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Editor-in-chief introduction

In the midst of a number of contradictions that the world knows between the field of international law and the field of actual practice in many areas, Legal globalization has turned into difficult rules for many countries, Where the latter have become confused between the legalization of subordination to others and the legalization that reflects the nature and roots of their societies.

The same applies to most national human rights laws, as well as laws imported from certain countries where the parent legislative authority is unable to enact certain rules, or for special purposes which deny the correct meaning of the law. property of legal abstraction.

The global health crisis caused by the global epidemic, Corona Covid 19, has also exhausted all international economic relations to an unexpected degree, and far greater than the effects of the economic recession that hit the world more than a decade due to the US real estate crisis, which caused the bankruptcy of some countries and raised many social issues affecting public safety for other countries, similar to political, economic and social security, and the negative effects on the global security.

Through this unpleasant reality, we publish the tenth issue of the Journal of Afro-Asian Studies through the platform of the Arab Democratic Center, where this publication is rich in economic, political and strategic themes. For example :*Financial Development and Economic Growth: Toda and Yamamoto causality test in Algeria,*Urban digital: on the "platformization" of the city and its consequences on urbanity* *Psychoanalysis Theory,*The first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity conference: A retrospective,*The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Own Local Revenue Generation: A Comparative Study between Uganda and Egypt,*The role of artificial intelligence in conflict resolution,*Valorization of local products in Morocco, and their rool in local development.

We hope this year that peace will reign in all countries of the world, and economic development will be achieved through international cooperation, and we end the COVID-19 crisis.

Editor-in-chief
Dr. LATRECHE Ali
Journal of Afro-Asian Studies



Introduction du rédacteur en chef

Au milieu d'un certain nombre de contradictions que le monde connaît entre le champ de la législation internationale et le champ des pratiques réelles au niveau de nombreux domaines, La mondialisation juridique s'est transformée en règles difficiles pour de nombreux pays, Où ces derniers se sont confondus entre la légalisation de la subordination aux autres et la légalisation qui reflète la nature et les racines de leurs sociétés.

De même pour la plupart des lois nationales relatives aux droits de l'homme, Ainsi que les lois importées de certains pays lorsque l'autorité législative mère est incapable d'édicter certaines règles, Ou à des fins spéciales qui nient le sens correct de la propriété d'abstraction légale. La crise sanitaire mondiale due à l'épidémie mondiale, Corona Covid 19, a également épuisé toutes les relations économiques internationales à un degré inattendu, et bien plus importants que les effets de la récession économique qui a frappé le monde il y a plus d'une décennie en raison de la crise immobilière américaine, ce qui a provoqué la faillite de certains pays et soulevé de nombreux problèmes sociaux affectant la sécurité publique pour les autres pays, similaire à la sécurité politique, économique et sociale, et aux effets négatifs sur la sécurité mondiale.

A travers cette désagréable réalité, nous publions le dixième numéro du Journal of Afro-Asian Studies à travers la plateforme du Centre Démocratique Arabe, Là où cette publication est riche en thèmes économiques, politiques et stratégiques. Par exemple: *Développement financier et croissance économique : test de causalité de Toda et Yamamoto en ALGERIE,* Le numérique urbain : sur la « plateformisation » de la ville et ses conséquences sur l'urbanité,* Théorie de la psychanalyse,* La première conférence de solidarité des peuples afro-asiatiques : une rétrospective,* L'impact des transferts intergouvernementaux sur la propre génération de revenus locaux : une étude comparative entre l'Ouganda et l'Égypte,* Le rôle de l'intelligence artificielle dans la résolution des conflits,* Valorisation des produits locaux au Maroc, et leur rôle dans le développement local,* Le travail des enfants en Tunisie : répercussions psychologiques et éducatives, Le rôle des relations publiques dans l'activation du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé

Nous espérons cette année que la paix régnera sur tous les pays du monde, et le développement économique sera réalisé dans le cadre de la coopération internationale, et nous mettons fin à la crise du COVID-19.

Rédacteur en chef
Dr. LATRECHE Ali
Journal of Afro-Asian Studies



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own Local Revenue The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Generation: A Comparative Study between Uganda and Egypt

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Abstract :

The literature of fiscal Decentralization emphasizes how the design of intergovernmental transfer systems has a significant implication on the behavior of local governments. The empirical results about the relationship between central transfers and the incentives they create for revenue mobilization are differ from country to country and depend on the structure and type of transfer system in each country. Given the lack of financial data at the local level, this type of study rarely involves developing countries. Using a unique and rich financial, socio-economic, demographic and political data on Ugandan and Egyptian local governments, this paper contributes to the new generation of fiscal federalism literature by assessing the fiscal incentive effects of two types of transfers: general purpose transfers (unconditional) defined by a formula and specific purpose transfers (conditional) allocated on an ad-hoc basis. The findings support the existence of a positive incentive effect of unconditional and conditional transfers in Uganda, but a negative incentive effect in Egypt, suggesting that the transfer system in Egypt suffers from a defect that does not make it able to create incentives for local governments to mobilize their revenues.

Keywords: Decentralization; Local public finance; local revenue; Fiscal incentives; Intergovernmental transfers; Uganda; Egypt



Introduction:

Although Decentralization has been adopted by both developed and developing countries, Fiscal decentralization is considered as an important tool to achieve development goals by exploiting the potential of local governments (Oates, 1972). Also Fiscal decentralization is a way to improve public sector performance by increasing local financial management efficiency and provide services to individuals in a manner that suits their preferences. Bahi and Martinez, (2005) have shown that Fiscal decentralization also allows individuals to get more of their requirements, making them more willing to pay taxes and reduce the resistance to fees and thus increase local tax revenues. As local governments have a deep knowledge of local tax bases, fiscal decentralization leads to an expansion of the tax base by bringing in individuals and companies not included in tax records (Bahi and Vazquez, 2006).

Decentralization wave emerged in many African countries since the 1960s as a tool to help colonies manage their internal issues after independence. By the mid-1970s and early 1980s, international donor institutions began to encourage newly independent states to decentralize for development goals. By the early 1990s, institutions started to enforce decentralization in developing countries as a part of its structure adjustment program (Shah and Thompson, 2004).

The main puzzle that has remained since the adoption of decentralization is that although, a lot of African States adopted the legal framework of decentralization and delegated powers to local authorities since the early 1990s, local governments' own revenues are still insufficient to cover large spending responsibilities, and they still rely heavily on transfers from the central governments. These transfers are often based on



different formulas that are at the discretion of the central government (Dickovick and Riedl, 2010).

In the decentralized system, the central government devolves some of their spending responsibilities to local governments, which often exceed their revenue capabilities, creating a vertical imbalance between the expenditures and revenues of local governments. On the other hand, due to the different costs of providing public services in addition to the weak administrative capacities of local governments a horizontal imbalance arises too (Brun and Khrai, 2016). These vertical and/or horizontal imbalances can be treated either by giving local governments more revenue or by adopting a modified transfer system able to addressing these imbalances. The first choice is often difficult for two reasons: First, the tax capacity and rules vary among local governments and thus the horizontal imbalance between them increases. Second, the central government has a greater capacity to manage and collect many taxes at the local level (Dahlby, 1996). Transfers from central to local governments are therefore best suited to fill these imbalances.

Transfer system aims to achieve a set of objectives such as: i) vertical equality by reducing the deficit between expenditures and revenues at the local level, ii) horizontal equality by reducing the gap between rich and poor local units., ii) ensure a minimum level of public service delivery. And iv), correcting the imbalance that results from administrative weakness, particularly with regard to tax administration (Bahi, 2000).

Intergovernmental transfers can be classified into two types: conditional and unconditional transfers. Unconditional transfer, are those amounts transferred to local units without reference such that local units have the freedom to allocate them according to their priorities. The amount to be transferred can be defined in four ways: (i) as a tax



sharing transfer;,, (ii) according to a formula based on some specific criteria;,, (ii) cost reimbursement where central government cover expenditure responsibility that face local governments by providing some services;,, and (iv) estimate the amount (Smoke and Schroader, 2002). But in practice most country use mix of these ways.

Conditional transfers are those provided for specific purposes, meaning that central government or higher local levels may offer financial transfers to lower levels for the purpose of spending on a particular service, such as vaccination against a specific disease, or the establishment of a new school (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2004).

It should be noted that the choosing between conditional and unconditional transfers is a major public choice. And that each type of transfers implies different level of control for local governments on their local revenue mobilization. The design of the transfers system has significant implications for the overall fiscal behavior of local governments, both on the spending or revenue side (Careaga and Weingast, 2003; Singh and Srinivasan, 2006).

On the expenditure side, there are two negative effects: “the Flypaper effect”, which refers to the assumption that increases in equalizing transfers tend to stimulate more spending than do comparable increases in local tax revenues (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008; Turnbull, 1998). And “gap filling effect “meaning that central government, in this case, gives local governments with large deficits an incentive to exaggerate expenditure figures and nullifies any incentives to increase local own revenues.

On the revenue side, transfers may lead to inefficient tax administration of recipient local governments. Some literature suggests that transfers give local units poor fiscal incentives to increase local economic development (Tanzi, 1996; Zhag, 2013). Heavy



dependence on transfers from central government hinders local government's ability to formulate its own policies and priorities reflecting preferences of their citizens (Masaki, 2016). The presence of these transfers will create an incentive for local governments to adjust its fiscal policy form that allows them to receive more transfers or at least not to lose these transfers (Bird, 2010; Weingst, 2009). Moreover, as these transfers are constantly changing and unstable and dependent on the national financial situation, it will be difficult for local governments to predict these revenues and this makes planning difficult (Prichard, 2010).

On the other hand, central transfers can have positive effects on revenue generation at the local level. Transfers led to increasing local spending, which improves private income and voluntary tax compliance and consequently local own revenue. Transfers also fill the financial imbalance of local governments in a way that improves their ability to provide goods and services and thus enhance their ability to raise taxes (Caldeira & Rota Graziosi, 2014).

Uganda and Egypt are ideal countries to study the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and local revenue generation for a number of reasons. First, intergovernmental transfers make up a large proportion of local government budget in both countries. Second, they have a large data base which allows researchers to empirically test the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and local revenue. Third: The two countries share many common features with the majority of developing countries, thus Uganda and Egypt are a representative cases of African countries.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the literature review. Section 3 presents the local structure of Uganda and Egypt and describes the intergovernmental transfers system .Section 4 empirically investigates the effect of



intergovernmental transfers on local own revenue. While Section 5 shows the result and discussion.

1. Literature review

The impact of central transfer on local own revenues generation has been empirically investigated in developed countries but given the lack of financial data at the local level, this type of study rarely involves developing countries. The empirical results about the relationship between central transfers and the incentives they create for revenue mobilization differ from country to country and depend on the structure and type of transfer system in each country. Many studies (Bravo, 2013; Mogues et al, 2009) have found a negative relationship. (Correa and Stelner, 1999) find the evidence of a disincentive effect of fiscal transfers on local tax effort.

Liu and Zhao (2011) highlight the negative effect of transfers that aim to reduce regional fiscal disparities on provincial tax efforts in China using a panel data from 1995 to 2007. Zhuravskaya (2000) analyses same relationship for Russian local governments and illustrates that any increase in local government's own revenue is almost entirely offset by lowering conditional shared revenues. Rajaraman & and Vasishtha 2000 investigates the incentive effect of unconditional fiscal transfers on their own tax revenue. They found that transfers from the center are significantly and negatively associated with states own-revenue.

On the contrary, more recent studies (Masaki, 2016; Brun & and Khdari, 2016) are suggesting that transfers can have a positive effect on local revenue. Dahlberg et al. (2008) report a statistically significant zero effect of transfers on revenue and a positive effect on spending in Swedish municipalities. Also positive effects are found by Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi (2014) for Benin by analyzing the effect



of unconditional central grants shared according to population criteria on local own revenue.

Bradford and Oates (1971a; 1971b) introduced a “medium voter transfer model” that affect local governments. In their framework, they assumes that transfers is equivalent to any other source of revenue for local governments and therefore it can be allocated between public and private goods according to the Income elasticity of the median voter. In this context, transfers from central government to subnational governments are expected to reduce local taxes and fees because some of these grants are distributed as lower taxes and fees Caldeira and Rota-Graziosia, (2014). Assuming an initial optimal balance between local public consumption and private consumption, grants would be passed on to local residents as reductions in local taxes and fees, other factors remaining unchanged.

On the other hand, Skidmore (1999) identifies a positive (crowding-in) effect of central government transfers on locally generated revenues Skidmore (1999). Also, Masaki (2016) argues that transfers led to increasing public expenditure in the local governments and this contributes to increased local revenue through improved service delivery that in turn increases willingness to pay rates and fees.

Existing evidence is mixed and this could be attributed to the different results in the literature, is the formula used to calculate the amount of transfers. If the formula used to calculate the transfer has an incentive component which transfers a higher amount for subnational governments that mobilize more own source revenues (Brun and Khdari, 2016). At the same time, local governments that already have higher own revenues, are likely to receive few transfers and therefore it is difficult to determine the direction of impact.



Additional empirical findings on relationship between transfers and the local revenues depends largely on the different types of transfers used in the analysis, whether conditional or unconditional. Unconditional transfers (for general purposes) provide greater autonomy to subnational governments as opposed to conditional transfers (for specific purposes), which are often very restricted (Smoke & Schroeder, 2000). Using a panel data set of 77 communes in Benin, Caldeira & Rota-Graziosia (2014) find a positive and significant effect of unconditional transfers on own revenue. In the study of Brun & Khdari (2016) on the Moroccan municipalities, they consider both unconditional and conditional transfers in their analysis and find significant and robust positive effect of unconditional transfers on local revenue generation while conditional transfers have a positive but less robust effect. They argue that unconditional transfers encourage tax efforts and thus incentives local revenue generation. On the other hand, Bravo (2013) finds a negative relationship between unconditional transfers and generating local revenues by applying to 340 chilean municipalities from 1990 to 2007. He discusses that unconditional transfers create disincentives to collect revenue.

Masaki (2016) investigates the effect of transfers on rural district in Tanzania with low financial capacity and find a positive effect. In the same context, Bravo (2013) finds an effect that is close to zero and statistically insignificant. Mogues, et al. (2009) investigates the effect of conditional transfers on 110 Ghana's districts from 1994 to 2004. They find a negative effect which they attribute to the limited of fiscal autonomy in the face of weak fiscal capacity. For South Africa, the Financial Fiscal Commission (2014) finds a positive effect of the intergovernmental transfers (local government equitable share) on rural municipalities' property rates tax collection efforts.



The literature suggests that many factors, other than transfers, can affect revenue generation at the local level have been used in empirical analysis. These include other fiscal variables, political economy factors, and other factors that may affect the tax revenue base and the capacity to collect taxes, such as the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the local government. With regard to fiscal factors, the relationship between local government revenues and expenditures has been investigated by Dahlberg & Johansson (1998) in Sweden, Mogues & Benin (2012) in Ghana and recently by Brun & Khidari (2016) in Morocco. They concluded that local expenditures positively impact local revenue generation, as they may exert pressure to expand revenues in subsequent time periods, especially when the local government has a hard budget constraint.

Also literature shows that as political participation, Partisan politics, and the political structure of local government affect revenue generation. Allers, de Haan, & Sterks (2001) in the case of the Netherlands, and Borge & Rattsø (1997) in the Norwegian context, reach that the political ideology greatly affects the level of local taxation: the more left-leaning the government, the more taxation. The following table summarizes some of the studies that analyzed the impact of central transfers on revenue generation at the local level.

This paper differs from the other literature as it includes a variety of integrated financial, demographic, socioeconomic and political variables. Moreover, this analysis uses the effect of Leviathan hypothesis on local revenue. Because In Africa, due to the reliance of local budgets on transfers from the central government, and the centralized budgeting, the amounts of local expenditures and transfers from the central government to the local budgets are largely subject to the political elites represented in the parliament,



which have bargaining power in the parliament and the central government Mala, (2002).

2 - Egypt and Uganda' local revenue structure and transfers system.

Revenue mobilization at the local level is one of the most important development issues, especially in developing countries, where the own revenues of their local governments are not sufficient to cover the big spending responsibilities Ruddock, (1994). Egypt and Uganda provide a model for the majority of developing countries, whose local governments rely heavily on central transfers and have weak tax administration.

The local governance system in Egypt is a reflection of the principle of lack of concentration in public administration, which represents the minimum stage of decentralization. All local administration units act as agents and assistants of the central government Mayfield, (1996). According to the Egyptian's Local Administration Law No. 43 of 1979, the role of local units in allocating expenditures is limited to participation in the preparation of the preliminary draft of the plan and budget Shand, (2005).

Egyptian local revenue is divided into i): shared taxes, where local units share the revenue from these taxes with the central government. ii) Non-tax revenue, which are the fees and expenses collected at the local level by local staff Abd El-Wahab, (1991). The figures indicate a decrease in tax revenues as a percentage of total revenues. For the fiscal year 2017/2018 to 2019/2020, tax revenues amounted to 3.9% of the total current revenues during the fiscal year 2019/2020 compared to about 10% in 2017 /2018. Analysis of the budgets of the Egyptian governorates during the period from 2016/2017 to 2018/2019 indicates that tax revenues have decreased to the total current revenues in about 94% of the Egyptian governorates.



The local governments in Egypt depend heavily on transfers from the central government, which amount to about 88% of the local total revenue. The philosophy of the transfer system in Egypt is based on "filling the gap" between total expenditures and revenues at the local level. These transfers are sent to local units in the form of quarterly payments. In the absence of legally defined criteria for the distribution of transfers, the transfers system in Egypt is characterized by a high degree of Lack of transparency. Amin (2005) analyzed is at the level of Egyptian governorates in order to reach the main determinants of the distribution of transfers to the governorates, the results of the analysis found that the current transfers system does not motivate the governorates to maximize their tax efforts.

In Uganda, the transfer of power from central government to local governments began with the enactment of the 1962 semi-federal Constitution. The aim of this step was to enhance self-governance; land administration; collection of taxes; management of local roads; rural water supplies; agricultural extension; and primary and junior secondary education. The Ministry of Regional Administration was created to superintend over this new sub-national governance arrangement. The 1964 Urban Authorities Act and the 1967 Local Administrations Act created a uniform set of regulations that gave the Central Government control over local administration in each district. In 1987, the National Resistance Council (NRC) enacted the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute, which gave them political, administrative, financial, planning and judicial powers. On 2nd October 1992, H.E The President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni launched the Local Government Decentralization Programme Muhumuza, (2008).

Uganda has one of the most highly developed local systems in all east and central Africa based on decentralization which adopted in 1999. The decentralization and



devolution were formally adopted following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution. Schedule 2 of the Constitution provided for the first time, a clear distinction between Central and Local Governments' roles. The local structure consists of five administrative levels from villages to districts Boger, (2013). This structure seeks to transfer administrative, political and financial responsibilities from central to local level. The national constitution outlines the roles and responsibilities of local councils and dedicates a whole chapter to Ugandan's decentralization policy Mpaata et al., (2015).

The Constitution and the Local Governments Act allowed Local Governments to collect revenue from a number of specified sources, formulate plans and budgets, allocate expenditure, and make investments in a wide range of services. Due to insufficient local own revenue to cover expenditure responsibility, Local governments rely heavily on transfers from the central government Sarzin, (2007). As Table 2 shows, the tax revenue of all Ugandan local governments is about 1.1% as a percentage of total local revenues in FY2013 / 2014; this figure increased to 1.3% in FY2015 / 2016 and reached 1.4%. In FY 2017/2018. Consequently central transfers formed about 96.5% of total local revenues in FY2013 / 2014 and reached to 95.7% in FY 2017/2018.

Table (1): Local government revenue by type for FY 2013/14 – 2017/18 - (UGx. Million)

Revenue items	2013/ 2014	2014/ 2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018
Taxes revenues	26,967	32,720	34,895	42,581	42,036
Central Transfers	247,357,5	2,480,466	2,528,445	2,871,595	2,892,646
Other revenues	62,267	66,952	61,432	89,290	87,770
Total revenues	2,562,809	2,580,137	2,624,772	3,003,465	3,022,452

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics

Note: Local government revenue is a summation of Districts revenue and Municipalities revenue.



The financial structure of the different levels of local government reveals, that districts and municipalities rely more on transfers from the central government than town councils Steiner, (2006). For districts revenue structure, the central transfers for the fiscal year 2017/2018 amounted to 2,576,776 million shillings, which is equivalent to about 98% of the total revenues of the districts, which amounted to 2,609,073 million shillings. Almost the same percentages in municipalities, where the proportion of central transfers amounted to about 95.7% of the total revenue. While transfers from the central government as a percentage of total revenues in town councils amounted about 72.8%.

Article 193 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides for intergovernmental transfers (grants) to local governments. Table 2 shows the types of transfers as well as the contribution of each type of transfers as a percentage of total remittances to local governments.

Table (2) Central Government transfers to Local Governments (UGX Billions)

Transfers to local government	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016
conditional transfers	1,733.15	1,926.39	1931.49
unconditional transfers	221.20	247.26	244.08
Equalization transfers	3.49	3.59	3.59
Total	1,957.48	2,177.24	2,179.16

Source: local government finance commission (LGFC)

Table 2 reveals that there are three types of transfers in Uganda Ziria, (2000): unconditional transfer, which specified in the Seventh Schedule to Constitution and present about 11% of total central transfers. Also, conditional transfer, consist of monies given to local governments to finance programmers agreed upon between the Government and the local governments and shall be expended only for the purposes for which it was



made and in accordance with the conditions agreed upon, it is constitute about 88% of total central transfers. Furthermore, Equalization transfer, which is given to some development targets. Its forms a very small percentage bout 1% of total central transfers. Article 193 (5) of the Constitution states that, “district councils shall be obliged to indicate how conditional and equalization grants obtained from the Government are to be passed onto the lower levels of local government.”

3 Methodology

3.1. Econometric model and estimation technique

Heavily depending on transfers from central government compromises local government autonomy to set policies in accordance local preferences. In the same time insufficient local revenues to meet spending needs, especially in rural local units, has a negative impact on the efficiency of the provision of social and economic services. This theoretical contradiction r is the reason for empirical analysis.

The analysis focuses on the highest local level for both countries, which is the Governorate level for Egypt, and districts levels for Uganda. The total number of Egyptian governorates is 27, while the number of Ugandan districts has devolved from 16 districts in 1959 to 121 in 2017. Because of the lack of data on all Ugandan districts, Empirical analysis covers cross-section data for 27 Egyptian Governorate and 100 Ugandan districts.

To analyze the impact of transfers on local own revenue, the following empirical model is estimated

$$\text{Log OwnRevenue}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log \text{TRANS}_i + \beta_2 \log \text{EXP}_i + \beta_3 \log X_i + \varepsilon_i$$



From Equation 1, own revenue denotes district revenue for Uganda/Egypt. $TRAN Si$ denotes the size of intergovernmental transfers from center government (log-transformed); $\log EXP_i$ is the log expenditures of local governments. $\log X_i$ is a vector of several explanatory variables commonly used in the literature on the determinants of local revenue? These include variables on socio-economic, demographic and political variables. ε_i is the error term.

3.2. Data resources and expected results

The database used in the analysis contains comprehensive and integrated financial, socio-economic, demographic and political data on Ugandan and Egyptian local governments. For Egypt, data on governorates were compiled from financial data related to own revenues and local expenditure as well as transfers from the central government to the governorates were collect from the budget figures for the fiscal year 2018-2019 from the Ministry of Finance. Data on socioeconomic and demographic variables at local level were obtained from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), which provides a comprehensive survey of the Egyptian governorates in terms of population, education, health, poverty rate, unemployment, and urbanization. Also, data dealt with the political variable, which is the number of seats allocated to parliamentarians within each governorate according to the latest elections in 2015 was obtained from the Ministry of Local Development.

The model included three types of explanatory variables that illustrate the financial, socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics of Egyptian governorates to reflect their ability to generate local revenue. For financial characteristics: The log of Current and capital spending for each governorate is included to explore the relevance of the intertemporal budget constraint. The dynamic relationship between local revenues and



expenditures has been investigated by Dahlberg & Johansson (1998) in Sweden and recently by Mogues & Benin (2012) in Ghana. Their results indicated that expenditures are positively related to own-source revenues.

Also, the model explores the relevance of socioeconomic and demographic variables to explain local own-revenue mobilization. The population number was included in the regression to control for the size of each governorate. Also, demographic variables such as total population and urbanization level are expected to be positively correlated with generating local revenue. The unemployment rate was included in the analysis to express the level of purchasing power of the local citizens. The high unemployment rate means that the purchasing power of local citizens is low and their ability to participate in local revenue generation is weak. Thus, this variable is likely to be negatively correlated with the generation of local revenues. The health and educational level of the local citizen was expressed using the number of currently enrolled in secondary schools 2018 and Infant Mortality Rates, Rate per 1000 live births 2018 (CAPMAS, 2018) , where these two variables were included in the analysis to express the extent of the ability of the local citizen to participate in generating local revenue. The improvement of the educational level and health of the local citizen, gives them the ability to pressure local government officials and increase efficiency in a way that makes them more willing to pay local taxes, so the level of education and health is expected to be positively associated with revenue generation at the local level. The poverty rate is used as proxy for income levels because information on income is unavailable at local level. The income base for taxation is likely to be lower in governorates with a larger poverty therefore this variable is expected to have a negative effect on revenue mobilization Mogues & Benin, (2012).



To take into account the political structure of the Egyptian local governments, and due to the centralization of the preparation of local budgets, a political variable has been included in the analysis that reflects the number of seats allocated to members of parliament within each Egyptian governorate. The increase in the number of Parliament members representing the Governorate, leads to increased negotiating power and thus decisions that would expand the tax base or search for new sources of local revenues. Thus, this variable is likely to correlate positively with local revenue generation Allers, de Haan, & Sterks (2001).

Data for Uganda was collected from Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2019), National Population and Housing Census 2014, which includes a complete survey of population, number of households and urbanization rate, and Uganda Bureau of Statistics, which provides many statistics on central and local Ugandan governments, and the Ministry of Education and Sports. Data for the political variable, linked to the results of the local elections held in 2016, were obtained from the Ministry of Local Development.

Variables that reflect the financial characteristics of the Ugandan districts have been expressed as Tax and non-tax revenues for each district according to the local budget figures for the year 2018-2019, conditional and unconditional transfers from central government, and Current and capital spending for each district. The district poverty rate was measured as a number of households without electricity in each district. Also education level was measures as a net enrollment rate in secondary schools.

The number of lower level administrative units in each district was concluded in the model to reflect the degree of expansion of the tax base. An increase in the number of lower local levels could lead to an expansion of the tax base and consequently an increase



in local revenues, so this variable is therefore likely to be positively associated with increased tax revenues. According to the Leviathan hypothesis, which says that governments with low levels of competition are more likely to extract higher taxes, the analysis has included a dummy variable describing the last local elections (2016) on the seat of district chairperson, which take zero if the candidate wins without opposition and 1 if there is competition in the elections. A political variable that less competition means that the government is less obligated to trade its preferences against the preferences of the average voter. Less competition implies that the government is less compelled to trade off its own preferences against those of the median voter, so this variable is therefore likely to be positively associated with increased tax revenues Brennan & Buchanan (1989).

3.3. Descriptive results and correlation analyses.

Table 3, 4 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. The local units in Uganda data considering revenues, transfers, expenditure and population are more consistent than those for Egypt, as indicated by the lower coefficient of variation. However, the variation in poverty rate among local units in Egypt is lower than Uganda.

Table (3) Descriptive statistics for Egypt

Variables	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) Sd	(4) Min	(5) max	(6) C.V
Revenue	27	5.534	0.315	4.884	5.866	6%
Transfers	27	6.676	0.306	5.976	6.910	5%
Expenditure	27	6.675	0.2917	5.948	6.912	4%
Population	27	3.533	0.532	2.017	3.818	15%



Urbanization	27	1.609	0.254	1.255	1.993	16%
Area	27	3.954	0.683	2.959	4.797	17%
Education	27	5.966	0.540	4.491	6.272	9%
Health	27	1.113	0.123	0.949	1.276	11%
Unemployment	27	1.075	0.134	0.778	1.245	12%
Poverty	27	1.492	0.244	0.880	1.737	16%
Seats	27	1.505	0.369	0.602	1.568	25%

Source: The table was calculated by STATA 11

Table (4) Descriptive statistics for Uganda

Variables	(1) N	(2) Mean	(3) Sd	(4) Min	(5) Max	(6) C.V
Revenue	100	7.426	0.161	7.033	7.752	2%
Unconditional transfer	100	6.568	0.127	6.303	6.838	2%
Conditional transfer	100	7.260	0.198	6.681	7.631	3%
Expenditure	100	7.336	0.176	6.881	7.677	2%
Population	100	5.400	0.264	4.686	5.841	5%
Urbanization	100	1.102	0.287	0.278	1.563	26%
Area	100	3.204	0.325	2.339	3.727	10%
Education	100	1.301	0.268	0.301	1.633	21%
Poverty	100	1.044	0.333	-0.154	1.528	32%
Lower level	100	0.301	0.213	0	0.698	71%

Source: The table was calculated by STATA 11



From the correlation matrix for Egypt data, the correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable is moderately good. Also From the correlation matrix for Uganda data, the correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable is moderately good. And there is no evidence of serious multicollinearity problem between independent variables since the correlation between them is not exceeded 0.8, except for expenditure which excluded from the model to avoid the multicollinearity problem.

