN Security Council and collective defense, the latter is resorted to by states. It is a measure that states take to defend themselves under their own responsibilities within the limitations of Article 51 of the Charter.

As for collective actions taken by the Security Council, they are under the responsibility of the United Nations and are carried out either in the form of sanctions

or coercive acts and are explained in Article 1, first paragraphs and 24, 39-41-42 of the [Charter of the United Nations. [36

Article 58 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### **4- Conditions for Collective Self-defense:**

It is understood that the use of force for the purposes of collective self-defense is not common in international life, as states usually shy away from participating in armed conflicts that they are not a party to, and although contemporary international life witnessed the conclusion of a large number of joint defense treaties and military alliances, the practices and behavior of states The real does not deny the desire to use force within the framework of collective self-defense, as cases such as these were relatively limited and non-existent and it is suspected that collective self-defense in many cases is a cover for a suit of foreign forces before there is an armed attack, in the hope that the Therefore, collective self-defense is necessary in the future, in other words it benefits from monitoring and extrapolating most cases of collective self-defense that this form of self-defense was a way to prevent an armed attack or as a precaution, and the use of military force was a rare and exceptional case Collective self-defense lies outside the territorial boundaries of the "victim" state.

Collective self-defense is surrounded by a number of complex difficulties and questions. If it is easier to theoretically distinguish between collective self-defense and military assistance that a country might provide to another country as a result of a request from the latter to respond to external interference to which it was subjected, it is difficult in practice to separate Or the distinction between them, the dividing line between them may sometimes knock to a large degree, and the few evidences on collective self-defense do not become disagreeable and widespread controversy over its legality, and this disagreement is not due to the permissibility of using force in the

framework of collective self-defense, the overwhelming majority in these cases has been raised. Questioned About the availability of the condition of armed attack and about the availability of an actual or real request for assistance from the victim state. A question has also been raised about Jeddah and the originality of the theory of collective self-defense. The theory was included in the folds of the United Nations Charter in the framework of Chapter Seven of it, which prompted some writers to consider it a new theory. It is not a precedent for the Charter. Another difficulty arising with regard to collective self-defense is the issue of defining the nature of this right. Is it an independent right that authorizes a third country to use force in defense of a victim of an armed attack, or does it imply a set of rights for an individual self-defense that cannot be neglected or exercised unless it is the third country is itself a victim of the armed attack, and what are the additional conditions that must be fulfilled in order to practice it, and does that require the existence of a previous treaty?

The practice of collective self-defense is subject to the availability of the same conditions and requirements that must be met for individual self-defense, but it requires in addition to these conditions a number of other conditions from the declaration of the victim state that states that it will be subjected to an armed attack. The victim states and the third state of the common defense.

### **5-Exercise of the Right of the State of Self-defense against another State to protect its Right to Political Independence**

The state resorted to these practices if other countries ignored the duty of non-interference referred to, and interfered with the affairs of the first state, and since the right to political independence and the duty not to interfere are not absolute rights, so the legitimacy of resorting to self-defense for the group of political independence rights is relative. If there are legitimate justifications for the intervention of the other country and there are some challenges imposed on the right of self-defense to protect the right to political independence, perhaps the most important of them is the right



given to the Security Council to interfere in the public interest of the international community.

It is true that the seventh paragraph in Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations, prevents the United Nations from interfering in the internal affairs of states, but it returns and indicates that this prohibition does not apply to the application of coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The second limitation is the right of self-defense given to states. The other, which makes the exercise of defending the right to political independence conditional on the immediate threat being threatened. And the lack of other alternative means to avoid it, and the measures taken by the states must be commensurate with the danger resulting from the actions of other countries and the last condition is the most important conditions to be observed, this means that if the danger resulted from the first state using or threatening force Against the political independence of the state, the second state's use of force or the threat of it, and proportionately to the danger to defend it and itself, is a legitimate self-defense.

#### **6- Exercise of the Right of Self-defense by States against Individuals:**

Some situations that arise from the threat against the political independence of the state may occur due to the behavior of individuals or groups for which no state is responsible for them and the best example of this appears when the concerned state takes court procedures to implement its obligations under international law, but it is not sufficient to prevent these individuals from organizing or Carrying out a campaign or when a group of individuals present in the territory of a state organizes or implements a campaign or other actions that directly affect the political independence of another country despite the fact that the first country has taken all of the measures it can to prevent them, or to implement obligations under the law For an international party to prevent the start of such actions from its territory, in other words, the measures taken by the first country are insufficient to prevent these groups from

carrying out their intentions in such cases, the state that conducts such activities on its territory, has not violated international law, or has violated Any of its international obligations, so no act of self-defense may be directed against it by the other state that jeopardizes its political independence. This does not mean that the victim state must remain idle or unable to take any action to protect itself that may resort to taking actions Or procedures for self-defense except that The procedures must be directed against the individuals and groups responsible for the acts referred to, and not against the first country. In this case, the state of necessity is the justification for the union of these procedures, and not the right to self-defense, provided that the necessity is urgent, and that there is no time for reflection and management and other measures.

### **7- Arab Collective Defense:**

The Arab League Charter dealt with this set out in Article 6 of it: “If it stipulated that when a state attacked the state of the person who gave the university or feared it would occur, then the aggressing state, or threatened with aggression, requests that the [council be called immediately to convene.

However, after the establishment of the Zionist entity, and the Arab states feeling of danger, the Joint Defense Treaty, which detailed the collective defense measures of the Arab state, was concluded. And if that needs to be reviewed now, and in its preamble, the primary goal is to formulate security and peace, in accordance with the principles of the Arab League, the Charter of the United Nations and its goals.

Article 2 of the treaty has shown that every armed attack on any one or more countries or their forces is an attack on everyone, so states committed in pursuance of the right to legitimate defense - individual and collective - from their entity to initiate with the assistance of the assaulted countries by all possible means, including force. Armed forces, to return the aggression and restore security and peace to its quorum, provided that you inform the University Council and the Security Council of the attack and the measures taken.

**Implications of the Use of Force for the Reality of International Political Action:**

The frequent resort to military power at the level of relations between countries has become a clear reflection on the international scene so that this scene is not free from conflicts and war, then the increasing violence as a result of the large number of military interventions. The causes of these wars are limited to a set of reasons, whether economic and political, and the main reasons are also the desire In expanding the spheres of influence and possessing economic and military power in a manner that serves the interests of the great powers that see it has the right to arrange international conditions in a manner that serves their interests and achieves its goals of control and control in order to extend influence over the weak countries, and among the most prominent powers A punch in this era, we find the United States of America is the country that was able to violate international law and fails the principle of the prohibition of resorting to military force and thus the United States of America was able to create for itself public policies based on a set of goals including controlling the countries or most of the Arab countries in order to ensure their interests then The seizure of oil, then control of the oilsprings, production and returns, as if it would control the rest of the world, then put America in a position to limit any attack that threatens it, and thus the United States of America wanted to create an international scene commensurate with its goals and then market its projects. That depends on force, war, and destruction under the pretext of reform and change, and all of that is done by military, economic, and political force. Thus, this impulsion and continued violation by the United States of the provisions of international law and its refusal to comply with the charters of the United Nations will produce a set of conflicts and wars that will have a profound impact on The human and civilizational reality of man is the force that is used today is more deadly and destructive, so that countries were destroyed and removed from the context of history and the devastation of Afghanistan, and through the destruction of Iraq not far from us, then an attempt to sabotage Lebanon as the weapons that were used in this Wars that made them primitive and

backward countries. Thus, America and its allies were able to break up the Arab situation and create a series of increasing conflicts without solutions and multiplication of sectarian and racial strife as in Lebanon and Iraq, and the increase in the phenomenon of religious conflicts in some countries and the creation of economic crises in the Arab world and then spreading Western culture to waste milestones The Arab character, all this is done by causing conflicts and wars and relying on the logic of military power, which is considered as a preliminary stage of destruction and sabotage and obstructing all Arab progress and social development plans. It is these and other reasons that have contributed to the emergence of unbalanced conflicts and wars in the Arab world in which there is no element of military and strategic balance. So that these countries could not confront the American military power and its allies, and it was difficult for them to confront the aggression that will be reflected on the reality of international life and establish a field of violence and ongoing rivalry, which will lead to the emergence of most difficulties in the face of peaceful solutions in order to reduce these conflicts and future wars that may It leads to the destabilization of global security in light of the frequent resort to the use of military force and the threat of its use, which will create unforeseen consequences and will have repercussions for the international community, which will lack the security and stability that has been lost due to lack of respect for the principle of prohibiting the use of military force. For strength in international relations.

**Excessive Use of Force:**

It is generally recognized in international relations that power is the basis of relations between countries, and power in its broadest sense is the ability to influence the behavior of other countries to align with the goals of the state that exercises power, and strength is a cumulative, multi-directional process, which is the basis for classifying countries on the scale of power, and countries are classified To super powers, big countries, influential countries and small ones.

Countries are also classified in terms of their goals as power states that seek control, possession, and influence such as America, Russia, Iran, and Israel, for example, and humanitarian countries that seek and harness their potential for humanitarian goals such as the Emirates. The elements and components of power vary from one country to another, but it is noticed through the geographical distribution of power that small states have important elements of power, and this may lead to what might be called a theory of integration in the elements of power. Power is linked to the political behavior of the state, and to its national goals, and these goals revolve around hegemony, influence, and geographical expansion, and these goals are incompatible with the goals of other countries, especially the power countries that have the same goals. This explains why we rely on self-power to protect the interests and goals of the state, as there is no state that does not seek to inflate its power elements, especially the military force, which is the main component or component of the state's power. This is embodied in the huge budgets allocated by countries to support and possess the latest weapons. Here lies the dilemma or problem of force in international relations, or what can be summarized by the power equation: military power plus the nation's national behavior equals more resort to force, more rivalries, conflicts and wars between states, and more excessive use of force.

