Terrorist Organisations and the ability for Rebirth after Dismantling: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
Prepared by the researche : Mustapha JALI – PhD researcher in Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University Fez, Morocco.
Democratic Arabic Center
Journal of extremism and armed groups : Eighteenth Issue – February 2025
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
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Abstract
This study, which is based on a case study of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, aims to help develop a deeper understanding of the operational, ideological, and organizational aspects of terrorist organizations after they are dismantled. This will help formulate new perspectives on how to deal with these organizations and create effective, long-lasting strategies to counter them.
The world failed to forecast the growth of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and Africa, and the world was stunned with the ISIS invasion of Syria and Iraq that transformed the landscape of the Middle East at the moment. What happens after the removal of the two organizations in the field and the dismantling of their components is a topic that has not yet been raised.
This paper argues that in spite of their leaders being killed, their organizations being dismantled, their territory being lost, and their military defeat, jihadist groups have shown over the past few decades that they are capable of resurrecting, making it difficult to determine whether they are completely eradicated or still functioning.
The emergence of al-Qaeda in 1987, the creation of the first “state” with the proclamation of the “Islamic State of Iraq” in 2006, the creation of the second “state” following the proclamation of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” in 2013, the declaration of a “caliphate” in June 2014, and the seamless adoption of alternative strategies and new command and organizational structures—all demonstrate the extent to which these two organizations can endure, reappear, and spread at various times, places, and forms.
INTRODUCTION
The threat posed by ‘Islamist’ terrorist groups is a paramount global concern in contemporary times. In recent decades, there has been a notable surge in the activity and growth of these organizations, which gives rise to a heightened risk to global security and regional stability. In order to comprehend the progression of these jihadist groups, it is necessary to take into account various historical, cultural, ideological, and political elements implicated in the emergence of this phenomenon. These factors can be examined from their historical origins to the latest advancements that have influenced the ideologies, strategies, and objectives of these organizations.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, many Western nations have made combating Islamic terrorism a central focus of their security and political agenda. The activities of Al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and its affiliates, which encompass jihadist terrorism, have significantly influenced worldwide security and stability. Consequently, we have observed notable changes in the methods of dismantling these terrorist groups and counterterrorism strategies, starting with the use of military force, along with other instruments such as severing terrorist funding, offering foreign assistance, undertaking diplomatic efforts, sharing information with foreign governments, and implementing policies to reintegrate former fighters into their communities of origin, etc.
Indeed, a multitude of factors have played a role in the progressive and transient deterioration of those organizations. Nevertheless, considering the current results, it is not feasible to definitively assert that any particular group has been decisively vanquished and eradicated permanently.
This study intends to enhance comprehension of the organizational, ideological, and operational elements of terrorist organizations following their dismantling through the analysis of case studies of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This can greatly aid in developing new perspectives on how to effectively address these organizations and establish suitable and sustainable strategies to combat them.
The term terrorist organization often refers to subnational political organizations that use terrorism, whereas the dismantling of terrorist organizations refers to the process of systematic deconstruction of a terrorist organization to the extent that it does not pose a substantial threat. This process could encompass numerous methods and measures targeted at weakening and finally disbanding the organization’s capabilities, influence, and operational capacity.
The issue we are attempting to address is what will happen to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) once their elements are dismantled and they are defeated on the ground?
And what are the lessons learnt from prior experiences in destroying these groups to avert their return? And what are the issues facing states and governments after the announcement of the repeal of these regulations?
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study is based on previous studies published in the field of security studies and terrorism studies, which dealt with the issue of terrorist organizations and counterterrorism from multiple aspects and approaches, as well as specific studies and experiences of both Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS).
Audrey Kurth Cronin’s (2009) analysis relied on selected case studies, concluding that there is no single way terrorist organizations can stop functioning. According to Cronin, “The only way to understand how terrorism ends is to analyze the dynamic relationship between all three actors: organization, target, and audience.” It follows that there is no single approach to defeating terrorist organizations. For example, capturing or killing the current leadership may destroy some organizations, but in others, it can make them more dangerous under the new leadership. It is also possible for a group to break, and dealing with shrapnel may be more difficult. On the other hand, in her study of al-Qaeda (2008), Cronin found that terrorist organizations in their last stages are often at their most dangerous state. Outcomes can range from the dissolution of a group and its purpose to the transition to greater violence.