Table (5) correlation results for Ugandan variables

. correlate (obs=100)	revenue	expend~e	uncond~l	condit~l	area	popula~n	urbaniz~n	poverty	lowerl~l	election	educat~n
revenue	1.0000										
expenditure	0.9242	1.0000									
uncondition~l	0.7444	0.6928	1.0000								
conditional	0.9028	0.9945	0.6198	1.0000							
area	0.1329	-0.0490	0.0840	-0.0605	1.0000						
population	0.6947	0.7364	0.5670	0.7256	0.0809	1.0000					
urbanization	0.2508	0.2240	0.1335	0.2216	-0.1147	0.2403	1.0000				
poverty	0.2762	0.3120	-0.0231	0.3389	0.0509	0.3464	0.4833	1.0000			
lowerlevel	0.4272	0.3902	0.1716	0.4069	0.1940	0.4249	0.0942	0.3299	1.0000		
election	0.1043	0.1083	0.1112	0.1038	-0.1093	-0.0203	-0.1119	-0.1493	-0.1207	1.0000	
education	0.1736	0.3204	0.0378	0.3480	-0.4354	0.1947	0.2626	0.3588	0.1472	-0.1191	1.0000

Source: The table was calculated by STATA 11

3.4. Estimation results and discussion.

Various country specific models are estimated as a double log model and the results are presented in Tables 6, 7. However, before the models estimation, the data properties are analyzed to establish their normal distributions and other data properties. First the model is estimated based on 27 observations for Egypt and 100 for Uganda. The R-squared reveal that about 84% and 73% of the variation in the local revenue collection is attributed to the key factors included in the estimated modes for Egypt and Uganda, respectively.



Table (6) the impact of central transfers on Egyptian local revenue

VARIABLES	Model (1)	Model (2)
Transfers	-3.200** (0.001)	-4.308*** (0.0000)
Expenditure	3.320** (0.001)	3.963*** (0.000)
Population	-0.434 (0.217)	
Urbanization	0.4911* (0.025)	
Area	0.055 (0.341)	
Education level	0.139 (0.603)	
Health level	-0.171 (0.545)	
Unemployment	-0.6513* (0.044)	0.0483 (0.808)
Seats		1.0316*** (0.000)
Poverty level		-0.1120 (0.295)
R-squared	0.848	0.864

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See Appendix 1, 2.

The results show that transfers have a significant decreasing effect on the local revenue mobilization. The findings means that a percentage increase in the transfers reduces local revenue mobilization by 3.2 percentage points (model 1) and by 4.3 percentage points (model 2). Our finding implies that there is need for measures to reduce transfers will enhance local revenue collections and this will build the local government capacity for self-revenue collection. Our findings are in line with previous authors (Bravo,



2013; Liu and Zhao 2011; Mogues et al, 2009; Correa and Stelner, 1999) who found that transfers negatively affect local government capacity for local revenue collection.

Also, these findings are in line with previous authors (Brun and Khdari, 2016), who suggest that the effect of intergovernmental transfers depend on the formula used to calculate the transfer. In Egypt there is no transfer's formula that sets specific criteria for the distribution of transfers and the only criterion is to close the gap between revenues and expenditures, which removes any incentive for these local governments to increase and mobilize local revenues. Also there is a positive impact of local expenditure on local revenue generation in both models, which is consistent with the theory and with previous authors Dahlberg & Johansson (1998), Mogues & Benin (2012), Brun & Khdari (2016) who found a positive relationship between intergovernmental transfers and local expenditure.

The political variable shows that increasing the number of seats allocated to members of parliament in each governorate has a strong positive impact on generating domestic revenue, which is consistent with the theory. But it should be noted here that the ability to influence government decisions that increase local revenues may not be related to numbers but rather to the personal abilities of these members.

There are some variables that express a non-significant relationship with local revenues generation in the first model such as education, population, and health level. Although this is not consistent with theory, but using school enrollment as an indicator to measure the education level may not reflect the degree of awareness among local citizens that can increase accountability and efficiency in revenue collection. On the other hand, using the number of people who are over 65 years old may better reflect the burden on local governments than the total population. Also, the first model shows positive effect of



urbanization on local revenue generation and a negative impact of unemployment, which is consistent with the theory.

Table (7) presents four models explaining the results of the relationship between transfers and local revenue generation for 100 Ugandan districts. The first and second models deal with the impact of unconditional transfers, while the third and fourth models address the impact of conditional transfers.

Table (7) Impact of central transfers on Ugandan local revenue

VARIABLES	Unconditional transfers		Conditional transfers	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Unconditional transfers	0.703*** (0.000)	0.8754*** (0.000)		
conditional transfers			0.738*** (0.000)	0.7521*** (0.0000)
Area	0.038 (0.243)		0.0815** (0.001)	
Population	0.144** (0.003)		0.121 (0.730)	
Urbanization	0.0294 (0.421)	0.0276 (0.462)	0.0719** (0.005)	0.0622* (0.018)
Poverty level	0.0527 (0.141)	0.0969** (0.005)	-0.0448 (0.060)	-0.0278 (0.253)
Lower levels	0.13518** (0.006)	0.1893*** (0.000)	0.039 (0.246)	0.064 (0.060)
Elections	0.0489* (0.056)	0.0420 (0.113)	0.0117 (0.518)	
Education level	0.0447 (0.282)		-0.047 (0.111)	--0.1013* ** (0.000)
R-squared	0.0730	0.697	0.870	0.851

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See Appendix 3,4,5, 6.



The results show that there is a strong positive effect of unconditional and conditional transfers on local revenue generation. The findings mean that a percentage increase in the unconditional and conditional transfers increase local revenue mobilization by 0.70 percentage points (model 1), by 0.87 percentage points (model 2), by 0.73 percentage points (model 3) and by 0.75 percentage points (model 4). Our finding are in line with previous authors Skidmore (1999), Skidmore (1999), Masaki (2016) who found a positive effect of central government transfers on locally generated revenues, but are not in line with previous authors Smoke & Schroeder, (2000), Caldeira & Rota-Graziosia (2014), who found a positive effect of unconditional transfers and a negative effect of condition transfers on own revenue.

Total population has a positive relation with local revenue, which can be explained by the increase in the population leads to the expansion of the tax base for local units. Education level shows a negative relationship with local revenue generation in fourth model. Although this finding contradicts the theory, but it can be explained that the reason for not attending education may be for work, which positively affects the increase in local revenues, but only in the short term.

Regarding the local structure, the analysis indicates that an increase in the number of lower local leads to an increase in revenue generation at the local level, which is in line with theory. The political variable shows a positive effect on local revenue generation in the first model, and a non-significant relationship with local revenues the second and third model.

By comparing the results between Egypt and Uganda, it is clear that: intergovernmental transfers have a negative impact on local revenues generation in Egypt, and a positive impact in Uganda. This is consistent with the nature and structure of the



transfers system in both countries, because the Egyptian transfers system does not contain a specific formula for transfers that could create incentives for local governments to mobilize local revenues. Also, there is no impact of demographic variables such as population and total area on the generation of local revenues in Egypt, while a significant relationship in Uganda. Urbanization level shows a positive impact on local revenues in Egypt and Uganda.

With regard to socioeconomic variables, the education variable showed a negative relationship in Uganda and non-significant in Egypt, also the poverty variable, which shows a positive relationship in Uganda and non-significant in Egypt.

It should be noted that the political variables have a strong statistical significance in influencing the generation of local revenue in Egypt and Uganda. This finding are in line with previous authors (Allers, de Haan, & Sterks (2001), Borge &Rattsø (1997) who found that political structure greatly affects the level of local taxation.

4. Concluding remarks.

In any decentralized system, intergovernmental transfers are an important element in the relationship between the central and lower levels of government. The literature confirms that the design of the transfers system has a significant impact on the behavior of local governments, and therefore policy makers must pay great attention to the design of the transfers system to take advantage of decentralization by giving enough autonomy to local governments in generating their own revenue.

Using integrated public finance dataset on Egyptian and Ugandan local governments, this paper estimated empirically the effects of intergovernmental transfers



on local revenue generation by using OLS techniques. The findings support the existence of a positive incentive effect of unconditional and conditional transfers in Uganda, but a negative incentive effect in Egypt, suggesting that the transfer system in Egypt suffers from a defect that does not make it able to create incentives for local governments to mobilize their revenues. These results are somewhat consistent previous findings in the literature on incentive effects of intergovernmental transfers.

The paper indicated that transfers represent a large proportion of local government financing in both Egypt and Uganda, amounting to 80%, and in Uganda, conditional transfers represent about 88% of the total remittances. The heavy reliance of local governments on transfers to finance their projects make their motives for collecting revenues less, and increasing the proportion of conditional transfers makes them more sensitive to political manipulation and local bargaining.

Our study finding has several policy implications. First, to reduce the dependence on transfers, especially the conditional ones, and to use these resources to increase local governments' capacity or at least the general-purpose transfers, to give local governments more autonomy in handling local issues.

Secondly, the results indicate that there is need to design a formula used for unconditional transfers. This formula should include a tax effort indicator and other indicators that can create incentives for local governments to increase their own revenue.



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Appendix 1: The impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Local Revenue Generation Using Egyptian Data

. regress revenue transfer expenditure population urbanization area education health unemployment

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	27
Model	2.19974867	8	.274968583	F(8, 18) =	12.61
Residual	.392522471	18	.021806804	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	2.59227114	26	.099702736	R-squared =	0.8486

Adj R-squared = 0.7813
Root MSE = .14767

revenue	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
transfer	-3.200466	.776959	-4.12	0.001	-4.832796 -1.568135
expenditure	3.320447	.8862451	3.75	0.001	1.458515 5.182379
population	.434547	.3397672	1.28	0.217	-.2792774 1.148371
urbanization	.4911299	.2012127	2.44	0.025	.0683977 .913862
area	.0553143	.0565875	0.98	0.341	-.0635715 .1742002
education	.1395009	.2633869	0.53	0.603	-.4138544 .6928562
health	-.1710137	.2773989	-0.62	0.545	-.7538072 .4117799
unemployment	-.6513511	.3043473	-2.14	0.046	-1.290761 -.0119412
_cons	2.367132	1.816985	1.30	0.209	-1.450212 6.184477

Appendix 2: The impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Local Revenue Generation Using Egyptian Data

. regress revenue transfer expenditure unemployment seats poverty

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	27
Model	2.24211216	5	.448422433	F(5, 21) =	26.89
Residual	.350158974	21	.016674237	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	2.59227114	26	.099702736	R-squared =	0.8649

Adj R-squared = 0.8328
Root MSE = .12913

revenue	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
transfer	-4.308905	.6236606	-6.91	0.000	-5.605879 -3.011932
expenditure	3.963631	.6871455	5.77	0.000	2.534634 5.392629
unemployment	.0483877	.1961652	0.25	0.808	-.3595602 .4563357
seats	1.031615	.229156	4.50	0.000	.5550591 1.508171
poverty	-.1120266	.1042935	-1.07	0.295	-.3289167 .1048636
_cons	6.653955	1.649353	4.03	0.001	3.223937 10.08397



Appendix 3: The impact of Intergovernmental unconditional Transfers on Local Revenue Generation Using Ugandan Data

. regress revenue unconditional area population urbanization poverty lowerlevel election education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 100		
Model	1.89591083	8	.236988854	F(8, 91) =	30.79	
Residual	.700448814	91	.00769724	Prob > F =	0.0000	
Total	2.59635965	99	.026225855	R-squared =	0.7302	
				Adj R-squared =	0.7065	
				Root MSE =	.08773	

revenue	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
unconditional	.7038652	.0896342	7.85	0.000	.525818 .8819125
area	.0384537	.0327538	1.17	0.243	-.0266076 .103515
population	.1443273	.0472163	3.06	0.003	.0505378 .2381167
urbanization	.0294474	.0364249	0.81	0.421	-.0429061 .1018009
poverty	.0527885	.0355809	1.48	0.141	-.0178886 .1234656
lowerlevel	.1351226	.0480769	2.81	0.006	.0396237 .2306215
election	.0489117	.0256214	1.91	0.059	-.001982 .0998054
education	.0447229	.0412861	1.08	0.282	-.0372868 .1267327
_cons	1.695119	.4848731	3.50	0.001	.7319779 2.65826

Appendix 4: The impact of Intergovernmental unconditional Transfers on Local Revenue Generation Using Ugandan Data

. regress revenue unconditional urbanization lowerlevel election poverty

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 100		
Model	1.80954904	5	.361909808	F(5, 94) =	43.24	
Residual	.786810607	94	.008370326	Prob > F =	0.0000	
Total	2.59635965	99	.026225855	R-squared =	0.6970	
				Adj R-squared =	0.6808	
				Root MSE =	.09149	

revenue	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
unconditional	.8754384	.0754758	11.60	0.000	.7255794 1.025297
urbanization	.0276617	.037431	0.74	0.462	-.0466584 .1019819
lowerlevel	.1893047	.0470443	4.02	0.000	.0958971 .2827122
election	.0420398	.0262773	1.60	0.113	-.0101344 .0942139
poverty	.096993	.0337951	2.87	0.005	.029892 .164094
_cons	1.475828	.4890102	3.02	0.003	.504887 2.44677



Appendix 5: The impact of Intergovernmental conditional Transfers on Local Revenue Generation Using Ugandan Data

. regress revenue conditional area population urbanization poverty lowerlevel election education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 100 F(8, 91) = 76.36 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.8704 Adj R-squared = 0.8590 Root MSE = .06082			
Model	2.25975028	8	.282468785				
Residual	.336609368	91	.003699004				
Total	2.59635965	99	.026225855				

revenue	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
conditional	.7385945	.0490571	15.06	0.000	.6411487 .8360403
area	.0815016	.0225885	3.61	0.001	.0366322 .1263709
population	.0121897	.0352527	0.35	0.730	-.0578354 .0822149
urbanization	.07198	.0249325	2.89	0.005	.0224546 .1215053
poverty	-.0448299	.0235447	-1.90	0.060	-.0915985 .0019387
lowerlevel	.0394406	.0338051	1.17	0.246	-.027709 .1065902
election	.0117641	.0181092	0.65	0.518	-.0242076 .0477358
education	-.0474634	.0294806	-1.61	0.111	-.106023 .0110961
_cons	1.762658	.2697874	6.53	0.000	1.226759 2.298558



Le numérique urbain : sur la « plateformisation » de la ville et ses conséquences sur l'urbanité

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Résumé:

Les mutations technologiques ont souvent produit des changements sociaux importants, qui se traduisent dans l'espace et la pratique de l'aménagement

On va essayer d'identifier quatre façons différentes selon lesquelles le numérique est en train de bouleverser totalement la pratique urbanistique. Décryptage de ces dynamiques, souvent plus complémentaires que contradictoires, à l'œuvre aujourd'hui dans les grandes villes.

Keywords: mutations technologiques, changements sociaux, aménagement, la pratique urbanistique, les grandes villes



L'association entre « ville » et « numérique » est déjà très ancienne. Le numérique sert la ville autant que la ville sert le numérique. On retrouve ici la contradiction soulevée plus haut sur la définition des communs : il s'agit, grâce ou avec le numérique, de trouver de nouvelles manières de résoudre les conflits, de poser des rapports de force, et d'imaginer une ville en commun.

À la fois dans la capacité des municipalités à mieux établir un « tableau de bord » de leur ville et, optimiser diront les optimistes, contrôler diront les autres, les activités et les comportements dans leur zone de responsabilité. Mais aussi dans les opportunités nouvelles offertes aux habitants de se rencontrer, d'échanger, de construire des relations sociales, souvent médiées, mais plus prégnantes et intimes que ce que les générations précédentes appelaient une vie « métro, boulot, dodo ». Nous vivons en réalité dans deux écosystèmes simultanément : l'écosystème terrestre, avec ses marqueurs spécifiques (déplacements, qualité de vie, habitat...) et ses crises internes (réchauffement climatique notamment), et l'écosystème numérique, avec ses utopies participatives comme avec les modes de soumission à une économie de l'attention. Parler ainsi des pratiques numériques quotidiennes, c'est rejeter la notion « d'outil », qui ne considère que l'aspect de prolongation des capacités humaines...

Alors que le numérique modifie profondément notre relation à l'espace, au temps, mais aussi aux relations humaines, au travail et *in fine* à la manière dont nous envisageons le gouvernement des choses et des êtres. Parler d'écosystème numérique, c'est également aborder l'impact sur la vie quotidienne des modes actuels d'établissement des relations, des échanges, des partages des savoirs. Créer un imaginaire collectif pour penser la ville de demain, ses capacités de résilience, d'auto-suffisance, d'adaptation autant que les volontés de devenir des « villes monde » (Sassen, 1998) passe par l'élaboration partagée



dans l'espace numérique avant d'avoir des effets concrets dans l'espace physique. Il n'y a pas d'un côté des communs de la connaissance et de l'autre ceux de l'espace naturel, mais une articulation nouvelle, qui est à la fois dans le temps long (capacités de coordination des acteurs, d'élaboration...) et dans le temps dit « réel » de la synthèse algorithmique des informations émanant des objets connectés (capteurs, divers, vidéosurveillance, et appareils personnels mobiles).

La ville se construit sur trois légitimités qui sont à la fois en concurrence et en coopération :

- les pouvoirs publics, avec les divers échelons territoriaux, qui disposent de la légitimité offerte par l'élection et de la capacité de mobiliser des moyens autour de l'intérêt général. Mais ceux-ci ont tendance à se considérer comme les seuls en capacité de définir et d'instituer cet intérêt général.
- les opérateurs privés, dans tous les domaines, qui imaginent de plus en plus une ville « utopique » ou « fluide », « sans couture ». La première conception des *smart cities* relevait de cette logique de captation privée des informations de la ville.
- la population, qui par ses actions directes, individuelles (ouverture de commerces, choix de l'habitat, mais également relations numériques, notamment via les médias sociaux) ou collectives (mobilisations, mouvements sociaux, construction et défense de communs dans la ville) participe à façonner la ville.

Une question de recherche qui se pose à nous est de savoir si et comment l'équipement numérique va rebattre les cartes de ces trois légitimités et permettre



l'extension des communs urbains, c'est-à-dire la prise en charge par les habitants de l'évolution de leur ville.

Les réseaux urbains

L'espace urbain est composé de trois niveaux de réseaux qui sont tous les trois profondément impactés par le numérique. D'une part les réseaux de surface, les lieux ouverts où les habitants circulent, se rencontrent ; les réseaux des utilités ou l'urbanisme des réseaux (Dupuy, 1991) : eau, évacuation, électricité... et réseaux numériques et communicationnels ; et les réseaux culturels, les lieux d'échange et d'élaboration collective. Les pouvoirs publics définissent les usages et accès de ces trois réseaux, mais les habitants savent s'insérer dans les interstices. Notamment avec le wifi et les réseaux de télécommunication de nouvelles générations et la géolocalisation permanente, l'accès aux informations est devenu ubiquitaire dans les villes, et les équipements dont disposent les individus vont renouveler les usages.

L'espace public de la ville est lieu de brassage, de rencontre, dont l'usage est souvent codifié par les puissances publiques ou régit par des normes sociales. Ainsi de l'usage collectif des trottoirs entre règles coutumières (convention de coordination comme le fait de laisser passer les personnes âgées) et règles de gestion publique (autorisations et prélèvements pour l'installation de terrasses privées par les commerces locaux, notamment les bars). Dans la ville, les espaces sous régime de propriété et les autres (en général dépendant de la domanialité publique) sont fortement intriqués. Et les pratiques sociales sont en permanence au confluent de relations privées et de l'exposition publique.

Ces pratiques sont réinventées de façon très importante par l'existence des outils numériques. On peut en trouver un exemple dans les changements provoqués dans les



pratiques de rencontre et la sexualité par les applications géolocalisées dédiées. La déambulation et les rencontres sont « augmentées » par le recours à des profils sur ces applications.

Ceci a une conséquence sur l'hétérogénéité des constructions relationnelles. Selon une étude de simulation, il en résulterait une plus grande mixité raciale des relations permanentes qui s'en suivent parfois, ajoutant le numérique aux situations de brassage des populations des zones urbaines (Ortega, Hergovich, 2017).

Les smartphones sont des outils de socialisation, et à ce titre modifient les relations dans la ville. Quand on doit se voir, on se téléphone : « T'es où ? » ayant remplacé le traditionnel et phatique « Allo ». On n'entre plus par hasard dans le restaurant du coin de la rue, mais on consulte Trip Advisor. On se déplace en ayant repéré le meilleur chemin via des applications comme MooveIt ou la RATP. Et quand il est question d'automobile, on utilise Uber, ou des plateformes équivalentes mises en place par les sociétés de taxis, réveillées de leur confort monopolistique par ces nouveaux venus aux pratiques commerciales agressives.

Mais pour autant, tous ces outils, cette infrastructure de communication, permettent-ils de construire du commun urbain ? Ou bien définissent-il le nouvel espace géographique, dans lequel les initiatives humaines vont pouvoir (ou devoir) se frayer un chemin pour construire la ville en commun ? Car les réseaux qui permettent cette nouvelle sociabilité sont en grande partie privés et concentrés. Il ne s'agit pas d'équipements publics dont les usagers auraient les clés, mais de plateformes dépendant de stratégies commerciales ou d'influence.



Plateformisation

L'équipement numérique peut lui-même être considéré comme une infrastructure à trois étages. Tout d'abord une couche physique, qui à l'image des autres réseaux de la ville (adduction et évacuation des eaux, routes, transports publics, ...) va demander des investissements importants, va suivre les lieux les plus actifs (fibre haut débit dans les centres ville et les zones industrielles et commerciales). Puis une couche logicielle qui va permettre les échanges entre les appareils connectés. Pour l'instant, l'internet est le principal outil logiciel normalisé.

Mais il est trop gourmand en énergie pour le peu de besoins des « objets connectés » qui se multiplient dans les villes (capteurs, *beacons*, caméras...). On va donc voir apparaître des protocoles spécifiques pour garantir la connectivité de ces objets. Enfin, une couche d'application peut également, quand elle est observée du point de vue des usages sociaux, être considérée comme une infrastructure de services. C'est notamment le cas des médias sociaux, infrastructure d'une nouvelle sociabilité. Ces médias ne seraient rien sans ce que les usagers eux-mêmes injectent dans l'équipement qui leur est proposé. Plus de deux milliards de personnes se sont pourtant prises à ce jeu qui consiste à fournir à une plateforme comme Facebook des informations très privées en échange d'un ciblage publicitaire toujours plus intrusif... et qui a des conséquences politiques comme le montre le débat actuel aux États-Unis.

La tendance générale du numérique est à la « plateformisation » : quelques opérateurs créent des plateformes qui mettent en contact des offreurs de services (publics ou privés) et des usagers. Le risque étant alors que ces plateformes ne deviennent les acteurs principaux de l'évolution des villes, alors même qu'elles sont mues par leurs



propres intérêts en tant que plateformes. Une contradiction nouvelle que les acteurs des communs urbains vont devoir affronter.

La confiance, qui est la base du commerce, se construit dorénavant sur les plateformes où chacun est noté, évalué, soumis à commentaire... mais où les acteurs des services ont besoin d'être présents pour trouver leur clientèle. Ce qui donne un pouvoir immense à ces infrastructures de plateforme. Et qui a des conséquences sur l'organisation même des villes.

Par exemple, Ada Colau est devenue maire de Barcelone au travers du mouvement « Barcelona en comu » en raison de son expérience d'activiste contre le mal-logement et les expulsions. Dans ce cadre, elle a dénoncé l'impact de Airb'n'b sur le prix des loyers, sur la disponibilité des logements et l'affluence touristique dangereuse pour l'équilibre écologique de la ville. Et ce n'est pas la seule ville à voir la plateforme engendrer une gentrification accélérée (Posner, 2017). Dans le même ordre d'idées, la ville de Londres est entrée en conflit pour interdire l'usage de Uber qui ne prenait pas de mesures suffisantes pour assurer la sécurité des passagers (AFP, 2017).

Ce que l'on a appelé « l'économie collaborative » est ainsi basée sur une double tenaille. D'un côté, il s'agit de promouvoir l'usage avant la possession. Les difficultés des services d'autopartage coopératifs, de co-voiturage libre, montrent en miroir que la dynamique porte en réalité sur une consommation d'opportunité et l'attrait de revenus secondaires quand elle est orchestrée par les plateformes numériques (par exemple Blablacar pour le partage payant de trajets... en échange d'une confiance établie sur la base de la notation permanente des participants entre eux). Pour évaluer ce type de plateformes en relation avec la construction de communs, il convient de regarder les intérêts propres de ces acteurs intermédiaires.



Une ville servicielle

Est-ce que les municipalités, à partir de leurs responsabilités spécifiques peuvent faciliter la prise de responsabilité directe des citoyens, et penser la co-construction de la ville de demain ? Le point de rencontre entre les villes et les services numérique se produit souvent autour des services rendus à des citoyens considérés comme des usagers ou des consommateurs. Ce sont souvent les municipalités qui financent et mettent en place les « civic tech », ces dispositifs qui visent à fluidifier la relation entre les citoyens et les élus. Dans les services de proximité, nous trouvons peu d'outils destinés à favoriser l'auto-organisation des citoyens, ni leurs capacités d'interpellation politique. Mais il y a de nombreux outils pour développer la « participation ».

Le service ‘Dans Ma Rue’, version parisienne d’un service anglais à succès appelé FixMyStreet, se présente ainsi : « Utilisez l’application mobile gratuite ‘Dans Ma Rue’ depuis votre smartphone pour transmettre directement les anomalies que vous constatez et vos propositions de végétalisation depuis les rues ou les parcs de Paris »¹. Le flâneur ou l’habitant peut photographier des situations pénibles et informer ainsi les services municipaux. Il s’agit d’améliorer les services proposés par la municipalité, ce qui est intéressant, mais ne résout pas la question de la co-construction avec les habitants, qui est la marque des communs urbains.

Plus généralement, on peut légitimement se poser la question des orientations à l’œuvre derrière le concept de *smart cities*. Ce concept a connu plusieurs définitions, qui toutes renvoient à la construction d’une ville sans couture, une ville fluidifiée par la connaissance des multiples mouvements browniens qui l’agitent et par l’amélioration des

¹ <https://www.paris.fr/dansmarue>

connaissances en temps réel de ce qui se passe dans les agglomérations. L'idée est d'abord venue des industriels de l'informatique, Cisco et IBM en tête, et a été proposée aux villes comme une offre de « solutionnisme technologique » pour construire des villes durables et résilientes.

Dans la première phase, il s'agit d'organiser la remontée d'information par le biais de capteurs, puis d'utiliser ces informations pour agir, si possible à distance sur les services concernés (feux de circulation, éclairage,...). Aujourd'hui, ce sont les notions de *dashboard* ou centres de commande, systèmes de vision panoptique des activités recueillies par ces capteurs qui ont le vent en poupe. Mais cette vision de la ville intelligente s'est surtout conçue sans les habitants, d'où une nouvelle orientation par le biais des civic tech.

Les projets de *smart cities* se transforment petit à petit en projets de « data cities » (Peugeot, 2014) : il s'agit de concentrer les données produites en permanence dans la ville, soit par la municipalité ou les services publics et les capteurs installés, soit par les opérateurs de service sous délégation, soit enfin directement par les citoyens, ce que le magazine *Wired* appelle le « pocketsourcing », le téléphone mobile devenant capteur ambulant et représentant le flux réel des personnes dans la ville.

Un dossier de la CNIL résume bien les problèmes posés par cette approche : « La notion d'intérêt général risque de se résumer à un calcul d'optimisation algorithmique de la somme des intérêts particuliers » (CNIL, 2017). On arrive alors à une conception, un imaginaire, d'une ville qui serait avant tout « servicielle », les habitants étant considérés comme des producteurs de données de façon mécanique, données que les opérateurs délégués par la municipalité vont transformer en services auprès de ces habitants, dans une logique descendante (et donc monnayable). La ville en communs part au contraire des



besoins, mais aussi des vécus, des envies, des projets des habitants pour redéfinir l'espace de leur vie.

Des villes comme utopies privées

Mais la dynamique d'une ville servicielle, « augmentée » par la technologie et les données, va encore plus loin, avec l'émergence de projets de « villes privées », ou de quartier entier régis par les spécialistes de la donnée que sont Google, Microsoft ou Cisco. Il s'agit pour eux de repenser la ville non pas comme un lieu de vie collectif, mais comme un espace de services où l'habitant doit être dorloté... tout en perdant sa vie privée et ses capacités d'action collective. Le projet le plus avancé dans ce sens découle de l'accord passé entre la municipalité de Toronto et Google (ou plutôt son holding Alphabet) : le quartier Quayside livré à la multinationale pour imaginer la « ville de demain ». Une tentative similaire a été engagée à Cannes en 2016 entre les équipes de la Mairie et Google France. Les deux parties entendent travailler ensemble à « un plan de développement de l'offre de services numériques » (Cannes, 2016).

Ces projets de *googlisation de la ville* sont emblématiques à plus d'un titre, car ils s'opposent presque frontalement au projet de villes en communs. Il s'agit d'une ville qui ressortirait du « meilleur des mondes », avec « des navettes autonomes, des feux de signalisation qui repéreraient les piétons, des maisons modulaires, des services de livraison par robots utilisant des tunnels... » (Hook, 2017).

Le Premier ministre canadien Justin Trudeau décrit le projet Quayside de Toronto comme : « un banc d'essai pour les nouvelles technologies, qui vont nous aider à construire des villes plus propres, plus intelligentes, plus écologiques » (*ibid.*). Il s'agit également d'une « ville pilotée par les données », dont les algorithmes analyseraient en



permanence le souffle et l'activité pour adapter les services à la fois aux usages collectifs et aux intérêts individuels tels qu'ils sont connus par les algorithmes de Google. Que devient la vie privée dans une telle monade urbaine ? Quelles sont les capacités d'intervention, de mobilisation, de discussion, et d'élaboration d'un projet collectif qui seraient laissé aux habitants ? Quelle serait la régulation d'une telle « ville privée » ? Sidewalk, la division d'Alphabet en charge du projet, indique qu'il sera nécessaire que Toronto supprime ou donne des exemptions pour de nombreuses régulations existant dans les aires urbaines, notamment le code de la construction, les règlementations sur les transports et l'énergie, et que la ville qui émergera de cette vision aura certainement besoin d'une « *tolérance substantielle concernant les lois et les régulations existantes* ». (Ibid.).