Therefore, throughout all stages of the development of international relations, military power was a prominent feature of these relations, and dependence on military power increased with the emergence and emergence of the nation-state in the aftermath of the Westphalia Conference in 1648, and since that date and power have been linked to the national behavior of the state and its basis of domination, control, and expansion, and the state's dependence on Maintaining its security mainly on its own strength. This behavior was coupled with mistrust and the security dilemma that still governs the political behavior of states, since Thucydides who laid the seeds for the theory of power or realism today, which is the dominant and explained theory of relations between states, and the basis of this theory is that evil is the primary component in the behavior of individuals, which is also transmitted at the level of the same country.

This realism has its supporters in all countries of the world, and it is not confined to the power countries only, but even to the smaller states, which explain to us the spread of wars and conflicts between countries, and also explains to us this excessive use of force in its military dimension. The danger in the theory of power is that it is no longer a monopoly on states only, but that actors other than the same countries, especially groups and movements of extremist and ideological and ideological extremes of all Islamic or non-Islamic tendencies are able to possess power in all its forms, and this may increase the complications of the excessive use of force. Indeed, the latter groups do not adhere to any obstacles in their use of force, which may lead other countries to use force to a higher degree. The phenomenon of armed force is widespread in all international and regional conflicts, especially in the Arab region. The problem of the use of armed force is that it does not resolve existing conflicts, may impose a state of power, but it is temporary, and is linked to a change in the balance of forces, which is often variable, and unstable, as shifts in power equations are a clear feature of contemporary relations, and therefore excessive force has proven its failure to resolve many disputes.

There are two problems related to the use of force, the first is the exclusion of moral norms and their dehumanization of force, there is no room for moral and human considerations, and therefore the victim always innocent civilians, and the second problem is the legitimacy of force, and here the role of the United Nations that provides this legitimacy to the use of force arises, and this legitimacy takes two forms, The international mandate for an international coalition uses force within the framework of this mandate. The second form is what the United Nations can do directly. Another problem is added to the military force, which is the problem of the political goals of the armed force.

Whatever the justifications for the use of military force are available, but they remain unable to achieve the goals behind their use. Rather, excessive use of force will widen the gap of hatred, hatred, and desire to kill and take revenge, and the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ongoing military confrontations in the occupied Palestinian

territories And the excessive use of force on the part of Israel must lead to more force on the Palestinian side. The years of conflict have demonstrated the failure of Israel to achieve its security and survival through repression and the exercise of excessive force against the Palestinians, the alternative to excessive military force activating the power of international legitimacy, the role of the United Nations in achieving a balance in rights between states, and working to settle international disputes by peaceful means, dialogue And the integration of rights between countries and activating the values of cooperation and dialogue between religions. The message of all religions is dialogue, non-violence, and the prohibition of human killing.

**Recommendations:**

The current international situation is witnessing an abortion of international peace and security, because the world today lives in a state of imposing hegemony through the use of military force, and this will generate feelings of hatred and hostility between peoples, so how can the international situation stabilize and there are those who work to destroy all elements of stability and balance The international reform, and that the proper reform will not come until after the restoration of the prestige of the United Nations and its resort to it in the event of conflicts and wars, and that the excessive use of military force and unilateral action will only bring international crises that will be reflected on all, an academic effort and a political effort through International agreements It is binding on all parties of the international community, and it is mobilized and signed.

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If Article 52 of the Charter stipulates for Chapter VIII on regional organizations 1 -  
that nothing in this Charter prevents regional organizations or agencies from dealing  
with matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security, what  
regional action is valid from them and appropriate as long as these regional  
organizations or agencies and their activities are appropriate With the purposes and  
principles of the United Nations, 2- Members of the United Nations who enter into  
such organizations or who compose such agencies replace every effort to procure a  
peaceful solution to local disputes through these regional organizations or by this  
agency, before submitting them to the Security Council 3. The Security Council should  
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## **Level of Fragility of Palestinian Society and the Role of Stability and Elasticity of the Palestinian Economy to Reduce this Fragility Level**

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### **Abstract**

Palestinian society has been shocked several times during the last hundred years, the fragility was a main outcome of these situations. Precisely and thoroughly measure of this phenomenon is the first necessary step to be taken to reduce their effect. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to measuring level of stability and elasticity of the Palestinian economy and its impact on the level of fragility of the Palestinian society and to identifying the elements and requirements of economic development needed to reduce fragility. By achieving this, the researcher used two types of descriptive approaches. The first is the survey, where Economists (Palestinian university professors and Economists in Palestinian research centers) evaluated level of economic stability and fragility through a special tool. The second type is a correlation and a time series data which used for statistical data from official institutions and research centers. The results showed that according to FSI model, the level of fragility of Palestinian society during the last decade was 86.2<sup>1</sup> and it was 86.4 in 2018, and this level describes in FSI scale as a high warning level. there was a fluctuation in the level of fragility in Palestine, in 2009 was the highest level, due to the aggression on Gaza Strip which caused bad social, economic and political conditions within the Palestinian society, and the second shock in level of fragility was in 2014 for the same

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<sup>1</sup> Range of Fragility (0.0 less fragile - 120.0 more fragile)

reason. Moreover, the average level of economic stability in Palestine during 2009-2018 and according to the FSI model was 8.3<sup>1</sup> and it was classified compared to surrounding countries as the worst. The level of economic stability is measured according to FSI model by measuring three sub-dimensions. The first sub-dimension is related to stability of economic reality as this sub-dimension stability reached at 8.6 and mainly causes of weakness of economic stability in Palestine. The second sub-dimension is Economic Inequality for economic sectors where the level of stability reached at 8.3 and The level of Human Flight and Brain Drain, the third sub-dimension, was at 8.1. The elasticity of GDP per Capita, inflation, and unemployment rate (as the main indicator to evaluate the situation of elasticity of Palestinian economy) is a very weak elasticity, which means again that the elasticity of the Palestinian economy is very weak. As a result of this weakness, the Palestinian economy is instable. The correlation coefficient between level of economic stability and fragility in Palestine was 69.3%. This does not mean that the impact of economic stability on the fragility of Palestinian society is weak but it was strong, as the result shows that 47.3% of the value of fragility of Palestinian society is explained by the value of economic stability. Finally, the results show that restructuring Palestinian economic system was the first requirements to reduce level of instability and fragility of the economy in Palestine, the second one reduced the impact of corruption on the economy, and the third was restructuring the education sector in line with the Palestinian market. For this the main recommendation was restructuring the Palestinian economic system to increasing the contribution of agricultural and industrial sectors in the Palestinian economy. Thus, it increases the elasticity of the economic system, which means increases the level of stability and reduces the level of fragility.

***Keywords: Economic Stability, Fragility of States, Elasticity of the Economy***

## **1. Introduction:**

Palestinian society has been shocked more than one time during the last hundred years. The British mandate on Palestine, then the Jordanian annexation of West Bank, as

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<sup>1</sup> Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)

followed by Israeli occupation and finally, the autonomy rule tailored by agreements which forms no difference from the mandatory, annexation or occupation. These shocks, since 1917, have been functioning as a hammer that has not stopped beating the fabric of Palestinian society, and the colonial occupation still constantly trying to crack the economic stability, social, political and environmental reality in the Palestinian society, as well, seeking to erase the existence of the Palestinian people.

After these shocks and confiscation of all Palestinian resources by the Israeli occupation, the reaction was the protection of the Palestinian human element by developing them, by implying flexibility to adapt to economic, social and political pressures. Illiteracy in Palestine is the lowest in MENA region, reaching at 2.8% for individuals aged 15 years and over in 2017, the percentage of Palestinians aged 15 years and over whose holding a Bachelor degree and Above are forming 17.3% in 2017, and life expectancy is high and it is near to developed countries, reaching at 73.8 years in 2017.

However, the fragility was the result of these situations, and it is the greatest challenge for Palestinians to achieve a suitable level of development. Where the fragility level has a direct impact on the level of sustainability of development.

Fragility is a multidimensional phenomenon. The main dimensions of fragility are the economic and political dimensions in addition to the social dimension. To make a change in the level of development in Palestine, first it is necessary to diagnose and measure the fragility level of Palestinian society, and this can only be done by measuring the levels of stability in the main dimensions of the fragility (economic, political, and social). Moreover, by studying the relationship between fragility and his dimensions. This gives best solutions to reducing fragility by improving levels of economic, political and social stability then improving level of development in Palestine. Through this improvement, it would lead to a breakthrough in the concept of development under occupation, where this kind of development would be functional to achieving freedom from Israeli military occupation.

## 2. Methodology

A descriptive method was used to prepare this study. The study is based on tow main calculations, as the following:

- Calculating elasticity of Palestinian economy during the last decade (2009-2018): The researcher used time-series data got from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), those time-series data are of main economic indicators (GDP Per Capita and Inflation, Consumer Prices). The slope of the linear regression equations of those indicators equals elasticity of those indicators. The change in the value of the main economic indicators was used as the dependent variable and the time (2009-2018) was used as an independent variable. The value of the elasticity for each indicator is equal to the value of the coefficient of the independent variable (linear regression slope) according to the linear equation ( $y = \beta x + \alpha$  (where (y) the dependent variable, (x) the variable Independent)).
- Calculating levels of economic stability and fragility of Palestinian society the researcher developed a especial questionnaire by using FSI model, after remolded it to suit Palestinian society. 80 Palestinian university professors in the Department of Economics and Economists in Palestinian research centers in 2018 used this tool to evaluate the level of stability of the Palestinian economy and the level of fragility of Palestinian society.