Seth Jones and Libicky Martin (2008) conclude that all terrorist groups eventually end. They further addressed the question of how they end, considering that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. It is rare, according to their conclusions, that military force was the main reason for the end of terrorist groups.
However, Ahmed Hashem, in his study of the Islamic State (2018), underlines the key innovations in strategy, ideology, and governance done by ISIS that have led to the group’s triumphs. To better understand how the movement survives and thrives, he argues that by focusing their ideology first and foremost on extremist anti-Shiite sectarianism—rather than Western “infidels,” the founders of ISIS were able to present themselves as saviors of what they saw as Iraq’s beleaguered Sunni “nation.” This helped them to acquire the support of Sunni populations. Moreover, ISIS’s incredible ability to capture major cities was the result of its innovative tactics, sowing terror before its attacks using targeted assassinations to kill key city leaders. Further, its decentralized regional command structure facilitated an extraordinary degree of coordination among small attack units. At the same time, the organization has made a genuine attempt to participate in state-building and population control.
The West has failed to forecast the growth of al-Qaeda in new forms throughout the Middle East and Africa. The world was horrified by the ISIS invasion of Syria and Iraq, which transformed the map of the Middle East at the moment. Both movements have cleverly continued to expand and spread. The issue that has not been answered by scholars and decision-makers in various countries of the world is what happens after the dissolution of the organization in the field and the dismantling of its components.
METHODOLOGY
Based on the descriptive and analytical case study, this research examines the cases of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to analyze each organization’s status at various points in time. It also provides a thorough understanding of the factors affecting terrorist organizations’ return after experiencing field defeat and dismantling over time. Hence, organizations with direct or indirect linkages or the same ideological and organizational commonalities or tactics and strategies that have disappeared or diminished in effectiveness over the previous decades, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, were chosen to provide significant evidence.
The qualitative data of this research utilized the analysis of reports, papers, statistics, and literary reviews of prior studies relevant to the phenomena of terrorist organizations. The inductive approach and the content analysis method of the study relied on the analysis of events and facts to reach general conclusions by observing the variables associated with the two organizations and their organizational and human, as well as ideological components at different stages and different temporal levels. One of the obstacles to the study was the difficulty of accessing the latest reliable data connected to the organizations under examination. Also, the study only looks at terrorist groups that have lost some of their efficacy but haven’t been completely ended. This makes it hard to come to a final conclusion that can be applied to other similar terrorist organizations.
RESULTS
- The Ability of Al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” to Return After Dismantling
In spite of their leaders being killed, their organizations being dismantled, their territory being lost, and their military defeat, jihadist groups have demonstrated throughout the past few decades that they are capable of resurrecting.
Al-Qaeda has been quiet about the appointment of a new leader for a while. Saif al-Adl is thought to be the new emir, and the organization hasn’t released a statement announcing his appointment or announcing the passing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was reportedly killed on July 31, 2022, in a US drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan. Following the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and until the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashemi al-Quraishi as the new Islamic State leader, who succeeded Abu al-Hasan al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, who was assassinated in the spring of 2023, there was a rapid turnover in the senior leadership of the Islamic State, particularly its general leader. This development also contributed to further decentralization and the stabilization of new command structures.
The case of al-Qaeda’s founding in 1987, the emergence of the first “state” organization with the name “Islamic State of Iraq” in 2006, the emergence of the second “state” organization following the name “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” in 2013, the proclamation of the “caliphate” in June 2014, and the seamless adoption of alternative tactics and new command and organizational structures demonstrate the extent to which these organizations can survive, reappear, and spread at various times, locations, and forms:
Initially, Al-Qaeda eventually changed from being an online movement to a conventional hierarchical organization that controlled its affiliated factions to varied degrees. From late 2004 onwards, the group started to reorganize itself in the tribal region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially in North Waziristan. This allowed Central Command to regain control over operations and motivate local groups to launch attacks on their own. Al-Qaida once more had a core, a dispersed network of associates, and compliant and understanding supporters by 2007.