La concurrence entre les grands opérateurs du numérique se déroule donc dorénavant sur le terrain des villes. Bill Gates vient d'investir 80 millions de dollars pour reconstruire la ville de Belmont en Arizona. L'opérateur en charge du projet le décrit ainsi : « Belmont sera une communauté en avance sur son temps, avec une infrastructure de communication conçue comme une épine dorsale basée sur les technologies de pointe, conçue autour des réseaux numériques haut-débit et des datacenters, des usines automatisées et des services de distribution innovants, des véhicules autonomes ou des centres logistiques robotisés » (Weiner, 2017).

Cisco n'est pas en reste, qui investit dans les villes intelligentes depuis longtemps, et que l'on dit à l'origine même de ces projets et de la dénomination *smart city*, vient d'abonder de 1 milliard de dollars le City Infrastructure Financing Acceleration Program (CIFAP). Ce fonds nous promet une ville à la circulation mieux régulée, la pollution réduite, les dépenses énergétiques optimisées, la sécurité renforcée (Lagane, 2017).



Ces utopies, financées par les géants des technologies de l'information et de la communication sont loin de la construction des communs urbains que pourraient permettre la multiplication des équipements numériques. La ville comme plateforme, n'est pas un projet qui vise à encourager l'investissement des individus dans la vie collective, mais au contraire un projet à la fois économique et une utopie froide qui se passe des désirs et volontés des habitants pour les réduire à des fournisseurs de données que les « intelligences artificielles » vont pouvoir interpréter à loisir. Mais au fond, ce projet, qui doit beaucoup aux urbanistes des années trente, Le Corbusier en tête, n'est qu'une manière particulièrement crue d'interpréter le phénomène des *smart cities* : nos données valent plus que nos vies.

Usages du numérique pour construire les communs urbains

Les divers acteurs des communs urbains sont eux-aussi arqués boutés sur les usages numériques. Même les communs non numériques, comme les jardins partagés, les AMAP pour l'approvisionnement alimentaire, les occupations de lieux culturels ou les mobilisations en défense du climat ou de l'eau comme commun s'appuient sur l'infrastructure numérique. Bien évidemment pour la communication entre acteurs des communs, les médias sociaux jouant le rôle de supports organisationnels. Mais le numérique intervient également comme outil de représentation de la ville, notamment autour de la cartographie ouverte, et comme moyen de diffuser largement l'information utilisée pour piloter la ville au travers de l'open data.

Le numérique support organisationnel

D'un point de vue général, le numérique permet à la fois de faire baisser les coûts de transaction (toucher de nouvelles personnes) et les coûts de coordination. Les activistes



des communs ont donc dès le début réussi à s'emparer de ces deux qualités pour construire les communs de la connaissance (Benkler, 2006). Mais aussi pour assurer la mise en contact et l'élaboration collective dans le cadre des communs urbains.

Pour co-élaborer un projet, il faut à la fois disposer de l'information nécessaire, trouver des méthodes d'organisation des débats et enfin garantir la mémoire de ces débats et décisions collectives. La plupart des projets de communs urbains utilisent le numérique pour cela : sites web pour la présentation et la mémoire, pad (systèmes collectifs d'écriture en simultané) pour la prise de notes, et médias sociaux pour faire connaître les réalisations et organiser des événements autour des communs urbains². On notera également l'importance des photographies ou vidéos, qui donnent à voir les communs en action, créant ainsi un ensemble référentiel et mettant en lumière de nouveaux modes de vie et de comportement.

Mais c'est une illusion de croire que les plateformes « sociales » qui sont devenues majoritaires sur internet seraient le support des nouvelles pratiques communes à venir. « *Don't be evil* »³ ne peut plus être la référence quand ces acteurs peuvent à la fois disposer d'une influence sans précédent, et être sensible à des manipulations venues d'acteurs déterminés comme l'exemple de l'intervention russe dans les élections américaines le souligne. En fait, par inadvertance, ou en confondant les modèles économiques et les discours utopiques (Turner, 2012), les activistes des communs n'ont pas vu venir la construction d'un « capitalisme de surveillance », ou d'une « architecture de la persuasion » comme dit Zeynep Tufekci (2017).

² Par exemple la page Facebook de la Cebada - <https://www.facebook.com/campodecebada/>

³ Don't be evil (« Ne soyez pas malveillants ») a longtemps été la devise (moto) de Google, au point (...)

Les tiers-lieux qui permettent de réaliser ou réparer des objets (*Fab Labs*, ateliers coopératifs, recycleries...) ou de créer des documents multimédias (Espaces publics numériques, bibliothèques...) sont sollicités, et constituent souvent des exemples majeurs des partenariats avec les puissances publiques.

Toutefois, l'usage des grands opérateurs du numérique, au même titre que les suivis de traces de la « ville intelligente », comportent des risques pour la vie privée. Dès lors, construire des espaces internet autonomes, fonctionnant sans mettre en danger ni la vie privée, ni les pratiques et usages des internautes font également partie de la construction des communs urbains. Il faut reconstruire la ville numérique de la même manière qu'il faut reconstruire la ville physique. En faisant participer les habitants à l'élaboration, à la décision et au contrôle des projets collectifs.

Certains vont chercher du côté des logiciels libres pour construire ces plateformes, comme par exemple le projet de l'Association Framasoft qui vise à offrir des outils en se passant de l'intermédiaire des plateformes oligopolistiques. Ce sera son projet « Dégooglisons l'internet », devenu « Contributopia », un terme qui résonne fortement avec les communs de contribution (Framasoft, 2017).

Mais ce passage au logiciels et services en ligne libres demande des efforts de pédagogie, d'expérimentation collective, et parfois de rappels à l'ordre : les défenseurs de la cause du libre soulignent souvent l'incohérence entre les projets de communs et l'utilisation de services centralisés, privateurs et espionnant les usagers. Les acteurs du logiciel libre sont souvent présents lors des actions collectives de construction de communs, à la fois pour ce rôle pédagogique, mais également pour étendre dans tous les domaines les notions de libertés de copier, analyser, partager les connaissances qui sont aux fondements du mouvement des logiciels libres.



Donner à voir les communs urbains

Un second usage du numérique dans la construction de communs urbains est celui du « donner à voir », de la représentation des projets et des objectifs.

Notre espace de vie est conjointement un espace physique, matériel et un espace mental (Bakis et Vidal, 2007). Chaque point de vie est aussi un point d'intérêt pour l'information. C'est une des leçons que l'on peut tirer du succès du jeu vidéo Pokemon Go : on peut faire apparaître de l'information (en l'occurrence des Pokemon, complètement abstraits) sur la carte d'une ville, ou au travers de l'appareil photographique du smartphone dirigé vers des lieux significatifs. Et dès lors, les témoins et joueurs ont longuement déclaré à toute la presse qu'ils avaient ainsi eu l'occasion de redécouvrir leur ville.

Cette « réalité augmentée » peut induire des comportements d'appropriation de l'espace urbain au travers des équipements numériques. Il peut également inciter les usagers à produire des informations associées aux coordonnées géographiques. De ce point de vue, les territorialités qui se dessinent au travers du *géocaching*, jeu de piste géo numérique mondial bien antérieur à Pokemon Go (2001), illustrent bien la capacité du numérique à se présenter comme opérateur de lien territorial et à s'engager dans un processus collectif de patrimonialisation de l'espace local (Vidal, Joliveau, Sansy, Couillet, Jeanne, 2017).

Nous voyons donc se développer un mouvement de « cartographie 2.0 » porté par le grand public, producteur de contenus et de savoirs géographiques (Mericskay et Roche, 2011). OpenStreetMap, comme plateforme de coordination de toutes les activités cartographiques ouvertes y joue dorénavant un rôle central. Tant pour les individus et les



associations qui peuvent l'utiliser dans leurs activités pour repérer, mais aussi pour annoncer des événements géolocalisés, que pour les services publics qui peuvent adapter les informations à leurs besoins particuliers.

Avec les cartes ouvertes, nous assistons à une double réappropriation de la cartographie : les usagers peuvent améliorer le fond de carte, préciser des noms ou des objets ; et ils peuvent utiliser ces fonds de carte pour apposer des informations complémentaires. Par exemple, le site fallingfruit⁴ cherche à obtenir une représentation géolocalisée des divers endroits où le glanage est possible, soit à partir d'arbres fruitiers plantés dans des espaces sans propriétaire, ou par la puissance publique qui ne ramasse pas les fruits, mais aussi des autres lieux de glanage urbain importants (fin de marchés, déchets alimentaires encore consommables...). Si les acteurs locaux peuvent enrichir cette carte mondiale, la base provient des données ouvertes des services des espaces verts des municipalités : ce qui souligne l'importance des données ouvertes que nous abordons plus loin.

Donner à voir, c'est également la volonté de témoigner (photographies) et de documenter (texte) sur les lieux de vie. Le projet Wiki Loves Monuments (WLM, 2017), lancé par la Wikimedia Foundation vise ainsi à diffuser sous licence ouverte des photographies des divers monuments et points d'intérêt, afin de nourrir en images les fiches géolocalisées de l'encyclopédie. Il s'agit ici d'utiliser le numérique pour construire un commun des représentations du patrimoine. On voit ainsi qu'en mobilisant l'imagination des habitants, on peut transformer des éléments du domaine public en des communs mis en valeur par les usagers eux-mêmes.

⁴ <https://fallingfruit.org/?locale=fr>



L'URBANISME À L'HEURE DU NUMÉRIQUE

Les mutations technologiques ont souvent produit des changements sociaux importants, qui se traduisent dans l'espace et la pratique de l'aménagement. Alors que la ville intelligente fait partie des concepts incontournables, voire dominants, les usages du numérique peuvent influer l'urbanisme selon quatre directions différentes. Ces scénarios sont représentés par une boussole, composée d'un axe horizontal opposant acteurs institutionnels et non-institutionnels, et d'un second axe, avec l'opposition entre ouverture et fermeture.

SCÉNARIO 1: UN URBANISME ALGORITHMIQUE OU LE RETOUR DES EXPERTS

La première direction possible repose sur la croyance dans la technique et les données, dans la tradition de la cybernétique inventée à la fin des années quarante. La ville intelligente repose, aujourd'hui, sur un accès à des données supplémentaires, dont le traitement est rendu plus rapide par le numérique, offrant de nouvelles ressources pour l'aménagement. Les acteurs privés participent à la circulation de ces modèles. C'est déjà le cas du groupe IBM et du centre d'opérations de Rio de Janeiro. Cette dernière collecte des données auprès d'une trentaine d'agences et de services municipaux, les stocke et les traite grâce à de puissants algorithmes, qui vont permettre de modéliser ces données. L'objectif est de mieux gérer la mobilité et les flux d'énergie dans l'espoir de bâtir une ville plus durable.

La crainte est qu'IBM, qui fournit les algorithmes, participe à un contrôle généralisé de la population sans se préoccuper de l'intérêt des citoyens ou des grands enjeux urbains, en particulier la question de la qualité et de l'accessibilité sociale des infrastructures. En



outre, le centre de Rio participe à une dépolitisation des politiques urbaines: la réponse aux enjeux publics amène à la formulation de réponses techniques sans mise en débat des solutions, ce qui laisse craindre une dépossession de la production urbaine au détriment des citoyens. Dans ce scénario, la numérisation des méthodes d'aménagement correspond au retour d'un urbanisme d'expertise, avec la domination d'acteurs techniques du secteur privé dans la production urbaine. Cela donnerait une nouvelle jeunesse à une approche rationnelle, qui apparaîtrait maintenant sous les traits d'un urbanisme durable.

SCÉNARIO 2 : UN URBANISME UBÉRISÉ SOUS LA PRESSION D'UNE EXTENSION DU DOMAINE DU CAPITALISME URBAIN


La deuxième direction possible renvoie à l'économie digitale – un vaste marché pour les grands groupes de services urbains– mais aussi à l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs. Concrètement, le privé devient plus présent dans l'espace urbain et fait évoluer la définition traditionnelle des services publics, avec les services de mobilités partagées comme Vélib' ou Autolib' à Paris, ou les bornes de connexion LINK à New York.

SCÉNARIO 3 : UN WIKI-URBANISME À LA RECHERCHE D'UNE VILLE ALTERNATIVE

La troisième direction correspond aussi à un contournement des acteurs publics, mais par la société civile. En effet, en suivant l'esprit des créateurs du réseau internet, des citoyens plus ou moins organisés, mais agissant toujours en réseau, s'emparent des questions urbaines. Ces «hackeurs» ou «codeurs» civiques participent au mouvement des «civic tech» en développant des dispositifs sociotechniques au service d'un renouveau démocratique. Ce wiki-urbanisme correspond à différents registres d'action, allant de la contestation, avec des sites de pétition en ligne (par exemple à Marseille, en 2013, une



pétition a permis le retrait du projet de casino, à des formes plus élaborées de contribution et de délibération. Bien souvent, la cartographie sert de base à ces échanges, comme pour Carticide, qui propose de localiser de nouvelles idées, de les commenter et de voter.



Dans ce cas, les acteurs de la société civile participent à la même dynamique que les acteurs privés du numérique, en remettant en cause la légitimité et la capacité d'action des acteurs publics à faire la ville en les contournant. Cette dynamique n'est pas nouvelle, il s'agit de l'influence des mouvements sociaux, qui s'appuient maintenant sur le numérique et viennent ainsi renforcer l'approche communicationnelle de l'aménagement. De même que l'urbanisme ubérisé, le wiki-urbanisme constitue une remise en cause des acteurs publics.

SCÉNARIO 4 : UN URBANISME OPEN-SOURCE PAR LE RENOUVEAU DES PRATIQUES DES INSTITUTIONS DE L'AMÉNAGEMENT

Enfin, la quatrième possibilité s'appuie sur les institutions. Pour elle, la numérisation renvoie à la circulation et l'ouverture des données publiques (open data) et aux nouvelles ressources offertes par la technologie pour mettre en dialogue les acteurs de

la ville, avec une évolution des instruments de la participation. Ces dispositifs sociotechniques peuvent prendre différentes formes en fonction de la nature des objets discutés, de leurs spatialisations et des degrés d'ouverture de la décision. À Paris, la numérisation a débuté avec la carte participative « Imaginons Paris » lors de la révision du PLU, avec 22 838 visites et 2 268 contributions.

Le numérique vient ainsi donner des ressources supplémentaires pour rendre plus tangible le tournant collaboratif dans l'urbanisme. Celui-ci a pour objectif de parvenir à des consensus par l'intermédiaire d'une interaction réussie entre un grand nombre d'acteurs. Dans ce sens, les technologies numériques offrent de nouvelles possibilités pour rendre ce tournant plus effectif et réduire le décalage entre théories et pratiques.

Ces quatre directions qu'emprunte l'urbanisme numérisé sont davantage complémentaires que contradictoires. Localement, l'une ne va pas éclipser toutes les autres. Ainsi, dans la plupart des villes, il est possible de repérer des interactions dans des configurations locales forcément inédites et hybrides. Elles mettent en avant différentes catégories d'acteurs (techniques, privés, citoyens et institutionnels), qui illustrent la diversité des effets du numérique.

À Paris, on retrouve ainsi l'usage du big data pour les grands opérateurs de services urbains, les enjeux de régulation des plateformes comme Uber ou Airbnb, les mobilisations citoyennes en ligne contre des grands projets dits « inutiles » et le développement de plateformes participatives. L'avenir dira si la numérisation progressive des villes sera à la hauteur des promesses, mais nous pouvons déjà faire l'hypothèse qu'il s'agira d'un élément central de l'évolution de la pratique de l'urbanisme.

Etude de Smart City Tunisie





Un « **smart** and sustainable city » tunisien est une ville qui dispose d'un cadre urbain, architectural et paysager harmonieux, en utilisant les nouvelles technologies, la connectivité et les systèmes d'information dans le but d'améliorer le quotidien des citoyens et leur bien-être. Aujourd'hui,

La Smart City fait partie des concepts incontournables de la production urbaine contemporaine. En plus d'être résiliente et durable, une ville devrait être intelligente. Cela implique des systèmes et des objets interconnectés par le biais de différentes technologies pour améliorer le mode de vie de la population locale.

En Tunisie, le concept de ville intelligente ou de Smart City commence à prendre de l'ampleur. Pour monter des projets Smart, le programme national Tunisian Smart Cities prévoit un ensemble d'activités concrètes, étendues sur trois ans, en vue de la production des études prospectives et stratégiques, du plaidoyer en faveur du développement territorial, et de renforcement des capacités des acteurs clés.

Le programme vise à optimiser les performances des villes tunisiennes, promouvoir et renforcer les capacités des acteurs locaux pour la prospective à travers un programme d'accompagnement concernant l'interprétation des lignes directrices du guide méthodologique de mise en place d'une démarche Smart City sur leurs territoires.

Il s'agit d'identifier et organiser les acteurs institutionnels, scientifiques, économiques et civils locaux clés qui agissent dans le développement territorial et les accompagner pour formuler des visions territoriales plus durables et réussir le montage technique, administratif, et financier des projets y associés.

Pour ce faire, les villes tunisiennes doivent rentrer dans un cadre d'éligibilité fondé sur 14 points, allant de la mise en place d'une vision concertée du territoire jusqu'à la création de la société de portage locale, afin de pouvoir bénéficier des financements associés, tous secteurs confondus (énergie, gouvernance, urbanisme, renforcement des capacités, mobilité, environnement, culture, patrimoine, digital, ...).

Un cadre d'éligibilité fondé sur 14 points

Le cadre d'éligibilité, fondé sur 14 points, sur lequel doivent s'engager les municipalités adhérentes. Il s'agit, en fait, de: définir une vision territoriale concertée, matérialisée par un Master Plan Programmatique à l'horizon 2050-2100, produire un document stratégique (ville durable, intelligente, inclusive, résiliente) à travers un planning de projets concertés sur 30 ans sous forme de catalogue évolutif et de planning de projets quinquennaux, élaborer un plan d'action avec 5 projets de tailles différentes avec les business modèles associés et la déclaration des périmètres Smart City qui bénéficieront de statut de zone franche urbaine, produire un schéma directeur des infrastructures numériques dans la ville, produire un schéma directeur d'autoproduction



des énergies renouvelables, produire une carte communale de la biodiversité et de la préservation de l'environnement, mettre en place une stratégie communale de lutte contre les changements climatiques, mettre en place une stratégie communale de lutte contre les catastrophes naturelles et sanitaires, produire un schéma communal (et/ou intercommunal) de la mobilité, du transport et de la logistique urbaine, produire un plan local de sauvegarde et de valorisation du patrimoine culturel, matériel et immatériel, en plus d'un audit général du patrimoine urbain et architectural, mettre en place une démarche de dématérialisation et de digitalisation de la municipalité, mettre en place une stratégie locale pour l'attractivité de la Ville et le Marketing Territorial, réaliser un audit U4SSC pour la définition et la mesure des indicateurs de performance suivant le référentiel international des «Smart City» développé par l'UIT (Union Internationale des Télécommunications) et finalement créer une société de portage du programme Smart City local avec des capitaux mixtes (Publics-Privés).

«Les freins que rencontre l'approche Smart City en Tunisie sont, essentiellement, liés au manque de ressources humaines au sein des collectivités locales, qui sont, bel et bien, capables de comprendre, d'animer et de porter une initiative Smart City locale... Et, d'ailleurs, les Caravanes que nous avons faites dans les 24 gouvernorats du pays, ont confirmé cela et des communes comme Gabés, Carthage et autres sont, aujourd'hui, porteuses de leur projet Smart City. Il existe un autre élément important et récurrent, qui n'est autre que le manque de moyens financiers pour que les mairies puissent payer de véritables études stratégiques et opérationnelles, qui devraient faire partie intégrante de leur plan de développement et d'aménagement urbain...»

D'une manière générale, et malgré ces barrières, la Tunisie d'aujourd'hui, grâce à l'association TSC et à ses partenaires, est en train de créer son propre modèle



«décentralisé» de Smart City, qui correspond aux spécificités de chaque région... Ainsi, chaque ville doit inventer son propre modèle de Smart City qui lui ressemble en utilisant les bienfaits des TIC»

Les fondements de la ville intelligente

La Smart City ou ville intelligente consiste globalement en l'optimisation des coûts, de l'organisation, du bien-être des habitants. Ce concept d'origine anglo-saxonne n'est pas nouveau. Les pionnières dans le domaine sont les mégalopoles d'Asie, comme Hong-Kong ou Singapour. Depuis 1980, les technologies avancées et les services de pointe sont les activités dominantes de Singapour, ville audacieuse et futuriste.

Cela s'illustre notamment par le projet Supertrees, l'implantation à travers toute la ville d'arbres artificiels hauts de 50 mètres. Ces arbres sont équipés de modérateurs de température. Ils éclairent, récoltent l'eau de pluie, les routes et ses édifices disposent de capteurs et de systèmes destinés à mesurer, organiser le trafic, et anticiper et ajuster les consommations d'énergie, etc.

Pour accéder au rang de **Smart City**, pour que le challenge soit atteint, toute ville doit avoir un état d'esprit « **smart** » :

-Les données sont au service des citoyens. Son traitement intelligent repose sur des principes participatifs et de transparence. Son action est une réponse à leurs attentes et leurs intérêts. Elle n'est donc ni intrusive, ni un moyen de contrôle de la vie privée.:

-Pour être smart, la ville s'appuie sur plusieurs projets data impliquant différents opérateurs urbains. Exemple des projets de mesure des déplacements, de



la pollution atmosphérique et sonore place. Ces données sont visibles sur une plate-forme Open Data de la ville.

-Être vigilant sur la notion de temporalité des données dans le lancement et l'anticipation des actions. Anticiper le développement de la ville ou la qualité de vie des citoyens ne se définit pas à partir des mêmes données que la prévention des accidents ou la fluidification de la circulation.

L'idée consiste à développer des moyens et des solutions aptes à répondre aux besoins de la population tout en préservant les ressources, l'environnement... L'analyse et la valorisation des données offre aux villes la possibilité de gérer finement leurs leviers économiques, environnementaux, citoyens... Cette gestion intelligente, c'est la capacité de mettre en lien ces leviers, de leur permettre de « performer » non plus individuellement, mais en les reliant les uns aux autres.

Par exemple, Los Angeles optimise les tournées de collecte des ordures à l'aide de capteurs dans les conteneurs. Un centre de supervision de l'exploitation de l'eau potable. Celui-ci collecte, visualise et analyse en temps réel l'ensemble des données liées au service d'eau de la ville. Ce qui permet à la ville de mieux anticiper et organiser les interventions, de réduire les fuites et la consommation de cette ressource.

Rendre par exemple un **bâtiment intelligent** pour optimiser sa gestion de l'énergie ne consiste pas seulement à le relier à Internet. Il s'agit de permettre à d'autres outils et systèmes de communiquer avec les données de fréquentation, de température. C'est ce défi technique que les villes doivent tout d'abord relever.



Smart City et Big Data

Le Big Data va permettre de faciliter l'essor des Smart Cities. Les technologies analytiques vont rendre nos villes plus saines, plus agréables et plus vivables notamment dans tous les secteurs :

- Transport ; Le trafic automobile sera constamment mesuré et régulé grâce à des puces RFID intégrées aux automobiles. En incorporant des capteurs aux voitures, il est possible de guider les véhicules vers le parking le plus proche
- Domotique ; Toutes les maisons, équipées de capteurs domotiques, peuvent être contrôlées par le biais d'un écran de télévision situé dans le salon.
- Immotique ; Les écrans de télé présence seront aussi disposés dans les bureaux, les hôpitaux, les écoles et les centres commerciaux.
- Sécurité : Les analyses prédictives ont été utilisées dans plusieurs villes autour du monde pour aider à prédire à quel endroit les crimes risquent de survenir, en se basant sur les données historiques et géographiques.
- Durabilité ; La surveillance et le contrôle sont deux critères essentiels pour assurer la durabilité d'un projet. De fait, les données permettent aux gouvernements et aux entreprises de vérifier les effets positifs ou négatifs de leurs décisions sur l'ensemble de la ville.

L'Open Data, moteur de la Smart City



Ce qui va permettre d'inventer la **Smart City**, ce sont les connexions entre ces réseaux, le croisement et l'exploitation des données. Le **Big Data** va permettre de faciliter l'essor des Smart Cities. L'importance de la donnée dans la **ville intelligente** prend effectivement tout son sens. La logique des réseaux, la collecte et le traitement des données, l'évaluation et la mesure de leur potentiel et de leurs limites conditionnent la performance de ces villes.

En théorie, **ces villes intelligentes et connectées** pourraient permettre de réduire la pollution, d'améliorer la propreté, de résoudre les problèmes de parking, et d'économiser de l'énergie. Dans la pratique toutefois, l'implémentation de ce concept se confronte à plusieurs problèmes. Néanmoins, grâce au **Big Data** et à **l'Internet des Objets**, ce projet utopique pourrait enfin aboutir.

L'interopérabilité des données

La diversité **des sources**, des **données**, leur **volumétrie**, les nombreux **acteurs**, nécessite un **pilotage** mené par la ville. La **gouvernance** et le **partage** de ces **données** sont deux principes fondamentaux pour :

- Visualiser et comprendre le fonctionnement, les consommations de la ville et discerner les dysfonctionnements.
- Faire émerger de ces informations des besoins auxquels il convient de trouver de nouveaux usages et de nouveaux services dits « **intelligents** ».

Enfin, les réelles conditions de succès résident dans l'**interopérabilité des données**, à savoir **l'accès** et le **partage** de toutes les données via des formats standards (**dont les**




APIs). L'enjeu consiste à rendre les données disponibles dans un format **lisible et exploitable** par les **acteurs**.

Rendre par exemple un **bâtiment intelligent** pour optimiser sa gestion de l'énergie ne consiste pas seulement à le relier à Internet. Il s'agit de permettre à d'autres outils et systèmes de communiquer avec les données de fréquentation, de température. C'est ce défi technique que les villes doivent tout d'abord relever.

Le Big Data

Le Big Data peut permettre de réduire la pollution. En incorporant des capteurs aux routes, il est possible de mesurer le trafic total à différents moments de la journée. Il sera également possible de mesurer la présence humaine dans une zone particulière à un moment spécifique pour ajuster l'éclairage urbain en fonction.



Planification urbaine

Les données peuvent aider à planifier la fabrication d'immeubles et l'aménagement d'espaces urbains. Il est possible de développer des modèles pour maximiser l'accès à



certaines zones ou services tout en minimisant les risques de surcharge d'infrastructure. En somme, le **Big Data** permet d'augmenter l'efficience.

Souvent présentée comme technique ou consensuelle, la ville intelligente pose des questions politiques : elle semble en mesure de rebattre les cartes de la gouvernance, avec l'intervention de nouveaux acteurs privés dans la gestion des villes, et un nouveau rapport entre les citoyens et les acteurs des politiques urbaines. L'étude remet en cause la thèse souvent avancée d'un retrait des acteurs publics dans la ville intelligente, qui seraient dominés par les entreprises de software et des télécoms.

Certes, dans des cas comme la Tunisie, l'appropriation du concept de ville intelligente par Tunisie Télécom est manifeste, avec la proposition d'un concept général allant du transport à la sécurité, afin de développer une offre de services spécifique en direction des collectivités. Mais d'autres cas pointent au contraire le poids des acteurs étatiques, comme Ogero, instrument du monopole d'Etat sur les télécommunications au Liban.

A Hangzhou, c'est la labellisation smart city portée par l'Etat chinois en 2012 et impliquant 285 villes qui a fortement orientée la ville vers cette stratégie. La smart city se traduit aussi par la construction de villes nouvelles et de quartiers pilotes qui font l'objet de collaboration entre des acteurs publics et privés, tels que Tunisia Economic City, qui porte une vision sectorielle et un objectif d'attraction de capitaux, ou encore Beyrouth Digital District, un exemple d'opération immobilière, financé par les pays du Golfe, la Banque mondiale et la Chine, et qui utilise la smart city comme un instrument de marketing.



La ville intelligente a aussi entraîné un questionnement sur la manière dont les outils numériques peuvent permettre une implication citoyenne. MiMedellín est un exemple d'interface ludique permettant d'impliquer les citoyens dans la gestion de la cité : des points sont donnés aux citoyens qui participent, des questions multiples permettent aux gouvernants de donner le choix au citoyen. Mais au-delà de l'outil, la participation citoyenne importante de Medellín s'explique par d'autres facteurs : la décentralisation, une logique d'autogestion héritée d'un épisode de violence liées au narcotrafic, un effort fait pour légitimer les politiques publiques par la participation.

De plus, le rapport réalisé sur la ville pointe l'importance de la combinaison du présentiel et du virtuel, notamment pour atteindre les populations les plus en difficulté vis-à-vis de l'outil numérique. Mais la participation numérique peut se retourner contre les citoyens.

C'est le cas de l'application Administration de proximité à Hangzhou, qui inclut dans ses services la possibilité de dénoncer des incivilités et activités illégales ou informelles. Le cas du stationnement est révélateur : une logique très innovante de géolocalisation de places libres est couplée à un outil de dénonciation du stationnement non autorisé.

Conclusion

En contraste avec la démarche globale et transversale qui transparaît dans le discours sur la ville intelligente, les projets se caractérisent en pratique par une approche sectorielle (notamment la mobilité) et/ou orientés vers des territoires bien spécifiques. La ville intelligente est donc en prise avec les fractures socio-spatiales qu'elle contribue parfois à reproduire ou accentuer, et les effets des politiques menées en référence à la ville



intelligente apparaissent parfois contradictoires avec les buts affichés. Le numérique apparaît comme un outil dont l'accès reste très variable. Il ne peut donc pas constituer le seul vecteur de certains services urbains mais peut contribuer à terme à réduire le poids de certaines démarches administratives coûteuses. Il peut permettre aux citadins de s'organiser et de prendre une part plus active aux politiques urbaines.

Cependant, il revient aux responsables politiques de fournir les services et infrastructures de base et d'orienter les initiatives privées à travers l'énonciation de stratégies collectives concertées. Par ailleurs, la structuration des marchés des télécommunications est un facteur-clé d'accès : les situations de monopole ou d'oligopole semblent globalement se maintenir et constituent un frein à la démocratisation des usages urbains d'Internet, malgré l'inventivité sociale et les détournements d'usages. Le marché des TIC semble quant à lui à ses prémisses et inégalement approprié par les autorités locales.

