Reconsidering Security in Africa Lord’s Resistance Army and Human Security in Central and Eastern Africa (Uganda, DRC, CAR, South Sudan)
Prepared by the researche : Mariam Bensaoud[1]
Democratic Arabic Center
Journal of extremism and armed groups : Seventeenth Issue – November 2024
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
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Abstract
This study examines the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a human security threat in Central and Eastern Africa, focusing on its impacts on civilians and wildlife, particularly women, children, and elephants. Adopting Critical Theory and the Human Security framework, the analysis broadens the discourse on security by shifting the referent object from the state to individuals and ecosystems. The paper explores the LRA’s history, tactics, and resilience, revealing how historical, geographical, and political variables sustain its operations across Uganda, DRC, CAR, and South Sudan. Key findings highlight the LRA’s atrocities, including abductions, mutilations, and its role in the illicit ivory trade, underscoring its dual threat to human lives and environmental sustainability. The research critiques traditional state-centric approaches to counterinsurgency and emphasizes the need for inclusive, human-focused, and regional strategies to address complex security challenges. By reframing security, this paper contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of threats posed by armed non-state actors in post-colonial Africa.
Having lived a long history of colonialism and patrimonial legacies, Africa remains one of the most challenging continents in terms of democracy establishment, state building, development, political stability and above all security. As a region, the African continent from its Maghreb to its Sahel all the way to Egypt and South Africa has offered a challenging post-colonial experiment for international security. The security challenges tearing the continent include but are not limited to old security challenges such as border conflicts, armed conflicts and inter-state wars to the more pronounced and concerning human security issues. Territorial integrity and ethnic divisions are two of the most visible effects of colonialism which contribute to keeping the continent ravaged by blood shedding, crimes, illicit activities and trafficking which dangers transcend the continent. Armed conflicts in Africa have had side effects beyond contributing to instability to causing other new security challenges that put African states and most importantly Africans into danger.
The available literature on the topic is vast but mainly focuses on state related issues such as democracy, corruption, patrimonialism, colonialism, state building, identity and ethnicity management or the failure of regional and international mechanisms. Other topics covered by the scholars on the topic are illicit economies, warlordism as well as border issues or regional security. Amongst the major works on the topic are Judith Vorrath’ ‘From War to Illicit economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone’ where incomplete state building and issues of criminal justice systems are blamed for making West Africa a transit zone for South American Cocaine destined for Europe.[2] Kristen A. Harkness (2016), on the other hand, focuses on the ethnic origins of LRA and their illicit criminal activities, which she traces back to the weakness of Ugandan Army and its inability to secure Ugandan borders and population in the North due to its ethnic lines and biases.[3] Andre Le Sage (2010) in ‘Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S Engagement’ criticizes the states’ weak reactions, corruption and tribally based armies which make ethnic divisions worse, thus, leading to a growth in LRA and other armies’ strength. This had contributed to a further weakness of civilians which happened to come under attacks both by LRA as well as by the armies. Le Sage also offers an overview of the group’s crimes ranging from illicit trade and war economy to piracy, arms dealing, and human trafficking.1 Kwesi Aning, on the other hand, tackles regional issues in the article ‘Africa Confronting Complex Threats’. Aning explores the core regional issues which lead to complex security issues in the region such as historic notions of sovereignty, lack of regional hegemonic power, elitism in regional approaches as well as the rise of a form of regionalism which lacks regional values in Africa. Political and military weaknesses added to interstate conflicts in the continent serve as fruitful ground for the growth and sustenance of transnational criminal groups as well as regional ones.[4] Michelle Sieff (2008), chooses to focus on the role of civil war and democratization process on the growth of armed groups in Africa in the article “Africa’s Many Hills to Climb”. According to Sieff, beyond Africa’s democratization issues, Africa’s relations to international community which is still locked in colonial type of relations, such as western donors’ relations, also explain Africa’s failure to cope with the armed group problem.[5] Issaka K. Souara (2009), also sheds the light on democracy building issues and the violence which follows elections in African countries such as military coups and their role in growth of armed groups by building a constant state of lawlessness and instability.[6]Abdel Fatau Musah (2009), explores the local and regional governance issues in the article ‘Security and Governance in West Africa’. Musah, argues that internal governance issues in Africa such as political elitism, past clan allegiances and patronage habits have led to the growth of repression and insecurity both from state and non-state actors such as quasi states and warlords.[7]DCAF and Geneva Call Report (2015) explores how armed non-state actors function in Africa and how they can be both useful and dangerous. Dangerous in terms of the threats they pose to the stability of the state in terms of the conflicts they foster as well as the illicit activities but useful in serving to sometimes balance for the states’ weaknesses by providing civilians certain services and goods the state failed to provide. The report also examines how the groups violence pose major hindrances to the functioning of international mechanisms such as humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations.[8] Finally, Tony Karbo and McCandless in the book ‘Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader’ adopt Ali Mazrui’s new wars theory to explain the effects of globalization on security and stability in the region. The regional conflicts including armed groups come as part of a natural process on the road to democracy which post-colonial countries must intake. The globalization process, however, added to lack of political and civil rights has caused more economic inequalities than elsewhere which contributes to security challenges in sub-Saharan Africa such warlords and armed groups.[9]
Adopting the Critical Theory approach, this paper aims to contribute to the available literature on armed groups in Africa by using the concept of Human Security to analyze the security threats posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Most of the literature on the topic focuses mainly on a state approach by shedding the light on issues of geopolitical character such as interstate conflicts and state behavior which contribute to LRA development. Available studies mainly adopted a causal approach analyzing what made LRA become and what makes it survive. Few, however, shed the light on the effects of LRA activities on human security by considering subjects such as women, children or even elephants which are all major resources for LRA.
To fill this gap, this paper asks the question:
To what extent has the Lord’s Resistance Army been a human security threat in Central and Eastern Africa?