### 2-1 Study Purpose

The study aims at measuring the level of fragility of the Palestinian society and the level of stability in the Palestinian economy, in addition to identifying required economic elements to reduce fragility.

### 2-2 Study Questions

The main questions of the study are:

- What is the Performance of the Palestinian Economy?
- What is the level of Economic Elasticity in Palestine?

- What is the level of stability in the Palestinian economy?
- What is the level of fragility of Palestinian society?
- What is the impact of economic stability on the fragility of societies in the Palestinian case?

### **3. Literature Review**

#### **3-1 Fragility of States**

Fragility is a complex and multifaceted concept. There is not yet an internationally accepted definition of fragility and researchers, practitioners and policymakers alike conceptualize it in different ways<sup>1</sup>. According to the OECD, “a fragile region or state has weak capacities to carry out basic governance functions and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crisis or natural disaster”<sup>2</sup>. More states that are resilient exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and elasticity should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum”<sup>3</sup>.

When fragility refers to the state, fragility is, in fact, a property of the political system. A ‘fragile state’ is incapable of fulfilling its responsibility as a provider of basic services and public goods, which in turn undermines its legitimacy. This has consequences on society as a whole, threatening livelihoods, increasing economic downturn and other crisis that affect human security and the likelihood of armed conflict. In this sense, such phenomena constitutes consequences of fragility. When fragility refers to society as a whole, violent conflict and other human-made crisis constitutes fragility itself. In this sense, fragility is a property of society and thus, is

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<sup>1</sup> Mata, J. Ziaja, S. 2009: Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility, German Development Institute/ United Nations Development Programme. Bonn, Germany. P 5

<sup>2</sup> OECD 2014 :Domestic revenue mobilisation in fragile states. OECD publishes on an annual basis since 2005 a report on fragile states. See “Fragile states 2015: Meeting the post 2015 ambitions”. P16

<sup>3</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management\\_en#\\_ftnref1](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management_en#_ftnref1) (Resilience and Fragility)

defined much more broadly, includes any kind of political, social or economic instability. This understanding of fragility is termed as a 'fragile social situation'<sup>1</sup>.

The term 'fragile state' coexists with conceptually similar notions like 'weak state', 'failing state', 'failed state' or 'collapsed state', all of which may be defined as different stages along the fragility spectrum. As for the development agenda, the realization of the specific challenges arising in fragile states and their impact on human development and poverty eradication efforts led to context-specific strategies and policies among donors – such as the above-mentioned OECD principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations.

The need for context-tailored development assistance becomes evident when analyzing progress made towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals, with fragile states falling behind other developing countries<sup>2</sup>. Stewart and Brown (2009) find that all existing definitions are built around three main dimensions of fragility: authority, service, and legitimacy failures that occur, respectively, when the state fails to protect its citizens from violence, to provide basic services to all citizens and to be recognized as legitimate by its citizens<sup>3</sup>.

### **Common features of fragile countries**


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<sup>1</sup> Mata, J. Ziaja, S. 2009: Users' Guide on Measuring Fragility, German Development Institute/ United Nations Development Programme. Bonn, Germany. P 5

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<sup>3</sup> European Communities, 2009, European Report on Development 2009, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. P16





*Source: Overcoming Fragility in Africa*

### 3-2 Measuring the fragility of states:

#### ➤ Why measuring the fragility of states is important?

**'A good prognosis for any disease is far more important than the quality of treatment'.** It is important for economic or policy or social objectives to be a clear and grounded in solid metrics. In formulating economic or policy or social development, metrics are important for understanding baselines and objectives. It helps to inform understanding and response to issues of social, economic, and political fragility based on solid data<sup>1</sup>.

The indexes used to measuring fragility are a significant tool in focus on not only the usual pressures that all state experience but also in identifying when those pressures are outrunning a states' capacity to manage those pressures. focusing on pertinent vulnerabilities that contribute to the risk of state fragility, these Indexes, and economic or policy or social frameworks and data analysis tools upon which it is built makes all risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the

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<sup>1</sup> International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2018, Defining and measuring state fragility, A conversation with J.J. Messner, Executive Director of The Fund for Peace, and speaker at IFAD's annual Lecture Series during the Governing Council meeting, 2018. (<https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/story/asset/40174446>)

public at large. The increased importance of the fragile states agenda has demanded indexes and other tools to help identify and monitor situations of fragility and hence make context-specific responses possible. In order to understand the application of a given index, however, it is important to make a distinction between intended and real usage; whereas producers may envision a particular usage for an index, users may utilize an index for a different purpose. Whether each of those uses is valid must be based on the particular circumstances. Producers of fragility indexes have diverse target audiences, ranging from governments, civil society, multilateral and bilateral donors, international lending agencies and private sector, to the academic and research community and media <sup>1</sup>.

➤ **What happens when measuring the fragility of states is not perfectly valid or reliable?**

There is no difference between the failure and fragility of the states. Chomsky answered the question of the impact of not perfectly measuring the fragility of states in his book "Failed States – The Abuse of Power and Assault on Democracy". He mentions that describing the state as a failed state (fragile state) only serves the policies of the colonial countries, where they try to interfere in the affairs of other countries. He also mentions that often countries fail not for internal reasons but for external reasons, where colonial countries are fueling internal conflicts of ethnic, sectarian, sectarian or other, as is currently the case in our region. Governance systems in these countries are weakened by colonial countries to take their sovereign will, and to facilitate interference in their affairs and to impose conditions on them through coercion because these countries describe as failed states (fragile state)<sup>2</sup>. So, there are non-innocent use (destroyer use) if any fragility index gives any country a bad level in fragility because of not perfectly valid or reliable of the index.

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<sup>1</sup> Mata, J. Ziaja, S. 2009: Users' Guide on Measuring Fragility, German Development Institute/ United Nations Development Programme. Bonn, Germany. P 8

<sup>2</sup> Chomsky, N. 2006. Failed States – The Abuse of Power and Assault on Democracy, Metropolitan Book, New York USA. P106-110

The issue of state fragility is by its nature a sensitive topic. No country wishes to be known as a “fragile state” – but we cannot hope to address issues of fragility if we are not prepared to talk about it. In so doing, it is equally important that such discussions are based on facts and clear metrics, to avoid terms such as “fragile state” being thrown around casually. Conversations about state fragility need to be objective and most of all constructive, and a data-driven approach is critical to ensuring this<sup>1</sup>.

### ➤ Indexes of Fragility of states

The increasing of global interest on the fragility of states and its impact on sustainable development made the number of Indexes that measured the fragility of states so large. The users’ guide which prepared by the German Development Institute and the United Nations Development Program on measuring fragility<sup>2</sup> provided an analysis and comparisons detailed about the most important of these indexes in terms of the methodology of work for each index, where users’ guide mention that there are 11 Indexes (see table 1).

**Table 1: Authoring institution and Producer of Fragility Indexes**

	Index	Producer	Authoring institution
<b>BTI-SW</b>	Bertelsmann Transformation Index State Weakness Index	Bertelsmann Stiftung	Bertelsmann Stiftung / Center for Applied Policy Research (Munich University)
<b>CIFP</b>	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index	Carleton University	Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
<b>CPIA</b>	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment	The World Bank	The World Bank

<sup>1</sup> International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2018, Defining and measuring state fragility, A conversation with J.J. Messner, Executive Director of The Fund for Peace, and speaker at IFAD’s annual Lecture Series during the Governing Council meeting, 2018. (<https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/story/asset/40174446>)

<sup>2</sup> Mata, J. Ziaja, S. 2009: Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility, German Development Institute/ United Nations Development Programme. Bonn, Germany.

	(CPIA) / International Development Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index (IRAI)		
<b>FSI</b>	Failed States Index (Fragile States Index)	Fund for Peace	Fund for Peace
<b>GPI</b>	Global Peace Index	Institute for Economics and Peace	Economist Intelligence Unit, with guidance from an international panel of experts
<b>IAG</b>	Harvard Kennedy School Index of African Governance <sup>4</sup>	Harvard University	Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University)
<b>ISW</b>	Index of State Weakness in the Developing World	Brookings Institution	Brookings Institution / Center for Global Development
<b>PCIL</b>	Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger	University of Maryland	Center for International Development and Conflict Management
<b>PII</b>	Political Instability Index	The Economist Group	Economist Intelligence Unit
<b>SFI</b>	State Fragility Index	George Mason University	Center for Global Policy (George Mason University)
<b>WGI-PV</b>	World Governance Indicators, Political Stability, and Absence of Violence	The World Bank	The World Bank

*Source: users' guide on measuring fragility P2*

There are main five dimensions that must be coverage by those indexes, but it is not covered as it should.

**Table 2: Conceptual dimensions covered by fragility indexes**

Index	Security Political Economic Social Environment				
	l	c			al
CIFP Fragility Index	X	X	X	X	X
Index of African Governance	X	X	X	X	
Index of State Weakness	X	X	X	X	
Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger	X	X	X	X	
Failed States Index (Fragile States Index)	X	X	X	X	
State Fragility Index	X	X	X	X	
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment / IRAI		X	X	X	
Political Instability Index		X	X	X	
BTI State Weakness Index	X	X			
Global Peace Index	X				
WGI Political Stability and Absence of Violence	X				

*Source: users' guide on measuring fragility P25*

### ➤ How do the results of the fragility indexes differ?

As most indexes rely on similar data sources and apply mostly additive aggregation methods (of similar conceptual attributes), one may ask whether the resulting index scores resemble each other as well. Bivariate correlations were used to determine how similar two indexes' scores were.