Des initiatives émergent et la croissance du secteur se confirme. Les dynamiques spécifiquement liées à la ville intelligente ne peuvent se passer de la collaboration des pouvoirs publics.

Des formations adéquates sont en cours de développement. Certaines "traditions" d'expertises locales (geoprocessing, cartographie) s'affirment et pourraient constituer des références nationales, régionales, voire mondiales à condition de bénéficier d'un soutien affirmé des villes dans lesquelles elles ont émergé. Il existe un grand contraste dans l'appréhension de la ville intelligente en fonction des acteurs interrogés et des villes. Les significations différentes associées à ce mot d'ordre urbain.



Ce faisant, elle enjoint à aborder le numérique de manière moins sectorielle, en l'associant à d'autres enjeux urbains tels que l'environnement, la participation, la préservation du patrimoine ou encore la justice spatiale. Cette appréhension permet de présenter le numérique non comme une fin en soi, mais comme un instrument au service d'une ville juste et durable.



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Financial Development and Economic Growth: Toda and Yamamoto causality test in ALGERIA

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Abstract:

The main objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth with the emphasis on the transmission channels as far as the influence of the financial system on economic growth in Algeria. We employ a time series analyses approach as adopted by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality test. Here, three indicators are employed, that are, domestic credit to private sector to GDP, real GDP per capita, and real Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Our main results find an existence of the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth, the evidence presented in this paper provides strong and robust support to the view that financial sector development is crucial for economic growth and the efficiency of the financial sector is potentially important for the long-term growth performance of Algeria.

KEY WORDS: Financial sector, Economic Growth, Toda and Yamamoto causality test, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Algeria



1. Introduction

The current crisis is reminiscent of the magnitude of the impact one can have on the other. The analysis of the causal links between finance and economic growth could be traced back, at least, to Schumpeter (1911), but it has really experienced a revival of interest from the works of Gurley and Shaw (1955), Granger (1963), Patrick (1966), Goldsmith (1969), Hicks (1969) and McKinnon (1973) through the introduction of empirical tests. Theoretically, Patrick (1966) proposes three hypotheses of links between finance and growth.

It is first of all the "Supply Leading" hypothesis where financial development is at the root of economic growth. Then, he proposes the inverse hypothesis called "Demand following" where the financial development is a consequence of the growth. Finally, the so-called "stage-of-development" hypothesis states that finance causes growth in less developed economies, but as economies develop, causality is reversed, with growth taking over finance. Subsequently, McKinnon (1973) undertook to test these hypotheses empirically and found that the causal link from financial development to growth is more decisive.

These results have had a great influence on the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in developing countries, particularly with regard to financial system reforms in these countries. Several studies will eventually lead to the same results as McKinnon (1973), such as those of the World Bank (1989), King and Levine (1993a, b), Pagano (1993), Neusser and Kugler (1998), Levine et al. (2000) and Calderon and Liu (2003). Conversely, fewer studies confirm, empirically, the causality going from growth to finance.



However, Robinson (1952) argued that the greater emphasis on finance tended to overlook this latter sense of causality. Given the importance of economic policy implications, research on the links between finance and growth is timely. The financial sector acts on growth through two channels: capital accumulation and productivity improvement.

There are many factors that can be treated as economic growth determinants. One of these factors is the financial system. The institutional frameworks of the financial system as well as its performance are no doubt important determinants of output growth. The theoretical structural model implies that the development and stability of the financial sector both have a positive impact on economic growth.

However, when verifying this hypothesis on the basis of empirical data for real economies, some questions appear. First, is the positive relationship between the development of the financial sector and economic growth unconditional, or are there some constraints? Also, can a too big financial system hamper the growth rate of GDP?

Second, what is exactly the stability of the financial system and how can it be measured on the basis of statistical data?

The problems regarding the relationship between the financial sector and economic growth strengthened after the last global crisis and the crisis in the euro zone. It turns out that some disturbances observed in the financial sphere of the economy may exert very significant and long-term impact on the behavior of the real economy.

Depend on the endogenous growth theory that indicated and stressed on the role of financial



intermediaries in improving the productivity of capital(Greenwood & Jovanovic 1990, Bencivinga & Smith 1991, Pagano 1993) , through two main ways :(i), by Collecting information for evaluating alternative investment projects hence improving the allocation of resources,(ii) providing opportunities to investors to diversify and hedge risk thus ,inducing individuals to invest in riskier but more productive investment alternatives (Pagano ,1993).

The recent view associated between financial liberalization and endogenous growth theory (Ang,2008, De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995, Benhabib & Spiegel, 2000, Beck et al, 2000, Levine & Zervos, 1998), that financial development contributes to economic growth through two complementarity channels: capital accumulation and productivity of capital.

Given the financial crisis experienced since 1986, Algeria , started to privatize its economy with 1990 as a key transitional year (the transition from planned to an open market economy).Algeria implemented several reforms starting by the financial sector under the following objectives¹ : reduction of the direct government intervention and strengthen the role of market forces in the allocation of financial resources, improvement of the financial institutions capacity to mobilize the domestic saving, enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy instruments, promoting competition among banks, and strengthening their financial soundness.

In April 1990, Algeria adopted the law on currency and credit (90-10) to grant greater independence to the central bank (Bank of Algeria since 1990) and strengthen its capacity for banking supervision.



Therefore, the purpose of this work is to investigate the empirical relationship between financial development and economic growth, and stressing on the transmission channels which financial development influence growth in Algerian economy, by addressing the following issue : ***Does financial development promote economic growth in Algeria ?,***

The study employs **Toda and Yamamoto (1995)** for **Granger non-causality procedure, during the period 1970-2016**, using indicators such as: credit to private sector to GDP measures banking system development, Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation as an indicator of the investment and Real GDP per capita as proxy of economic growth rate.

The paper is organized as follows: The first section is the introduction. Section **2** discusses theoretical and empirical issues on the relationship between the financial development and economic growth (describes various literatures reviewed). Section **3** explains the used data, methodology and econometric model, Section **4** reports empirical results. Finally, section **5** concludes the paper.

2-Literature Review

A growing body of theoretical and empirical work demonstrates a strong, positive link between financial development and economic growth and the theoretical underpinnings of this relationship can be traced back to the work of Schumpeter (1912)¹ and more recently, to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The main policy implication of

¹ Schumpeter argued that finance does matter for economic development because financial institutions, by searching for successful innovation projects, finish by encouraging enterprises to produce better and more.



the McKinnon-Shaw school is that government restrictions on banking systems hinder financial development, and ultimately reduce growth.

A flourishing body of empirical work includes three approaches in order to examine this positive relationship. They are: Cross-country studies, individual country studies and firm industry level studies. In this section these three approaches will be reviewed with focus on benefits and limitations.

Arab-country studies

The seminal work in this area is by Boulila & Trabelsi (2002) investigated the causal relationship between banking system development and economic growth in Tunisia, they found evidence of finance leading growth during the period 1963-1987 (period of financial repression), and bi-directional causality from 1962 to 1998, they concluded that the weak evidence to support that financial system contributes to economic process in Tunisia. The study of Ben Naceur & Ghazouani (2007) and AL-ZUBI, Khaled& al (2006) aimed to examine the effect of banking system and financial market development on economic growth in 11 countries from MENA region, using GMM approach with various indicators of financial development, they found a negative relationship between financial system development and growth, they linked this result to the underdevelopment financial systems that are characterized by the countries under study (in MENA region). Alaoui Moustain (2004) and Chatri & Maaruf (2013) are among studies that have tested the financial-led growth hypothesis on Morocco, using VAR and VECM, respectively model with various indicators of banking system and stock market, they found that the result depended on the proxies chosen for financial development, these result indicates that Morocco should keep to promote financial development through more financial reforms to spur the real sector.



The studies of Bakhouche (2007), Lacheheb & al (2013) and Medjahad & al (2015) attempted to determine and analyse the effect of financial development on real sector in Algeria (test of supply leading hypothesis), using the same approach is ARDL model .their finding is no significant effect from financial development on growth in Algeria, they related this result to less developed banking system and need to more financial reforms to accelerate economic growth in Algeria ,Mohieldin, Mahmoud; and Al (2019) examines empirically the relationship between the development of the financial sector and economic growth in Egypt between 1980 and 2016.

It draws comparisons based on critical financial indicators between Egypt and selected emerging markets and developing economies, using a new data set of financial development indexes released by the International Monetary Fund. Econometric time-series modeling of bivariate regressions for real growth per capita and measures of financial development, to assess the relationship between financial development and economic growth in Egypt, yields three specific findings. First, there is a strong association between real growth per capita and financial development measured. Second; access to and the efficiency of banking services are not associated with real per capita income.

Third, the Financial Markets Access Index—which compiles data on market capitalization outside the top 10 largest companies and the number of corporate issuers of debt—indicates that there is a robust association with real per capita gross domestic product. The main policy implications suggest that there should be a stronger focus on promoting a more proactive role for the financial services industry in Egypt.

Cross-country studies.



The seminal work in this area is by Goldsmith (1969). Using data from 35 countries from 1860 to 1963, Goldsmith found that a positive association could be observed between economic and financial development if periods of several decades are considered. However, his work has several weaknesses: (i) it involves limited observations on only 35 countries, (ii) it does not control for other factors influencing economic growth, (iii) the size of financial intermediaries may not accurately measure the functioning of the financial system and (vi) it does not identify the direction of causality. Recently, researchers have taken steps to address some of these weaknesses. King and Levine (1993a, b, c) provided evidence for 80 developing countries over the period 1960-1989. They control for other factors affecting long-run growth, and examine the productivity growth channels. Besides that, they use four measures of the level of financial development to more precisely measure the functioning of the financial system than Goldsmith's size measure.

Furthermore, King and Levine (1993 b) study whether the value of financial depth in 1960 predicts the rate of economic growth and productivity improvements over the next 30 years. The regressions indicate that financial depth in 1960 is significantly correlated with each of the growth indicators averaged over the period 1960-1989. Thus, results suggest that the initial level of financial development is a good predictor of subsequent rates of economic growth and economic efficiency improvements over the next 30 years even after controlling for income, education, political stability and measures of monetary and fiscal policy.

Individual-country studies.

Country-case studies provide a rich complement to cross-country comparisons. The most influential work in this area is by McKinnon (1973). He studies the relationship



between the financial system and economic development in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan in the post-World War II period.

He concluded that better functioning financial systems support faster growth. The proponents of this approach criticize empirical studies based on cross-country growth regressions. They argue that these studies do not explicitly confront the issue of causality. In particular, this approach involves averaging out variables over long time periods, and using them in cross section regressions aimed at explaining cross-country variables of growth rates. Therefore, these techniques cannot allow different countries to exhibit different patterns of causality.

This means that the causality result is only valid on average. Furthermore, cross-country growth regressions suffer from a variety of errors: measurement errors, statistical errors and conceptual errors. Also, since various factors change during the time period of the study (policies, preferences and business cycles), hoping to capture all these changes by certain explanatory variables averaged over time is rather optimistic. Consequently, interpreting the coefficient derives from such studies is rather difficult. Recent empirical literature in country-case studies can be found in Demetriades and Luintel (1996) work. They examine the effects of various types of banking sector controls on the process of financial deepening using data from the Reserve Bank of India.

They find that these controls, with the exception of a lending rate ceiling, influence financial deepening negatively, independently of the well-known effect of the real interest rate. Gelbard and Pereira Leite (1999) examine the case of sub-Saharan Africa. They find that some progress has been achieved in terms of modernising the financial sector since the mid 1980's, but conclude that much remains to be done.



They also show some empirical evidence supporting the positive relationship between financial depth and growth for sub-Saharan Africa². The positive and significant relationship between financial depth and growth has also been found in studies using pure time series.

Firm-industry level studies.

This approach focuses on microeconomic aspects. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1996) analyse the relationship between industry-level growth performance across countries and financial development. They find that industries that rely heavily on external funding grow comparatively faster in countries with well-developed intermediaries and stock markets than they do in countries that start with relatively weak financial systems. Similarly, using firm-level data from 30 countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) argue that firms with access to more developed stock markets grow at faster rates than without this access. Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1998) tested the financial-growth nexus by focusing on the importance of the differential cost of external finance for firms.

The firm's dependence on external finance is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures minus flow cash from operations divided by capital expenditures. The authors focused then on the details of a mechanism by which finance affects growth, providing by the same occasion another test of causality, since they found evidence for a channel through which finance theoretically influences growth.

² For additional country case studies see Park (1993), Patrick and Park (1994) and Fry (1995).



Thus, using firm and industrial level data for a broad cross-section of countries present evidence consistent with the view that the level of financial development materially affects the rate and structure of economic development. On the other hand, many studies show that there is negative relationship between financial development and economic growth. For example, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), in their empirical study of the long run correlation between financial development and economic growth, using panel data regressions with random effects for Latin American countries during the period 1950-1985, also have found a strong negative correlation between financial development and economic growth.

They explained the finding by the effects of experiments of extreme liberalization of financial markets in some Latin American countries followed by their subsequent collapse. Berthélemy and Varoudakis (1998) also found a negative correlation between financial development and growth using panel data regressions based on a panel set of 82 countries for the period 1960-1990.

They argued that this empirical result might be explained by the existence of “threshold effects”, which state that countries may need to reach a certain level of financial depth (a threshold) before there is a significant effect on growth- associated with the existence of multiple equilibria in the long run between financial development and growth. They assume that the interaction between financial and real sectors generates two stable equilibria: a low equilibrium with weak growth performance and an underdeveloped financial sector and a higher equilibrium with notable growth and normal development of the financial market. Between the two, there is an unstable equilibrium, which defines the threshold effect of the financial development on economic growth.



Besides these three approaches, recent empirical literature has also revisited the old debate on the relative merits of bank-based financial systems (such as Germany and Japan) versus market-based financial systems (such as U.K. and U.S.). Proponents of bank-based systems find that: (i) in highly liquid markets, information is quickly revealed to investors at large, creating a free-rider problem, (ii) small investors are unable to exert corporate control due to superior information of managers and the likely collusion between managers and a few powerful members of the board and (iii) liquid markets make it easy for concerned stockholders to simply sell their shares rather than coordinate pressure against management.

Thus, those proponents argue that the combination of all of these market failures leads to an inefficient allocation of the saving and banks mitigate these failures by their long-term relationships with particular firms.

On the other hand, proponents of market-based systems focus on the weaknesses of bank-based systems, arguing that: (i) large banks tend to encourage firms to undertake very conservative investment projects, and extract large rents from firms, leaving them with low profits and little incentive to engage in new and innovative projects and (ii) shareholders have little oversight over bank managers who control not only banks but also, indirectly through financing, the firms. Moreover, the advocates of this system claim that it provides a various set of financial instruments that allow greater customisation of risk management techniques than in a more standardised bank-based system (Khan and Sehhadji, 2000). Emerging evidence suggests that neither view is fully correct. Levine (1999), James, Caprio and Levine (2000) suggest that establishing a legal environment that strongly protects the right of investors is much more important than comparing between these two systems. Levine (1997) argues that the choice is not either banks or



markets because both of them provide complementary financial services to the economy, with both having positive implications for economic growth.

3.Data and Methods

3.1 Empirical specification and Data

This part highlights the econometrics model used to study the relationship between financial development and economic growth in Algeria.

The data we have employed for Algeria economy are annual observations covering the period **1970–2016**. The variables are measured as follows: The annually data on the economic growth is proxy by real GDP per capita, real gross fixed capital formation as a proxy of volume of investment (capital accumulation) that used from previous studies such as: Adul G et al (2013), Ghirmay (2006), Hatem Hatef Abdulkadhim Altaee&al (2014) among others.

In the literature the most common measures for financial development are the M2 to GDP ratio or the Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). In this study the second measure is used in the absence of the role of financial market in Algeria(bank-based). this is one of the most widely used measures (proxies) of financial development (De Gregorio & Guidotti 1995, Benhabib & Spiegel,2000, Adul & al ,2013, Beck & al, 2003, levine and Zervos ,1998) Anwar et al (2011), Ogunyiola (2013).

This indicator measures the quality and quantity of the investment financed by the banking sector, Data for our variables obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI), On-line, 2018 (www.worldbank.org). All the variables are expressed in natural logarithm for the usual statistical reasons.



To model the effect of financial development on economic growth we follow the standard literature in specifying a Solow Growth function pertaining to the economic model below:

$$GDPC = f(FD, GFCF)$$

GDPC denotes real gross domestic product per capita, FD denotes the domestic credit to private sector measure of financial development and GFCF real gross fixed capital formation.

The regression in log forms is as follow: $\log Gdp\varphi = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log FD + \alpha_2 \log GFCF + \xi_t \dots (1)$

4. Empirical Results

This section present firstly, the econometric methodology adopted to achieve the objective of this paper and secondly, the empirical results.

The empirical results commences by testing the order of integration of the variables. The Augmented Dickey Fuller approach was employed.

4.1 The stationary of the time series

Each time series was examined to determine if it is stationary or non-stationary employing the unit roots test. If a time series is found to be non-stationary, subsequently the examination was undertaken to determine if its first difference is stationary. Using this procedure the order of integration of a time series is determined. Table 1 presents the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics for the log levels and the first differences of the logs of the annual time series data.



From table 1; it is evident that all-time series are compatible with the hypothesis that stationarity characterizes the variables in this study. Since, (the ADF absolute computed values, are greater than the absolute critical values, at the first difference for variables, where all the statistics are significant).

Table 1. Unit Root Test (Augmented Dickey Fuller)

	ADF		
	Level	1 er difference	
Log gdpc	- 0.5979 (0.8610)	-3.3159)201(0.0	I(1)
Log fd	-1.3211 (0.6117)	-4.9867 (0.0002)	I(1)
Log gfcf	.23712 (0.9951)	-0.4510 (0.0011)	I(1)

Source: prepared by the researcher, depending on the program eviews 8

According to the results obtained by the time series of this function is stationary at 5% (in absolute value) this means that there is a co-integration between the variables and there is a long-term relationship.

4.2 The Optimal Lag Length Selection

The next step is to determine the optimum order of lag length. This is important since under parametrization would tend to bias the results and over-parametrization would diminish the power of tests. The optimal lag length of the lagged differences of the tested variable is determined by minimizing the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Bastian Criteria (SBIC). Table 03 shows the selected lag length by criteria, all the criteria (LR, FPF, AIC, SC and HQ) recommended a joint lag **2** according to the table 2.



Table 2. the Optimal Lag Length

Lag	LogL	LR	FPE	AIC	SC	HQ
0	-1564.292	NA	9.15e+27	72.89732	73.02020	72.94264
1	-1396.908	303.6276	5.79e+24	65.53061	66.02210	65.71186
2	-1378.603	30.65038*	3.78e+24*	65.09781*	65.95793*	65.41500*
3	-1373.310	8.123601	4.57e+24	65.27025	66.49899	65.72337
4	-1369.007	6.004073	5.88e+24	65.48872	67.08608	66.07778

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion

LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)

FPE: Final prediction error

AIC: Akaike information criterion

SC: Schwarz information criterion

HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

4.3 Cointegration Test

As the econometric analysis suggests, when the concern of unit root has been addressed; the co-integration test can be applied to verify the existence of long run relationship. The theory of co-integration defines that even though the variables under consideration are non-stationary at individual level but the linear relationship among them may still be stationary. After confirming the stationarity of the variables at 1(1).

This technique observes the long run relationship among the non-stationary variables while showing number of cointegrating equations. The test is based on the comparison of $H_0 (r=0)$ against the alternative $H_1 (r \neq 0)$ where “r” represents the number of co integrating vectors.



Table 3. Johansen cointegration test

Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized		Trace	0.05	
No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Statistic	Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.420626	34.60841	29.79707	0.0129
At most 1	0.199781	10.04705	15.49471	0.2771
At most 2	0.000398	0.017894	3.841466	0.8935

Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level

Evidence from the result we find that λ_{trace} is greater than the critical values at the level of 5% suggests that the null hypothesis of no co-integration ($r = 0$) cannot be rejected that there is no cointegration between the variables models to be estimated, but at ($r = 1$) we find that λ_{trace} is smaller than the critical values at the level of 5% and therefore accept the null hypothesis, Based on these results, we can find one cointegrating. This in effect suggests that the existence of long-run relationship between the variables employed in our study is confirmed.

4.4 Toda-Yamamoto Granger Causality Test

Having ascertained that a cointegrating relationship exist between financial development, Domestic credit to private sector and economic growth, the final step in this study is to verify if financial development Cause economic growth using the Toda and Yamamoto causality test.



The empirical results of Granger Causality test based on Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology is estimated through MWALD test and reported in Table 5. The estimates of MWALD test show that the test result follows the chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom in accordance with the appropriate lag length along with their associated probability.

Table (5): Toda-Yamamoto Causality

Dependent variable: GDPC

Excluded	Chi-sq	df	Prob.
GFCF	14.86405	2	0.0006
FD	13.38100	2	0.0012
All	42.22640	4	0.0000

Dependent variable: GFCF

Excluded	Chi-sq	df	Prob.
GDPC	4.590666	2	0.1007
FD	0.619535	2	0.7336
All	5.774385	4	0.2166

Dependent variable: FD

Excluded	Chi-sq	df	Prob.
GDPC	1.100031	2	0.5769
GFCF	4.855068	2	0.0883
All	4.926580	4	0.2949

It is clear, from Table 05 that there is a unidirectional causality between financial development, investment and growth, for the fact financial development affect economic growth through capital accumulation channel and productivity of capital,



5. Conclusion

This paper offers a broad analysis of the effect of development financial sector on economic growth for Algeria. The evidence presented in this paper provides strong and robust support to the view that financial sector development is crucial for economic growth and the efficiency of the financial sector is potentially important for the long term growth performance of Algeria. Given this positive relation, the importance of financial sector development should not be underestimated and has to be one of the main strategies to achieve sustainable economic growth in the long term. Building sound and stable financial sectors requires; liberalization of the financial system, adoption of the internationally acceptable codes and standards, strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision and training of the staff to manage and regulate these institutions.



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The role of artificial intelligence in conflict resolution

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Abstract

This article proposes the main aspects of artificial intelligence and their implications for international law. It also deals with the current artificial intelligence revolution and shows the arguments from which the current international law for managing artificial intelligence in times of conflict is drawn.

Key Words: artificial intelligence, intelligence revolution, international law, managing artificial intelligence, conflict resolution.



Preface:

The Internet and the technological advancement in information and communication technologies ('ICTs') have significantly altered the way business is conducted and led to an ever-increasing use of electronic instead of paper-based means of communication and data storage. Such ICT revolutionary and innovative applications have been equally extended to the Justice system in a manner that has transmogrified, and continues to do so, in-court and out-of-court dispute resolution techniques and schemes to ensure efficiency, fairness and swift resolution of ensuing disputes

Research importance

Creativity is a fundamental feature of human intelligence, and an inescapable challenge for AI. Even technologically oriented AI cannot ignore it, for creative programs could be very useful in the laboratory or the marketplace. And AI-models intended (or considered) as part of cognitive to understand how it is possible for human minds to be creative the earliest efforts to apply AI in the legal context date back at least to 1970 Many attempts were ambitious in terms of complexity and capabilities.

Some initiatives sought to create computerized judges that could perform complex legal despite the failure to achieve widespread adoption of AI in the legal realm, explorer IN this area should continue As access to justice problems enter a 'crisis level, technology continues to progress. The JPES is meant to be a modest businesslike and realistic system for implementation and adoption on a wide scale. If it succeeds, it could help to advance the development of AI justice technologies while also enhancing access to justice and ODR processes Shifting the orientation from highly advanced to more modest systems in the legal realm will parallel the evolution of AI generally According to technology author and journalist Steven Levy, the failure of initial, highly ambitious AI efforts led to a



'Winter' where no projects or visions could 'grow.' In his view this winter was followed by a reorientation towards processes where computers were highly proficient. In Levy's words: "[...] as the traditional dream of AI was freezing over, a new one was being born: machines built to accomplish specific tasks in ways that people never could. In the justice context, the JPES is consist Tent with a shift to simpler, less sophisticated, more practical AI products that herald a new Spring, characterized by the delivery and deployment of these sys teems; The use of Artificial Intelligence during war is nothing novel but with advancement of AI technologies it poses many challenges to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Law. This need to be discussed in detail to solve the legal and ethical issues related to use of this technology during war. AI is that branch of science and engineering that is based on building intelligent machines capable of acting like humans in any complex environment including warfare.

1 AI is rapidly becoming the focus of international economy, and it is seen as a new engine of social and economic development where AI has become a frequent topic of discussion among scholars in recent times; About its potential advantages and disadvantages and its uses in various sectors related to the implementation of its tasks and during the war as well

Search problems

While the current capabilities of digital devices are enormously impressive, future increases in power and reductions in cost are inevitable Courts, in the mid-1990s, were beginning to struggle with jurisdictional questions such. as where an event occurred if parties were in different places and were interacting online.



Many of the legal questions surfacing at the time, however, while interesting, were largely irrelevant to persons who found themselves involved in a dispute arising online.

In the vast majority of situations where parties were in different places, land based courts and systems were not really useful options for persons who felt aggrieved. The network's rapid communication and information processing capabilities, however, did open up opportunities for creative approaches and responses to problem solving for cases that did not go to court. In other words, many of the same forces that contributed to disputes could also be employed to resolve disputes.

Today, there is little doubt that there is an ongoing and growing need for ODR. There are indeed large numbers of disputes stemming from online activities; in fact, there are a greater numbers of disputes than anyone predicted. As will be noted later, eBay itself claims to have handled over sixty million disputes during 2010. In addition, over this period of time, how and when ODR is being used has also expanded. Without neglecting the need to respond to disputes arising online, ODR has also been focusing attention on traditional kinds of disputes occurring offline.

More to the point, the boundary line between the online and offline worlds is, as "the digital world merges with the physical world" much less clear than it used to be. As a result, the challenge of ODR currently is less focused on where the disputes originated than it is in finding tools and resources that can be as effective in any dispute regardless of where it originate.

I The role of artificial intelligence in armed conflict

Since the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, which each contain common Article 3' regarding non-international armed conflicts, the law of armed conflict



has been seen to be binding on all ‘parties to the conflict’, whether State or non-State actors. The scope of common Article 3 is limited, as was the extent to which non-State groups were bound by the law of armed conflict, but the law applicable to non-State actors has developed over the ensuing decades.

It began with the drafting of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, applicable to certain kinds of non-international armed conflict, and continued with the development of customary international law Obligations under international human rights law are directed specifically at States.

Attempts are sometimes made to extend them to non-State actors. Numerous resolutions of the United Nations Security Council refer to the human rights obligations of all parties, even in non-international armed conflicts. However, while non-State actors may have obligations imposed by both domestic and international criminal law, it is not yet clear that all non-State armed groups, particularly those which do not exercise control over territory, are bound by general human rights law.

In any event, even if non-State actors are bound by some obligations under human rights law, they are not subject to the same international judicial mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights law that States might be.

The use of Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as ‘AI’) during war is nothing novel but with advancement of AI technologies it poses many challenges to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Law. This need to be discussed in detail to solve the legal and ethical issues related to use of this technology during war. AI is that branch of science and engineering that is based on building intelligent machines capable of acting like humans in any complex environment including warfare.¹ AI is



rapidly becoming the focus of international economy, and it is seen as a new engine of social and economic development. AI is a frequent topic of discussion among scholars in recent times; about its probable advantages and disadvantages and its uses in various sectors especially during war or other combatant activities.

It is quiet probable that AI may be used to design new weapons, may help in identification by voice and image recognition, patrolling and evidence collection. The People's Republic of China has already announced that by 2030 extensive use of AI may take place in military and security installations.⁴ Under this policy document, China also discussed about formulating laws, regulations and ethical norms related to AI, by amending existing laws to be in consonance with AI, Designing Intellectual Property Rights standard to support AI development and most importantly create an infallible safety regulation and assessment system for AI expansion. The US military is planning to have more number of robot soldiers than human soldiers by the year 2025. These combat robots would most likely be an inherent part of the US fighting strategies within next 10 to 15 years. These plans of the world superpowers clearly reveal that nations have a well-defined roadmap for the future of Artificial Intelligence and plan of using it during war and conflict situations

II. Legal Status of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Liability in Terms of Application of its Systems

The use of AI during war poses many queries in the mind of researchers, As to what will happen in case criminal liability arises due to the act of AI, who will be Held responsible for such an act, who will bear individual criminal responsibility that, is The inventor, the programmer, the military commander under command responsibility.



Or AI-device programmer under individual criminal responsibility.⁶ further, a question that arises is how can AI device distinguish between who is combatant and who is hors De combat, whether these AI machines can arrest someone as prisoners of war, and can a combatant surrender to an AI device? These are just few set of questions which need to be answered before countries think of using AI machines and devices for war purposes.

AI war machines and devices have to go through the checks of military necessity proportionality and distinction before these can be used for combatant activities. As Most of the principles of Geneva Conventions are treated as customary international.

Law, it becomes very important to predict all probable losses and damages that can happen because of AWS playing combatant role It is probable that these AI weapons can perform combatant activities during war better than human beings but there will always remain the fear that these advanced machines may decide to do things which they are not instructed to do or perform which humans have never thought of or thought of them to be incapable of doing.¹¹ ‘Black box’ problem also creates a fear that these AI-based machines may not follow Geneva Conventions and Customary International Law at all times

The functions that AI can perform during warfare are dual in nature; firstly, it can be used for combatant activities, and secondly for providing humanitarian assistance to people, who are hors de combat. AI can also be really useful in natural, chemical and biological disasters (no doubt its precision and legality are always debated).

Few researchers also criticize AI on the aspect that rather than giving full control to AI weapons, it is much better if it provides support to human actions during war or



humanitarian assistance. This is because a human decision having gone through the process of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop, which in a simple way means observe, orient, decide, act and if AI is performing all the four stages, the chances of IHL violations are added. The best solution to such a problem is that AI or AWS should perform functions of observe and orient but the function of decision-making should be performed by a human controlling it and AI can execute the final act. If there is a chance to make smart machines errors, artificial intelligence can be located within the possibility, or creates unintended consequences of its actions in the pursuit of targets that seem harmless.