To answer its research question, the paper devises the ‘human security’ into two referral objects namely civilians, which focuses mainly on women and children in places such as North Uganda, West South Sudan, South Darfur, CAR and Congo, and the second referral object which consists of elephants. The second referral object being the subject of a major illicit and criminal activity by the armed group is analyzed both through direct and indirect referral. The first focuses mainly on the implications of poaching activities by LRA on African elephants and the second relates the activity to first referral by considering direct dangers from LRA’s poaching on civilians as well the money gained from poaching and its contribution to the group’s extended violence and crimes on the referral object I (Civilians).
This study adopts the Critical Theory for security studies as its theoretical approach. Critical of the classical and traditional approaches to the study of security where the centrality and focus has solely been on the state, the Critical Theory calls for expanding the security studies analysis and agenda beyond the state to other referent objects that can either be beyond or below the state. Established by Ken Booth (1991), the critical theory seeks to redefine the state as a mean to security rather than its end. The theory reframes the understanding of the state as the center of security to the actual provider of security which brings into center other referent objects such as citizens. Individuals are, thus, considered as an important element of security analysis of current world security challenges which traditional theoretical models failed to predict, explain and solve. Unlike traditional theories which focus mainly on the structure of international system and its security implications on the state, Critical Theory aims to engage with contemporary security problems to which it aims to develop contemporary ways of analysis far from the pragmatic and structural traditional ones as Marx Morkheimer puts it. Ken Booth (1991) one of the major contributors to the development of the critical approach for security analysis has developed the concept of ‘Emancipation’ as central to the understanding of security. According to Booth, security in its essence infers freedom from threats and dangers that would inhibit the existence and liberty of individuals.[10]
Against the Copenhagen School of security studies, the Critical Studies School calls for the politicization of security and for the insistence on security in issues where it traditionally has not been so such as human security, liberty, environment, social equality and freedom, etc.
This study falls more specifically within the range of the Welsh School which follows the Gramscian and Frankfurt School critical theory as a guideline for the understanding and analysis of security. The While recognizing the importance and role of the state, the Welsh School calls for the broadening of our understanding of security and for the consideration of other referent objects than the state. The Welsh School goes against Copenhagen’s arguments for desecuritization, given that it would leave security as a concept and a practice under the monopoly of a political elite which has so far not proved any useful in providing security in practical and real terms to common individuals, overall livelihood and wellbeing. The critical scholars, are thus, set to represent those referent objects that have been absent in the representation, framing and discourses of security by reframing security, or more rightly by freeing its borders.[11]
One of the conceptual pillars to Critical Theory for security analysis is Human Security. The concept basically refers to the security and freedom of individuals from all harms and threats. It is however, not limited to humans but also occasionally used to refer to broader areas which come below or above the state level such as society, culture and environment. There are basically three major explanations for human security, two of which are said to be narrow while the other referred to the broadeners of the concept. The first definition adopted by scholars such as Alston (1992), Lauren (1998) and Morsink (1998) refers to natural rights and the rule of law which refer to the fundamental liberal understanding of individual rights including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The second definition which has been established by international advocates of human rights such as Bootros Ghali (1992), Moore (1996) and the UN in its resolutions (1995, 1999), refers to a humanitarian view of security and the responsibility and rights to be free from genocide and war crimes. The third definition of the concept, also known to be adopted by the broadeners, extends the concept of human security to economic, social and environmental security and not only considers humans but also overall livelihood under which referent objects such as animals and mother nature would come.[12]
Accordingly, the concept of human security is divided into negative and positive human security with the first referring to the absence or freedom from threats while the second referring to the more positive side of not only securing but also flourishing.[13]
For the scope of this study, the paper focuses on negative human security while adopting a general view of the latter which includes elements from the three different definitions of human security. In other words, the paper does not limit human security to individuals’ freedom from threats but also considers objects of overall livelihood and mother nature such as animals. The concept is adopted to refer to threats of life and liberty from crimes against humanity not only involving individuals but also animals.
2.1 Warlord, Religion and Mysticism
Developed under the lead of the mystic warlord, Joseph Kony, the Lord’s Resistance Army group rests firstly on a complex system of belief where Kony takes a metaphysical role according to which comes the legitimacy of his lead, of the group and of its criminal activities. Joseph Kony which has proved to be a serious challenge for multiple international, regional and local operations to catch and to bring into justice declares himself as a prophet, possessed by several spirits which connect him directly to God, give him orders and allows him to predict group’ members future mainly intentions for defection or loyalty. According to Kony, he was attributed the duty of ‘tribal purification’ by God which requires him to lead a group of purified souls that can purify or otherwise kill and torture those who refuse the legitimacy of the guerilla group.[14] This is mainly carried toward the Acholi community amongst which Kony was born in 1961 before he grows to be a soldier with Ugandan People Democratic Army, from which he defects to lead own rebellious army as UPDAG enters into agreement with the Ugandan government. To keep his armed group pure, Kony carries daily mystic traditions to make new members, mainly abductees of LRA, join the pure line of the group such as the Shea oil bath. Kony also carries daily traditions of cleansing his own army members by leading prayers in evening, reciting bible and then predicting members sins and futures according to which he orders death penalties.[15]
2.2 Political Background and Development
The rise of LRA stretches back to the conflicts over governance between Northerners and Southerners following the country’s independence in 1962. The country’s ethnic and divisive lines stretching back from the British colonial time had divided the North and South over who is more entitled and who shall govern the country as an entity. This has made the country go through a series of military coups and violence. The first military coup carried by the northerner Idi Amin made the country drawn into failure and lack of rule of law. Having shut all institutions and carried targeted killings against civilians, Idi Amin increased the divide and violence in the struggle over integration. Overthrown by forces of Ugandan refugees, who were expelled during his role, and Tanzanian army, Idi Amin was followed by Obote (a northerner) who became president in 1980 through elections. Yoweri Museveni, a Southerner and an electoral candidate with Obote, believed that elections were rigged by Obote and launched a guerilla war against the government which would last for five years between his guerilla army and the Uganda National Liberation Army. Obote, however, thrown by own army in 1985 is replaced by Tito Okello who served as a transitional government with Acholi soldiers and who entered into agreement with Museveni’s Army which already controlled many parts of the country. As Okello’s army broke agreement conditions with Museveni and carried targeted killings. Museveni’s forces took over Kampala and overthrew his presidency leading to Museveni ‘s rise as president.[16]
Museveni’s rise to presidency was, however, a turning point to Uganda not in terms of the economic and social reforms and the transition he would carry, which remained focused on the South, but rather in relation to the beginning of a lifetime struggle with the North that would give rise to one of Africa and the world’s most complicated and challenging insurgency which with time would turn to a criminal group: Lord’s Resistance Army.