**Table 3: How similar are index results? Bivariate correlations**

	BTI- SW	CIF P	CPI A	FS I	GP I	IA G	IS W	PCI L	PII	SF I	WGI- PV
<b>BTI- SW</b>	1										
<b>CIFP</b>	0.81	1									
<b>CPIA</b>	0.61	0.56	1								
<b>FSI</b>	0.82	0.93	0.59	1							
<b>GPI</b>	0.79	0.78	0.66	0.8 2	1						
<b>IAG</b>	0.84	0.89	0.62	0.8 4	0.8 3	1					
<b>ISW</b>	0.82	0.92	0.69	0.8 5	0.7 5	0.9 4	1				
<b>PCIL</b>	0.58	0.63	0.1	0.5 5	0.5 7	0.2 2	0.5 7	1			
<b>PII</b>	0.64	0.72	0.48	0.7 4	0.7 0	0.6 9	0.5 2	0.49	1		
<b>SFI</b>	0.81	0.92	0.57	0.8 6	0.7 6	0.8 1	0.8 9	0.66	0.6 6	1	
<b>WGI- PV</b>	0.82	0.79	0.43	0.8 0	0.8 9	0.8 5	0.7 2	0.52	0.7 2	0.7 8	1

*Source: users' guide on measuring fragility P29*

From the above table, we show that the coefficients between indexes imply a large degree of similarity: for the most part, they range between 0.7 and 0.9. This is not unusual, however, for macro-social indicators. The reasons why the scores of fragility indexes are highly similar. First, it is possible that indexes actually measure their respective concepts with a high degree of accuracy. High correlations would show that the real-world phenomena that are being measured often occur jointly. Second, it is possible that the indexes do not measure the concepts accurately. Then, high

correlations could be caused by the fact that most indexes use highly similar data sources. Moreover, We find that the FSI is the most closely related index by the other indexes. That encouraged the researcher to use this index to develop the study tools.

➤ **Fragile States Index (FSI)**


Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that might impact their levels of fragility. It was set in the 1990s by the Fund for Peace (FFP), as Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, where researchers can determine state fragility assessed and ranked at a national level by using this framework. FSI inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policymakers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency.

FSI used Twelve indicators to measure the condition of a state at any given moment. The indicators provide a snapshot in time that can be measured against other snapshots in a time series to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening. Below is the list of indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index. Ranking all states with full membership in the United Nations where Taiwan, Palestine, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, and Western Sahara are not ranked, despite being recognized as sovereign by one or more other nations. The ranking is based on the sum of scores for 12 indicators. Each indicator is scored on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable), creating a scale spanning 0–120.

**Fragile States Index Indicators:**

Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure condition of a state at any given time. The indicators provide a snapshot in time that can be measured against other

snapshots in a time series to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening. Below is the list of indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index.



*Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/>*

*Note: for more detail about the FSI indicators go to Appendix 1*

### FSI calculated by three main streams:

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework is broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of the saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to



statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer-term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negatives that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

### 3-3 Elasticity as a solution of fragility

Elasticity determines persistence of relationships within a system and a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist. In this definition elasticity is the property of the system and persistence or probability of extinction is the result. Stability, on the other hand, is the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance. The more rapidly it returns, and with least fluctuation, the more stable it is. In this definition stability is the property of the system and degree of fluctuation around specific states the result<sup>1</sup>. The elasticity of a system, therefore, has to be assessed in relation to its functions. When applied to an economic system, elasticity is about the capacity of the market and its supporting institutions to “allocate resources efficiently or to deliver essential services”. When applied to a socioeconomic system, elasticity is about its capacity to enable society’s members to pursue their well-being and to satisfy needs and wishes that they could not fulfill if they were in isolation<sup>2</sup>.

In an evolving world, socioeconomic systems experience changes, and shocks that could affect these elements. So, the capacity to maintain or reorganize these conditions

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.resalliance.org/key-concepts> (Holling 1973, Gunderson & Holling 2002, Walker et al. 2004)

<sup>2</sup> European Communities, 2009, European Report on Development 2009, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. P72

enables a system's members to exert their capabilities over time. In other words, if the capacity of a social system promotes well-being among its members, its elasticity makes this functionality durable. How do different societies build elasticity, and on which components and mechanisms are elasticity-based? Two arguments can be put forward: <sup>1</sup>

1. Proper functioning of the state supports the elasticity of a socioeconomic system, because it enhances human capabilities both in stable situations and, to a greater extent, in times of distress.
2. In a socioeconomic system, managing adaptation processes in reaction to changes are not restricted to state institutions. In every society, nonstate actors elaborate their own capacities and systems for self-organization, adaptation, and learning. The sources of elasticity that originate in civil society include social cohesion and networks, social memory, 2 bonds of mutual trust and of penalization for wrongdoing, informal and private institutions regulating economic activities, resource use rights and dispute resolution.

The state shapes elasticity of the economic social structures because it sets the governance mechanisms in society, delivers public goods, provides basic services and protects citizen safety and security, all essential for building human capabilities. Conversely, state fragility can undermine the elasticity of a socioeconomic system. Economic and human development, elasticity and the strengthening of state institutions are closely intertwined. If economic development strengthens state capacity and creates demand for the "state", the formation processes and elements of functional and legitimate state entities would help people to perform their economic activities and to pursue their well-being even in the face of changes<sup>2</sup>.

Elasticity is seen as a major part of our answer to fragility: helping build the capacity of states and societies to deal with increased risk and maintain or re-establish quickly

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<sup>1</sup> European Communities, 2009, European Report on Development 2009, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. P71

<sup>2</sup> European Communities, 2009, European Report on Development 2009, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. P74

their core functions after a shock. This reflects a change in perspective from how fragility was approached before: concentrating on the strengths that can be identified in states and societies and building on those rather than, as before, focusing on their weaknesses and seeking to identify and deliver a solution (which, if imposed from outside, usually does not work)<sup>1</sup>.

Elasticity is a dimension of sustainable development Goals (SDGs), that can no longer be overlooked. Building and maintaining elasticity promote human well-being. In a static world, the degree to which members of a social system or group (households, communities, states) can control their destiny depends on the rights, identity, decision power and problem-solving mechanisms attached to membership<sup>2</sup>. Therefore Goal number 16 in SDGs on peaceful, just and equitable societies is included in the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development which means that putting the focus on conflict prevention is essential for building elasticity. Most post-conflict countries are also pre-conflict countries. This implies that post-conflict stabilization becomes conflict prevention<sup>3</sup>.

#### ➤ Economic elasticity

Economic elasticity refers to the ability of the country to withstand a shock and recover quickly to potential after it falls into recession. Resilient economic structures herewith prevent economic shocks have significant and persistent effects on income and employment levels and thus they can reduce economic fluctuations<sup>4</sup>. Resilient economies are better able to weather shocks. This is particularly relevant in a monetary union, where the policy instruments to address the effects of significant economic events are more limited and where inflation differentials can exacerbate real interest rate differentials that can magnify shocks by fuelling economic booms. Resilient economies are able to avoid dangerous vulnerabilities and deal more efficiently with shocks, which helps preventing unsustainable booms and reducing the depth of

<sup>1</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management\\_en#\\_ftnref1](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management_en#_ftnref1) (Resilience and Fragility)


<sup>2</sup> European Communities, 2009, European Report on Development 2009, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. P71

<sup>3</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management\\_en#\\_ftnref1](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management_en#_ftnref1) (Resilience and Fragility)

<sup>4</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN EMU, Brussels, 13/9/2017, P2

recessions, thereby preventing the strong spillover-effects across the euro area witnessed through multiple channels during the crisis<sup>1</sup>. Based on previous definitions of elasticity, we show that elasticity depends on the adaptation of components systems (economic, social and political) to internal and external shocks. In other words, economic, social and political elasticity is conducive to economic, social and political stability. Flexibility is nowadays a dimension of development as it is an inevitable product of flexibility.

### Interactions between state fragility and socioeconomic elasticity



Source: *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*

### 3-4 Economic Stability

There is an integral and interdependent relationship between concept of development and stability (economic, political or social). The relationship in practice, for example, we can not create economic stability status without the development of the economic sectors or we can not raise the level of development without having stability situation. The stability in the countries or their (economic, political or social) systems is an effective tool to achieve the full well-being of the societies, through the State's development programs and plans in various economic, political and social fields. Here we will review the concept of economic stability, as one of the development pillars and one of the fragility dimensions.

<sup>1</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN EMU, Brussels, 13/9/2017, P3

The economic stability concept is one of the most common concepts in economic studies and literature. However, there is no standard definition, and economists combined economic stability and financial stability because economic stability contributes to financial stability and vice versa is true. In addition, several international initiatives to promote financial stability include several macroeconomic performance indicators relevant to financial stability<sup>1</sup>.

The IMF Promoting economic stability is partly a matter of avoiding economic and financial crises, large swings in economic activity, high inflation, and excessive volatility in foreign exchange and financial markets. Instability can increase uncertainty, discourage investment, impede economic growth, and hurt living standards. A dynamic market economy necessarily involves some degree of volatility, as well as gradual structural change. The challenge for policymakers is to minimize instability in their own country and abroad without reducing the economy's ability to improve living standards through rising productivity, employment, and sustainable growth. Economic and financial stability is both a national and a multilateral concern. As recent financial crises have shown, economies have become more interconnected. Vulnerabilities can spread more easily across sectors and national borders<sup>2</sup>.