One of the scenarios for the committed artificial intelligence is what we have already we have already in movies such as the Terminator and television programs where AI becomes a high-intelligent centrifugal aware and decides that he does not want human control anymore Experts now say the current artificial intelligence technology is not yet able to achieve this very serious achievement of self-awareness; However, future giant computers may be for artificial intelligence.

Technology, Dispute Resolution, and the Fourth Party III.

Online dispute resolution (ODR) is the use of information and communication technology to help people prevent and resolve disputes. ODR, like its offline sibling alternative *dispute resolution* (ADR), is characterized by its extrajudicial nature. In a sense, dispute resolution is defined by what it is not: it is not a legal process.

Any resolution *outside* of the courts is dispute resolution. If you and your counterparty decide to resolve your dispute by consulting tarot cards that is alternative dispute resolution. If you decide to resolve your dispute with a game of checkers, that is



also alternative dispute resolution. However, if you decide to resolve your dispute with a game of online checkers that is online dispute resolution. Either way, in the dispute resolution world, we paint with a pretty big palette As ODR has developed over the past 20 years, a few core concepts have emerged. One of the most foundational concepts is that of the “fourth party”.

Originally introduced by Ethan Kats and Janet Rifkin in their book *Online Dispute Resolution*,¹ the fourth party describes technology as another party sitting at the table, alongside party one and party two (the disputants) and the third party (the neutral human, such as a mediator or arbitrator). You may be forgiven for picturing the fourth party as a friendly robot sitting next to you at the negotiating table and smiling patiently. Bear in mind, though, that this fourth party could just as easily be a black cylinder sitting on the table - *a la* Amazon Echo - or just software floating somewhere in the cloud.

The form of the fourth party is irrelevant to the function the fourth party provides. The fourth party can play many different roles in a dispute. In most current ODR processes, the fourth party is largely administrative, handling tasks like case filing, reporting on statistics, sharing data, and facilitating communications. We ask our friendly fourth party robot to take notes, or to dial in someone who could not join us at the table in person. But it is obvious to those of us in the ODR field that the fourth party is capable of much more. While we humans pretty much work the way we always have, with our cognitive biases and attribution errors, computers are getting more powerful all the time.

It is inevitable that at some point we will ask our fourth party robot to help us resolve our issues, or maybe even to just handle it for us outright. The artificial intelligence is a key dimension. Artificially intelligent *entities* may be considered to



operate lawfully as long as they are subject to human control; autonomous weapons systems may soon become unlawful, unless they are controlled by humans.

Whereas the law direct concerned by these manifestations of artificial intelligence (company law and the law of armed conflict, respectively) induces indications of how control tissue can be solved - think of the laws regulating a company board's control over management or the chain of command in armed forces - international law has available a rich jurisprudence with respect to control, which has accumulated over the years in the most diverse situations.

This experience should be drawn upon to shed some light on the puzzling control issues associated with artificial intelligence. Ruth party is just getting started the most obvious source in this regard is the case law of the international criminal courts. May of the cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia deal precisely with control: When and under which conditions is a commander high up in the hierarchy responsible for deeds on the ground? When are instructions Safe precise to warrant attribution? When are the tasks divided among several actors so strongly linked that they may be considered as one entity joint criminal enterprise ?³⁰ The answers this case law gives to such questions may contain dues of how control over artificial intelligence can be practically tackled.

The fact that in international criminal law humans are excusively involved, while with artificial intelligence one or more humans interact with machine, shouldn't be a reason not to draw on the tribunal's record. Communication theory, at least, point that correspondence with an arterially intelligent agent need not necessarily b fundamentally different from soda intercourse among humans General international law may not speak to control as directly as international criminal law.



However, the situations the world Court has addressed are even richer, more diverse, and thus more informative Consider the following two examples stemming from the time other League of Nations. They are just little among dozens. i) In 1931, Austria had concluded a treaty with Germany establishing a customs union.

Soon thereafter, the Permanent Court of International Justice was asked to bear you an opinion on whether Austria violated its international obligation laid down in previous treaties (*inter alia* the peace treaty of Saint-German-en-Layoff 10 September 1919) not to alienate its independence.

The Court concluded that Austria had *parody* violated this obligation. The opinion provides an illustration of what it means not to alienate one's independence. Is this not also relevant for humans who are prone to alienate their independence and subject themselves to the 'will' of artificial intelligence? ii) In 1930, the same Court indicated in an Opinion that the Free City of Danzig was precluded by its status that was secured *inter alia* in its constitution, which in turn was guaranteed by the League of Nations, from joining the International Labor Organization.³⁴ The following quotes from the opinion are evidence of the Opinion's relevancy: "The result is that, as regards the foreign relations of the Free City, neither Poland nor the Free City are completely masters of the situation. And: "...So far as these rights involve a limitation on the independence of the Free City, they constitute organic limitations which are an essential feature of its political structure.

Some questions follow naturally, namely what does it mean to be the complete master of situation involving artificial intelligence or what are the organic limitations of our artificial intelligence's structure? Overall, the opinion offers an illustration of how to structure a situation of competing interests and mutual dependency - which is just the



point to be addressed with regard to artificial intelligence the flipside of retaining control over something is that some decisions must not be delegated.

The persons controlling an artificial intelligence necessarily need to take some decisions themselves, else they would not be in control. The questions to be answered then are: Which decisions are these? What is it that cannot be delegated to a machine? With regard to autonomous weapons systems, the consensus seems to be that the decision to kill a human person in concrete combat situation cannot be delegated to a machine.

With regard to the artificially intelligent entities discussed Benefit, the answer may be that a human per se needs to be chargeable in case crimes are committed; criminal responsibility thus cannot be delegated. A search for other such limits of delegation in international law reveals again an interesting decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice, namely *Consistency certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution the Free City*.

The legislative organs of Danzig had introduced a very general penal norm, Authorization of authorities to sanction individuals when an act deserved penalty according to fundamental conceptions of penal law and sound popular feeling. The Court in 1935 advised that such a norm, in moving beyond the *nulled crimes* principle, violated the fundamental rights of individuals and the rule of law. In the perspective of artificial intelligence, the ruling suggests that the discretion delegable to an individual- which in the case of the Permanent Court was an individual judge, while in the case of artificial intelligence it is a synthetic individual- may be limited. The orders of the human principal gives may have to be specific, the space the digital agent can fill may have to be limited



This leads to the question: Should we commit to the basic principle that artificial intelligence must be precluded from taking discretionary decisions?

Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees and the other cases discussed at the broader task ahead for lawyers. Like the foregoing international case law, the human rights case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which is much thicker, is likely flush of the kinds of dues offered by *Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees*. In addition to the overarching perspective on delegation and control in general, guidance can be drawn from the case law anyone regard to each specific fundamental right. In the same way that *Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees* speaks to nullum crimes, thus enabling inference for artificial intelligence, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights speaks to the right to life, the prohibition of torture, etc.

And in each case implications for artificial intelligence are likely. Examination the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is a mammoth task (not to think of the case law of national courts!). However, in addition to exposing the limits of delegation and control! it will become evident where all legal systems are vulnerable to the artificial intelligence revolution under way. Data protection is already further ahead in coming to grips with the consequences of artificial intelligence because it threatens digital privacy most directly.

But the law governing companies, contracts, banking, agency - not to speak of public law in general- is nowhere near that far. It therefore seems urgent to start to look at the case law through the lens of artificial intelligence

IV. Legal Regulation of AI-based Technologies:



There is big lag in the development of digital and other information technologies in Egypt in comparison to developed countries. According to the data of the Federal Program “Digital Economy,” the Russian Federation ranks 41st in readiness for the digital economy, showing a significant distance from the higher rankings of dozens of leading countries such as Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United States of America the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Japan.

From the point of view of economic and innovative results of using digital technologies Russia ranks 38th far behind leading countries such as Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Israel, Singapore the Netherlands, the United States of America, Norway, Luxembourg and Germany In the view of many experts in the field, such a significant lag in the development of the digital economy is explained by the gaps in the regulatory framework for the digital economy and an insufficiently favorable environment for doing business and stimulating innovation, and, as a result, a low level of digital technologies by business structures and adequate legal basis for the tools and mechanisms which allows attracting investments and innovators There are many reasons for this, and they are not, in principle, reasons related to the creation of law in a given country. Knowledge will always be the key to the development of new technologies.

For example, in 2019 India introduced the subject “artificial intelligence” into the curriculum of its schools, an event which was picked up and reported by the media around the world. It should be expected in the future that such activities will also have an impact on creating law in this country A characteristic feature of the countries under study is that the first measures at the government level were undertaken relatively recently. The period of the end of 2017 and the start of 2018 was crucial in this area, when the first policies and reports in the field of artificial intelligence were created and special funds for



research, education and training were involved. Little time has passed, which is why a common feature of all of the BRICS countries is that none of them has special legal regulations in the field of AI. Yet, we can cite only a small number of examples of individual countries in which legislative initiatives are emerging; and this may result in the development of new legal regulations at the end of 2020 or early 2021. At the moment, the interest of countries in addressing the issues relating to AI is also compounded by the achievements of other countries and international organizations. National agencies in their reports indicate that in legal regulations and activities they will consider, for example, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles in the field of AI. This also applies to declarations from some BRICS countries (e.g. the AI policies of Brazil). Brazil clearly indicates that it implements OECD recommendations.

On the other hand, it can also be concluded from the actions of other countries that they are in line with the OECD strategy in this area. Also and robotics are proving to be valuable tools to assist caregivers, support elderly care and monitor patients' conditions on a real time basis, thus saving lives.

AI has the potential to be a great tool to fight educational inequalities and create personalized and adaptable education programs that can help people to acquire new qualifications skills and competences, according to individual ability to learn. Artificial intelligence already has an important impact on the EU economy and GDP growth. In addition, AI is being used to improve financial risk management and provide the tools to manufacture, with less waste, products tailored to our needs. Moreover, AI helps to detect fraud and cyber security threats and enables law enforcement agencies to fight crime more efficiently. Yet, as with any new technology, the use of AI brings risks. The citizens



of the European Union fear being left powerless in defending their rights and safety when facing the information asymmetries of algorithmic decision-making Entrepreneurs are concerned by legal uncertainty within the European Single Market.

Artificial Intelligence has the potential to do both material harm – for instance in relation to the safety and health of individuals, including loss of life and damage to proper and immaterial harm – such as loss of privacy, limitations on the right to freedom of expression, human rights, dignity and discrimination , and can relate to a wide variety of risks.

V. Artificial Intelligence and Information Technology in Training and Professional Activities of Lawyers

Artificial intelligence day after day is approaching that everything is an observer and microcontroller in favor of maintaining national security for States from terrorist attacks and citizens from various crimes. Artificial intelligence today can identify the faces and identity of people in streets, stations and hotels through surveillance cameras and can identify any telephone calls posing a threat or is a criminal talk between wanted, all this happens at record time with millions of citizens who move daily and with millions Telephone calls and very highly efficiently This is facilitated by government agencies and security.

It is true that we have not reached the total control of everything but artificial intelligence aspires to reach an integrated system where he is watching: all emending and all the places where e-cards are used for purchase and all reservations in hotels, restaurants, airports and stations, all Motor numbering panels in the streets, all audio calls, all conversations from public places by special microphones planted there, all people who



are present in a specific place such as streets, public squares, stadiums, mosques and others by surveillance cameras, all hospitals and list of people To injuries or accidents at a specified time, all courts and issues that are taught and the relationship of persons identified by all press reports and social networking publications.

All these data are gathering and analyzed to extract the relationship between a people or some targeted persons and a subject they share. Features of faces during meetings and phrases that can be taken, different correspondence or calls and various places where they are present and various remittances they have made and their relationships with issues in the courts or previous criminals or a file for existing or previous social problems through which it can be concluded And predicted the actions of specific persons after the intelligence system and the nomination of important things related to security and crime to limit the research and investigation into specific persons followed and monitored until their piping before making any crime and so we had a proactive step against terrorism And crime The legal framework of arbitration does not, in itself, bar the use of legal technologies by arbitrators, parties, and their counsel.

Arbitration is indeed contractually based, and arbitrators, with the consent of the parties, enjoy significant freedom in directing fact-finding and in case-management. Article 19 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration thus provides that the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed, failing which the arbitrator will 'conduct the arbitration in such manner as [she or he] considers appropriate', including the issues of 'admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence' Furthermore, arbitrators enjoy considerable freedom in their role as fact-finders. For instance, Article 25 of the ICC Arbitration Rules gives arbitrators recourse to a broad range of means for



establishing the facts of the case, neither specifying nor preferring any single method: ‘The arbitral tribunal shall proceed within a short time as possible to establish the facts of the case by all appropriate means.

Despite the lack of legal barriers, resistance to technology and artificial intelligence persists, flourishing on concerns that such technologies will usurp arbitrators’ roles. It is, however, improbable that technology could completely replace arbitrators. It bears emphasizing that almost all existing national, international, and institutional laws and rules envisage that arbitrators must be human. Some jurisdictions even explicitly provide that such a role could only ever be entrusted to physical persons. Nevertheless, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration and its preparation works do not include a specific definition of arbitrators. In reliance on this legal loophole, some commentators have advanced the possibility of appointing computers and programs as arbitrators.

However, without mentioning all the liability and disclosure issues that such an appointment would raise, an automated agent acting as arbitrator would lack the key human characteristics of emotions, empathy, morality, the ability to explain decisions, and the ability to decide *ex aqua et bono*. Even though in principle it is not impossible to entrust part of an arbitrator’s mission to automated agents when it comes to the logical assessment involving fact-finding, the ‘sociological print’ is a key component of the mission that only humans can perform.¹⁰ It is indeed arguably required that arbitrators possess human characteristics such as capacity, impartiality, and independence.

It is therefore generally accepted that arbitration cannot be fully automated by artificial intelligence. The use of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in arbitration poses various challenges due to the characteristics of arbitration. These include



issues concerning confidentiality, due process, the arbitrator's role, and potential for decreased flexibility. There are two aspects relating to the issue of confidentiality, each appearing at different points in the arbitral process: first, the question of access to precedent, i.e., arbitral awards or procedural orders, during the preparation phase, notably in counsel's preparation of written pleadings; and second, the question of the external input necessary to operate technologies during proceedings. The first aspect is most salient in commercial arbitration, as commercial arbitral awards are usually confidential – unlike in most investment treaty arbitrations.

One way to overcome this challenge, however, is to access information directly via arbitral institutions. For instance, the legal tech Dispute Resolution Data has built its case law database with the cooperation of twenty arbitral institutions. In order to avoid any confidentiality issues, the arbitral institutions upload the data themselves, ensuring that the names of the parties and other sensitive details remain confidential. The second aspect related to confidentiality is that any recourse to digital technologies or artificial intelligence involves some external input, meaning that ultimately, humans external to the arbitration proceedings will program and handle these technologies.

VI. Hangzhou Internet Court

The Hangzhou Internet Court in China seeks to move the entire litigation process to the Internet, including prosecution, filing, proofing, court hearing, and ruling. The online process brings disputants across the country together to increase efficiency and “save judicial resources.”

The court has a broad reach to cover copyright, contract disputes related to e-commerce, product liability, internet service provider disputes, conflicts over loans



obtained online, and domain name disputes. Experts have viewed the court as one of the most ambitious of its kind. The court's process begins when the plaintiff registers on the site and is verified as a legitimate claimant.

The plaintiff fills out an online form describing the conflict and allows the Internet Court to retrieve the case information. Each party obtains a "My Litigation" tab and enters a "query code" provided in the notice in order to review the complaint. Within fifteen days of filing the case, a mediator contacts both parties and conducts pre-trial mediation via the internet, phone or videoconference. If mediation fails, the lawsuit goes to the court's "Case Filing Division" where the parties can track the case, and gather information about similar cases in order to determine likely outcomes that may assist them in reaching settlements before litigation. As of February 2018, the experience in the four Hangzhou courts hearing online cases has been "encouraging" for advancing efficiency. During its first year, the court received filings for over 6,000 cases, of which about two-thirds were resolved or dismissed through online means. Participation is voluntary and defendants can demand that the case be heard off-line. Typical cases involved purchases from large e-commerce companies based in Hangzhou, which include Alibaba, Tabaco and Net Ease.

This has caused some concern regarding power imbalances, as well as questions regarding the influence that these ecommerce giants may have in the court itself. Nonetheless, the Hangzhou Internet Court has been so successful in creating efficiencies that China plans to set up internet courts in Beijing and Guangzhou, according to a statement from China's Supreme People's Court (SPC). Furthermore, the Hangzhou Court is setting trends broadly in consideration of technology's role in litigation. Recently, the court in Hangzhou became the country's first to accept "legally valid



electronic evidence using block chain technology. The plaintiff in an infringement case conducted an automatic capture of infringing webpages and the source code through a third-party platform

and uploaded them and the logs to Truth block chain for document verification. The court accepted this means for submitting evidence, after finding that the block chain technology complied with relevant standards to ensure the reliability of the electronic data. Chinese courts require strict verification procedures, and this case established that block chain can be used as a legal method to determine the authenticity of an item of evidence, similar to a traditional notarization service commonly used in China

VII. The role of artificial intelligence to protect civilians in war

In the event that an armed conflict has no international nature in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party is committed to conflict to apply as a minimum of the following:

1. Persons who do not participate directly in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have shown their weapons, and arid persons for fighting because of disease, wound or detention or for any other reason, in all cases are treated, without any harmful discrimination based on the element Or color, religion, belief, sex, generator, wealth or any other similar

For this purpose, the following acts are prohibited for persons mentioned above and remain prohibited at all times and places

- a. Assault on life and physical safety, in particular murder in all its forms, distortion, cruel treatment, torture
- b. Take the hostages



- c. Assault on personal dignity, in particular, degrading and surrounding dignity,
- d. Issuing provisions and the implementation of sanctions without a previous trial before a legal problem tribunal and ensure all necessary judicial guarantees in the eyes of the emanate peoples

Combines the wounded and patients and takes care of them-2

An unsanitary humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may expose its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should be above this, through special agreements, to implement all other provisions of this Convention.

It is not in the application of advanced provisions that affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict. The Geneva Conventions AP-I Article 36 to the Geneva Conventions, burdens all State parties, which are using any new weapon or technology in warfare to meet the abovementioned criteria. AI has to ensure that the new weapon does not cause superfluous

harm or unnecessary suffering of disproportionate and indiscriminate nature. The use of AI should always be for military necessity and military advantage. Furthermore, it should also adhere to all obligations which the State has undertaken under various International Treaties and Customary Law the AI should also be capable of understanding the nature of hostile, hors de combat, how to deal with surrender and how to seize any person, weapon or property.

Though machine learning of high grade can make the above things possible, the chances of errors because of black-box syndrome are quite high and cannot be ruled out



as the same may not comply with the norms of IHL. As per the weapon review procedure provided under Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, the obligation of weapon review is on the States willing to introduce such weapon in war and the State will create an internal committee to review the weapon according to Additional Protocol-I, but only a few countries have a well-developed weapon review procedure. But the question and controversy remains for some in the event that artificial intelligence or a machine commits a mistake. Will the responsibility be on the manufacturer or the user of the machine, as he is the watchdog over its operation and is treated as a guardian of things?

The researcher believes that in this context, the legal responsibility should be on the user of the machine; because he is the actual controller It has a guard over things that he has actual power over AI weapons must not cause relentless destruction to the environment and the principle of just war, and the principle of proportionality must be observed while programming these weapons. In addition, artificial intelligence weapons must be compatible with the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I Convention Article 51 Should It must be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law

Conclusion:

- The necessity of enacting a law regulating the work of artificial intelligence we can easily imagine a discussion about what the various future legal consequences will be if today we do not pass a certain law and defining the role of artificial intelligence
- The law has a long history of dealing with oversight and delegation. The case law of international courts abounds with issues of oversight and delegation. For example, but The case law of the International Court of Justice, the International



Criminal Courts, Regional human rights courts are likely to be littered with these cases, so there should be decisions governing the work of AI in such cases

- -Artificial Intelligence should, at all times, take care of IHL not just because of obligation under the Geneva Convention but also as a part of the Customary International Law The Customary International Law of warfare puts negative duty on any State using AI during the war to refrain from violating IHL including the direct responsibility not to support or assist the commission of contravention. The best way of weapon review is to take all stakeholders including the military lawyers, AI developers, testers and end users together during the testing and evolution stage.



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Valorization of local products in Morocco, "figs, and grapes doukkali" and their rool in local development

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Abstract:

Local products are considered among the agricultural products to which the State has attached particular importance in recent years, distinguishing them by a set of projects within the framework of solidarity farming. It aimed to improve the conditions of their production and marketing, as well as to organize the groups producing and grouping them within the framework of professional organizations. This attention came to major considerations and objectives, among which we mention: reducing the gravity of socio-economic differences within rural areas by diligence, and diversifying the incomes of agriculture ... However, the diagnosis of its reality shows a group of imbalances that still suffer from it, such as: poor productivity and production and the difficulty of marketing it. This poses the problem of their promotion in the light of the presence of many challenges which limit their contribution to territorial development in the region.

In this context, this study aims to diagnose the reality of the Doukkala terroir Products, by highlighting the capacities available in development and the constraints that prevent their development.

Keys words: Local devlopement - valorization - local products - Solidarity Agriculture



I. Introduction

Grapes and figs are among the most important agricultural products in doukkala that deserve attention and care, in addition to the possibilities and qualifications they have, which make them promising producers to contribute to achieving territorial development in the region. Given the historical and heritage value they have and the special place they have in the local population, the guardian interests of the sector have made it possible to think about ways to make them contribute, along with other economic activities, to improving the conditions of static living and achieving sustainable local development. In this context, a number of attempts have emerged, such as: the establishment of agricultural cooperatives and the organization of some awareness-raising and other campaigns, the most prominent of which have been to protect the product and ensure its continuity and market presence. However, it remained modest and lacking in effectiveness.

As an attempt to overcome these imbalances, the concept of valorization agricultural products has emerged as a substitute for previous interventions and a new strategy to restore consideration for agricultural products, especially the “Products terroir”, by increasing its productivity and improving its marketing and competitiveness conditions among the rest of the products [1].

II. study Area

The fig Below shows the study area covering the provinces of el Jadida and Sidi Bennour.






Fig. 1. Localization of study area

I. The problematic

The study tries to diagnose the realities of the fictional products in a manner and to highlight their qualifications and constraints. The problem of the study has been formulated as follows:

What is the reality of valorization of local products in Doukkala? What is its contribution to local development?

III. Study methodology

For a holistic approach to the subject of the study, the following curricula and approaches have been adopted:

- Descriptive method: it will enable us to diagnose the field of study.

- The statistical approach: It will allow us to collect statistical data and process them statistically and cartographically.
- The coordinate approach: it will enable us to highlight the interactive relationship of a person with his field.

In addition to the theoretical and applied parts, the theoretical part was found in which references, articles and studies dealt with the field products in general and the producers of grapes and figs in particular. As for the technical part, we have dedicated it to field visits and interviews with various actors.

IV. Study objectives

The study aims to:


- Introducing local products in Doukkala, by diagnosing their reality, and by highlighting their production and marketing methods.
- Explaining the paths the valuation and the constraints it faces.
- The reality of valuation of fictional products in terms of current, challenges and future prospects.
- The prospects for dirt development and the challenges facing achieving this goal.
- The capabilities and opportunities offered by the local products to contribute to the territorial development.

V. Study Results

1. Fig and grapes stand out as the most important local products in Doukkala

a.Figs: There are many varieties of figs in the region, in which we distinguish between local varieties and imported varieties. The results of the field work enabled us to take stock of the following items [2]:





Picture 01: Local and Imported Figs in Doukkala

Many of the aforementioned varieties dominate in the region of Had oulad frej, so that we find the region's farmers especially the producers of figs, who have intermarried between the local and imported varieties, with the aim of diversifying the product and meeting consumer demand for some varieties such as "Nabol, Ghodan and White Amber ..." some producers confirm through our interviews that they were impressed with some of the varieties produced in different regions of Morocco, especially the Wazzan region, which is well-known at the national level for fig production. [3].

B. Grapes

Grape seedlings represent 33% of the national area with a production of 27% of the national production. The boreal fields in Doukkala account for 98% of the production, which is mostly exploited in traditional methods. The average production yield is 35 quintals per hectare in the mullet and 125 quintals in the irrigated field. Grape product has benefited from the coding mark of luxury products [4].



Doukkala peasants produce many varieties of grapes some of which are local, such as the Doukkali grapes, and some of them are imported, but the Doukkala grape variety remains dominant over the rest of the other varieties due to its adaptation to the natural environment of Doukkala [5].




Fig.2.: Localization of Local Product in Doukkala

2. The production and marketing of grapes and figs in Doukkala go through a set of stages:

a. Production of grapes:



The production of grapes goes through a bush in several basic stages before being marketed in which the producers use the local know-how and the techniques known in production. In this context, we will review the results reached during the field research:

- Traditional methods dominate the production of grapes in a broom.
- Most peasants employ the know-how and knowledge inherited through generations.
- Plowing and fertilization operations vary from one farmer to another.

The renewal of seedlings is taking place slowly. The majority of peasants take advantage of the use of new seedlings granted by the Regional Office for Agricultural Investment because they do not match with the local cultivar "Doukkali grape - العنب الدكالي", or because the harvesting stage is late, because the maturity of the newly planted grape tree requires at least two years to pass.

- About 5% of the producers have good technical knowledge in producing grapes in the region and market their products outside the production field at an important price. Protecting the grape tree from climatic pests and diseases is a major concern for farmers, especially as they consider it a cultural heritage that must be protected.

- Most of the producers who were interviewed stated that they did not benefit from the training courses designated for them by the peasant authorities, the guardian of the sector.

Weakness of innovative solutions to ward off climate hazards such as dry arid winds, which cause great damage to the production of grapes in the absence of watering water, as well as their eruption coincides with the last stage of ripening of grapes.



- The draining of grapes remains very weak due to the fact that the majority of farmers prefer to sell their product fresh to take advantage of its profits directly. It is also mostly restricted to the remaining dry grapes during the end of the harvest season [6].



Picture 2: Some Grape Production Processes

b. Production of Figs

Doukkala peasants, especially the Had Oulad Farej, employ a group of know-how in the production of figs and care for their trees, starting with preparing the soil and fertilizing it through the use of fertilizers, through removing weeds, using pesticides, and caring for the product regularly until the maturity period. The aforementioned phases of the farmer require good preparation and timeliness to take care of his product and monitor it continuously to avoid being infected with fungi and diseases that cause severe damage to his product if he omits it and leave the opportunity to reproduce.



Picture 3: Some 'Figs Production Processes

C. The Marketing of Grapes and Figs Passes Through a Group of Stakeholders

Marketing of grapes and figs goes through several stages, which are illustrated in the following diagram:




Fig. 3: Stages of Marketing Grapes and Figs

It appears through the simplified diagrams above that the path of marketing grape and figs product passes through several marketing paths, starting from the producers and passing through to the wholesalers, intermediaries and installments sellers until the consumers. It is also noted that the real returns from the profit of the grape product do not directly benefit the producers and explain This involves the intervention of non-essential actors in the marketing path, especially the brokers who benefit from an important profit margin compared to the producers [7].



Picture. 4: Diversified Marketing of Grape Product



Picture .5: Diversified marketing of fig product

The photos above show the marketing of fig and grape products, which take many forms, as follows:

- Marketing in the local market near the weekly market;
- Wholesale marketing in the weekly market;
- Marketing in-place to wholesalers or intermediaries who are flocking to the fig fields to purchase it directly;
- Marketing for the emulsification laboratories, especially the Al-Baraka jam factory, which has an on-site assembly unit that is purchased during the harvest period;
- Marketing in installments that remain weak;

Generally, the brokers remain the main beneficiaries of the fig and grape intake. This affects the profits of the producers' profits and wastes important profits on them.




Fig.4: Distribution of the Sale Price Along the Harvest Season

It appears through the graph above that the price of selling grape products varies according to the harvest season, so that it rises at the beginning of the harvest and lowers

it in the middle, then returns to the increase at the end of the harvest. This difference is due to the relationship between demand and supply, so that whenever the demand for the product is large and the supply is small, the price is high and vice versa. The table below shows the difference in selling price of a product:

Period	Production	Price (DH)
July	25	5 -4
August	55	5 -2
September	20	5 - 4

Table. 1: Distribution of the Sale Price Along the Harvest Season

Some producers resort to marketing their product outside their region in the direction of the major markets in Morocco such as Casablanca and Marrakech ... The goal behind this is due to the high price of selling the product compared to selling it inside the region [8]. The map below shows some of the marketing trends of grape product






Fig. 5. Marketing Trends for Local Products

3. The Effects of Grapes and Figs on Local Development

a. The Direct Effects of Grapes and Figs

Grapes and Figs occupy an Important local labor:

Providing the appropriate conditions for the production and marketing of grapes and figs requires the presence of an important labor force. The peasants of the region depend mostly on the local labor force (men, women), which can be divided into the hands of a scientist from the family members, or from within the circle or from the neighboring districts, or from the nearby groups ... It was also found that some mediators and wholesalers use the labor force Local or family members of the field owner.

It is *also* worth noting that some students and students take advantage of the job opportunities offered by the production of grapes and figs, especially during the weekend. This enables them to cover some tuition fees or help their families and save pocket money.

Creating a commercial boom in the region during the year-end period stimulates the commercial dynamism of farmers and provides additional income that revives the farmer

b. Indirect effects of grapes and figs

- Maintaining and continuing the production of grape and fig products.
- Building valorization units.
- Organizing exhibitions.
- Maintaining ecosystems through a lot of tree planting.
- Bring in investors from outside the region.
- Proving rural people in their geographical area.
- Create a competitive edge within the rural world.
- Improving the standard of living of farmers and their children.
- Training of farmers in the agricultural field.
- Tourism promotion of the region and the definition of the production area.