Museveni’s rise to presidency was met with a large-scale resistance from the North, because of his being Southerner which meant the end of the Northerners’ hold on military and political institutions of the country. That also meant the possible discrimination and marginalization of Northerners under a southerner rule. As a result, an insurgent group raised called the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) under the lead of Alice Lakwena. Lakwena, a relative of Kony, led the group through claims of magical power and through holy spirit tactics which were composed of initiation and purification rituals but with strict rules on behavior and violence. Defeated in 1987, Alice retreats to Kenya, and her rebellion leadership is followed by the rise of Joseph Kony who uses HSM remnants to compose own armed group first known as the Christian Army and later labeled as the Lord’s Resistance Army. The armed group under the lead of Kony, sets as its objective the overthrow the Museveni government and the rule of Uganda based on the Christian Ten Commandments. Unlike HSM, however, Kony’s LRA sets no rules on behavior toward common citizens and noncombatants and accordingly carries a variety of attacks and crimes while moving between Sudan and Uganda. The year 2006, however, proves to be a turning point for LRA and Central and Eastern Africa as LRA becomes a transitional armed group functioning in four countries (Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and DRC) instead of Uganda alone after being forced out by Ugandan Army across borders.[17]
It is after this event, that LRA has become a larger threat for human security across the region by carrying a variety of criminal activities that put into danger citizens, mainly women and children, as well as other creatures such as elephants which become a major source of earning through poaching activities. This geographical scattering of LRA has made it become a highly complex guerilla group which now served not only as insurgency but more properly as a transnational criminal group which built alliances with states and other guerilla groups. The complex regional context which consists of several intrastate and interstate conflicts has contributed to the complexity and growth of LRA.
2.3 Organizational Structure and insurgency tactics
LRA’s group has proved to be essentially challenging for international, regional and local counterinsurgency operations. This has been the case due to the group’s insurgency tactics and strategies and highly organized structure which allowed it to escape all attempts of defeating it. LRA has not depended on the number of its fighters which in no way could equal or exceed the number of fighters in the militaries of Uganda, AU’s RTF, U.S AfriCom and other UN initiatives. Instead, LRA developed itself into a structured organization with developed tactics that consisted of making use of very small units with small number of fighters rather than the opposite.
2.3. (a) Organizational structure
LRA functions through a very hierarchical and structured armed organization where Kony serves the highest position as the general and ideological leader. Right under Kony is his senior advisors who are assigned specific missions and positions such as public relations and military strategy. Then, comes the level of hardcore fighters which are estimated to be between 500-1000 with fluctuation depending on abduction. The members are then divided into four brigades which take care of the overall leadership of fighting. Beneath this leadership comes the field or operation units which is composed of field commanders, abductees and an officer of religious affairs who takes care of the praying and fasting. The field units’ groups are trained to split to a maximum possible level during operation while keeping a close coordination of moves amongst each other. LRA also avoids using high frequency radios and technology to avoid detection by the governments intelligence services.[18]
2.3. (b) Resilience Strategies
As for its resilience tactics, LRA as mentioned earlier has depended in its fight against governments on tactics that can ensure it can not be caught by forces. First, is the element of unpredictability and surprise as its crucial strategy for successful attacks regardless of its decreasing number of fighters. This allows LRA to keep civilians and armies in constant fear which gives it an indirect control of territory and civilians moves as most individuals would empty any space where there are doubts about existence of LRA units around out of fear.[19] The second strategy is the use of remote and strategic areas which generally consist of ungoverned and contested spaces where LRA can be out of reach for armies but in touch with other criminal groups and traders to whom it sells resources and buys supplies as is the example of Kafia Kingi enclave, Lubanga Tek and Imatong Mountains.[20]
The third important resilience strategy of LRA group is the division into very small and fast units through Central African Republic and Congo. Once attacked or while attacking, the units get scattered into very small number of fighters as small as 3 or 4 members and get scattered around different parts. This allows them to easily attack civilians without being previously detected and likewise easily scattered after attack to not being caught by Ugandan or other forces.[21]
The Lord’s Resistance Army is also known for its strategy of targeting less urbanized areas, that are given up on or neglected by own governments, as a field for their hiding and activities. Additionally, they also use coalitions with other rebel groups such as Ex-Seleka with whom they occasionally do business and occasionally fight against.[22] Another important strategy is their targeting of small targets rather than large scale attacks which allows them to avoid confrontation with Ugandan Army.[23] The armed group also makes use of small weapons such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) along with AK-47s but with the latter’s possession limitation to Unit commanders alone.[24] Furthermore, LRA also uses as a strategy the targeting of civilians which it uses as a provocation against and a strategy to decrease the legitimacy of the government. Through its surprise criminal attacks on civilians, LRA aims to pass a message to the communities that their governments could not protect them. Abduction is also another resilience strategy which has served LRA to keep going regardless of its recent years decreased number of fighters and its entering into what is known as a survival mode. The use of abduction allows LRA to fill its ranks forcefully without needing to have loyal fighters voluntarily joining its lines, which has become impossible given that most ex-loyal fighters have voluntarily escaped and most people in the region are horrified by the group’s atrocities.[25]
In line with Critical Theory and to properly understand the functioning, growth and most importantly the continuity of LRA regardless of the joint efforts that were directed against it, there are three important variables that explain and feed the existence of LRA: History, Geography and the Political Context.