Table 1 offers a selection of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups that were active between 2015 and 2019. The majority of these groups are still operational. Al-Qaida has built a network of organizations with groups that have sworn allegiance or were sympathetic to the group’s ideology through the use of localization policies. Examples are al-Shabaab, which operates in Somalia and Kenya; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria (which was created by the combining of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Jaish al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haq, and Harakat Noureddine Zengi); and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin in the Sahel region. Using the same method, Al-Qaeda united Ansar al-Din, the Massena Liberation Front (FLN), Al-Mourabitoun, and the Al-Qaeda branch in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin. Furthermore, once ISIS started to lose a lot of its territory in Syria in 2015, other al-Qaeda branches moved in to fill the gaps. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which primarily targets pro-government forces and the Yemeni army in Yemen, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, which operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India, are two other active groups that are of serious interest to the West.
Table 1: A selection of Al-Qaida-affiliated organizations active from 2015 to 2019
Source
Development Services Group, “Annex of Statistical Information 2019: Country Report on Terrorism 2019.” Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center, US Department of State. 10 June 2020.
Second, the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by US special forces in Idlib province in northwest Syria on October 26, 2019, and the group’s purported defeat in Syria and Iraq after it lost the last remaining pockets of the caliphate by driving it from the village of Baghouz east of the Euphrates River by March 2019 were insufficient to bring down the international jihadist group. The group has discovered an ideology with extraordinary mobilization, recruitment, attractiveness, and propaganda over a long period. In fact, on October 31, 2019, ISIS announced the appointment of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi as its new leader, five days after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed. The group undertook organizational restructuring after losing all of the areas it controlled to restart operations as a covert organization with considerable flexibility by moving from a centralized to a decentralized setup. It has reconstructed its structures related to the military, security, administration, finances, legitimacy, and media. It has also started basing its military plans on the demands of the “guerrilla warfare” and “war of attrition” tactics, not only in Syria and Iraq but also in many other Middle Eastern and African nations where it has established its own mandates and formed loose alliances with people and groups that share its ideological views and eventually became its affiliates (Table 2), including in Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Sahel, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Somalia. To assert control over territory, show that it prefers lethal strikes, take credit for the attacks it carried out, and use traditional and social media channels, the group also devised a new operational, ideological, and organizational model. Thanks to the use of this approach, ISIS has become one of the most well-known and well-liked terrorist groups in the world. As a result, even after ISIS lost power in the regions of Iraq and Syria where it first emerged, there was a sense that the group operated globally.
Table 2: A selection of ISIS-affiliated organizations active from 2015 to 2019
: Source
Development Services Group, “Annex of Statistical Information 2019: Country Report on Terrorism 2019.” Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center, US Department of State. 10 June 2020.
- A Critical Analysis of the efficiency of Western Strategy in addressing “Jihadist” Terrorism
The outcomes of the war on terror promptly demonstrated the rise of more robust, aggressive, and broadly disseminated forms of jihadism. The global strategy led by the United States has primarily emphasized the use of military force, along with other measures such as severing terrorist funding, offering foreign assistance, engaging in diplomatic efforts, exchanging information with foreign governments, and implementing policies to reintegrate former combatants into their original communities. These efforts have collectively contributed to the gradual and temporary decline of these organizations. The militaristic measures employed to eradicate these organizations demonstrated limited efficacy in combating terrorist groups, as they merely facilitated their evolution, adaptation, and heightened level of risk. 2019 saw 4,420 deaths and 6,652 injuries from Al-Qaida-affiliated groups in 767 incidents, compared to 6,652 deaths and 6,652 injuries from ISIS-affiliated groups in 959 incidents (Figure 1), ISIS-affiliated groups have been accused of more violent crimes, such as beheadings and burnings, than Al-Qaeda affiliates.