4. Coercion of valuation of fictitious products in the region

In spite of the importance that domestically produced products have on the part of the local population, and also the role they play at the socio-economic level, some natural and human constraints hinder their valuation and reduce their potential to contribute to territorial development [9]. In this context, we will review some of them through the following fig:






Fig. 6. Production Related Constraint




Fig. 7. Marketing Related Constraints

In addition to the constraints of production and marketing, there are climatic challenges:




Fig. 8. Climate Constraints



Picture. 06. The Effect of Hot, Dry Winds on Grape Products

Each year, producers suffer from hot winds, leaving a huge loss in grape production. This is noticed through the image above [10].

Conclusion

We conclude from the above that local products with stock have important capabilities to contribute to earthy development, but their performance of this role remains subject to overcoming the valuations constraints that limit their economic and social effectiveness, by helping the farmer by framing and searching for spaces to market his product, and also by organizing continuous local training courses motivate him to attend in order to improve his production methods and to answer the constraints facing him.



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The first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity conference: A retrospective

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Abstract:

This article aims to analytically examine an unprecedented major historic event: the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity (AAPS) conference held in Egypt in 1957-1958. A general review of the AAPS allows to better understand resolutions and recommendations of its first conference in context. This includes its introductory and closing speeches, political issues and social matters it raised and tackled, its economic, cultural "humanistic", and internal (organizational and financial) resolutions. The latter focus notably on the establishment of the Council for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity and its Permanent Secretariat having its permanent headquarters in Cairo. Finally, a critical analysis of the first AAPS conference is crucial for several reasons and in the light of current circumstances and topical problematics.

Key words: Imperialism ; Afro-Asian ; Solidarity ; Decolonization ; Anticolonialism ; Liberation movements ; Independence ; Socialisation ; Nationalism ; Patriotism ; Arabs ; Zionism ; Underdevelopment ; Socialism.



*Arab progressives need to look back on
themselves to break free from the tendency
to prefer the word to its content*

(Houari Boumédiène, 1967)

This article aims to analytically examine an unprecedented major historic event: the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity (AAPS) conference¹ held in Egypt in 1957-1958. A general review of the AAPS (1st Section) allows to better understand the numerous and diverse resolutions and recommendations of its first conference in context (2nd Section). Finally, a critical analysis of the latter is crucial for several reasons and in the light of current circumstances and topical problematics (3rd Section).

1- Overview of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity

As per its own definition provided by its official website², the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity *Organization* (AAPSO) is a mass non-governmental organization with national committees in more than 90 countries nowadays in Asia and Africa, and has associate member committees in Europe and Latin America.

The first conference of AAPS (*movement*) (not yet turned into an organization back then) was held in Cairo between December 26, 1957 and the first of January 1958 gathering representatives of numerous Asian and African people. Reportedly, the participation of some of the latter's delegations was prohibited by the colonizers. The

¹ Reference is made to the second trilingual edition (Arabic, English, French) of the Conference minutes (no publication date specified therein). The author of this study consulted a scanned copy (Princeton University Library) of those minutes in the Arabic language: pp.1-67.

² <https://www.aapsorg.org/en/welcome-to-aapso.html>



Conference occurred during the Cold war, five years after the 23 July 1952 Egyptian revolution, and two years after each of: the first Asian Solidarity Conference in Delhi dated April 6, 1955 (which AAPS elaborates and extends), and the Bandung Conference dated 18-24 April 1955³. AAPS first conference was held just before the 1958 Tashkent Conference (for which it incites)⁴, and four years before the Non-Aligned movement (NAM) was established in 1961⁵.

AAPSO enjoys an observer status in NAM and was since then considered as a popular extension of the latter's objectives - NAM was itself an official continuation of the Bandung conference. Also, four years after the first AAPS conference, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was found in 1961 (also known as the "Special Committee on Decolonization" or the "C-24").

AAPSO struggled since its inception against colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, racial discrimination and wars. It endeavored for peace and extended various forms of support and escalation for liberation struggles to peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America, that collaborated to the birth and independence of numerous countries.

2- Brief about the First AAPS Conference

³ Lumumba-Kasongo, T, Rethinking the Bandung conference in an Era of ‘unipolar liberal globalization’ and movements toward a ‘multipolar politics’, Bandung: Journal of the Global South 2, 9 (2015), 25 July 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40728-014-0012-4>

⁴ The Freie Universität Berlin’s PalRead recently held a webinar (part of its “Mighty Magazines”) dated February 23, 2021, about “The Afro-Asian Anti-Colonial Movement and its Writers”. It was provided by Anaheed Al-Hardan and Tareeq Mehmood and is highly interesting, notably regarding the historical context as well as the intellectual and cultural background of the first conference of AAPS (movement).

⁵ About the history of the Non-Aligned movement, see: CVCE. European Navigator. Marco Gabellini, the beginnings of decolonization and the emergence of the non-aligned states, Last updated in 2016: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_beginnings_of_decolonisation_and_the_emergence_of_the_non_aligned_states-en-effd9a16-36f5-438a-8d7d-0ac6872c0250.h



The first AAPS conference started with **introductory speeches** by the President of the Conference Anwar AsSadat (President of the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian solidarity in charge of holding the Conference in Egypt), the President of the Indian delegation Rameshwari Nehru, and the General Secretary of the Conference Youssouf AsSiba'i.

The Conference tackled political issues notably by raising a series of calls for: (i) nuclear and atomic disarmament (twelve years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and just before the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy dated September 1958); (ii) for nonviolence and alternative means of political conflicts resolution; (iii) for enhancing nations' representations at the United Nations which promotes the principle of self-determination; (iv) for anti-colonialism and anti-mandate described as "terrorism"; as well as (v) for refusing each of the apartheid, discrimination, slavery, the "Atlantic Alliance", the Eisenhower doctrine, the Baghdad Pact and the Israeli violations especially the "conquest" of Palestine (It shall be noted here that the latter is considered by some jurists as being the exact relevant terminology in terms of international public law).

Then, the conference took economic resolutions (with a socialist spirit), mainly about commercial exchange, agriculture and industrial development, social justice and wellbeing, individual dignity, labour and social protection, guarantees and rights, syndicates and cooperatives, economic rights of non-independent countries, and rejecting economic monopoly. To a lesser extent, there might be a shallow quasi-"communist" influence in the approach of colonialism and imperialism (whether economic or otherwise) as being an exploitation of the "proletariat" vulnerable countries by the "capitalist" powerful States.



The conference also made decisions regarding **social matters** especially health, medical and social services, and fighting illiteracy (which was, and still is nowadays, indeed a crucial regional need). Relatively, very remarkable, reformative and progressive steps were decided towards achieving gender equality, protecting and enforcing youth and families (women and children in particular; although some Afro-Asian religions or traditions would refrain therefrom especially at that time). Furthermore, the conference made **“humanistic” resolutions** towards an international **cultural** collaboration.

The Conference also took **internal (organizational and financial) resolutions** notably the **establishment of the Council for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity and its Permanent Secretariat** having its permanent headquarters in Cairo. The Conference was ended by **closing speeches**. The first one was made by AsSadat, who wrongly speaks of a so-called “acquired peoples’ freedom” (instead of the *inherent* freedom found, in fact, in the human nature itself as per natural law⁶). The second closing speech was made by Nehru, who namely thanked the Egyptian President Gamal AbenNasser, and, may be unintentionally, poetically represented the AAPSO logo signification and message.

3- Critical Review of the First AAPS Conference

As a *utopia* of a better world order and as a tentative breach in the vicious circle of colonization and of the past bipolar world, the Conference was definitely by itself an added value to the history of regional and international relations and politics. However, many critics can be made to it; the following are the most important ones:

⁶ See a recent book in French (by the author of this study): Ghadir El’Alayli, *Le droit naturel, fondement de l’Etat de droit panarabe*, Editions Pedone, Paris, 2021.



If the Conference minutes were officially published by its Permanent Secretariat only in Arabic, French and English, this risks to reflect an Afro-Asian integration of linguistic imperialism and may be colonial socialization. In fact, there are many other African and Asian languages that should be taken into consideration in this regard.

The same critic applies to each of the following use of: The “white man” patriarchal concept to describe the Western colonizers vs. the so-called “colored people of the world” ; The theory of “natural rights of all nations” without explaining it, revisiting it and introducing it to Afro-Asian public opinions; The expression “Middle-East” without even providing any terminological, geographical or political indication or delimitation ; The so-called “Arab nationalism” and “Arab patriotism” systematically inspired of the Western model of Nation-State and thoroughly influenced by Western patriotic sentiments without revisiting them and without providing any scientific explanations or precisions; The distinction between “developed” States and “big” nations on the one hand, and so-called “retarded” (Afro-Asian) countries / States / economies, “small” nations / States⁷ or the allegedly “small Palestinian people victim of colonialism and zionism” on the other hand. These issues may also depict an *exaggerated* feign pityability and victimization coming out of an inferiority complex or internalized orientalism.

The latter somehow dangerously and “blindly imports” and adopts Western abstract perspectives without proactively taking matters in hands, filtering their accuracy, providing any explanatory criteria or even adapting them to local or regional cultures, considerations, true needs and expectations⁸.

⁷ However, it shall be noted that the Conference did not use (did it consciously avoid using?) the concept of “Third World” (which originated from the French demographer Alfred Sauvy who wrote of “Three worlds, one planet” in an article published in the French newspaper L’Observateur in 1952).

⁸ Compare with: Anibal Quijano’s concept (in 2000) of the coloniality of power.

The Conference also lacks of technical accuracy when it uses rather literature and undefined wordings such as “*national sovereignty of the umma*” which means nation, but no specification was made as to which nation is meant.

This may be connoting an Islamic influence, which may also apply to the word “*al-jihad*” used to describe the struggle for freedom and against colonialism. Also, the word “*aqtar*” is used to describe regions and countries, whereas the positive international law and international community’s cant and logic are those related to “States” and to their bilateral, regional and international relations. Even the key-words “African” and “Asian” were not terminologically and geographically defined, whereas there is a serious need of accuracy and clarification in this regard.

Moreover, the Conference recommends dirigisme and collectivization, which might be arguable and contentious socio-economic measures. It calls for a nationalist transversal propaganda immersing even in the education field, and in this context, it aims to found relevant civil society organizations, whereas the latter should be, by definition, non-governmental. In addition, it was decided to “guide” the medias and “push” towards the AAPS through literature too, as well as to “use” literature, arts and sciences “in the sake of peace and wellbeing”. These are shocking violations of fundamental freedoms and rights.

The Conference was characterized by its excessive demagogic, poetry wording and emotional literature, sometimes excluding any rational or reasonable thoughts. Idealist imaginaries, ideological exaggerations and sentimental representations were often brought to the table, and reference to “ideals” happened to be often expressly made. This occurred without, at least, rethinking relevant pillars such as the Arab Renaissance *[An-Nahda*



*Al'Arabiya*⁹ and the wider oriental heritage. In fact, persuasion left sometimes no room for conviction.

Pretentious and non-pragmatic simple enumeration and an over-simplistic listing of general and universalizing principles, values and virtues predominates the discourse, whereas “reality” might not always be the same everywhere in the world, not even among the disparate societies of Asia and Africa themselves. The conference also suffers from a static approach of international relations conceived as having to always be regulated, even in the future, by the Bandung Conference principles considered as having to be, ideally, applicable to all countries. The AAPS Conference resolutions and recommendations were conveyed as “a message of hope and confidence for the upcoming (1958) year”. The minutes’ introduction encompasses even intentional rhyme (which may remind of Coranic verses writing style).

Some readers might note a naivety, such as the belief in a divine justice ruling over political conflicts and international relations, or the quasi-systematic tendency to political unification even where it is not necessarily feasible or pragmatic such as the cases of Yemen, Korea and Vietnam. This phenomenon somehow seems to also apply to the so-called “Arab *umma / nation*” as per the Conference, but to a lesser extent as this case remains rather ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. The League of Arab States was not even mentioned, and the Arab nationalism was not subject to any discussion or analysis in the light of other existing movements and competing doctrines in the Arab world, especially at the time, such as pan-Africanism, pan-Syrianism and pan-Islamism¹⁰.

⁹ Compare with Arab existentialism.

¹⁰ See the critical retrospective analysis of these movements and doctrines, notably pan-arabism, in the abovementioned book (in French) of the author of this study: Ghadir El'Alayli, *Le droit naturel [...]*, op.cit., 2021.



Other readers would see that the Conference is taking the Afro-Asian public opinions for granted: when it affirms that colonization is the sole reason that explains the “retarded” local economies, and that the risk of war is the exclusive reason why cultural and social rights were not implemented. In fact, several Afro-Asian regimes, leaders or establishments were (and many still are) corrupt and/or incompetent. The same applies when the Conference absolutely and very generally describes conspiracies led by the colonizers through local actors against “patriotic” governments in the region. In fact, in the name of such conspiracy theory (regardless of its extent of truthness), brutal oppressions were locally made sometimes against sincere or credible oppositions. Some local governments committed assassinations, imprisonments and employed atrocious cruel methods of torture, in violation to basic rights and freedoms.

There are also self-centered, machiavellic, opportunist or biased positions based rather exclusively on Afro-Asian interests, as well as inconsistencies and contradictions like the following facts: Refusing coalitions and the European Common Market although AAPS itself might be considered as a coalition that even calls for autarky in the medical and medication field¹¹; Rejecting any foreign interference in internal governmental issues, but recommending such “solution” in order to put an end to apartheid, and founding the liberation movement on natural rights; Calling for decolonization and liberation together with safeguarding French interests in Algeria on an alleged “rightful basis” and aiming to convince the French that an independent Algeria would “serve” French interests; Totally denouncing Balfour Declaration, zionism and Israel as implementing a settler colonialization, and at the same time accepting the idea of a “rightful solution” to the

¹¹ One can imagine how dangerous such project could be if applied, especially when humanity comes to face a pandemic (like the COVID since the beginning of 2020)!

Palestinian issue; In addition to another inconsistency residing in the name given to Palestinians sometimes as so, while other times only as “Arabs in Palestine” which is itself a colonial expression¹². Finally, although Palestinian refugees and their right of return were clearly mentioned, statelessness¹³ and their basic rights in their respective countries of residency were not. Not any consideration or planning was made about the (possible) upcoming generations of refugees.

The conference did not analyze plural or fragmented African and Asian societies, identities and cultures e.g. internal tribal and ethnic disputes; minorities, communautary groups, confessionnalism, institutionalized under-representation and marginalization as a “divide and conquer” colonial legacy. For instance, this was the case of the French mandate in Lebanon which is a typical example of imperial internationalization of local politics in the light of global events as demonstrated by patterns¹⁴: In Lebanon, the French mandate started in 1923 to “succeed” the Ottoman empire that ended after World War One; Lebanon gained independence only in 1943 before the end of World War Two. The 1957-1958 Lebanese political crisis¹⁵ itself reflected these foreign interferences¹⁶ in the context of a bipolar world order. Although held during the 1957 Lebanese crisis, the Conference totally avoided these and similar controversial but crucial issues, as it did not tackle the highly sensitive case of Lebanon.

¹² See about decolonizing research on Palestinians: Anaheed Al-Hardan, Decolonizing Research on Palestinians: Towards Critical Epistemologies and Research Practices, Qualitative Inquiry 2014 20: 61-71, December 16, 2013, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077800413508534>

¹³ About this concept, see a book (in French) of the author of this study: Ghadir El-Alayli, Le droit de la femme libanaise d'accorder sa nationalité à ses enfants, HBDT, juin 2015.

¹⁴ Compare: Evan Ritli, Colonialism, Lebanon and the Middle East, July 5, 2011, <https://www.eir.info/2011/07/05/colonialism-lebanon-and-the-middle-east/>

¹⁵ See in Arabic:

سأيد عبد العال، أزمة الحكم في لبنان 1957-1958، مجلة كلية الآداب بقنا، 2012، ص. 216-215.

¹⁶ This subject-matter is very topical with current (2021) Lebanese political events.

Unanimity on all numerous and various resolutions including subtle ones, and the special care revealed by participants to achieve such unanimity may remind the late 20th and even early 21st century readers of dictatorial and non-democratic States' electoral ironic results phenomenon of around “99,9% of votes”. Anyway, although they were unanimously approved, not much of these resolutions were actually (well) implemented afterwards, which draws legitimate questions about the extent to which they were pragmatic. Finally, the Conference lacks of efficiency as it does not take any effective and escalating diplomatic action against colonizing States and their allies.

These are some of the unfulfilled promises of past decolonization struggles¹⁷. Many Afro-Asian people still suffer since then also because of neocolonialism¹⁸; Revisiting their “Future Pasts”¹⁹ struggles might be the key for a better tomorrow: “that they might have life, and have it more abundantly” (John 10:10).

“We can change the world and make it a better one. It is in your hands to make a difference”

(Nelson Mandela)

¹⁷ About the history of decolonization, see in French: Ludivine Thiaw-Po-Une, Decolonization, in: Encyclopédie de la culture politique contemporaine, dir. Alain Renaut et coord. Claire Demesmay, Pierre Zelenko et Ludivine Thiaw-Po-Une, Ed. Hermann, 2008, Tome I, pp.190-194.

¹⁸ Compare: Lutfi Hamadi, Edward Said: the postcolonial theory and the literature of decolonization, European Scientific Journal, June 2014, Special edition, vol.2, pp.39-46.

¹⁹ <https://www.aub.edu.lb/aafp/Pages/about.aspx>



Le travail des enfants en Tunisie : Répercussions psychologiques et éducatives

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Résumé

Le travail des enfants est l'un des problèmes les plus importants de la société tunisienne. Il s'est aggravé surtout après la propagation de l'épidémie du Covid 19. Ceci a affecté la santé mentale de l'enfant et par conséquent il y'a eu augmentation du taux d'abandon scolaire.

Nous avons également noté à travers cette étude l'augmentation de phénomène d'exploitation des enfants dans les travaux dangereux et interdits, notamment dans le domaine du commerce et de l'industrie.

Mots clés : Le travail des enfants, répercussions psychologiques, répercussions éducatives



1/Introduction

Le travail des enfants est l'un des phénomènes sociaux les plus importants qui s'est aggravé après ce qu'on appelle le «printemps arabe», en particulier en Tunisie, en raison du taux élevé de pauvreté.

En parlant du travail des enfants on peut évoquer, tout d'abord, le fait que les parents comptaient généralement sur les enfants pour accomplir de nombreuses tâches, que ce soit à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur de la maison, comme l'agriculture, et dans l'entreprise familiale. Sachant que cela est considéré par la famille comme une formation et une préparation de l'enfant pour l'avenir . Cependant, si l'enfant effectue ces actions par désir, le travail est dit bénévole et ne pose aucun impact négatif sur son développement physique, psychique et intellectuel.

Le travail des enfants est le produit des répercussions sociales, en particulier celles liées à l'exploitation et à l'exposition de l'enfant à la violence, au harcèlement ou au viol, en plus des lourdes conséquences de l'emploi de l'enfant à des travaux pénibles et des dommages physiques qu'il le lui cause.

Sur le plan éducatif, le travail des enfants dans des conditions d'exploitation conduit à une exclusion totale de l'éducation, et ses répercussions futures sur l'enfant d'une part, et la famille et la société d'autre part.

Mais ce qui attire l'attention, c'est le dernier rapport de l'Organisation internationale du travail qui parlait du travail de 13 millions d'enfants travailleurs dans les pays arabes. Sachant que la région du Maghreb arrive en tête avec 6,2 millions d'enfants et la Tunisie se classe troisième avec 180000 enfants¹ dont un tiers provient du nord-ouest.



En 2020, l'institut national des statistiques a établi que 9,7% des enfants âgés de 5 à 17 ans sont des enfants économiquement actifs, c'est-à-dire qui travaillent, ce pourcentage atteignant 18,5% dans les environnements et 4,8 % dans le district municipal.²

2/Objectifs:

Approfondir davantage la recherche scientifique sur les questions liées aux enfants.

Se renseigner sur les conditions de vie des enfants travailleurs.

Connaître les impacts économiques du travail des enfants en Tunisie.

Expliquer les implications psychologiques, sociales et éducatives du travail des enfants.

Connaître les mécanismes et solutions proposés pour limiter le phénomène du travail des enfants.

3/La problématique

Dans quelle mesure le travail des enfants affecte-t-il les aspects psychologiques et éducatifs et leur vision de l'avenir ?

4/Hypothèses

Le travail des enfants affecte l'aspect psychologique et éducatif.

L'augmentation du nombre de la pauvreté chez les enfants et la propagation de leur emploi entraîneront la propagation du phénomène de la violence et de l'extrémisme au sein de la société.



5 /Les concepts de base de l'étude

Enfants qui travaillent:

Selon la définition internationale, le travail représente «toute activité économique même si cette activité est au sein de la famille et sans rémunération, car elle peut à terme avoir des impacts sur les composantes de la vie de l'enfant, et même affecter le développement physique et psychologique »3.

En fait, les enfants sont obligés de tourner vers le marché de travail à leurs jeunes âges de 9 à 15 ans, sachant qu'ils peuvent subir des pressions sur le lieu de travail qui varient selon le type et les conditions de travail, l'employeur et son niveau de satisfaction , la rémunération et la relation avec les collègues.

Cela à des répercussions sur le développement psychologique de l'enfant vu qu'à cet âge il est censé être protégé par la famille avec ce qu'elle représente comme affection, jeu plaisir de vie mais aussi par l'école avec son côté éducation, apprentissage et vie sociale afin développer ses capacité intellectuelle et psychique.

Le concept de pauvreté, de marginalisation et d'exclusion

La pauvreté est l'un des concepts les plus tristes que le monde et les penseurs cherchent à établir en construisant une économie équitable pour un État juste. Cependant, à mesure que le système impérialiste empirait, la conscience des pauvres diminuait, comme le disait «Kafka France»5 qui considérait aussi que « La vie est la guerre : Guerre avec vous-même, guerre avec votre situation et une guerre avec les idiots qui ont créé ces conditions ». Dans ce même contexte, Noam Chomsky a dit que la pauvreté n'existe pas, il n'y a qu'un système défaillant dans la gestion des ressources du pays6.



Dans les pays arabes en particulier Tunisie, on constate la prévalence de la pauvreté dans certaines régions, de sorte que l'enfant peut mourir froid. Ainsi, les pauvres, comme l'a dit le poète Muzaffar al-Nawab, sont devenus un cadavre d'où vous vouliez le soutenir.

Il convient de noter le nombre élevé d'enfants pauvres dans le monde. Selon les statistiques de l'UNICEF": Il y a actuellement 150 millions d'enfants vivant dans une pauvreté multidimensionnelle, sans accès à l'éducation, à la santé, au logement, à la nutrition, à l'assainissement ou à l'eau potable.

Ce nombre représente une augmentation de 15% par rapport aux niveaux de pauvreté avant la pandémie de Covid-19 »⁷.

Le Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance (UNICEF) a également confirmé que le taux de pauvreté en Tunisie est passé à 25 % ⁸, ce qui est considéré comme une quarantaine complète, contre 19 % avant le déclenchement de la pandémie. Elle a souligné que la proportion d'enfants tunisiens vivant dans la pauvreté était passée à 900 000, contre 685 000 enfants avant la quarantaine^{8"}

Selon le ministère des Affaires sociales, le taux de travail des enfants a atteint 7,9% . En effet les statistiques de 2017 nous montrent que Le nombre de rapports relatifs au travail des enfants a doublé, passant de 8272 en 2009 à 17506 en 2020⁷.

Dans ce contexte particulier, l'acteur social a toujours connu l'exclusion et la marginalisation des politiques de développement de l'État, ce sur quoi la Chicago School of Sociology s'est concentrée, notamment en termes de formes multiples de marginalisation, de marginalisation sociale et d'exclusion,



Le terme «marginal» n'apparaît chez le sociologue Robert Park qu'en 1928, en plus des études de nomenclature de Goffman (La maladie de l'esprit) et des études d'Outsiders Becker en 1963 9.

Le terme marginalisme a pris une dimension scientifique avec les savants de la Chicago School et apparaît sur tous les groupes sociaux avec une minorité numérique et culturelle qui vivent d'une manière qui s'exprime sous une forme ou une autre à un autre déviant pour des raisons de race, ethnicité, linguistique ou religieux, ou pour des raisons de nature économique10.

Il convient de noter que «chaque domaine marginalisé a un domaine, tout comme chaque domaine a marginalisé des personnes11».

Le travail des enfants en Tunisie affecte la santé psychologique et la vie future de l'acteur social, "en particulier avec la propagation de l'exclusion, de la marginalisation, des inégalités et de l'exclusion qui se traduit par une société parallèle ou un large secteur d'activités informelles et instables. Gains, intérêts et hégémonie ainsi que l'individu se retrouve victime de la situation marginale12"

La marginalisation économique est principalement liée au refus de participation au marché productif (chômage) ou au refus de participation au marché de consommation (pauvreté)13.

En résumé, le phénomène du travail des enfants fait référence à leur exploitation dans toute forme de travail qui les prive de leur enfance, entrave leur capacité à s'inscrire à l'école laissant aussi un impact mental, physique, social ou moral négatif sur les enfants.

I/Travail des enfants en Tunisie



Bien que la Tunisie soit considérée comme l'un des premiers pays à signer les conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail n° 138 de 1973 relatives à l'âge minimum d'admission à l'emploi et la convention n° 182 de 1999 concernant l'interdiction de toutes formes de travail des enfants. Malgré cela les enfants sont encore forcés de rejoindre le marché du travail et ils sont obligés de quitter l'école.

On constate, à travers les statistiques récentes de l'Institut National de la Statistique, l'augmentation du taux de travail des enfants en Tunisie suite à la pandémie Covid19, qui est mis en évidence dans le tableau suivant:

Tableau 1: travail des enfants en Tunisie selon l'année et l'âge.

Année	2010	2017	2020
Nombre	120 milles	155 milles	215 milles
Age	Entre 5 et 17 ans		

Institut national de la statistique Tunisie 2020

On remarque à travers ce tableau que le pourcentage de travail des enfants en Tunisie a augmenté de 95 000 entre 2010 et 2020, ce qui signifie qu'il a doublé pendant 10 ans. Cela est dû aussi à la détérioration de l'économie tunisienne post révolution 14 janvier 2011. Cette situation s'est aggravée suite à la crise sanitaire Covid 19 qui a touché la Tunisie comme tous les autres pays du monde ce qui a conduit par conséquent, à l'augmentation de la mendicité et le travail des enfants.

L'Institut national des statistiques a également souligné en 2020 que le pourcentage de travail des enfants varie en fonction de l'âge, ce qui est mis en évidence dans le tableau suivant :



Tableau 2 : travail des enfants selon l'âge, pour l'année 2020

Age	Nombre	Totale
Moins de 16 ans	179 milles	
Plus que 16 ans	34 milles	215 milles

Institut national de la statistique Tunisie 2020

On note à partir de ce tableau que le taux de travail des enfants de moins de 16 ans est élevé en Tunisie, soit plus de 75%. Sachant que le travail de cette tranche d'âge est criminalisé par la loi.

Cependant, les domaines de travail des enfants varient, ce qui est mis en évidence dans le tableau suivant:

Tableau 3 : travail des enfants selon les domaines

Métiers	Nombre	Total
secteur agricole	107 milles	
Domaine de commerce	46 milles	
Domaine de l' industrie	30 milles	
Autre	32 milles	215 milles

Institut national de la statistique Tunisie 2020

On remarque à travers ce tableau que le pourcentage de travail des enfants dans le secteur agricole est le plus élevé. En effet, environ la moitié du travail total des enfants est employée dans l'agriculture et 20% dans le domaine du commerce, en particulier dans les zones frontalières. Cependant le pourcentage de travail des enfants dans l'industrie représente environ 15% du total. Dans ce contexte précis, l'Institut national des



statistiques a indiqué que «plus de 136 000 enfants travaillent dans des métiers dangereux»¹³.

Vu les difficultés économique et sanitaire difficiles, l'enfant devient de plus en plus opprimé, comme l'a confirmé le sociologue Jean Labbens, qui disait que «les pays du tiers monde, sont plus opprimés que les pays capitalistes, parce que l'impérialisme mondial ronge les peuples pauvres pour sucer leur sang dans le but de faire fonctionner leurs machines industrielles »¹⁴. Cela a conduit à l'émergence d'une classe sociale non structurée dans le Tiers-Monde", qu'il appelle aussi la classe des gens misérables à la recherche de leur « pain »¹⁵, que les capitalistes exploitent en les employant à des travaux dangereux.

Concernant la répartition géographique du travail des enfants en Tunisie, le ministère des Affaires sociales affirme que le nombre des enfants qui travaillent diffère selon les régions de la République, ce qui est mis en évidence dans le tableau suivant :

Tableau 4 : Travail des enfants selon la répartition géographique en Tunisie

Régions	Nombre	Total
Nord-ouest	55 milles	215 milles
Grand Tunis	50 milles	
Sud Est	40 milles	
Sahel	37 milles	
Autres régions	33 milles	

Institut national de la statistique en Tunisie 2020



On remarque à partir de ce tableau que le taux de travail des enfants est élevé, surtout dans le nord-ouest, puisqu'il a atteint environ 27,7 %, majoritairement dans le secteur agricole, suivi de plus de 25 % dans la région du Grand Tunis, en particulier dans l'industrie. Alors que 20 % sont dans le sud de la Tunisie, en particulier dans le commerce. Ces chiffres confirment que le pourcentage de travail des enfants est élevé, en particulier dans le secteur agricole, le commerce et l'industrie. Cependant, il est frappant de constater qu'un pourcentage important est employé dans des travaux dangereux, qui affectent la santé mentale et l'éducation des enfants .

Comment le travail des enfants affecte-t-il la santé mentale et l'éducation en Tunisie?

II Implications psychologiques et éducatives

1/ Implications psychologiques

Les répercussions sont le résultat d'un travail, par exemple dans le travail de l'enfant lorsqu'il effectue un travail pénible qui lui inflige des dommages psychologiques, surtout lorsqu'il est recruté et exploité dans la contrebande et le commerce interdit.