In the first layer comes history and more especially colonialism which has set the region and Uganda, specifically, into a fate of a lifetime division which has so far been the evil from which all evils came to be. Up until the 14th and 15th century, the whole region is known to have been under the reign of a single kingdom. An invasion from the North, However, has made it divide into four small kingdoms known as Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Buganda. As the Europeans set foot on the region, the British ‘divide and conquer’ strategy took on furthering division lines between Ugandan South and North and the creation of identity on ethnic lines. The Nilotic speaking North was perceived as primitive and treated accordingly. Northerners were given status and activity based on their physical fitness only. The British used them for their military activity but did not invest into their development or education. The South, however, which was perceived as more of a soft community was given educational and development opportunities and considered fit for civil service. Development was mainly favored in the South of the country while the North intentionally neglected. The North and Northerners were given a second-tier status. Jobs for northerners consisted mainly of labor work. Another divide was also conducted on basis of religion, setting separate Muslims in the North and East and Christian communities in the rest of the country. The Acholi community been the major ethnic community of the North which was subjected to this British discrimination and suffered from poverty as a result of it, compared to Southern communities, would carry this into their struggle for equal being in the post-independent Uganda which ultimately gave rise to a never ending battle between South and North leading to the rise of LRA which came to attack own community, Acholi.[26]
This history not only has led to the group’s creation but has productively served its purposes by justifying its existence and fight and drawing to its lines thousands of committed fighters in its early years. This same history has fed the rise of many other rebel groups not only in Uganda but also around the region, which claim to be motivated by ethnic marginalization and division from the powerful other as is the case with SPLA in South Sudan or Arrow groups in Western Equatorial State.
The second important variable which also explains the existence and functioning of LRA, and even other armed groups if we want, is the geography of the region which offers perfect opportunities for their growth and sustenance. Central and Eastern Africa’s Large Flora and Fauna has so far proved to be a major contributor to the continuity and growth of LRA.
The region’s large amount of forests and bush areas such as claves offer convenient places where LRA can manage to easily hide and grow across the four countries where it is active whenever it is pressured by Ugandan army or any regional and international force.[27]
Moreover, is the importance of wild animals available in the region which serve as an important resource for LRA’s illicit trade of ivory which gives LRA a comfortable source of richness even if they are strained from conducting their regular business in other mineral resources such as gold, diamonds, etc.[28]
3.3. (a) Interstate Level Context: Proxy wars
The third major variable which is crucial in understanding the very being and growth of LRA is the political context of the area where it functions which breeds not only the growth of LRA but also of a network of other armed groups. The various regional interstate conflicts have given rise to a trend of using armed groups, born out of intrastate conflicts, as part of states offense and defense paradigms. To secure their interests and regimes, states sought alliances with guerilla groups such as LRA and others in complex political and geopolitical equations among the regional neighbors. Armed groups coalitions with the states and the support they earn from it, in terms of weapons, physical area, training and other benefits made them become a natural part of the regional political network making it almost impossible to abolish them in the existence of the current political regional context.
Beyond LRA, the region is one characterized by a very active and complex network of insurgent and criminal groups which build complex relations with each other and the states. Mutual intervention in internal affairs through armed groups has become a regional trend. At the center of this, is the geopolitical calculations such as the important geopolitical position of Sudan and South Sudan which has been crucial in the rise of this security mechanism in Central and Eastern Africa. South Sudan’s geopolitical position and its important oil fields make it subject to border conflicts among regional countries, this has been exacerbated by ethnic intrastate conflicts which put the states at a high risk of secession.[29]
LRA ‘s continuity as well as growth in force and capabilities is largely due to Uganda and Sudan’s rebel steeple-chasing game which has rendered both of their populations subject to multiple attacks from guerilla groups. Because of Ugandan support to SPLA which has been crucial to the latter’s ability to separate from Sudan and gain independence over the South Sudan area, Sudan has since 1990s been a loyal and committed supporter to LRA which it has used as a counterinsurgency against Uganda-SPLA guerilla group coalition. Sudan is believed to have officially received LRA and gave it a base around its Juba area. Sudan has also played an important role in helping LRA continue to exist and grow when it has been chased away by Ugandan Army. It has offered a haven from Ugandan and other forces in the Kafia Kingi enclave which besides being a disputed area, thus not allowed to be accessed by Ugandan or any other armies, is also an important point for LRA trading activities. The areas of Kafia Kingi clave and South Darfur provide LRA members access to trading hubs where they can sell their ivory and get necessary supplies.[30] Among other forms of supports that have been handed to LRA by Sudan is lands for cultivations, materials to construct their homes, hospitals for treatment as well as weapons, ammunitions and landmines which make Kony incredibly strong and almost impossible to defeat.[31]
Other regional conflicts which feed the existence of LRA and a network of non-state armed groups is the Congo conflict where SPLA guerilla took over Congolese borders to fight against Sudan. This conflict has made the area between South Sudan and DRC borders an ungoverned space which served the interests of LRA that was already functioning in Western South Sudan to expand further into DRC’s borders.
The Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, conflict is yet another source of strength for LRA. The frontier dispute among the three countries and their use of proxy groups has made these latter dominate the borders and grow in power. While Ethiopia backed SPLA against Sudan, Sudan replied by supporting LRA with whom it launched a military attack to regain territory from the South. Sudan’s support was also directed against Eritrea which responded to the offensive by joining Uganda and Ethiopia in their support to SPLA.[32]
3.3. (b) Intrastate Level Context: Failed State Building and Ethnic Governance
The other important political factor in the existence and growth of guerilla groups in the region including the Lord Resistance Army is failed state building and ethnic governance which is a common attribute of all the states where LRA and other guerilla groups have a strong hold and continue to successfully exist.
Following their independence, the states where LRA has been functioning including Uganda, CAR, Congo and South Sudan have followed similar patterns of governance which are characterized by divisible, corrupt and illegitimate politics which have proved to intentionally discard and neglect certain areas and populations. Areas where communities of other ethnic lines than those holding the power were left underdeveloped and empty from state forces such as police and other institutions that can protect civilians against guerilla groups. Targeted marginalization by theses states governments of certain populations have been an opportunity of growth and functioning for LRA which has exploited the absence of governments and adopted as a strategy the targeting of non-urbanized areas and communities that were not considered by governments as worthy of their protection.