The United Nations consider any economic system is stable if it can absorb the impact of shocks which exposed because of the system's weaknesses then warranty that the economy quickly recovers<sup>3</sup>. Economic stability refers to the absence of excessive fluctuations in the macroeconomy. An economy with fairly constant output growth and low and stable inflation would be considered economically stable. An economy with frequent large recessions, a pronounced business cycle, very high or variable inflation, or frequent financial crises would be considered economically unstable<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Abdul Moneim, H. 2012: The performance of Arab economies during the past two decades. Arab Monetary Fund, United Arab Emirates p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/22/How-the-IMF-Promotes-Global-Economic-Stability> (How the IMF Promotes Global Economic Stability)

<sup>3</sup> Abdul Moneim, H. 2012: The performance of Arab economies during the past two decades. Arab Monetary Fund, United Arab Emirates p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.coursehero.com/file/43468351/ECO-3-assdocx/> (Managerial EconomicsDr. Maximo S. Artieda)

Darussi in his thesis pointed that economic stability as "Full operation of the available economic resources and avoiding the big sudden changes in the level of prices while maintaining a real growth rate in the Gross national product (GNP)<sup>1</sup>. Economic stability means the economy of a region or country shows no wide fluctuations in key measures of economic performance, such as gross domestic product, unemployment or inflation. Rather, stable economies demonstrate modest growth in GDP and jobs while holding inflation to a minimum. Government economic policies strive for stable economic growth and prices, while economists rely on multiple measures for gauging the amount of stability<sup>2</sup>.

A stable economy demonstrates steady, manageable growth in GDP and employment. Manageable growth means the economy grows at a sustained rate that does not spark inflationary pressures, resulting in higher prices and negatively affect corporate profits. An economy that shows steady growth for one quarter of the year, followed by a sharp decline in GDP or a rise in unemployment in the next quarter, indicates economic instability. Economic crises, such as the global credit crunch of 2008, cause worldwide economic instability, lowering production, employment and other measures of economic health<sup>3</sup>.

#### ➤ **Key measures of economic performance**<sup>4</sup>

Traditionally, the key measures of economic performance in macroeconomics include:

1. Economic growth – real GDP growth.
2. Inflation – e.g. target CPI inflation of 2%
3. Unemployment – the target of full employment
4. Current account – satisfactory current account, e.g. low deficit.
5. Well-being Index

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
<sup>1</sup> Hamlaoui, a. 2014: The Role of International Financial Institutions in Economic Stability, Mohammed Khedr University-Biskra, Algeria. Pp. 47, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.coursehero.com/file/43468351/ECO-3-assdocx/> (Managerial EconomicsDr. Maximo S. Artieda)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.coursehero.com/file/43468351/ECO-3-assdocx/> (Managerial EconomicsDr. Maximo S. Artieda)

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/10189/economics/key-measures-economic-performance/> (Key measures of economic performance)

## Measures Economic Performance



Source: <https://www.economicshelp.org>

As an overall look, it is important for economists to look beyond the headline statistics. Real GDP will always be useful for showing the stage in the economic cycle. It is of some use in indicating living standards. But, it is far from the ultimate guide. There is always a need to look at related statistics to give a better overall picture. For example, median real wages, unemployment rates, well-being index.

➤ **Calculate economic stability by FSI:**

Economic indicators are one of the mine dimensions of FSI, which used to calculate the stability of economic, the economic indicators in FSI divided into three categories, of which:

**E1: Economic Decline** *Questions to consider may include:*

**Democratic Arab Center – Germany – Berlin**

- Government Debt: What is government debt?
- Interest Rates: How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- Inflation Rate: How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- Productivity: What is productivity?
- GDP: What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- Unemployment: How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?
- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- National Economy: How do experts view the economy?
- Business Climate for FDI: Is the business climate attractive to FDI?
- Business Climate for Entrepreneurship: Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?
- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

**E2: Uneven Economic Development *Questions to consider may include:***

- Economic Equality – Gap: Is there a large economic gap?
- Discriminatory Economics: Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Economic Justice: Does economic justice exist?
- Hiring Practices: Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and the perception of others?
- Social System: Do equal rights exist in society?
- Equal Rights Legislation: Are there laws protecting equal rights?
- Free Education: Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Equal Education: Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Job Training: Do programs for job training exist?
- Access to Job Training: Use Do people know about job training and is it available based on qualification and need?
- Ghettos or Slums: Do ghettos and slums exist?

**E3: Human Flight and Brain Drain *Questions to consider may include\*:***

- Professional Flight: Are professionals leaving the country?




- Political Drain or Return: Are politicians leaving the country?
- Brain Drain: Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Return of Middle Class: Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?
- Remittances: Are there a large number of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

#### 4. Fragility of Palestinian Society

During the last decade (2009-2019) the level of fragility of Arab world society was 81.3<sup>1</sup>, FSI scale describes this level as high warning .


**Fragility level of the Arab world, 2009-2019**



*Source: Calculated by the researcher*

<sup>1</sup> Range of Fragility (0.0 less fragile - 120.0 more fragile), the source of Arab countries data are from the FIS database (<https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/>) except Palestine data calculated by the researcher

## Fragile States Index Heat Map for the Arab world, 2019



Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019-FSI-Heat-Map-Country-Names.pdf>.

## Fragility level of the Arab world by Country, 2009-2019


Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Algeria	80.6	81.3	78.0	78.1	78.7	78.8	79.6	78.3	76.8	75.8	75.4
Bahrain	59.0	58.8	59.0	62.2	62.9	64.7	64.4	63.4	64.9	64.4	63.8
Comoros	86.3	85.1	83.8	83.0	84.0	85.1	83.3	83.8	84.8	82.6	81.7
Djibouti	80.6	81.9	82.6	83.8	85.5	87.1	88.0	89.7	88.9	87.1	85.1
Egypt	89.0	87.6	86.8	90.4	90.6	91.0	89.9	90.2	89.8	88.7	88.4
Iraq	108.6	107.3	104.8	104.3	103.9	102.2	104.4	104.7	105.4	102.2	99.1
Jordan	77.9	77.0	74.5	74.8	75.7	76.7	76.9	78.0	78.7	76.8	75.9
Kuwait	63.4	61.5	59.5	58.8	59.6	59.0	57.5	58.5	58.5	55.9	53.2
Lebanon	93.5	90.9	87.7	85.8	86.3	86.9	88.1	89.6	88.2	86.8	85.0

<b>Libya</b>	69.4	69.1	68.7	84.9	84.5	87.8	95.3	96.4	96.3	94.6	92.2
<b>Mauritania</b>	88.7	89.1	88.0	87.6	91.7	93.0	94.9	95.4	93.7	92.2	90.1
<b>Morocco</b>	77.1	77.0	76.3	76.1	74.3	74.4	74.6	74.2	74.9	74.0	73.0
<b>Oman</b>	47.2	48.7	49.3	51.7	52.0	53.1	52.0	51.6	52.5	52.6	50.0
<b>Palestine</b>	88.9	84.9	83.0	84.3	84.8	88.0	86.8	87.8	87.6	86.4	83.9
<b>Qatar</b>	51.9	51.8	49.5	48.0	47.1	48.9	46.3	45.1	44.0	48.1	45.4
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	77.5	77.5	75.2	73.4	72.7	73.1	71.6	72.2	71.2	70.2	70.4
<b>Somalia</b>	114. 7	114. 3	113. 4	114. 9	113. 9	112. 6	114. 0	114. 0	113. 4	113. 2	112. 3
<b>Sudan</b>	112. 4	111. 8	108. 7	109. 4	111. 0	110. 1	110. 8	111. 5	110. 6	108. 7	108. 0
<b>Syria</b>	89.8	87.9	85.9	94.5	97.4	101. 6	107. 8	110. 8	110. 6	111. 4	111. 5
<b>Tunisia</b>	67.6	67.5	70.1	74.2	76.5	77.5	75.7	74.6	74.2	72.1	70.1
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	51.8	52.4	50.4	48.9	47.3	47.6	46.2	44.5	43.7	42.8	40.1
<b>Yemen</b>	98.1	100. 0	100. 3	104. 8	107. 0	105. 4	108. 2	111. 5	111. 1	112. 7	113. 5

*Source: Arab countries data are from the FIS database (<https://fragilestatesindex.org/excel/>) except Palestine data calculated by the researcher.*

According to FSI model, the level of fragility of Palestinian society during the last decade was 86.0 and it was 83.9 in 2019, and this level is considered in FSI scale as a high warning level.

#### **Fragility level of Palestinian Society, 2009-2019**



*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

During the last decade, there was a fluctuation in the level of fragility in Palestine, in 2009 was the highest level, due to the aggression on Gaza Strip which caused bad social, economic and political conditions within the Palestinian society, and the second shock in level of fragility was in 2014 for the same reason.

In general, when examining the reason for the fragility of the Palestinian society during the last decade (2009-2019) based on the FSI model, we find that economic stability has the lowest level of stability 8.30, then external interference 7.86 (note that this dimension after 2015 has the lowest level of stability). And the level of stability of other FSI dimensions was 6.13 for Cohesion in Society, 6.64 for Political Stability and 7.50 for Social Stability.