On remarque d'après les enquêtes sur terrain que les enfants qui travaillent souffrent des problèmes psychologiques comme le montre le tableau suivant:

Tableau 5 : pourcentage des enfants travailleurs atteints maladie psychologie

	Pourcentage
Enfants avec problème psychologique	55%
Enfants sans problème psychologique apparente	45%
Total	100%



Une étude de terrain

D'après ce tableau les résultats nous montrent que 55% , donc plus ce que la moitié des enfants qui travaillent sont atteints par des maladies psychologique. Cela confirme les effets néfastes de travail sur la psychologie de l'enfant.

En effet, l'enfant qui est exploité économiquement, quitte l'école pour travailler ce qui provoque des dépressions, introversions et la vieillesse.¹⁵

L'enfance est fondamentalement l'étape où de nombreux besoins doivent être satisfaits (le besoin de manger, de jouer, de prendre soin, de réconforter ...), «L'enfant a un monde spécial dans lequel il a ses propres capacités psychologiques, sociales et physiques, appuyer par la présence de la famille qui lui apporte tendresse, gentillesse et protection »¹⁶.

«Parmi les dommages psychologiques que les enfants subiront du fait de l'exploitation, de l'effort et de l'épuisement du fait du travail et du manque de stabilité psychologique pour eux comme leurs pairs qui ne travaillent pas, se trouvent les effets psychologiques »¹⁷. En raison de la perte de leur enfance et de la capacité de se bâtir un véritable avenir en étudiant dans les écoles et les universités, ils ont perdu leurs droits humains les plus fondamentaux.

« Il existe des statistiques indiquant que les filles qui travaillent dans des conditions difficiles, vivent loin du domicile familial, et qu'il est quasiment interdit d'entrer en contact avec leurs familles et amis, elles sont aussi parfois victimes d'abus physiques, psychologiques et sexuels, et tout cela menace l'équilibre psychologique et social»¹⁸. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé a signalé que les enfants qui travaillent en Tunisie,



par exemple, souffrent de symptômes graves, dont les plus importants sont la dépression, l'introversion et le vieillissement prématûre.

Selon les statistiques de l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT), « d'après les données fournies par divers pays, environ 73 millions d'enfants de 10 à 14 ans sont considérés comme des travailleurs permanents. Leur âge varie de 5 à 14 ans, et plus du double. Ce nombre, soit environ 250 millions d'enfants, exercent actuellement divers métiers. »¹⁹ Le travail des enfants n'est plus un problème particulier dans les pays en développement, mais s'est étendu aux pays industrialisés d'Europe, d'Amérique et d'autres pays.

« Ainsi, nous constatons que 370 millions d'enfants sont des enfants travailleurs qui exercent divers emplois, et dans le cas où un enfant sur dix souffre d'accidents du travail qui entraînent une invalidité permanente, nous avons environ 37 millions d'enfants handicapés en raison de ce grave problème à au niveau mondial»²⁰.

2/ Implications éducatives

On remarque d'après les enquêtes sur terrain que les enfants qui travaillent ont des problèmes dans l'éducation comme le montre le tableau suivant:

Tableau 6 : décrochage scolaire pour les enfants qui travaillent

	Pourcentage
Les enfants non scolarisés qui travaillent	62%
Les enfants qui travaillent pendant leurs études	38%
Total	100%



Une étude de terrain

A travers ce tableau, nous constatons que 62%, soit environ plus de la moitié de l'échantillon total, d'enfants ont quitté l'école.

Cela signifie que l'enfant travailleur est privé de l'éducation sociale de ses avantages et son impact sur sa personnalité dans le futur. Sachant que l'école permet de développer ses capacités mentales et sociales en étudiant et ayant contacts avec ses camarades de classe. Cependant, entrer tôt sur le marché du travail entraîne de nombreux effets qui le privent de ces gratifications²¹.

Le sociologue Abdul Sattar Al-Sahbani dit que: "Le travail des enfants affecte négativement leurs vies éducatives, car l'enfant passe la plupart de son temps au travail au lieu de le consacrer aux études, ce qui constitue un fardeau pour lui, et lui cause de la fatigue et du stress, ce qui conduit à son tour à un affaiblissement de la capacité de l'enfant à poursuivre ses études, et ses activités et l'intégration dans le milieu éducatif »²². D'autre part, des études indiquent que les enfants qui travaillent sont incapables de se réconcilier entre l'école et le travail, ce qui conduit à leur sentiment d'anxiété et le manque de concentration. Le travail des enfants contribue également à leurs mauvais résultats à l'école ou à l'interruption de l'éducation.

De plus, la chose la plus dangereuse pour le travail des enfants, C'est que l'ignorance est répandue dans des environnements simples et peu éduqués, par manque de connaissances adéquates et de la culture nécessaire dont certaines familles ont été privées en raison de coutumes sociales dépassées ou de certaines raisons économiques, et ainsi le phénomène de l'emploi se propage comme un devoir sur les enfants²³.



Nous avons également expliqué précédemment que le travail des enfants est l'une des principales raisons de les priver de l'éducation et l'abandonner de l'école. En effet plus le pourcentage d'enfants qui travaillent est élevé, plus le taux d'abandon scolaire est élevé et moins les enfants profitent de leurs droits les plus élémentaires, à savoir l'éducation, malgré les efforts de certains pays d'assurer la gratuité de l'enseignement primaire.

En conclusion, l'enfant vit un isolement social lorsqu'il quitte l'école, qui représente un lieu de pratique d'activités sociales, d'interaction humaine ,d'apprentissage et de développement .

Conclusion

La Tunisie et de nombreux pays arabes souffrent du phénomène de travail des enfants à un âge précoce. En effet, il y a une augmentation constante du travail des enfants dans les terres agricoles, les boulangeries, les travaux de construction, la collecte des ordures, dans le nettoyage des voitures et la fabrication de feux d'artifice primitifs que les enfants achètent pendant les vacances, la fabrication de chaussures et la pêche, autres que leur travail domestique. Cependant l'enfant ne peut pas concilier le travail et l'éducation, ce qui influence ses capacités intellectuelles et fini par l'abandon scolaire. En outre, il y a des effets néfastes sur la vie sociale de l'enfant travailleur et des répercussions négatives sur son état psychique vu la pression qu'il subit dans le lieu de travail.



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- Frans Kafka 3 juillet 1883 (juin 1924) en allemand: Franz Kafka est un écrivain juif tchèque qui a écrit en allemand, pionnier de l'écriture cauchemardesque. Il est considéré comme l'un des meilleurs écrivains allemands dans l'art du roman et de la nouvelle. Kafka a appris la chimie, le droit et la littérature à l'Université allemande de Prague (1901). Il est né dans une famille juive libérale et, au cours de sa vie, il est devenu proche du judaïsme. Apprenez l'hébreu avec un professeur particulier. Travaillé en tant qu'employé dans la compagnie d'assurance accident. Il passait son temps libre à écrire de la fiction, dans laquelle il voyait le but et l'essence de sa vie. Peu de ses écrits ont été publiés au cours de sa vie, la plupart d'entre eux - y compris ses grands romans (Le jugement) et (L'absent) qu'il n'a pas terminé - ont été publiés après sa mort, par son ami proche Max Brod, qui n'a pas répondu à la demande de Kafka de détruire tous ses écrits.
- Avram Noam Chomsky, né le 7 décembre 1928 à Philadelphie, en Pennsylvanie, est un linguiste et philosophe américain ainsi qu'un scientifique cognitif, logicien, historien, critique et activiste politique. Il est professeur émérite de linguistique au Département de linguistique et de philosophie du Massachusetts Institute of Technology, où il a travaillé pendant plus de 50 ans. [7] En plus de son travail en linguistique, Chomsky a écrit sur les guerres, la politique et les médias et est l'auteur de plus de 100 livres



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Psychoanalysis Theory

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Abstract:

This article is an investigation of Freudian phenomenon psychoanalysis theory. The article provides definitions of some important Freudian terms like consciousness, drive repression and others. In addition, it explains the fundamental points of psychoanalysis like the characteristics, the definition and the notion of the subject from a Freudian point of view. It is an explanatory article to psychoanalysis theory.

Key Words: Psychoanalysis, Freud, Drive, unconsciousness, consciousness, Object and Subject.



Introduction

Psychoanalysis is a science which is mentioned in the nineteen centuries by Sigmund Freud and other practitioners. Psychoanalysis is an umbrella term that carries many dependent and independent terms that all meet in the points of the diagnosis and the curing of a patient and in the reinterpreting of the social and cultural characteristics of societies and people. The following chapter elaborates and explains the basics of psychoanalysis theory. This article would answer the following questions: What is psychoanalysis? Who is its founder? How it does develop? What does it mean psychanalysis theory? What does Freud mean by unconsciousness? What are the defence mechanism? What are the themes and principles of classical psychoanalysis? And what are the ethics of psychoanalysis?

The Beginning of Psychoanalysis

The nineteen century is an age of discovery and enlightenment; it is when the first birth of psychoanalysis and other disciplines like psychology and sociology. As a first appearance of a medical science like psychoanalysis, it very quickly spreads in clinical and academic spheres¹. For instance, psychoanalysis is considered a paramount medical curing during the nineteen centuries basically with the shell-shocked patients during both the World War I and II. Moreover, it is taught at the universities as a science of diagnosis, it diagnoses mental utterances and people behavior and interactions as the unconscious impulses².

¹ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
P,3

² - Ibid. P,3.



There is such an interesting feature of psychoanalysis which is the reflexivity of human beings. To begin with, it refers to the method that through which a man or woman can get meaning of what others say and interpreting their own actions; therefore, humans are seen as meaning making machines³. Besides, the reflexivity of human beings also means that the psychological theories that are culturally based, they do not only describe what people look like but it also produces people in their own image⁴.

Freud's Life and the Schools of Psychanlysis

The following paragraph would explain the life of Sigmund Freud and the development of psychoanalysis. To start with, Freud is considered by time the founder of psychoanalysis and the theory too. Freud first believes in this science by many of his teachers and scholars of his time since they are the ones who pave the way to psychoanalysis as a science. Freud is well-educated in humanities and classical literature which support him in the learning of psychoanalysis⁵. As far as his personal life is concerned, Freud is originally a Jews from Europe; he gets his emancipation even though he suffers from anti-Semitism. Freud later on with all his studies and academic career, he becomes able to see the foibles of his society better than those who are within it⁶.

Freud is the one who states that there is a mental status of human mind that is the unconscious. Freud brings to the medical and academic field a new subject of analysis that is the unconscious; he is the first one who reveals the real definition and nature of

³-Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 4.

⁴ - Ibid. P, 5.

⁵ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 17.

⁶ - Ibid. P, 17.



unconscious and later on to psychoanalysis in general⁷. To define the unconscious is “the unconscious, first and foremost, is a term applied to the tendency of unacknowledged wishes to break through into consciousness through indirect mean”⁸, so the unconsciousness is all the messages that concerned a man or a woman and they wish to fulfill.

There are schools of psychoanalysis that are well-known from years ago. The following map sums up all the schools.




Figure 1- Schools in psychoanalysis

Source: This map shows us the schools of psychoanalysis and it is taken from the book of Frosh Stephan *a Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*.

The Unconsciousness

Freud coined psychoanalysis and basically unconsciousness. To begin with, Freud would like to prove himself as an intellectual and cultural figure and he has an inclination

⁷ - Ibid. P, 18.

⁸ - Ibid. P,20.

to philosophy and psychology as sciences⁹. Besides, psychoanalysis is a stream of psychology, focusing on creating its own vision and attitudes of the world; ultimately, psychoanalysis is created to explain certain trauma caused by internal and external factors¹⁰.

There are some special terms of Freud like sex and dreams in addition to Oedipus complex and unconscious. For example, the unconscious is a phenomenon comes from the clinical work of Freud¹¹. Freud confirms that they are three ways of saying parole: “1- the conscious, which means they are in awareness, 2- preconscious, which indicates that they are not conscious but are nevertheless available for thinking, should the person concerned need them, 3- Unconscious, which means they are repressed and inaccessible¹²”.

The unconscious of Freud has its own characteristics like it is a dynamic system. To start with, a dynamic system is perceived as a set of psychological forces that are responsible of repression¹³. This feature of the unconscious as a dynamic system leads to a science called psychodynamic; it is a major of theories and therapies that are basically based on the idea of dynamic system¹⁴. Freud explains the difference by the conscious and the unconscious ideas by stating that “the former comprises the presentation of the

⁹ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 29.

¹⁰ - Ibid. P,29.

¹¹ - Ibid. P, 39.

¹² - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P,40

¹³ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 41.

¹⁴ - Ibid. P, 42.



thing plus the presentation of the world belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone¹⁵".

The Foundation of Psychoanalysis

There were events and medical cases that push forward Freud to create what is called today and famous psychoanalysis. In 1886, Freud began a new adventure at Berg Strasse 19, it was a central point in his life since he shifted all his interest from neuroanatomy to the detailed clinical observation of mental functioning. The first book of Sigmund Freud is *On Aphasia: A Critical Study*, published in 1891 and it was dedicated to Josef Breuer, then Freud was perceived as a psychological contribution to these conditions. Freud was facing problems concerning patients for whom no organic treatment is possible and seeing the impotence of the current treatment. When Freud got into struggling with the suitable curing to assist his hysterical patients, he used the then-current technique of trying to clear away symptoms employing hypnotic proposition. Unfortunately, Freud lost the challenge at hypnosis and became intellectually unsatisfied with the approach. Freud was encouraged by his best friend Breuer 's depiction of the case of Anna O, which all contributed to a great change in Freud live is the discovery of ideas are the core of psychoanalysis¹⁶.

The core of psychoanalysis from ideas, principles, aims and themes would be concluded in the following paragraphs. The case of hysteria that Freud worked on led him to deduce the first basis of psychoanalysis; for instance, the patient Jones who would like to be a famous social worker, got sick by a mental state and had many somantic

¹⁵ - Ibid. P, 43/44.

¹⁶ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P 7.

complaints. She supposed to have two clear states of consciousness, one seems normal and the other is of a naughty child, she shifted between the two through autohypnosis and through which she would awake in a normal state. She would like to link her worries and her hallucinations to Breuer who was shocked once he saw that her symptoms determined once they get together. Breuer devoted most of his time treating and curing her until she assumed a hysterical pregnancy which pushed him to flee and to publish her case himself. Freud after the hearing of Breuer case, he concluded that whatever are the causes of hysteria, the symptoms themselves are both treated and abolished by using ideas alone¹⁷.

Freud had explained well that there is a connection between the ideas of inner psychic conflict and hysteria. He clarifies that inner psychic conflict is much enough to cause hysteria, he even asserted on the importance of sexuality as the feasible causes of nervous disorders and of sexual seduction in general and the reasons of neuroses which Breuer talked about and was uncomfortable about. Freud and Breuer disagreed on certain points that each of them viewed things according to his principles; for instance, Breuer believed that hysterical symptoms could appear in a hypnoid state, proposing that the division of the mind was due to pathological brain function rather than as Freud explained due to psychological conflict. Besides, Freud and Breuer published a collaboration in 1893 called *On the Psychical Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomenon: Preliminary Communication* after they released a book called *Studies on Hysteria* in 1895; yet it was the last collaboration between the two since Freud no longer wanted to work on hypnoid states and would like to focus on sexuality¹⁸.

¹⁷ - Ibid. P, 7.

¹⁸ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 8.

Freud had caused all these neurotic symptoms to sexuality and the sexual nature of the patient. He once wrote “I was not prepared for this conclusion and my expectations played no part in it, for I had begun my investigation of neurotics quite unsuspectingly”¹⁹. Even though, there was some doubt and questions about what Freud had reached from conclusions that the symptoms of neurasthenia as well as those of hysteria were caused by sexual disturbance and such illnesses were consequences of heredity in the nervous system. For example, Freud concluded from his patients talk that childhood seduction is the source of sexual disturbance, he also declared that the patient verbal productions had meaning and that the psychic as well as physical life pursued the principles of determinism.²⁰

Freud and Breuer worked together on certain treatment and curing sides that were enough effective in the curing of patients. For instance, in the case of Elizabeth von R, Freud had turned to the cathartic technique, the treatment is done in 1892 and became popular in 1895, it was identified by Freud as the first- full length analysis of hysteria. Freud explained his method by “clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city”²¹, Freud reminds the Bernheim school technique and how had shown that people would recall what had happened to them during a somnambulist state and he employed the pressure technique , pressing on his hand on the patients ‘s forehead to get memories but it was a tiresome procedure to Freud and the patient but later on Freud developed himself and

¹⁹ - Ibid. P, 8.

²⁰ - Ibid. P, 8.

²¹ - Ibid. P, 8.



used the same procedure of pressure technique which led Freud to notice resistance from a patient and becomes an essential element in psychoanalysis²².

Psychoanalysis Theory

Psychoanalysis is a science that could deal with the human being and as well as with a social or a cultural phenomenon, all the social and cultural phenomenon are caused by a man or a woman due to a drive, this drive has many interpretations according to Freud so what does drive mean according to Freud?

Drive is explained by Freud differently and unique and the drive for Freud is two types. To start with, drive is a psychological concept basically employed by Freud and those who come after him, Freud defines the drive as “it is a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic”²³, the drive is that instinct which urges someone to do what the unconscious tells him or her to do, not in respect to the laws but in satisfying the desire. Besides, the drive is an actual impulse or call to do something under the pressure of the unconscious, such as there are some cases in which people are not controlling themselves so they lose all the control over things; ultimately, Freud has a second name to the drive is the experience of being compelled to do something²⁴.

As stated before, there are two types of the drive that are the sexual drive and the other drive as Freud says. To begin with, sexual drive or sexuality is a concept that sets up the theory of Freud; sexuality is pleasure and the sense of reaching the highest self-satisfaction. For psychoanalysis, it serves the sexual desires of man and woman not the

²² - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 8.

²³ - Ibid. P, 46.

²⁴ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P,46.



reproduction²⁵. The second drive is called the other drive, it is a strong drive that destructs the individual like hunger and thirst and these are classified by psychoanalysts as the ego-preservative drives. Freud mentions a third drive that is the death drive and he gives proofs of its existence and what is death drive? Death drive is a strange and powerful power that destroys whatever does not go with a human's principle and mind such as the social conflicts²⁶.

Psychoanalysis conceives those humans become objects when they encounter their drive like sex, love, and food. To start with, this process gets in the thought of objectification in the sense that these people are derived from their humanity and their sense of existence. This idea of object relation is well-explained by Laplanche and Pontalis who write "as we know, a person is described as an object in so far as the instincts are directed towards him; there is nothing pejorative in this-no particular implication that the person concerned is in any sense not a subject²⁷", the object relation is a theory that studies how the object affects the subject and becomes stronger than it in the effect on the human's mind.

The notion of a subject is discussed before by the post-structuralism and also by psychoanalysis. To start with, the subject according to Lacan means that "the person is not in control of her or himself, but is rather a kind of alienated being at the mercy of certain kinds of internal and external forces²⁸", the subject or the person in fact is not someone who is out of the universal system but he or she is a part of the system when he

²⁵ - Ibid. P,48.

²⁶ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 54.

²⁷ - Ibid P, 129.

²⁸ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 174.



or she follows the stream and becomes a docile body. Besides, the subject is a notion of meaning and actions and it is exposed to forces in the sense that they are outsider forces that work in a delusion of the subjects and Lacan names them by the big other of society²⁹.

Psychoanalysis is not just a medical science but it has other relations to other disciplines. To begin with, psychoanalysis works in the benefit of other social and cultural disciplines, it helps investigating and digging in the issue from a point that could say things differently; in fact, psychoanalysis contributes to understand social and cultural phenomena³⁰.

There are some psychoanalytic terms that proved their efficiency in the analysis of some social and cultural issues. To start with, the term repression is used in social analysis as a term that signifies the oppressed societies and how they repress their people desires. The second term is projection; it refers to the hatred of society that underlies in the unconscious of us and reveals out in the external behavior. The third term is identification; it stands for the identity that people enrolled in even though it is not theirs; such as diasporic identities which shows how much the other cultures impact on the people's identities. The fourth concept is castration; it means in psychoanalysis the lack of achieving something, in social analysis means the lack of full filing the human's desires. As a conclusion, psychoanalysis theory is an analysis of people's thoughts, feelings, behaviours, desires, and memories.

Defence Mechanism.

²⁹ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 175

³⁰ - Ibid. P, 223.



The socialization of human beings indirectly plays a certain role in controlling themselves from the outside factors as well as protecting themselves against the full force of their unconscious impulses. The following paragraphs explains the mechanisms that psychoanalysis set up to do this.

Many scientists in psychoanalysis have been defining defence which is a word that used a lot in the field of psychoanalysis in general. A defence is defined as the following “a defence is a mental action that blocks a perceived threat, this threat might come from outside, but commonly it is an internal threat”³¹. The defence works as a mechanism against all the refute actions; for instance, an idea or a wish or a traumatic memory is considered as a dangerous thing to the ego system in that occasion the defences react and operate. To explain this phenomenon from a psychological point of view, if someone is aware of the threat, meaning it is already got the alarm from the consciousness, on the other hand, if the threat is an unconscious idea to the person, it keeps the menace upon the person and once it is recognized the defence is activated against it and the reasoning too³².

Self-protection is one of the first defence mechanism that psychoanalysts talk about. Self-protection is all the time works as a basic and automatic reaction of the organism, human threat. This kind of self-protection is carried by taken some evasive actions in order to evade any threat, even though there is a risk that a threat will have an attack before it can be escaped; hence, the best idea is to provide someone self with defences in order to protect itself.

³¹ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 57.

³² - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.P, 57.

Once the defences are set up, should be permanent. These defences have advantages as well as disadvantages; for instance, one is always protected by the defences and the defences can play the role of destroying a potential aggressor, whereas, the disadvantages are the defences need to be arranged in good order which costs a lot of money and energy. In general, defences can preserve oneself and they cannot solve conflicts³³.

Defences are forms of unconscious psychological processes that prevent harming of unpleasant unconscious ideas in order not to leave much trace in consciousness. The defences and the ego are partners since they both work to mobilize unconscious defences against the elements of the id and superego. Repression is considered one of the most noticeable and known of defences and it is psychologically determined as a broad term used to stop unconscious impulse from being achieved. The term repression stands for an entity which is the unconscious idea kept out of consciousness and to the process that preserves it³⁴.

Freud focuses mostly on repression as a defensive mechanism and her daughter Anna Freud adds more ones as defensive mechanism. Regression is a defence that enables the individual to evade the facing something disturbing by protecting oneself or fixating upon the problem. Second defence is reaction-formation which stands for the reaction against an unconscious idea by doing its opposite; for instance, extreme politeness against envious hostility, and the example of risk taking against timidity and hyper anxiety.

Third defence according to Anna Freud is denial, it is a kind of defence that explained by sociologists and social psychologists as process by which people refuse to see the

³³ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 56.

³⁴ - Ibid. P, 59.



implication of their actions, it is defined too as a way of refusing to permit an idea access to consciousness. Finally, sublimation is a defence that Freud recognized as an important defence because it is a basis for creativity, the aim of this defence is that the activities that seem sublime or super good are ways to fulfill the sexual desires, as a consequence, the energy from the drives is carried politely and slightly to bring the satisfaction to the person and also to move forward in culture³⁵.

Defence and resistance are both terms connected with each other and they complete one another. Defence stands for the tools through which the mind unconsciously assures itself from the risk from within and without. On the other hand, resistance refers to the operation of defense inside the analytic situation. The proceedings of analysis involve a profound process for both analyst and patient; the patient's inner world of imagination, emotions and Sufism spotlights more on the figure of the analyst whereas the patient comes in contact with all the nostalgic memories of itself and the world around him or her. Resistance mirrors the methods by which patient and analyst arranged to evade the danger that could arise, defence and resistance are paramount in the job of interpretation since it makes a good contribution to result of analysis³⁶.

These two concepts have a historical path and they complete each other. Defence and resistance both originate from the work of Freud, he mentioned them in 1894 in his paper Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, introducing the idea that the mind unconsciously divides itself when there is a risk like unacceptable ideas, experiences and feelings. Hence, the ego guards itself against any strange up normal things. Whether these ideas

³⁵ - Frosh, Stephen. *A Brief Introduction to Psychoanalytic Theory*. First, vol. Two, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P, 65.

³⁶ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 93.

that repressed on the conscious side of the mind contribute to repression of incompatible ideas and begin to affect them, curing must be present to restore to the normal phase³⁷.

Freud elaborates more the two concepts of his theory of psychoanalysis and they get much more importance in the field of psychology. As far as Freud is concerned, defence is no more synonym of repression and it is seen as a mean to include all the techniques used to control conflict. Besides, Freud had shown the series of unconscious operations through which defences come into action; facing a natural desire that menaces the emergence of a danger situation, the ego generates signal anxiety, a unit of unconscious impacts that mobilizes the defences obligatory to prevent the menacing elements, Freud calls these four danger situations by psychic helplessness, loss of the object, castration anxiety, and superego anxiety³⁸.

The structural theory works with the operation of the three psychic agencies id, ego, and superego and the relation among them. The term of defence gets changed with the new alteration of psychology since defence no longer just mirrors the action of the ego against the banned impulse, but it contains joining of ego and impulse, a combination by which the ego won enough power to arrange the needs of the id and superego. Besides, resistance is no more synonyms with the activity of defence in the analytic situation, according to Freud, it exists five different kinds of resistance which the only three first have to do with ego; resistance due to repression, to the transference, and to the secondary gain from illness. Another origin of resistance is the sluggishness of libido which means the aversion to give up a previous method of satisfaction, a fifth and last resistance comes

³⁷ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 94.

³⁸ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 94.

from the superego, in the shape of a persistence of unconscious guilt and the urgent need of punishment³⁹.

Anna Freud follows the job of her father Sigmund Freud who explains and gives much information on the subject but Anna Freud adds more details to the issue and makes it clearer enough to most people. To start with, Anna Freud established the foundation of the investigation about the study of defenses and their development, she analyses and arranges the mechanisms of defenses available to the ego, identifying nine which are common to her father too; regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, interjection, turning against the self and reversal, and she adds another one the tenth one is sublimation that is seen as more normal than an ego function. After Anna's studies and observation of children in school and residential settings as well as child analysis, she comes to the conclusion that she puts defense and the experience of danger inside a development context. There are some defenses like sublimation and repression are available to the ego only with the formation of the tripartite mental structure whereas other defenses are features of earlier phases of ego development⁴⁰.

Generally speaking, Anna Freud sees defences and resistance in way that looks like her father adding just more clarifications and little addition. Anna Freud considers defences as mechanisms, actions that come feasible to the ego basically over almost a relatively prolonged time of maturation. On the other hand, Melanie Klein and her followers, consider defenses as a symbolic representation or unconscious phantasies which are put to a particular careful use. They argued too that from the first stances of

³⁹ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 94.

⁴⁰ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 95.

life, the infant understands and shows all experiences in terms of its relationships with other outside things which is seen as the only way to see and to know the other world. Natural impulses are shaped as phantasies of what the self hopes to achieve. Defenses contains the conversion and manipulation of representations of self and objects; Klein initiated many defensive maneuvers which could best be seen from this angle. To protect the good representation from the bad representation of the self and object, there should be a split between the things so as to evade the dominance of the bad⁴¹.

Themes and principles of Classical Psychoanalysis.

The theory of psychoanalysis centuries ago had been classical in the sense it is first interested in the most important things like; the ego, dreams, sexuality, and other subjects. Today especially in the United State of America there are many schools that become so famous about psychoanalyses and they both share some important points and they radically differ in other ones. Freud ideas were accepted by some and refuted by others because of saying that they are less useful and incompatible. The followings paragraphs would discuss the classical theory of psychoanalysis.

Freud first ideas where centered around issues that were the main focus of research investigation for Freud and his followers. The interpretation of dreams is one of the famous points that Freud talked about and still today his analysis and interpretations from patients are used as major references in many cases.

According to Freud almost all the dreams that happen to us are result of preceding mental events, dreams are neither chatter, nonsense, visitations from outside places or people, nor

⁴¹ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 95.



divinely inspired; yet, when they are studied and analysed it becomes clear to us that they are sense-making reflections of our everyday concerns. The term of overdetermination is used on psychoanalysis and it means the mental events like neurotic symptom, dream image, or parapraxis that are always caused by more than one antecedent mental cause. So, the two terms; psychic determination and overdetermination are major developed words in the interpretation of dreams⁴².

Another theme of classical psychoanalysis is talking about instinct and providing the characteristics of psychoanalysis. The article Three essay discusses the instinct and talks about mainly the sexual instinct or libido, it is a biological concept, a part of man's and woman's phylogenetic inheritance which during childhood experiences a genetically preprogrammed developmental of organizations. Besides, Kohut who is the architect of self-psychology suggested a third source of psychic energy, narcissism that went through daily phasic reorganization in parallel with libido. The Three Essays mentions also that the sexual deviations represent arrests or regressions of the new born developmental programme, which means that the sexual instinct can be analyzed into its source, aim, and objects, then each of these can be seen as developing independently of one another⁴³.

Freud gives much importance to the role of anxiety and he provides enough data about the topic. Freud had revised his theories of instinct in 1920 and the model of mind in 1923, then he revised his theory of genesis anxiety and its main role in psychic conflict in his monograph 1926 The Problem of Anxiety. Freud explains the genesis of anxiety by the product of transformation of damned up sexual energy, in other terms, it is a product

⁴² - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 157.

⁴³ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 158.



of sexual frustration. In 1926, Freud said other ideas about the topic is that an individual advanced anxiety in response to the perspective of a developing danger situation, named this by signal anxiety on the light of that the ego organized its defensive operations. The issue of the genesis and role of the anxiety had been a subject of discuss and disagreement among psychoanalytic scientists, most of scientists and schools adopted the vision of Freud that is anxiety is a motive of defense, the difference that Freud ‘s castration anxiety included both fear of genital mutilation in both sexes as well as fears of bodily injury⁴⁴.