In Uganda, for example, the North from where LRA originated and long functioned has been intentionally left alone and discriminated by the Southerner President Museveni. Development incentives and reforms targeted the South only while keeping the North marginalized. This not only offered LRA legitimacy and a cause but also a free ground where it could carry attacks and illicit activities without restraints.[33]
South Sudanese government has also intentionally kept its Western region out of its governance incentives because of the region’s Zande ethnicity which has been in conflict with the dominant Dinka ethnic group to which the president and army members belong. The government complete absenteeism in the region, even while it was under serious attacks from LRA, made the group take advantage of the area as a base. Neglected by the government, while the East was given all sorts of institutions to protect it, the Western region of South Sudan had to develop its own community defense unit known as the Arrow Boys and which claim to have been abused by government SPLA army instead of given support in their fight against LRA.[34]
The same sectarian politics have also dominated Central African Republic which has left its Eastern area and other regions ungoverned. President Bozize’s corrupt regime could not care any less about the country’s Southeastern areas or even about most of the country. Instead, to safeguard his regime, Francois Bozize entered into coalition with UFDR rebel groups and handed them control over diamond mining regions such as Sam Ovandy. Even after his overthrow, the Eastern region has continued to be left without any governance responsibility from the government. This came to the benefit of LRA which uses the area to transport illicit ivory, gold, diamonds and also carries looting activities for food supplies from citizens.[35]
Likewise, in Congo which is an important spot for LRA activities, the Eastern region of the country has been denied the government attention and became center to military, political and multiple other crises. Preoccupied by its power transition problems, Congolese government never responded to LRA’s violence in the area and even went further to denying that LRA even existed on its territory while international community was raising alerts about the group atrocities in the Congolese areas of Haute Uele and Bas Uele provinces. Civil war unravelling the country since 2008, the unwillingness of President Kabila to leave power, the inaptitude of Congolese army due to its fragmentation by factional fights as well as North Kivu and Kaisai provinces conflicts about resources and rebels and the existence of many active local militias such as FDLR, Mai Mai and Kamuina Sapu in addition to the government’s lack of will to fight LRA made the latter have a very safe territory for criminal activities in Congo. One of LRA’s most empowering criminal activities is takes place at the Garamba National Park where it carries its elephant poaching for ivory trade and also uses the area for its general trading activities.[36]
To analyze the impact of LRA on human security in the region, this study divides human security into two referent objects namely referent (I) which is civilians with a focus on women and children and referent (II) which is African elephants subject to poaching from LRA. The referent (II) is also analyzed in relation to referent (I) by shedding the light on the indirect impact of the elephant poaching activity on referent object (I) as the following chart illustrates:
4.1 Referent Object (I): Civilians (esp. Women and Children)
Adopting as its motto ‘’kill one to frighten many’’, the Lord’s Resistance Army has mainly carried attacks against noncombatant and unarmed civilians. Its major criminal activity which is abduction has mainly targeted women and children to serve the purposes and needs of its organization. Few of LRA’s attacks has been on state institutions, officials or army. Instead, LRA has intentionally planned strategies to avoid any confrontation with the state. LRA has adopted as its strategy the targeting and attack of areas where the state presence was very low, close to absent. Its major areas of attacks have been villages, camps and similar community spaces. Besides presenting a physical threat and causing thousands of deaths, LRA’s attacks have left millions displaced, physically harmed and incapable.
In 2004, for example, LRA fighters carried an attack on Barlonyo Camp by setting it to fire causing about 300 deaths at once which made the attack be known as the Barlonya massacre.[37] In 2016, LRA also burned down the full village of Zabe causing a similar massacre.[38] LRA’s attacks on Northern Uganda, especially, which have been happening since its creation in 1986 have had disastrous effects on the Acholi community and have caused a huge displacement of the community making the area almost empty from inhabitants.[39] LRA also carried attacks against civilians in DRC and CAR while in South Sudan’s Western Equatorial region which made civilians get displaced to refugee camps in South Sudan.[40] LRA also carried attacks on catholic nuns from Latin America while on a mission[41] and attacked aid workers in Yei and Yambio areas.[42] Other multiple attacks to the four countries where it is active have been carried from the border triangle. Civilians have also come under attack in areas where LRA was extracting goods, gold and diamonds such as in mining camps in Congo’s Haute Kotto Prefecture.[43] According to the UN, an estimated 100,000 people have so far been killed by LRA and at least 2.5 million have been displaced because of its criminal activities, including 180,000 Congolese, 60,000 South Sudanese and about 80 percent of the Acholi population who either had to get internally displaced or to become refugees across borders. [44]
Besides attacking the life of civilians, LRA has also deprived many from their freedom through abduction which forcefully turned small children into criminals and very young girls into sexual slaves, mothers and porters. LRA has carried strategic abduction of children under the age of ten, as young as 5 years old, both young boys and girls to serve its organization needs and purposes. The abduction crimes of LRA have especially intensified after its loss of many fighters which voluntarily escaped following Uganda’s Amnesty act in 2001 which promised defectors to be forgiven except the LRA leader and seniors. Young boys are used by LRA to fill its lowest ranks of field units and fighters. Before abducting them LRA subjects the children to multiple practices of horror to prepare them for criminal activities. Young boys are usually ordered to kill own parents or other members of family and once taken to the organization the children are taken into of a process of initiation and integration.[45] This consists of torture on them such as beating, burning, etc. as well as ordering them to kill other children even eat humans’ flesh or else to be killed. This is conducted to disturb the children psychology and make them ready to follow all orders from Kony and carry all sorts of possible crimes under pressure. The killing of own family members is also taken as guarantee for eternal loyalty as the abductees would never be able to go back to their own communities where they can be faced with resentment and revenge killing.[46]
Abducted women and young girls serve services such as bringing food and water as well as the group’s possessions from one camp to another when on the move. Young girls are also offered as rewards to Acholi fighters of LRA or Kony himself where they serve as sexual slaves. These young girls also give birth to other children victims who are born into LRA and are subjected to a natural socialization into crimes, violence and atrocities against the outside world. This is because these children, born into LRA and having no encounter with the normal world, take it as their natural identity to be criminals. This class of children in LRA have proved to grow to be the most dangerous LRA fighters who would carry the most horrifying crimes in the most horrifying manners.[47]