**Stability Level for FSI dimensions in Palestine, 2009-2019**

Year	Cohesion in Society	Economic Stability	Political Stability	Social Stability	External Intervention
2009	6.07	8.78	6.76	7.95	7.81
2010	5.67	8.66	6.56	7.48	7.38


2011	5.67	8.41	6.39	7.23	7.30
2012	5.91	8.39	6.61	7.08	7.55
2013	6.12	8.25	6.60	7.27	7.50
2014	6.70	8.17	6.72	7.60	7.68
2015	6.33	8.13	6.73	7.62	8.10
2016	6.33	8.19	6.82	7.72	8.45
2017	6.30	8.17	6.77	7.80	8.40
2018	6.23	8.12	6.64	7.61	8.32
2019	6.09	8.08	6.39	7.13	8.00
Average	6.13	8.30	6.64	7.50	7.86

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

#### 5. Stability of Palestinian Economic (By using FSI model)

#### Average of the Economic Stability Level of the Arab World During the Last Decade (2009-2019) by Country



*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

#### Economic Stability level of the Arab world by Country, 2009-2019

Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Average
Algeria	6.0	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.0
Bahrain	4.4	4.5	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.1
Comoros	6.7	6.7	6.7	7.0	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.1	7.2
Djibouti	6.0	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.5	6.7	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.5
Egypt	6.9	6.7	6.5	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.6
Iraq	8.4	8.6	8.3	8.3	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.2	6.9	6.6	7.7
Jordan	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.6
Kuwait	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.3	4.0
Lebanon	7.0	6.8	6.4	6.1	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	6.0
Libya	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.5	5.3	6.0	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.0
Mauritania	6.6	6.6	6.4	6.4	6.7	6.8	7.1	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.7	6.8
Morocco	6.8	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.2	6.5
Oman	2.7	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.3
Palestine	8.8	8.7	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.3
Qatar	4.3	4.3	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.7	3.6
Saudi Arabia	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4
Somalia	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.8	8.9	8.9	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.2	9.1	9.0
Sudan	8.5	8.3	7.9	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.1	8.0	8.2
Syria	7.2	6.9	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.8	7.3	7.9	8.1	8.1	8.2	7.3
Tunisia	5.8	5.7	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.8
United Arab Emirates	4.1	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.5	3.4
Yemen	8.2	7.9	7.6	8.0	8.2	8.1	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.2

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

**Economic Stability level according to FSI in Palestine by sub-dimensions of  
Economic Stability, 2009-2018**

Year	Economic Reality	Economic Inequality	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Economic Stability
2009	8.7	8.7	8.9	8.8
2010	8.5	9.0	8.5	8.7
2011	8.1	8.9	8.3	8.4
2012	8.4	8.8	8.0	8.4
2013	8.5	8.5	7.8	8.3
2014	8.7	7.8	8.1	8.2
2015	8.7	8.0	7.8	8.1
2016	8.8	7.9	7.8	8.2
2017	8.8	7.8	7.9	8.2
2018	8.8	7.6	8.0	8.1
2019	8.8	7.2	8.2	8.1
Average	8.6	8.2	8.1	8.3

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

The average level of economic stability in Palestine during 2009-2019 and according to the FSI model was 8.3 and classified as the worst as in comparison to the surrounding countries. The level of economic stability is measured according to FSI model by measuring three sub-dimensions. The first sub-dimension is related to the stability of the economic reality where this sub-dimension stability reached 8.6 and it was mainly cusses of the weakness of economic stability in Palestine. The second sub-dimension is Economic Inequality in economic sectors where level of stability reached 8.2 and the level of Human Flight and Brain Drain, the third sub-dimension, was 8.1.

#### ➤ Economic reality stability

Measuring the level of stability of economic reality is related to measuring the average of 9 levels. The result shows that all those levels were very low stability, with

the range of stability between (8.3-9.4). The worst level of attraction for foreign investment (9.4) was a reflection of unstable economic reality.

**Level of Stability in Economic Reality according to FSI in Palestine, 2019**

Economic Reality	Stability
Interest rates of banks and lending institutions	8.3
Commodity prices with household living standards	9.1
Efficient use of available resources	9.0
Palestinian Consumer Confidence in the Palestinian Economy	8.5
The confidence of economists in the Palestinian economy	8.3
Attract foreign investment	9.4
Attract to internal entrepreneurship	8.3
Encourage competition and prevent monopoly	8.8
Cost of basic goods and services (health, education, electricity, water, fuel)	9.1
Average	8.8

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

➤ **Economic Inequality**

Measuring the level of stability of Economic Inequality is related to measuring the average of 8 levels. The result shows that stability of all those levels was very low, within a range of stability between (6.3-8.0). The worst level of Equal employment practices in different economic sectors (8.0) was a reflection of unstable Economic Inequality.

**Level of Stability in Economic Inequality according to FSI in Palestine, 2018**

Economic Inequality	Stability
Equal opportunities between economic sectors	7.7
Equal rights for different economic sectors laws	6.9
Equal employment practices in different economic sectors	8.0



Equal quality of education in all Palestinian communities	6.3
Equal quality of health in all Palestinian communities	7.1
Equal access to job training opportunities for all segments of society	7.9
The equal ability of citizens to obtain loans from the banking system	6.8
Equality of knowledge and competition for jobs, each according to his specialty	7.1
Average	7.2

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

### ➤ Human Flight and Brain Drain

Measuring the level of stability of Human Flight and Brain Drain is related to measuring the average of 6 levels. The result shows that all those levels were very low stability, with the range of stability between (6.9-9.4). The worst level of Unemployment, lack of financial return for various scientific and technical competencies, low expenditure on scientific research and impact on brain drain in Palestine (9.4) was a reflection of unstable Human Flight and Brain Drain.

### Level of Stability in Human Flight and Brain Drain according to FSI in Palestine, 2019

Human Flight and Brain Drain	Stability
Emigration of Palestinian Professionals / Technicians Outside Palestine	7.5
The size of the migration of Palestinian intellectual elites outside Palestine	7.9
Political Corruption, Lack of Democracy, Human Rights Violations and Impact on the Brain Drain in Palestine	7.9
Unemployment, lack of financial return for various scientific and	9.4

technical competencies, low expenditure on scientific research and impact on brain drain in Palestine	
Equal opportunities among graduates of national and foreign universities on the brain drain in Palestine	6.9
The creation of an appropriate climate for governments and their creativity, and benefit from experience and skills in the absence of proper scientific planning and impact on the brain drain in Palestine	9.3
Average	8.2

*Range of Stability (0.0 more stable - 10.0 less stable)*

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

## 6. Performance of the Palestinian Economy During the Last Decade (2009-2019)


### 6.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

There was a slowdown in the GDP growth during the last decade in Palestine, this slowdown refers to the affected the Palestinian economy by many factors, where the GDP growth in 2019 increase by 0.9% compared to 9.6% in 2011.

The continued decline in the value of grants and assistance to Palestine after 2009 was the most important reason of this slowdown, moreover the continued restrictions on the movement of goods and people, and the siege of Gaza Strip, where they led to a slowdown in the growth rate in the West Bank, and a sharp decline in Gaza Strip during 2019. As a result of this slowdown, the contribution of the Gaza Strip to GDP declined to 17.9% in 2019, compared to 39.4% in 2005.


### GDP in Palestine by Region, 2009-2019 At Constant Prices

The base year 2015



*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P14*

#### GDP growth in Palestine, 2010-2019




*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

## 6.2 GDP Per Capita

GDP per capita in Palestine declined in 2019, compared to 2018, amounting to USD 3,364.5, it decreased in the West Bank by 1.1% amounting to USD 4,802.5, whereas it declined by 2.8% in Gaza Strip reaching USD 1,416.8 during 2019. This leads to decreasing the gap between them, where the GDP per capita in Gaza Strip represented 29.5% of the GDP per capita in the West Bank in 2019, and remained lower than its rate in 1994, when it was 96.5%.

### GDP Per Capita in Palestine by Region, 2009-2019 At Constant Prices

The base Year 2015



*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P16*

The Palestinian economy encompasses several economic activities. It is predominantly a service economy as a result of the services and other branches activities contribution to GDP and to employment. Where Services and other branches activities ranked first in the Palestinian economy, value-added in 2018, the percentage contribution to GDP was 37.5%, on the other hand, Industry activities contributed by 13.2% to GDP during 2018, while Agriculture contributed by 3.0% to GDP during the year 2018.

**Table 4: Value-added (USD Millions) of main economic activities by region 2015-2019, at constant prices: the base year 2015**

Economic Activity	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Agriculture	1,035.2	1,142.9	1,074.1	1,091.1	1,091.5
Industry	1,629.7	1,829.4	2,094.2	2,056.6	2,053.3
Construction	665.3	780.3	818.8	920.8	898.1
Wholesale and Retail	2,760.0	2,950.5	3,165.5	3,346.1	3,372.0

Trade					
Transportation and Storage	257.4	274.6	275.6	278.0	255.5
Information and Communications	549.8	523.6	486.3	497.0	492.7
Services and Other Branches	5,051.4	5,545.8	5,158.3	5,127.9	5,266.3
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	13,972.4	15,211.0	15,426.9	15,616.2	15,764.4

*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P18*

**Table 5: Percentage contribution of economic activities to GDP in Palestine, 2015-2019 at constant prices: the base year 2015**

Economic Activity	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Agriculture	7.4%	7.5%	7.0%	7.0%	6.9%
Industry	11.7%	12.0%	13.6%	13.2%	13.0%
Construction	4.8%	5.1%	5.3%	5.9%	5.7%
Wholesale and Retail Trade	19.8%	19.4%	20.5%	21.4%	21.4%
Transportation and Storage	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	1.6%
Information and Communications	3.9%	3.4%	3.2%	3.2%	3.1%
Services and Other Branches	36.2%	36.5%	33.4%	32.8%	33.4%

*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*


### 6.3 Revised Unemployment Rate

Labor Force is the most important production factor in Palestinian economy, especially in the face of limited natural resources and Israeli control over land, water,

and mobility of people, goods and capital. The size of the labor force in Palestine increased during 2019 by 2.8% compared to 2018. The number of employed individuals increased by 3.5%, where the number of employed individuals in Palestine reached 950.9 thousand employed individual during the year 2019 compared to 918.8 thousand employed individual in 2018.

In Gaza Strip the size of the labor force increased by 6.6% compared to 2018, and the number of employed individuals increased by 2.8%, since the increase in the number of unemployed individuals was more than the rise of size of the labor force, this led to increasing the revised unemployment rate to 45.1% during 2019 compared to 43.1% in 2018. Whereas in the West Bank the decrease in the number of unemployed individuals and increase the size of the labor force, this led to decreasing the revised unemployment rate to 15.3% during 2019 compared to 17.7% in 2018.