Figure 1: Comparison of the number of attacks and injuries for which factions loyal to both ISIS and Al-Qaida were responsible in 2019
: Source
Development Services Group, “Annex of Statistical Information 2019: Country Report on Terrorism 2019.” Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center, US Department of State. 10 June 2020.
- Challenges related to terrorist organizations remain notwithstanding the declaration of their dismantling
A short study of the reconfiguration of al-Qaeda and ISIS indicates that there is a bureaucratic organization that is very strict yet complicated and has a great potential for adaptation and constant development. The rapid transition to new organizational structures, the redeployment, and the positioning of fighters, as well as the adoption of alternative strategies, demonstrate the organizational development of these two organizations and their ability to survive, return, and spread at different times, locations, and forms. It also conveys indications to the world’s states and counterterrorism professionals that the ideological, tactical, and human issues associated with these two groups in general will persist.
DISCUSSION
Al-Qaeda’s Ability to Organizational Rebuilding
Al-Qaeda has its beginnings in the Islamic opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but ideological roots predate this conflict since much of the doctrinal inspiration stems from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyyah.[1] However, this organization got its start when Abdullah Azzam, the chief propagandist of Sunni extremists, asked al-Qaeda to lead by example and organize the Muslim world against its oppressors in 1987. [2]
Al-Qaeda has been made up of three main components since September 11: first, a core central group of strategists and leaders who work directly with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri; second, groups that either formally or unofficially align with the nucleus and occasionally follow directives from the center (often referred to as the “network”); and third, local factions, including individuals, who have no direct contact with the center but nevertheless make an effort to identify with the ideology and claim to be named al-Qaeda. [3]
Although the United States was initially successful in apprehending some al-Qaeda leaders, the organization was not significantly undermined. The group has increased the number of assaults it has carried out, either directly or indirectly, expanded its geographic reach, and changed its organizational structure.
The U.S. approach against al-Qaeda concentrated on the use of military action after September 11, 2001, as part of the “war on terror” campaign. Other measures have also been employed, such as cutting off terrorist finance, offering overseas assistance, acting in diplomacy, and exchanging intelligence with other governments. But military force was the principal instrument. Evidence available by 2008 shows that the U.S. plan has not succeeded in diminishing al-Qaeda’s capabilities. Several reports have concluded that al-Qaeda was still a powerful and prominent organization, aiming to unite Muslims to fight the United States and its allies (the distant enemy) and overthrow Western-friendly regimes in the Middle East (the near enemy) to establish a comprehensive Islamic caliphate. The group’s assaults have extended to Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It has also expanded its organizational structure and modus operandi, which has included the employment of terrorist techniques ranging from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to more advanced vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, drone assaults, and mortar fire.[4]
Alongside the rise in suicide attacks, there has been a push for low-level operatives to act independently and at a top-down strategy that includes strategic planning, central command, and ongoing, separate, and simultaneous coordination of terrorist operations from a distance.[5]
The military method attempted to remove the organization has eventually shown to be as seldom successful against terrorist groups as in the past, as over time it has just developed and grown more deadly.
Despite the disintegration of the core due to military activities since September 11, the reduction and then the expansion in the number of groups and persons linked with the organization. However, the troika still exists. Those who disagree about the nature of al-Qaeda typically refer to various sections of its composition and consequently get to different conclusions regarding its existence and survival. Al-Qaeda’s three organizations, notably its core leadership, network, and followers, have always adapted to new conditions.