According to the UN, an estimation of at least 60,000 to 100,000 children have been abducted by LRA.[48] This is only counted mainly from returnee centers which means that counting those not released would double the number. In Northeast Congo, for example, in 2015 alone abductions rose to 485 civilians.[49] In Central African Republic, 217 civilians were abducted in 2016 among whom 54 were children.[50] Between the period of 1986 to 2002, LRA has abducted between 54,000 to 75,000 people including about 25,000 to 38,000 children.[51] The highest abductions are carried from the Acholi community, from where Kony originally comes, and which is regarded by him as ethnically superior to other ethnic groups. Among the so far abducted children by LRA only 25,000 have been able to return while others remain in the captivity of Kony.[52]
In addition to its dangers on the life and freedom of civilians, LRA has also endangered their physical safety and capability through the criminal act of mutilation. The cutting of hands, fingers, noses, lips and the pulling or burning of eyes has been an LRA stamp on the region community members. LRA has conducted mutilation of many members, especially abductees, which could not execute orders as given or refused to do so. Those believed to have lied or planned to escape are also punished by mutilation to set example for others. This is also said by Kony to be an order from God to punish those who do not carry his orders. A famous event has been that of an abducted 17 years old boys to whom LRA has carried multiple mutilations, cutting his ears, hands, nose, and sending him back to his community as message. Used as a strategy of fear to make larger communities closer to subordinating to LRA rather than resisting it, mutilation has left many physically incapable and eternally handicapped, which infers their economic incapability as well given that those subject to mutilation of hands, legs, etc. find it impossible to earn a living and to carry normal lives.[53]
Another implication of LRA on civilians has been its endangering of peace among communities. Due to LRA ‘s criminal acts and its forcing abductees to carry crimes, LRA has divided many families and communities and made many of them hated by their surrounding and in times subject to attacks and revenge killing. If members and abductees defect to Kony and return home, they are faced by another phase of social, economic and psychological atrocities. Not accepted by their communities and actually resented and blamed by them for the harms they had to surrender from LRA, returnees are unable to integrate and live in constant state of blame. Accordingly, they also live physical violence and are in many cases not allowed to work. Children of returnee women have also been defined by communities as the children of evil (referring to Kony) and that they should be killed before they grow to become another Kony. These women, thus, while subject to violence in LRA return to face other atrocities where they are ashamed and have to struggle to secure children they never chose to have and which themselves neither chose to be nor chose being from LRA.[54]
It is important to note also, that these vulnerable unarmed civilians have especially come under attacks as a reaction from LRA to military pressures from state armies or other regional and international forces. The more the armed forces attacked LRA or chased it, the more the attacks came on the unarmed ones. These attacks carried with full unpredictability and surprise as well as with full atrocity have deprived civilians, especially women and children, from security at all levels. Life, freedom, physical safety as well as peace which includes their social, economic and psychological well being has been snatched by LRA’s multiple crimes from targeted killing to abduction and mutilation.
Accordingly, while LRA is fully responsible for these acts, it is also important to criticize the role of the states that have been behind this group such as Sudan which it uses to secure itself against Ugandan support of SPLA in South Sudan. It is also important to mention the role of failed counterinsurgency strategies which have mainly adopted a military approach attacking LRA while not considering the protection of civilians as an important asset for the defeat of LRA. Counterinsurgency forces by Ugandan army, African Union’s Regional Task Force as well as U.S AfriCom and UN peacekeeping did not place their forces around communities that are mostly to be under direct attack by LRA and in many occasions were not well equipped to do so.[55] Additionally, considering that LRA’s strength has been the use of non-urbanized areas where communities and regions were left ungoverned by own government, it would make perfect sense to adopt as counterinsurgency the investment in the development and infrastructure of those areas as well as the building of equal and transparent governance which considered all citizens worthy of its attention and protection with support of U.S, AU and international institutions. Adopting a non-proactive approach has made counterinsurgency operations make civilians even more vulnerable and more attacked. Issues of corruption and ethnic bias has also been a highlight in the failure of counterinsurgency strategies by the Ugandan army. Ugandan army has itself carried violence and criminal abuses against the people of the North while carrying its counterinsurgency operation in the area making the citizens double insecure causing deaths and displacement. The army not only conducted abuses such as torture and rape but also beat many to death in camps for the displaced.[56] This is mainly because of the army’s ethnic line which has been in enmity and competition with the ethnicity of the North. The army is also believed to have carried illegal extraction of resources, mainly gold, in Congo while claiming to be after LRA. This has led to conflict between the countries making Congo deny the access to its territory to all counterinsurgency forces chasing LRA.[57]
4.2 Referent Object II: Elephants (Illicit trade and LRA’s Tusk War)
Lord Resistance Army’s illicit trade has endangered the existence and security of African elephants. Becoming a major source of income for LRA, ivory has been sought through poaching African elephants in the region mainly located in Congo’s Garamba National Park. Moving into the Garamba National Park in 2012, LRA has endangered one of Africa’s most important Wildlife treasures: Elephants. Carrying at least 29 attacks against elephants, LRA has become a major actor in global illegal ivory trade. Its crimes against elephants consist of poaching, hunting and then removing their tusk.[58] According to the UN, an estimation of 50 to 90% decrease in elephant population has been recorded due to this poaching activity. This has made African elephants at risk of local extinction since the elephant killings by guerrilla groups exceeded the elephants’ reproduction rates.[59] It is estimated that since 2014, LRA alone has killed more than 170 elephants.[60] Once killed, the tusk of the elephants is taken and is traded by LRA in exchange for money, weapons and other supplies. Ivory’s cost being around $1,300[61] per pound, with high demands from Asia especially, has been an important source of enrichment for LRA and its leader who is believed to possess at least 16 pieces of tusk.[62] Trade in ivory in addition to other illegal trade activities has been carried by LRA in the three border lines between South Darfur, Kafia Kingi enclave and CAR’s Haute Koto Prefecture.[63] LRA’s war economy of trade in ivory is said to include transnational actors and international actors which come to buy ivory, sometimes with helicopter as defector ex-bodyguards of Kony report.[64]
4.3 Referent (II) in relation to Referent (I)
In relation to Referent one, it is important to consider the implications of poaching elephants on the security of civilians also. From one side, poaching attacks have directly affected civilians living in the surrounding area. While chasing elephants LRA also carried attacks against civilians which came in its way killing at least 1,260, abducting 2,842 civilians (for the period in between 2009-2013) and displacing about 440,653 individuals.[65] From another point of view, elephant poaching and ivory trade has allowed LRA to have more supply of money, weapons and other necessary materials which means the strengthening and continuity of LRA, thus, the continuity of attacks and atrocities on civilians. The ivory has allowed LRA to build relations with other transnational groups and to access illegal trade market[66] which feeds its criminal capabilities.