**Revised Unemployment Rate in Palestine by region, 2015-2019**



*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P21*


#### 6.4 Prices and Purchasing Power

Consumer price index (CPI) recorded an increase by 1.58% in 2019, compared to 2018, reaching 101.58 (base year 2018). The rising resulted mainly from the increase in the food and non-alcoholic beverages group by 3.33%, it was followed by

personal care, social protection and miscellaneous goods and services group by 5.64%, recreation, sport, culture, gardens and pets group by 12.33%, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics group by 1.36%.

### Trend in consumer price index (CPI) in Palestine, 2015- 2019

Base year: 2018= 100




*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P28*

### 6.5 Current Balance (Deficit)

The current balance in Palestinian government in 2019 recorded a deficit of USD 912.4 million compared to USD 720.6 million in 2018, increasing by 26.6%. This is mainly explained by an increase in current expenditures and net lending value by 5.2% compared to 2018, despite of the increase in total net public revenues value by 0.8% compared to 2018.

### Current Balance Deficit in Palestine, 2009-2019




*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P32*

### 6.6 Trade Balance

The value of trade balance deficit increased by 1.2% in 2019 compared to 2018, reaching USD 6,500.7 million. This increase in the value of trade balance deficit resulted from the increase in the value of total imports of goods and services by 1.4% in 2019, which reached USD 9,153.1 million, despite of increasing in the value of exports by 2.1%, representing USD 2,652.4 million. Furthermore, the ratio of trade balance deficit to imports recorded a slightly decrease to reach 71.0% in 2019, compared to 71.2% in 2018. As shown in the figure below, the deficit in the trade balance value worsened significantly during the the last decade, 2009-2019 as a result of the steady increase of imports compared to exports.

#### Trade Balance Deficit of goods and services in Palestine, 2009-2019






*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P44*

### 6.7 International Investment Position (IIP)

During the last decade, there was a fluctuation in the value of international investment position- Net in Palestine. The net international investment position (IIP) value for Palestine increased by 32.1% at the end of 2019, reaching USD 2,098 million, compared to USD 1,588 million at the end of 2018, due to the increase of the value of total stocks of the Palestinian assets abroad despite the rise of the value of total stocks of foreign liabilities in Palestine at the end of 2019.

**International Investment Position- Net in Palestine, 2009-2018**



*Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2019. Ramallah – Palestine. P47*

## 7. Economic Elasticity in Palestine

In economics, elasticity is the measurement of the proportional change of an economic variable in response to a change in another. It shows how easy it is for the supplier and consumer to change their behavior and substitute another good, the strength of an incentive over choices per the relative opportunity cost.

### ➤ GDP Per Capita Elasticity

According to the value of the slope of the linear regression equation for the change of GDP Per Capita during the time (2009-2018) of which:


$$\Delta \text{GDP Per Capita} = \beta \text{ Year} + \alpha$$

where  $\text{Slope} = \beta$ ,  $\Delta \text{GDP Per Capita} = -0.0065 \text{ Year} + 0.06$ ,

which means elasticity of GDP Per Capita = 0.0065

The elasticity of GDP per Capita (as the main indicator to evaluate the situation of elasticity of Palestinian economy) is a very weak elasticity.

**Change in GDP Per Capita in Palestine, 2009-2019**



*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

### ➤ Inflation, Consumer Prices Elasticity

For more assurance on the level of elasticity of the Palestinian economy, I will calculate the elasticity of another main economic indicator (inflation) by using the same above method.

Where the value of the slope of the linear regression equation for the change of inflation during the time (2009-2018) of which:


$$\Delta \text{inflation} = \beta \text{ Year} + \alpha$$

where  $\text{Slope} = \beta$ ,  $\Delta \text{inflation} = -0.0043 \text{ Year} + 0.0405$ ,

which means elasticity of Inflation = 0.0043

That means there are no differences between the level of elasticity of inflation and the level of elasticity of GDP per Capita. Both levels have a very weak elasticity, which means again that the elasticity of the Palestinian economy is very weak. As a result of this weakness, the Palestinian economy is instability.

**Inflation, Consumer Prices (%) in Palestine, 2009-2018**



*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

### ➤ Unemployment rate Elasticity

For more assurance on the level of elasticity of the Palestinian economy, I will calculate the elasticity of another main economic indicator (Unemployment rate) by using the same above method.

Where the value of the slope of the linear regression equation for the change of inflation during the time (2009-2018) of which:

$$\Delta \text{unemployment rate} = \beta \text{Year} + \alpha$$

$$\text{where } \text{Slope} = \beta, \Delta \text{unemployment rate} = -0.015 \text{Year} + 0.065,$$

$$\text{which means elasticity of unemployment rate} = 0.015$$

That means there are no differences between the level of elasticity of unemployment rate, inflation and the level of elasticity of GDP per Capita. All those levels have a very weak elasticity, which means again that the elasticity of the Palestinian economy is very weak. As a result of this weakness, the Palestinian economy is instability.

**Change in the unemployment rate (%) in Palestine, 2009-2018**



*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

## 8. Impact of Economic Stability on Fragility

### ➤ Correlation between stability and fragility

The correlation coefficient between the level of economic stability in all countries of the world and fragility was 92.3%. And the result shows that 85.2% of the value of


fragility explains by the value of economic stability, which means the main control of the fragility around the world is the stability of economic.

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.923 <sup>a</sup>	0.852	0.852	9.0428

a. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Stability


#### The level of Economic Stability and the level of Fragility in the world, 2018



*Source: Calculated by the researcher.*

At the Palestinian level, the correlation coefficient was lower than in the rest of the world, between the level of economic stability in all countries of the world and fragility was 69.3%. This does not mean that the impact of economic stability on the fragility of Palestinian society is weak but it was strong, where the result shows that 47.3% of the value of fragility of Palestinian society explains by the value of economic stability.

## The level of Economic Stability and the level of Fragility in Palestine, 2018



Source: Calculated by the researcher.

## Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.693 <sup>a</sup>	0.480	0.473	9.46081

a. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Stability

➤ **Elements of economic development which need to reduce the fragility of the Palestinian society**

We have talked about the impact of stability and elasticity of Palestinian economic on the level of fragility of Palestinian society. In order to Palestinian university professors in the Department of Economics and Economists in Palestinian research centers evaluate (commensurate with the Palestinian reality of level of economic stability and level of fragility), they rank the requirements which need to reduce the level of instability of economy and fragility in Palestine, where restructuring the Palestinian economic system was the first of the requirements to reduce fragility, the second one was Reduce the impact of corruption (in the government and private sectors) on the economy, and the third was Restructuring the education sector in line with the Palestinian market.

**Arrange the elements of economic development to be achieved to reduce the  
fragility of Palestinian society**

<b>Economic development required to reduce fragility</b>	<b>Ranks</b>
<b>Restructuring the Palestinian economic system</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Reduce the impact of corruption (in the government and private sectors) on the economy</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Restructuring the education sector in line with the Palestinian market</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Raising the efficiency of national industries and enhancing the theory of substitution of the Palestinian product at the expense of the imported product</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Raising the share of the scientific research sector in universities from the government budget</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Reducing abuses and violations against the Palestinian economy</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Enact legislation that meets the needs of economic development</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Providing protection networks for farms and supporting production requirements in the agricultural sector</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Developing the role of productive sectors in the Palestinian economy</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Enhance the government's ability to exploit its natural resources, which are besieged or confiscated by the occupation</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Activating the role of the government in setting economic policies and development programs</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Reducing government interventions in the Palestinian economy</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Strengthening the cycle of the religious tourism industry</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Enhancing the role of the Palestinian market in defining the Palestinian economy</b>	<b>14</b>

### **Results**

- The level of fragility of Palestinian society has reached to alerting level, and this result corresponds to the level of fragility of the Arab countries surrounding Palestine.

- The level of economic stability in Palestine has a significant impact on the high level of fragility of Palestinian society.
- Most economic indicators have high levels of instability, causing a high level of instability for the Palestinian economy and a high level of fragility.
- The elasticity of the main economic indicators was very low, which cause a weakness in the elasticity of the Palestinian economy, causing a high level of instability for the Palestinian economy and a high level of fragility.
- To use the development of the economic system as a tool to reduce the fragility of Palestinian society, first, we most restructuring the Palestinian economic system to be suitable for the reality of the Palestinian economy which greatly affected by the Israeli occupation, especially the Israelis, controlled the crossings.
- The second one was to reduce the impact of corruption (in the government and private sectors) on the economy, and the third was Restructuring the education sector in line with the Palestinian market.

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The structure of the Palestinian economic system, which was established by relying on a system of development assistance, which reinforced the free market system or the open market, which proved its failure to manage the Palestinian economy in proportion to the shocks suffered by the Palestinian society, either through the occupation, which seeks every day to destroy the economic system of the Palestinian society, or through the global economic system which based on the dominance of the major economies, which enhances the dependency of small systems. This was confirmed by the level of economic stability during the last decade and the need to restructure the Palestinian economy as a requirement to develop the economic system in Palestine.

By looking at the contribution of the economic sectors in the GDP in Palestine, during the last decade, we could describe the Palestinian economy as a service



economy, not an agricultural neither industrial. This economy has not the ability to withstand shocks, resist and cope with shocks. it is weak, compared with the big economic systems can not keep pace. This was clearly in the impact of the investment climate, inflation, and equal opportunities, which resulted in a highly alarming level of economic reality, which was reflected in the per capita GDP, reflecting the weakness of the Palestinian economy. Therefore, the contribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors in Palestine must be increased as its important role in promoting stability and reducing fragility.

**PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OF EMPLOYEES  
IN THE MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC  
RESEARCH  
IN REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
BY  
Dr. ANWAR MUSLEH SALEH MOOZAB  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN MANAGEMENT  
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UNIVERSITIES**

**ABSTRACT:**

This study was addresses in the performance appraisal of the ministry of higher education and scientific research in the republic Yemen. Performance appraisal is much needed in the ministry of higher education and scientific research because it enables the employees to know how can they performing in comparison with set standards and then try to improve their performance therefore this study highlight to what extent effectiveness of using of performance appraisal and what are the benefits of appraisal and what are the problems of performance appraisal. This study is hoped that the results can be used to improve the process of evaluation the ministry of higher education and scientific research.

**KEY WORDS:** Performance, improve, employees, education.

**Introduction:**

The performance appraisal can be described as the process of identifying, observing, measuring, and developing human performance in organizations. Each component of this definition refers to integral elements of the appraisal process. Identification is the process of determining what areas can be studied; specifically, the process of job analysis to identify performance related criteria, and the evaluative scale used. The observation should involve

fair, accurate, and unbiased judgments, with the rater frequently observing previously identified characteristics. Deviation from these criteria can lead to poor ratings. Measurement needs to be related to the integral operation of appraisal. The scales used to make these assessments “not only need to be relevant, but also must be comparable across other raters in the organization, the final component, development, should focus on more than the assessment of past performances. Focus on the future and skill levels of the raters are primary objectives.

The organization must be able to measure performance to successfully influence performance, and there are two specific purposes that an effective appraisal process can serve evaluative or judgmental function; and developmental function of the appraisal process.

The results of appraisals in the context of an evaluative or judgmental function are used for making administrative decisions about employees pay increase, promotions or transfers. The developmental role of appraisal focuses on facilitating an individual's effectiveness by improving job performance regarding one's own abilities and desires, and on increasing these abilities. The role of the individual's ability and motivation as primary performance determinants are valuable in demonstrating how an effective appraisal process can be central to obtaining effective performance within an organization. Despite the details that are required to implement an effective appraisal. The reactions of workers to their jobs can alter their basic self-perceptions and self-esteem. The implications of a negative appraisal, in particular, can affect an employee's sense of self worth and importance adversely within the work environment. Other job aspects (e.g., work motivation, performance, interpersonal relationships, communication and support of organizational goals) also can be negatively impacted. The key is to implement an effective appraisal system consistently, with employees having confidence that the process is objective. Most often, employees must understand the process of identification, observation, measurement, and development and believe that the performance appraisal can aid in improving their work performance, an organization benefits from improved work performance of its employees.

Before implementing an effective appraisal process, an organization must recognize that its employees are its most valuable resource. Although the organization holds this philosophy, employees impacted by this process may not share the same perception or regard for their value to the organization. Thus, employees' resulting job satisfaction or dissatisfaction may be an affective reaction to the evaluative aspect of their job

performance. Managers to understand satisfy employees' desires for good managerial relations, respect, fair and adequate compensation, and opportunities for growth and development through training, is reaping the benefits the Bruce and Blackburn concluded that distinct relationships exist between (good) human resource management practices and improved performance. In the "new workplace," the importance of respect for the individual is emphasized. The opinion that satisfied employees can make a difference was prompted by what has been described as the "third industrial revolution," which began with the Hawthorne studies of the 1930s that called for a humanization of the workplace. Bruce and Blackburn referred to Herzberg's 1959 work on "satisfiers" and "dissatisfies" in the workplace as a catalyst for the position that job satisfaction serves as a means of improving employee motivation.<sup>10</sup> Thus, with that improvement, an increase of individual productivity, job longevity, and organizational efficiency could be expected to emerge. Therefore, it is important that performance appraisal is conducted in a fair and consistent manner. The researcher has a background in public human resources, as he is a member of the working staff in the ministry of higher education and scientific research, based on his own experiences, The Researcher has become concerned with the actual process of performance evaluation. As an employee in a public organization, the researcher has experienced situations in which evaluations were not conducted effectively it becomes useless.

## **Statement of the Problem**

There are many problems related with the systems of performance appraisal in the public sectors in general and the ministry of higher education and scientific research in Yemen in particular. one of the most important problems is that the followed stage and procedures are traditional was depends on reports in the evaluation the employees which are done annually besides, appraisal is being done by the direct responsible for this weaker are that employee which make in equity appraisal for this also there is no feedback by the direct responsible for employees about appraisal of results and mentioning the points of weaknesses in their performance of weak and not making effective communication ,which is supposed to be feedback from the side of the direct responsible on the employee weaker about his results of appraisal then offer the knowledge of the weaker/ employee for

the results of appraisal will help him to improve his present performance furthermore, promotion in work does not depend on results of appraisal, incentives and allowances, which can make the process of performance appraisal not effective in the reward system.

The problem of this study addressed in performance of appraisal in the ministry of higher education and scientific research therefore the researcher desired to determine whether the performance appraisal instrument and process used by the ministry of higher education and scientific research effective or ineffective, so the researcher used a survey to determine what benefits of appraisal and which factors influences the using of the performance appraisal system.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of the present study are as follows:

1. To investigate whether the current criteria of performance appraisal for all employees is adequate to evaluate the performance.
2. To determine whether the performance appraisal instrument is appropriate for evaluation of the needs of employees and management
3. To investigate whether the feedback helps employees to improve performance of employees.
4. To know how the results of performance appraisal used in the ministry of higher education and scientific research for employees and management.
5. To determine the factors, which affect the performance appraisal process in a select public organization - in the ministry of higher education and scientific research.
6. To know the current performance appraisal process administrated in an equitable manner among all employees
7. To know what are the requirements of the effective performance evaluation.

## **Hypotheses of the Study**

This study hypothesized the following:

1. The current criteria of appraisal is inadequate to evaluate the performance.
2. The current instrument of appraisal inappropriate for needs of employees.
3. There is no association between the feedback and improved performance of employees
4. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and pay and rewards.
5. There is an association between Performances appraisal and disciplinary action.
6. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and training development programs
7. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and satisfaction of employees

## **Limitations of the Study:**

The limitation of the present study is as follows

1. The study is limited to performance appraisal the employees ministry of higher education and scientific research in Yemen.
2. The study is limited to a year of 2019.
3. The study is limited to ministry of higher education and scientific research of Sana'a city only.

## **Statement of the Hypothesis**

The hypothesis of the present study is as follows:

8. The current criteria of appraisal are inadequate to evaluate the performance.

9. There is no association between the feedback and improved performance of employees.
10. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and pay and rewards.
11. There is no association between Performances appraisal and disciplinary action.
12. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and training development programs.
13. There is non significant relationship between Performances appraisal and satisfaction of employees

## **Methodology of the Research**

The research Methodology adopted is as follows:

- A) **Primary data:** Primary data was collected through Questionnaire, The primary data has been collected from the sample had chosen randomly sample from ministry of higher education and scientific research in Sana'a city the capital city of Yemen
- B) **Secondary data:** this study also uses secondary data. The researcher has collected secondary data from published sources also secondary data was collected from ministry of higher education and scientific research, journals, newspapers, reports, previous studies, internet, and books. The secondary data was also analyzed and used for presentation of study.
- C) **Statistical methods used:**  
The study has used various statistical methods such as collection and classification of data, tabulation of data, graphic presentation of data percentages, average, etc. and chi-square for testing of hypothesis, the test of significance wherever necessary are used.
- D) **Size of sample:**

This study based upon sample survey. The researcher has used sample randomly selected from the employees of ministry of higher education and scientific research, thus the total sample size was 80 employees and administrators, 20% from the total employees and administrators in ministry of higher education and scientific research.

## **Findings of the Study**

1. The results of this research indicated that were only 35% of the respondents agree the criteria clear for all employees, the results of respondents indicate that were 65% disagree with this statement, an additional 65% of the respondents did not indicate the current criteria of appraisal are adequate to evaluation of performance and to the nature of the basis work.
2. The results of this research indicated that the 60% of the responding disagree the performance appraisal instrument was the most appropriate form of evaluation for the needs of employees.
3. The results of this research indicated that only 40% of the responding agrees there is post appraisal feedback to employee about his evolution. In addition 60% of the responding disagree feedback helps employees to improve their performance.
4. The results of performance appraisal if that were used to facilitate decisions concerning pay increases 62 % said they disagreed with this statement.
5. This study revealed lack of use of performance appraisal to determine individual and organizational training and development needs. 60% of the respondents did not indicate the ministry of higher education and scientific research did not use performance appraisal for organizational training and development needs and in additional 40% of the respondents were agree it was used for this purpose.



6. The results of this research indicated that the majority of respondents 98% said that there was no training provided to managers and employees to give effective appraisals and only 2% said that there was training given.
7. This research indicated that 62% of the responding agrees for the statements that the supervisor's personal values and bias can replace organizational standards in the evaluation process, and the 38% of the responding agrees for the statements that the appraisal administered in equitable manner among all employees.
8. Finally, only 8% of respondents to the survey, indicated that they were satisfied with their performance appraisal system and the remaining respondents were either dissatisfied about their appraisal system.

### **Recommendations of the Study:**

The most important suggestions and recommendations were:

1. Ministry of higher education and scientific research should to use a variety of performance appraisal instrument and tools to be fitted with job requirements.
2. Ministry of higher education and scientific research should use performance appraisal to identify the training and development needs of their employees.
3. Ministry of higher education and scientific research needs to develop the performance standards taking into account job requirements and need to reconsider the standards to fit with all the functions.
4. Provide feedback to employees about the results of evaluation it enable them to see the weaknesses and strengths in their performance, and so as to improve the level of their performance.
5. Ministry of higher education and scientific research should devote the necessary resources to implement such a appraisal system more effective.

6. Ministry of higher education and scientific research should to increase the usefulness of performance appraisal by using for decisions regarding pay increase, rewards, promotions and job changes.

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