During the 1970 and till the present days, the classical perspective has disseminated till the mid of the twenty century. This expansion is due to two reasons; accretion from within and assimilation of findings and frameworks from other schools of psychoanalysis. The first classical psychoanalysis was extracted from biology and not from sociology, its vehicles of motivation were instincts not coming from people like a mother but they are taken from instincts like sex and aggression. Many classical analysts supported Freud’s vision of analysts as scientist’s surgeon working upon an objectified analysand, Freud was not seen as an equal partner in the enterprise, the analysand ‘s ideas were known, whereas these of the analyst were kept private for him. The classical psychoanalysis is recommended to use corrective emotional experience⁴⁵.

The ego is a concept and a phenomenon that takes much debate and discussion from Freud till the recent scientists. During the 1930s and 1940s, ego psychologists were the forerunner of the classical thought, they took their ideas from Freud ‘s knowledge and assumptions especially from Freud’s major works like; *The Interpretation of Dreams*,

⁴⁴ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 159.

⁴⁵ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 159.



Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Ego and the Id, and The Problem of Anxiety. These scientists mainly focused on the majors of the ego of The Ego and the Id. For instance, the issue of the ego has been explained in various ways, Ann Freud studied the ego ‘s defensive devices stressed the threats to the mind coming from within, from the pressures and demands of the drives. The second psychologist is Hartmann who sees the ego as an organ of reasoning adaptation, Hartmann’s main focal point was about its inner workings and structure as well as on risk and other functions that are set for it⁴⁶.

The relationship between the analyst and the patient or rather the analysand is rather more conservative and secret in the previous year whereas today it gets changed. The relationship between these two fundamental persons in the structural relationship created a mood of transference from limited relationship to real relationship. By the 1950s, many patients and analysands had perceptions about the analyst that were so forcefully supported by the residues of early experiences that almost all of what the analysand and the patients said and thought about the analyst might regarded as transference and unrealistic view about him or her.

Freud wrote about the unobjectionable positive transference of analytic patient, he called it by unquestionable since it did not get inside the ongoing psychoanalytic process. Another new vision of the patient and the analyst is that recently the new schools developed a new trend toward the reduction in the attribution of authority and privilege to analyst’s point of view compared to that of the patient, it is a trend that insisted on the collaboration and equality between the analyst and analysand; hence, in these days most

⁴⁶ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012. P, 159.

of psychologists say that the analytic couple or pair than the patient and the doctor, it is in fact now an interchanging relation⁴⁷.

Psychoanalysis and Ethics

Psychoanalysis is a science that tries to show to the patient the right and the wrong thing. Historically speaking, psychoanalysis has a long history of deep-seated ambivalence about ethics, ethics are defined according to psychoanalysis as right and wrong actions, good and bad character features and other cases. Ethics are not meaning the same as morality, they both mean different things; for instance, ethics affords arguments on behalf of basic regulating standards and decision-making methods, whereas morality is a more expressive concept standing for how people think and behave inside a cultural context. Freud ‘s interpreters presented that classical psychoanalysis theory contributed to the pointlessness of ethical vision and discourse because the genuine moral conduct is not permitted. Freud ‘s comprehending of morality is in terms of superego seemingly grasps an ethical relativism incompatible with any rational method of adaptation among other competing standards that ostensibly differ systematically with changing of child development, personality type, and sociocultural context⁴⁸.

There is a contradiction between the anti-moral implications of classical psychoanalytic theory and the moral aspects of analytic practice which needs a serious analytic thinking. This is considered an important study because such a study would explain to us that how the moral aspects of psychoanalysis are not known for so long, the weakest point that was a strong point to other of the failure of Freud ‘s friends to find an

⁴⁷ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 163.

⁴⁸ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 349.



adequate approach to ethics has served as a major energetic for many scientists like Alfred Adler and Erich Fromm who broke any rank with the classical tradition, in addition to Erik Erikson, Heinz Kohut, and Irwin Hoffman who reexamined psychoanalysis largely from within , partly in order to find an ethic in psychoanalysis⁴⁹.

One of the fundamental ethics aspects in psychoanalysis is neutrality which is considered by many scientists as an essential element in talking about ethics in psychoanalysis. During the era of Hartmann, the concept of neutrality is given much more spotlight about both its meaning and its usefulness.

The term is used in writing on technique for a desirable mental state containing a combination of decently conscientious and permissive attitudes and characters that are part of an analytic listening. The term neutrality is presented as a translation of Freud ‘s term indifferenz that comes from the Latin term neuter which means neither one nor the other. The term captures Freud ‘s attention that the analyst hears with smoothly suspend attention that Anna Freud featured in structural terms like taking up a mental position close to the demands of the id, ego, and superego. As far as Freud is concerned, to be neutral means that the aim of the listening is to benefit the patient by allowing the analyst to hear the full series of meanings in the patient’s communications with little distortion and interference from the analyst ‘s own opinions⁵⁰.

Conclusion

As a summary, this chapter is elaborating the basics definitions of psychoanalysis with the role that they have in relation to humans; in addition to, it represents the kinds of

⁴⁹ - Ibid. P, 350.

⁵⁰ - Gabbard, Glen O., et al., editors. *TEXTBOOK OF Psychoanalysis*. Second, vol. one, United State of America, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012.P, 352.



drive that Freud talked about and the names of phenomena about feelings and reaction of people in the light of psychoanalysis. Besides, the article tries to speak about main points in psychoanalysis theory like defence mechanism, themes and principles of classical psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis and ethics.

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Le rôle des relations publiques dans l'activation du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé

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Résumé :

Cette étude vise à identifier le rôle des relations publiques dans le renforcement du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé, considéré comme l'un des mécanismes permettant à rapprocher les points de vue entre les deux parties, prenant en considération des énergies, des capacités humaines, des ressources de recherche scientifique que possèdent les universités, ainsi que les opportunités que possède le secteur privé dans l'exploitation de ces énergies et ressources universitaires, et le besoin de l'université d'un tel partenariat vu son importance particulière dans le domaine de l'emploi de ses diplômés et du financement de ses projets de recherche.

Le faible niveau de rendement de l'enseignement supérieur, la politique de la quantité au détriment de la qualité, et la réticence des universités à prêter attention aux valeurs de la recherche scientifique, tout cela a rendu la possibilité de partenariat un processus difficile, car les institutions scientifiques souffrent d'un déficit manifeste à cet égard, et le secteur privé a des réserves sur ses performances et craint de s'associer avec lui. Il s'agit de discuter des moyens de rapprocher les points de vue, d'œuvrer pour faire tomber les barrières et d'y trouver des solutions efficaces. Si l'état du partenariat théorique acceptée dans le passé, l'heure actuelle est peut-être devenue impérative pour transférer ce partenariat de la logique de la théorisation et des formalités à la logique de l'activation et de l'application.

Mots-clés : relations publiques, partenariat, université, secteur privé, enseignement supérieur



Introduction:

Le partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université entraîne de nombreux avantages pour les deux parties, car il assure au secteur privé, à travers les études menées par l'université en fonction du développement dans le monde de la technologie et les moyens de production et lui apporte des solutions scientifiques : l'université cherche à obtenir un soutien financier, notamment le manque du financement qui touche les universités et le manque du soutien gouvernemental dans la gestion de leurs projets scientifiques, en plus de lier l'université au marché du travail à travers ses diplômés : ils peuvent un emploi dans des institutions du secteur privé.

Ce qui se passe aujourd'hui sur la fonction des relations publiques à l'université c'est de parvenir à un rapprochement entre le secteur privé et l'université. L'université devrait donc mobiliser tous ses efforts de communication et ses programmes médiatiques afin de commercialiser ses recherches, ses études et idées scientifiques pour l'intérêt du secteur privé. A partir de tout cela, on peut soulever la problématique suivante: **Quel est le rôle des relations publiques dans l'activation du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé ?**

Afin de trouver quelques éléments de réponse à cette problématique, nous allons essayer de proposer quelques analyses constituera notre travail en trois parties :

Le premier axe : La définition du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé et son importance.

Le deuxième axe : Les obstacles du partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université.



Le troisième axe : le rôle des relations publiques dans l'activation du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé.

A/ Définition du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé:

L'Organisation japonaise pour des petites et moyennes entreprises et l'innovation régionale l'a défini comme : « Un ensemble d'événements qui englobe des recherches communes , les contrats de recherche financés, la supervision technique, le conseil, la formation technique et l'ouverture de start-up qui ont lieu en coopération entre les universités et un groupe de secteurs différents, ou entre les universités et les institutions gouvernementales et municipale et d'autres secteurs de manière à partager des informations, des visites et la participation à des événements pour échanger des idées plus l'utilisation des installations⁷⁶.

Il a également été défini comme « le mécanisme par lequel les institutions du secteur privé peuvent activer les résultats de la recherche des institutions universitaires et scientifiques et les expériences de leurs professeurs et chercheurs dans l'amélioration du processus administratif, ou la conception ou la fabrication de nouveaux produits, qui peuvent être le résultat de recherche commune. Le secteur gouvernemental peut jouer un rôle dans l'ouverture des liens de communication entre les deux parties.⁷⁷

Il a été défini également comme toute activité coopérative et intentionnelle qui se déroule entre des institutions économiques et de services de diverses nationalités, des

⁷⁶ Issam Amanullah Bukhari, Une étude des facteurs de réussite et des défis de l'expérience japonaise dans le partenariat communautaire entre les secteurs industriel, gouvernemental et universitaire, Le premier forum pour le partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, Université islamique Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, 26/25 mai 2009 ,p218.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p 218.



institutions civiles et gouvernementales et entre des institutions scientifiques dans le but de réaliser un projet spécifique (recherche, conseil, formation, chaire de recherche. .etc), selon un cadre contractuel préservant les intérêts des deux parties. Cela se fait en intensifiant les efforts, les compétences et l'expertise, et en fournissant les moyens et capacités nécessaires pour aider à mettre en œuvre le projet du partenariat ou l'activité de partenariat avec la prise en charge des parties de tous les risques qui peuvent survenir⁷⁸.

b/ son importance:

L'importance du renforcement du partenariat entre les universités et le secteur privé réside dans un ensemble d'avantages qui sont obtenus pour les deux parties suivantes :

1/Pour l'université :

Le secteur privé permet à coopérer avec l'université et joue un rôle important pour faire avancer la recherche scientifique et l'enseignement universitaire sur la bonne voie. Cela est représenté dans ce qui suit :

L'industrie fournit à la recherche scientifique de nouveaux sujets issus de la réalité scientifique existante. La véritable recherche scientifique est celle qui cherche des problèmes proches de sa réalité, cela crée chez le chercheur le désir et le sérieux qui sont l'une des caractéristiques de la recherche et contribue également à enrichir le processus d'apprentissage à l'université grâce à l'élaboration de plans et de programmes éducatifs en fonction des besoins pratiques et scientifiques existants et à la réalité industrielle qui

⁷⁸ Abdel-Wahab djouda Abdel-Wahab El-Hayes, Partenariat communautaire dans la recherche scientifique et ses défis dans le Sultanat d'Oman, Le premier forum de partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Université islamique, 25/26 mai 2009, p191.

prévaut dans la société. Il s'efforce également de former une génération de diplômés familiarisés avec la réalité des futurs travaux.

Ce qui met les expériences académiques universitaires en contact permanent avec les expériences pratiques dans les institutions et les entreprises.⁷⁹

Le partenariat fournit à l'université un soutien financier pour le développement des capacités humaines et de laboratoire, car la recherche scientifique nécessite des fonds énormes pour acheter des équipements, développer des capacités humaines et de laboratoire, et employer les chercheurs nécessaires. Il améliore son exploitation qui se limite à l'étude des problèmes théoriques soulevés dans les livres et les recherches publiées Par conséquent, la coopération avec les institutions industrielles et les entreprises pour résoudre leurs problèmes et améliorer leurs performances, conduira à l'exploitation de ces potentiels pour une exploitation appropriée au service du développement national. Cela conduit à une augmentation de la position de l'université dans la communauté et à la prise de conscience des individus de son importance et de sa mission : Ils ressentent le besoin de lui apporter un soutien matériel et moral, ils sollicitent conseils et adoptent les résultats de ses recherches⁸⁰.

2/Pour le secteur privé.

⁷⁹ Jamal Ali Al-Dahshan, les universités et Service de l'industrie : réalité et perspectives d'avenir Un document de travail présenté à la première conférence scientifique pour la commercialisation de la recherche universitaire appliquée intitulé : La recherche scientifique au service de l'industrie, 7/8 octobre 2009, Université de Menoufia,p 06.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p 06.

Si le partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université contribue à faire avancer la roue de la recherche scientifique et son développement, il est en même temps au service du secteur privé à travers :

Le bénéfice des résultats de la recherche appliquée menée dans les universités liées aux domaines productifs des organisations du secteur privé et en tirer profit pour créer de nouveaux produits, de nouvelles méthodes de travail ou développer des produits anciens. La coopération conduit également à réduire la dépendance à l'égard des importations technologie étrangère en réduisant les dépenses et en augmentant le rendement économique du secteur privé. En plus d'améliorer le niveau de service et de maintenir le niveau existant et l'accélération de mise en œuvre selon les spécifications et au coût le plus bas possible tout en obtenant le bénéfice économique requis afin d'obtenir un rendement supplémentaire qui n'était pas obtenu par les méthodes traditionnelles⁸¹.

C/ les exigences du partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université.

L'activation du partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université nécessite la fourniture des éléments suivants⁸² :

- ✓ l'autonomie de l'université : l'université ne peut devenir innovante et réactive que si elle est dotée d'une autonomie où le gouvernement peut guider les universités à travers des règles générales , définir des objectifs de politique

⁸¹ Sami Morad : Façons d'activer le partenariat entre les universités et le secteur privé et leur rôle dans le développement du développement administratif au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, Conférence sur le développement administratif à la lumière des défis économiques, 22/24 novembre 2016,p 09.

⁸² Ahmed bin Muhammad Naqadi, Muhammad Mustafa Al-Bann , Le rôle de l'échange de connaissances dans l'activation du partenariat communautaire : une stratégie suggérée, Forum de partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique : recherche scientifique et échange de connaissances à l'Université islamique Imam Muhammad bin Saud, 22/23 avril 2013, pp. 25-26.

éducative et des mécanismes de financement et fournir des incitations pour les activités de recherche et d'innovation en se débarrassant de la bureaucratie gouvernementale tout en soumettant l'université à la responsabilité institutionnelle de la société pour les résultats de son travail.

- ✓ Permettre à l'université de mieux répondre et plus rapidement aux besoins du marché et que le développement de relations de partenariat stimule les processus d'échange de connaissances avec le secteur privé : cela fait partie des engagements de l'université envers la société.
- ✓ Impliquer le secteur des entreprises dans le processus d'élaboration des programmes d'enseignement et de mise en place de programmes de formation professionnelle continue en adéquation avec les besoins du secteur des entreprises, pour activer le partenariat institutionnel avec le secteur privé et chercher à intégrer les chercheurs et les étudiants de ce secteur.
- ✓ La participation du secteur privé à la proposition et à la mise en œuvre des résultats de la recherche et à l'établissement de projets de recherche communs.
- ✓ La mise en œuvre d'une stratégie de communication à grande échelle avec le secteur privé et mettre en place un certain nombre d'événements pour confirmer l'engagement des universités envers le partenariat, tels que la tenue de forums, de séminaires, de panels de discussion...etc.
- ✓ L'université devrait disposer de capacités de recherche suffisantes pour mener une coopération créative avec le secteur privé, en plus des éléments d'infrastructure requis tels que des bureaux de transfert de technologie, l'élaboration de politiques liées aux licences et aux droits de propriété



intellectuelle en particulier et les incitations nécessaires pour encourager les universitaires à procédures complètes de brevet.

D/Images et formes de partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université.

Il existe différentes formes de partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université : elles sont les suivantes⁸³:

Consultations : Ce type de partenariat prend deux formes :

La forme formelle, comme les entreprises industrielles passant des contrats de consultation avec des universités dans des domaines de recherche spécifiques en échange de salaires convenus, tandis que la nature informelle se fait individuellement entre les chercheurs des universités et les entreprises industrielles.

Application pratique, développement de l'élaboration des programmes et cours de formation et enseignement continue : Cela se fait en autorisant aux étudiants universitaires de s'appliquer concrètement en entreprise, visites scientifiques d'entreprises, participation d'organisations du secteur privé à des ateliers ou à des conférences pour développer des programmes et des cours.

Partenariat de recherche et centres de recherche : Mener des contrats de partenariat dans des projets appliqués et de recherches communes entre les deux parties dans le but de transférer les connaissances des départements et laboratoires universitaires à une application pratique dans le secteur des entreprises pour suivre le rythme des dernières technologies.

⁸³ Sami Morad, Ibid. p 12.

Octroi de licences pour exploiter les droits de propriété intellectuelle et les brevets : les universités accordent des licences aux entreprises industrielles le droit d'exploiter les brevets et la propriété intellectuelle générés dans les universités afin de développer la créativité et de produire de nouveaux produits.

Incubateurs technologiques : L'université se met au service et fournit, une expertise, des équipements et des installations à ceux qui souhaitent établir des installations sous tutelle technique et administrative, et bénéficient de ces incubateurs : porteurs d'idées de projets TIC (technologie d'information et de la communication), diplômés d'universités avec les spécialisations appropriées porteurs de projets et d'idées qui coulent dans ce domaine et visent à adopter des créateurs et des innovateurs et à transformer leurs idées et projets d'un simple modèle de laboratoire à la production et l'investissement.

Soutien aux étudiants : Par le biais de certaines entreprises offrant des bourses, des prix financiers et des prêts sans intérêt on peut aider les étudiants qui se spécialisent dans les domaines qui les intéressent.

Chercheur externe : les entreprises offrent aux étudiants diplômés la possibilité de faire leurs recherches dans l'entreprise en tant que chercheurs externes pour des périodes limitées sous la supervision de professeurs d'université dans des recherches intéressant l'entreprise, un expert de l'entreprise peut participer à la supervision de la recherche.

Bourses ouvertes: Les entreprises offrent des bourses ouvertes de petits montants aux professeurs spécialisés dans les disciplines vitales qui les concernent aux départements scientifiques intéressés à les développer dans les universités.



Subventions en nature aux universités : Les entreprises offrent des équipements et des appareils en cadeau aux universités sans frais ni frais pour les universités, et les subventions sont déduites de l'impôt sur les sociétés.

Centres de consultation privés : Certaines universités autorisent la faculté à établir des centres de consultation spéciaux pour employer des étudiants diplômés en recherche au service du secteur privé.

Centres de recherche : Certaines grandes entreprises créent des centres de recherche ou des laboratoires dans des universités qui portent leur nom et sont sous la direction de l'université.

Le deuxième axe : Obstacles au renforcement du partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université

Il existe certains obstacles et difficultés qui s'opposent à la réalisation d'un partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université. Certains d'entre eux sont pris en charge par l'université, et d'autres sont prises en charge par le secteur privé. Cela peut être résumé comme suit:

1-La croyance dominante selon laquelle la recherche scientifique relève de la responsabilité de l'État.

Il existe une croyance prévalant dans la plupart des pays arabes que la recherche scientifique est la responsabilité de l'État seul. Les universités en Algérie sont toutes gouvernementales, ce qui suggère que la responsabilité a été placée sur l'État, mais la question est plus grande que cela. La recherche scientifique c'est une question complexe



de nature différente : elle se diffère d'autre domaine ce qui rend l'État incapable de faire progresser, seule, ce secteur vital, car les universités ne peuvent pas soutenir seules tous les projets de recherche⁸⁴.

2/Manque de conviction quant à l'importance du partenariat.

Il y a certaines entreprises au niveau du secteur privé qui ne sont toujours pas convaincues de l'importance du partenariat en raison de son coût financier parce qu'elle n'est pas rentable et conduit à la dispersion des efforts de l'entreprise, et son intrusion dans ce qui est inutile et n'en connaît pas la fin⁸⁵.

3/ Manque de confiance du secteur privé dans les résultats de la recherche scientifique arabe.

Dans les pays arabes, les gens ne font pas confiance à tout ce qui est local. Le produit qui porte une marque étrangère a un avantage sur le même produit qui porte la même marque, mais il est local, et cela s'applique au reste. Les recherches scientifiques dont les résultats sont annoncés de l'intérieur de notre pays n'ont pas une valeur et ceux de l'étranger, dont ils nous ont été exportés sont considérés comme postulats les plus importants dans ce domaine même si certains travaux de recherche arabes ont été bien accueillis à l'étranger et ont fait un succès⁸⁶.

⁸⁴ Salem ben Mohammed Al-Salem, Recherche scientifique dans le domaine des études de l'information : une étude des défis auxquels sont confrontés le partenariat communautaire, Journal of King Fahd National Library, Volume 17, Numéro (2), 2011, p15

⁸⁵ Ibid. p 16.

⁸⁶ Mohammed Oqla Abu Ghazaleh, La réalité de la recherche scientifique et le rôle du partenariat communautaire dans celle-ci : problèmes et solutions, Le premier forum de partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la

4/Manque de mesures incitatives pour encourager le partenariat.

L'absence d'incitations ou de gains tangibles ou de récompenses monétaires ou morales qui motivent le secteur privé à s'associer fait partie des facteurs qui constituent un défi au partenariat, ce qui peut entraîner une réticence à coopérer, et peut-être parmi les raisons de cette réticence est l'échec toucher les besoins réels du secteur privé par l'université, en particulier la recherche appliquée d'intérêt pour les secteurs industriels et productifs, car aborder les problèmes réels auxquels le secteur privé est confronté le motive à soutenir et financer la recherche, malheureusement, le bénéfice souhaité de la majorité des projets de recherche proposés est faible car il s'agit de recherches purement théoriques, étudient des cas restreints ou ne contribuent pas efficacement au développement national⁸⁷.

5/Manque de coordination entre l'université et le secteur privé.

Les entreprises industrielles des pays occidentaux se distinguent par leur communication continue et efficace avec les centres de recherche scientifique, tandis que dans les pays arabes, ce qui distingue nos secteurs productifs est leur isolement des universités et des centres scientifiques, et leur contentement des marques importées. Selon des études, les institutions de recherche éprouvent beaucoup de problèmes: aucune relation entre l'université et le champ de production, en plus de la non-participation des grandes entreprises aux dépenses de la recherche scientifique. Les universités arabes souffrent d'une séparation presque complète entre eux et les et la pratique loin des salles

recherche scientifique au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, Université islamique Imam Mohammed ben Saud , 25/26 mai 2009,p 329.

⁸⁷ Salem ben Mohammed Al-Salem,Obstacles de partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique Le premier forum pour le partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, Université islamique Imam Muhammad bin Saud , 25/26 mai 2009,p141

d'enseignement et des laboratoires. La recherche menée à l'université dans les salles d'enseignement n'est qu'une recherche individuelle de professeurs essayant de produire scientifiquement dans le but de promouvoir, de publier ou de se faire connaître : ce sont des recherches qui ne peuvent résoudre les problèmes de la société⁸⁸.

6/Réticence à impliquer les institutions du secteur privé à toutes les étapes du partenariat.

Les universités n'impliquent pas les institutions du secteur privé à toutes les étapes du partenariat (planification, conception, mise en œuvre) et limitent leur rôle à verser de l'argent ou à verser des dons⁸⁹.

7/Absence de législation gouvernementale.

L'absence de législation gouvernementale qui motive les institutions du secteur privé à s'associer et pénalise les institutions réticentes. Il peut amener les institutions à interpréter cela avec une négligence de part de l'État ou sa réticence à participer au secteur privé dans les affaires de la société.

L'influence de certains hommes d'affaires peut jouer un rôle dans l'absence de ces réglementations afin de ne pas contraindre le secteur privé à un partenariat qui entraîne un coût matériel. En plus de l'absence de législation gouvernementale qui définit le concept, la portée et les limites du partenariat⁹⁰.

⁸⁸ Mohammed Uqla Abu Ghazaleh, Ibid. p 329.

⁸⁹ Salem bin Muhammad Al-Salem, recherche scientifique dans le domaine de l'étude de l'information, Ibid. p24

⁹⁰ Salem bin Muhammad Al-Salem, Obstacles au partenariat communautaire dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique, Ibid. p143,144

8/ Manque de programmes de relations publiques au niveau de l'université.

Les relations publiques sont le lien qui relie l'université à son environnement car La marginalisation de ces relations par l'université affectera négativement le partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé.

Le troisième axe : le rôle des relations dans l'activation du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé

Les obstacles et les défis précédents constituaient les raisons les plus importantes qui ont conduit au manque de confiance de la majorité des entreprises du secteur privé dans les capacités de l'université, ce qui a conduit à l'isolement du secteur privé de l'université.

L'université accuse le secteur de négliger la science et ne se soucie pas de la recherche scientifique produite par les universités nationales. D'autre part, le secteur privé accuse l'université de ne pas fournir de recherche à haut niveau, Cependant, la confiance peut être restaurée entre eux grâce à des efforts de relations publiques qui s'appuie sur la communication entre les deux parties, et par conséquent le rôle des relations publiques réside dans le renforcement du partenariat entre l'université et le secteur privé à travers les éléments suivants :

1/Renforcement des contacts de l'université avec le secteur privé :



La fonction des relations publiques dans ce domaine est la suivante⁹¹ :

- ✓ Le suivi de différents établissements du secteur privé en mettant l'accent sur ceux qui sont proches de l'université et en identifiant ses systèmes internes, en plus d'établir des contacts personnels avec la direction de l'établissement afin de savoir les difficultés qu'il peut rencontrer dans la production, le marketing et la concurrence avec un enregistrement de ces consignes dans un fichier pour le diffuser par la suite aux professeurs selon leurs spécialités.
- ✓ Délivrance d'un dossier d'information sur les responsables de la recherche scientifique de l'université classés selon les domaines de recherche dans lesquels se spécialisent les membres du corps professoral contenant un résumé de la biographie de chacun.
- ✓ -Diffuser un bulletin de synthèse général sur la coopération entre l'université et le bénéfice que peut apporter ce partenariat et le diffuser aux établissements avec l'ajout des dossiers des professeurs de chaque établissement.
- ✓ -Réalisation d'entretiens privilégiés entre techniciens des établissements et professeurs exerçant dans leur domaine de spécialisation.
- ✓ -Inviter les responsables des entreprises à visiter l'université notamment les laboratoires et les départements dans le but de renforcer le lien entre leurs institutions et l'université.
- ✓ -Impliquer des personnes qualifiées du secteur privé dans la discussion des messages académiques.

⁹¹ Vers une société de la connaissance, une série d'études publiées par l'Institut de recherche et de consultations de l'Université du Roi Abdulaziz, Partenariat entre les universités et le secteur privé en recherche, cinquième édition, Bibliothèque nationale du Roi Fahd, Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, p25.26

2/Faire des programmes pour renforcer la relation entre le secteur privé et l'université :

Ces programmes comprennent⁹² :

- ✓ -Organiser des débats pour étudier le rôle du secteur privé dans le soutien à la recherche scientifique.
- ✓ -Organiser des conférences périodiques auxquelles participent des spécialistes du secteur privé pour présenter les activités de leurs institutions aux départements et collèges appropriés.
- ✓ -Former un conseil consultatif pour chaque département ou collège de personnalités éminentes travaillant dans le secteur privé pour évaluer l'activité de recherche du département.
- ✓ -Inviter des techniciens du secteur privé à présenter leurs travaux aux professeurs et étudiants des programmes d'études appropriés.
- ✓ Former un comité universitaire qui supervise la propriété intellectuelle de l'université et cherche à concéder des droits de brevet.
- ✓ -Désigner un comité du département de la recherche pour échanger des expériences avec des universités reconnues pour leur succès à attirer le secteur privé⁹³.

3/L'université organise des ateliers de sensibilisation des propriétaires de fonds d'une part et des responsables de la gestion de ces entreprises d'autre part afin de clarifier la nécessité de la recherche scientifique et ses résultats pour faire avancer le processus de développement et qu'ils sont majeurs bénéficiaires de ces résultats recherches qu'ils

⁹² Ibid. p26.27

⁹³ Mohammed Uqla Abu Ghazaleh, Ibid. p 339

soutiennent car ils sont partenaires de sa mise en œuvre, ce qui facilite le processus d'inscription dans leurs budgets des éléments liés au soutien des projets de recherche scientifique.

4/Inciter les professeurs à passer leur congé dans l'industrie et fixant des instructions dans chaque université pour organiser cela et les exhortant à passer le semestre d'été dans une entreprise industrielle et à financer le travail du professeur de l'industrie, et à profiter de la période estivale pour développer des projets communs afin d'obtenir des financements auprès des autorités compétentes, considérer le travail dans l'industrie comme équivalent au travail universitaire en termes d'années d'expérience et donner quelques points lors de la promotion pour travailler avec l'industrie⁹⁴.

Conclusion

De ce qui précède, nous concluons que malgré les différents objectifs et orientations entre le secteur privé et l'université, tous deux ont besoin de ce partenariat en raison des avantages qu'il procure aux deux parties.

-L'université se bénéficie du partenariat avec le secteur à travers un soutien financier pour sa recherche scientifique, ses équipements et l'emploi de ses diplômés. Le secteur privé est considéré ainsi comme un terrain fertile pour mettre en œuvre ses recherches pratiques ou appliquées.

-Le secteur privé se bénéficie de ce partenariat à travers des extrants de l'université que ce soit en termes de cadres qualifiés ou de recherche scientifique qui contribue au développement de la production.

⁹⁴ Jamal Ali Al-Dahshan, Ibid. p15

-La diversité des formes de partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université varie, allant des consultations, de la recherche appliquée, des pépinières d'entreprises, des bourses...etc.

-Il existe de nombreuses difficultés et obstacles qui empêchent l'établissement d'un partenariat entre le secteur privé et l'université, pour les surmonter, l'université devrait intensifier ses efforts de relations publiques dans ce domaine afin de présenter ses différentes spécialités, compétences et réalisations dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique et de se montrer avec une bonne image aux yeux des établissements privés.



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