Based on these findings, the LRA presents an existential threat both to civilians’ life, freedom, peace, economic, social and psychological well-being, especially but not limited to women and children, as well as to African elephants.
In conclusion, this paper has analyzed the threats of the Lord Resistance Army on human security in Central and Eastern Africa by adopting the Critical Theory approach for security studies. By adopting this new perspective for security analysis, the paper was able to draw the important conclusion that LRA presented an existential threat to human security in the region including both civilians and wildlife animals. In doing so, the paper aims to contribute to the literature on security in Africa in relation to guerilla groups which only offers a dearth of attention to human security and focuses mainly instead on a state approach in treating the subject. In line with the Welsh School for security studies, the paper has opted for reframing the concept of security as one where civilians and animals are the central referent objects rather than the state. This, as a result, helps to unveil the politics of security and issues around security approaches both in practice and theory. Therefore, to guide better research and policy approaches on the issue. While security is supposed to originally mean the protection of citizens and constituents, security in classical theories and in practice has come to be allied to the protection of the state and its regimes, mostly at the expense of the security of the constituents. This understanding of security, has led to the development of approaches that rendered common citizens and the ‘nation’ part of the nation-state model highly insecure at various levels.
As the case in hand displays, Central and Eastern African states such as Uganda, Congo, CAR, Sudan and South Sudan stand as outliers to the nation-state model adopted by classical theories. Firstly, the nation states are not coherent entities and do have multiple identities that are mainly based on historical and ethnic lines which is source to serious divisions and issues. The state is also not the only actor in the region and does not have monopoly over force. Other actors such as non-state armed groups have important control over the dynamics of movement, territory and do have control over the use of force in parallel with the states. Governance is also not carried indiscriminately, and states have not proven responsible toward all citizens, regimes are rarely legitimate or representative of the “majority”. Armies and important state institutions are guided by ethnic lines and only serve to protect the state and their ethnic groups. This leaves many populations unprotected, in times subject to threats and abuse from own states armies. Counterinsurgency operations guided by military approaches and missing to provide protection for civilians, have rendered many civilians more vulnerable to the threat of LRA.
The case of LRA also highlights an important point which is the clash between the security of the state and that of the populations. Ugandan support to SPLA against Sudan for its own state interests and geopolitical calculations has rendered its own population insecure due to Sudan’s unconditional support to LRA against Uganda. Ugandan state security scheme as expected by scholars such as Mohammed Ayoub and Charles Tilly has presented existential threats to the communities of its North as well as others across its borders. The failure of all the counterinsurgency approaches to bring LRA and its leader down also raises many interrogation marks. The Ugandan state approach, for example, infers that the latter only chased LRA to weaken its Sudanese enemy rather than to protect its Norther population given its visible lack of will to provide any protection to civilians even while carrying operations.
Considering the existential threats that LRA has had on the study’s two referent objects, the paper calls for the adoption of new theoretical and practical approaches in dealing with security issues which consider the safety, liberty and freedom of non-combatant civilians, women, children and animals as central and as falling under the responsibility of state, regional and international mechanisms. While not affecting the existence of any state, LRA has deprived tens of thousands of the right to life, millions of their homes and families. It has deprived children, women and common citizens from their freedom, mutilated their bodies and conducted crimes that made them socially, psychologically and economically handicapped. It has deprived the communities from peace and instigated long term resentment, hatred and violence among close ones which require generations to heal. LRA has also been an existential threat for elephants and its crimes are drawing African elephants near to extinction due to its illicit trade in ivory for acquiring resources and conducting more crimes. LRA has turned the region into a general state of insecurity.
Accordingly, the most constructive way to security against LRA would be the consideration of alternative more proactive approaches that can tackle the weaknesses of the states in question which have been exploited by LRA to grow. Equal governance and protection to all citizens along with the investment in the development of non-urbanized areas would highly weaken LRA and would save many lives. International and regional initiatives such as those by AU and UN should work on building regional security systems and on solving the regional issues between the countries which feed support to LRA and others especially the one between Uganda and Sudan. IR scientists should also contribute to the development of such approaches by building analytical models that are close to reality than perfection and which take into consideration the imperfect world of areas still locked in post-colonial development of states. Inclusion of area studies experts and knowledge of local languages to the study of security for areas such as Africa, the Middle East and Asia would do great benefit not only to IR as a science but also to overall existence and freedom.
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[1] Mariam Bensaoud is a PhD scholar in international Relations at the University of Dokuz Eylul, Izmir, Turkiye.
Contact: mariambensaoud1@gmail.com
[2] Judith Vorrath, “From War to Illicit Economies: Organized Crime and State Building in Liberia and Sierra Leone”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (2014)
[3] Kristen Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2016, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 587-616. DOI: 10.1177/0022002714545332
[4] Kwesi Aning, “Africa Confronting Complex Threats”, International Peace Academy, 2007.
[5] Michelle Sieff, “Africa: Many Hills to Climb”, World Policy Institute, 2008, pp. 185-195.
[6] Issaka K. Souare, “The AU and the Challenge of Constitutional Changes of Government in Africa”, Institute for Security Studies, 2009, paper 197.
[7] Abdel Fatau, Musah “West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region”, International Peace Institute, 2009.
[8] DCAF & Geneva Call, “Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends and Future Challenges”, DCAF, Working Paper Series No 5, 2015.
[9] McCandless, E., and Tony Karbo, Peace, Conflict, And Development in Africa: A Reader, University for Peace: Switzerland, 2011.
[10] Pinar Bilgin, “Critical Theory”. Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Paul D. Williams. Routledge: Tayler and Francis. London and New York, 2008, pp. 89-102.
[11] Bilgin, pp. 98-102
[12] Fen Osler Hampson, “Human Security”. Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Paul, D. Williams. Routledge: Tayler and Francis. London and New York, 2008, pp. 229-243.
[13] Hampson, p. 231
[14] Dorothy Horsfield, “The Lord’s Resistance Army: Alive and Well”, Eureka Street.com.au, Vol. 25, No. 16. 2015.
Africa Journal, “Surviving the Lord’s Resistance Army in S. Sudan”, America, Vol. 20, No. 27, 2010.
[15] GlobalSecurity.Org, “The Lord’s Resistance Army”,2016.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lra.htm
Abasa Africano, “Ungoverned Spaces and the Survival of Terrorist Groups: A Case Study of the Lord’s Resistance Army”, Calhoun: NSL Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, 2015.
[16] Africano, pp. 18-20
[17] Africano, pp. 21-22
Adrian Taylor, “Uganda and the ICC: Difficulties in Bringing the Lord’s Resistance Army Leadership before the ICC”, 6 Eyes on the ICC, 2009, Vol. 23.
[18] Anthony Vinci, “The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord’s Resistance Army”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2005, Vol. 16, N. 3, pp. 360-381, DOI: 10.1080/09592310500221336
[19] Vinci, p. 372
[20] Robert L. Feldman, “Why Uganda Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army”, Defense and Security Analysis, 2008, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp.45-52, DOI: 10.1080/14751790801903210
[21] Feldman, p. 47
[22]Paul Ronan, State of the LRA 2016, LRA Crisis Tracker, 2016.
[23] Feldman, p. 47
[24] Vinci, 368-369
[25] Vinci, pp. 371-376
[26] Taylor, pp. 24-26
Juma Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda, Uppsala,
Sweden: University Printers, 2002, pp. 11–12.
[27] LRA Crisis Tracker, 2016, p. 6
[28] LRA CRISIS TRACKER, pp. 6, 7, 8
[29] IRIN, “Regional Interests at Stake in the South Sudan Crisis”, 2014.
http://www.irinnews.org/report/99802/regional-interests-stake-south-sudan-crisis
[30] LRA CRISIS TRACKER, p. 20
The Economist, “International: Africa’s Most Wanted, Uganda, Sudan and Congo”, London, 2006, Vol. 379, Iss. 8480: 64.
[31] Vinci, p. 366
GlobalSecurity.org, 2016
[32] Majak D’Agoot, “Understanding the Lethargy of Sudan’s Periphery-Originated Insurgencies”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2013, Vol. 24, No. 1. DOI:10.1080/09592318.2013.740229
[33] Pamela Faber, “Sources of Resilience in the Lord’s Resistance Army”, CNA: Analysis and Solutions, 2017. Klaus Dodds, “Geopolitical Hotspot: Uganda”, Geographical, 2011.
Charles Wendo, “Northern Ugandan Humanitarian Crisis Shocks UN Chief”, The Lancet, 2003, Vol. 362.
Kennedy Tumutegyereize, “What Will It Take to end LRA Conflict”, Conciliation Resources, 2012.
[34] Mareike Schomerus & Lotje de Vries, “Improvising Border Security: A Situation of Security Pluralism along South Sudan’s Borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Security Dialogue, 2014, Vol. 45, No. 3, 279-294.
Chloe Auletta-Young, Beth Maclin, Jocelyn Kelly, Will Cragin, “We Mobilized Ourselves: Community Resilience in Areas Impacted by the Lord’s Resistance Army”, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2015. Available at: https://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/hhi_lra_report_we_mobilized_ourselves.pdf
[35] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 16
[36] Anthony W. Gambino, “State Failure: The Responsibility to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 51-58.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43133573
“Taping the LRA: South Sudan Tries to Bring Uganda’s Rebels to Peace but not to Justice”, Africa Confidential, 2006, Vol. 47, No. 11.
The Economist, 2016
Faber, p. 17
[37] Africano, p. 26
[38] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 8
[39] Horsfield, p. 13
Feldman, p. 45
[40] Shomeros et Al, p. 283
[41] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 8
[42] Africa Confidential, p. 5
[43] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 6, 19
[44] UN Security Council, “Demanding that Lord’s Resistance Army End All Attacks, Security Council Calls for Full Implementation of Regional Strategy in Central Africa”, 6971st Meeting, 2013, SC/ 11018.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11018.doc.htm
The Resolve, “Key Statistics,” The Resolve: LRA Crisis Initiative.
http://www.theresolve.org/the-lra-crisis/key-statistics/
Africano, p. 28
Roger Persichino, “Humanitarian Situation Critical in Uganda”, InterAction, 2004,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200403090590.html
[45] M. Gustavsson, J. Oruut & B. Rubenson, “Girl soldiers with Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda Fighting for Survival”, Children’s Geographies, 2017, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 690-700. https://doi.org/10.1080/14733285.2017.1300233
Human Rights Watch, “Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda”, 2013.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/03/28/stolen-children/abduction-and-recruitment-northern-uganda
LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 4
[46] Vinci, p. 370-371
LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 14
The Lancet, 1818
[47] Vinci, 367, 368
[48] Genocide Watch, “Reward Offered for Information on Kony by Reuters, in New York Times”, 2013. http://www.genocidewatch.org/uganda.html
[49] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 4
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[54] Tony Onyulu. “Ugandan Children of Women Raped by LRA Fighters Face Threats”, Newsweek, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/2015/11/13/warlords-brood-390144.html
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Jeffrey, p. 12
[55] LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 19
Africa Confidential, p. 5
The Economist, p. 2
[56] Feldman, p. 47
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[63] Christy Bryan, “How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa” National Geographic, 2015. Available at: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html.
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