Indeed, the hierarchy in existence on the 11th of September, 2001, has been shattered after the invasion of Afghanistan and the dispersion of the center. Many of these initial leaders had been murdered and replaced by new ones. The demolition of the original summit pushed the group to develop and depend increasingly on the Internet and other methods of communication to carry out the organization’s purpose and aim, which is above all the mobilization of the people. The invasion of Iraq substantially contributed to that process, as well as giving practical training to a huge and rising number of warriors who eventually returned to their local roots. The initial front, which comprised groups from Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan, joined a rising number of additional organizations that were affiliated with it. These groups included the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Jemaah Islamiyah (Southeast Asia), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (merged with Al-Qaida in 2001), Ansar al-Mujahideen (Chechnya), Jemaah Islamiyah (Egypt, with a global presence), Abu Sayyaf (Philippines), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Algeria), Harakat al-Mujahideen (Pakistan/Kashmir), and others. As linkages to existing organizations expanded, leaders sought to achieve their dream of launching a “global jihadist movement,” comprising connected and targeted internet groups, as well as committed cells led by al-Qaeda’s vision.[6]
Al-Qaeda therefore became a virtual movement and again a typical hierarchical organization as well, exerting varied degrees of operational control over groups that were linked with it. Beginning in late 2004, the nucleus started to reassemble itself in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal region, primarily North Waziristan, and to reestablish the ability to lead operations. Arab, Pakistani, and Afghan agents re-established a base in that hilly area and worked under the overall command of al-Zawahiri. This featured a series of training camps in tribal regions near the Afghan border. In addition to preparing groups of 10 to 20 men, this training infrastructure supplied a new operational hub for communications with the organization’s branches throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. Thus, Central Command once again exercised command and control capabilities, sometimes assisting operations from the center, as well as encouraging local forces and allowing them to carry out strikes independently. By 2007, al-Qaeda had once again established a core, a decentralized network of partners, amateur followers, and sympathizers.[7]
There was a notable surge in al-Qaeda affiliate attacks between 2007 and 2013, with al-Shabaab accounting for 25% of the violence, Jabhat al-Nusra for 21%, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for 10%. Nearly 56% of the attacks in 2013 were directed towards the targets of the so-called “near enemy” in North Africa, the Middle East, and other non-Western regions. This represents the highest percentage of attacks against the nearby enemy ever recorded. This implies that either because it is becoming more difficult to attack “far enemy” targets in the West, or because al-Qaeda and its affiliates have opted to concentrate on the close enemy, or both.[8]
Therefore, Al-Qaida has shown incredible complexity and adaptability, which have enabled it to maintain a degree of survival and spread in the global terrorist battlefield. Al-Qaeda remains a threat due to its reconstituted structure, its ability to carry out operations that it controls centrally and independently instigated through its wider network of groups and individuals, and most importantly, its media campaign that maintains the group’s image appealing to a variety of followers and sympathizers. Al-Qaeda is still resourced, a central ideological school, and an effective propaganda tool. No terrorist organization has shown Al-Qaeda’s adaptability, tenacity, and worldwide reach.
The Islamic State’s Partial Defeat
Following the group’s mid-2014 takeover of Mosul and the declaration of the Islamic State and the caliphate, an extensive number of publications on various aspects of the group have been released. A portion of this content focuses on elements that have been mostly constant across the group’s existence, such as its basic strategy and ideology.
The Islamic State is a Sunni extremist organization created as a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria in 1999, and following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the group engaged in the Iraqi insurgency. In 2014, the organization proclaimed itself a worldwide caliphate. The Islamic State adheres largely to a global jihadist ideology, advocates an anti-Western interpretation of Islam, and supports violence against anyone who does not agree with its ideology, including other types of Islam. The group’s initial objective was to build an Islamic caliphate with a Salafi orientation that spanned throughout Iraq, Syria, and other areas of the Levant and eventually spread to other regions of the globe.[9]
The group has seen ups and downs that are practically cyclical during its history. The Islamic State of Iraq was founded by al-Qaeda affiliate Zarqawi in October 2006, marking the pinnacle of the group’s early expansion. By 2008, the Iraqi and American governments had declared the group to be in danger of collapse.[10] Still, it was too soon to declare the organization permanently defeated. Not only has the Islamic State of Iraq disintegrated, but it has also given rise to what is thought to be the most potent terrorist group in modern history.
After Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over as head of the Islamic State of Iraq in May 2010, the organization steadily recovered power, and that is when the final resurgence started, long before 2014. The group’s rebirth was largely aided by the U.S. departure from Iraq in 2011 and the escalating violence of the Syrian conflict starting in 2011. At the end of this expanding era of notoriety, the organization declared in June 2014 that the Islamic State and the Caliphate had been established.[11]
By taking advantage of the turmoil that followed the 2011 Arab uprisings and escalating sectarian tensions, it was able to proclaim in 2014 the creation of an “Islamic caliphate” over substantial areas of land it had taken over in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Local forces in Syria and Iraq were unable to retake the group’s sphere of influence, and in order to drive ISIS out of the areas it controlled, a multinational military coalition headed by the United States was formed. This effort resulted in heavy casualties and destruction of both cities as ISIS was driven from its strongholds in Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. [12]
International assaults on the group have increased as a result of its geographical growth, savage brutality against other ethnic and religious communities in the area, and threats against the West. The organization therefore lost most of its authority over territory, and the governments of Iraq, Russia, and the United States proclaimed the group to be defeated. However, there have been indications of a collective comeback, so many observers have cautioned against declaring victory just yet. The organization has been successful in growing and proliferating in the majority of regions where authoritarianism, ethnic and sectarian disputes, and foreign meddling have surfaced. When US President Donald Trump declared on March 22, 2019, that he had destroyed ISIS, the group had already lost its last remaining pockets of territory when it had to evacuate the village of Baghouz east of the Euphrates River. These claims were further reinforced on October 26, 2019, when a US special force killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the northwest Syrian province of Idlib. The group’s spokesperson, Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, was killed the next day in another assault by American troops in the northern Syrian city of Jarablus, Aleppo. [13]
Yet this was simply the end of one chapter and the start of another in the history of the most pervasive, alluring, and deadly organization in the annals of international jihadism; it was a tactical as well as a moral triumph. It became evident that even after losing some of its top leadership and ground control, the group persisted in its efforts to establish a caliphate.
The terrorist organization was not vanquished despite the group’s losses in Syria and Iraq. The organization has spent many years uncovering an ideology that has extraordinary abilities in the areas of mobilization, recruitment, attractiveness, and propaganda. It also adapts quickly to changes in the geopolitical landscape of the area.
In fact, on October 31, 2019, ISIS declared a new leadership five days after the death of its previous leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi was designated as the “Caliph”.[14]
After losing authority over every location, the organization also finished the organizational restructuring process, which allowed it to resume working as a covert organization with a great deal of flexibility by moving from a centralized to a decentralized approach. It has started basing its military plans on the requirements of the “war of attrition” and “guerrilla warfare” tactics not only in Iraq and Syria but also in many other countries where it established branches (named as wilayat) in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Khorasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Caucasus, and East Asia. It has also rebuilt its military, security, administrative, financial, legitimate, and media structures. Additionally, it has been active in Somalia, the Philippines, and West Africa, especially Nigeria.[15]
At the height of its activity between 2013 and 2016, the group also drew in about 40,000 foreign fighters from 110 countries. According to a UN Monitoring Group report released at the end of December 2019, member states estimated that between half and two-thirds of the over 40,000 fighters who joined the caliphate are still alive. About 25,000 fighters are believed to be present in both Syria and Iraq combined—roughly 11,000 in Syria and 14,000 in Iraq—with a further 25,000 serving in other Middle Eastern branches of the group, according to confirmation from the U.S. government, the UN, and other sources. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has issued a warning, stating that ISIS may possess up to $300 million in cash that it retained after the fall of the “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria.[16]
The aforementioned evidence indicates that the group’s decrease in assaults was just momentary, making a potential revival of the group quite possible.
There’s a wide range of proof that the organization has already changed to survive—especially when it comes to its military strategies and propaganda. After Baghdadi’s execution, the U.S. State Department highlighted ISIS’s tenacity in its yearly terrorist report. The study came to the conclusion that the organization could still move about and issued a warning that terrorist organizations had improved their strategies and technological know-how. Given the conditions surrounding its comeback, ISIS’s financial, media, and military capabilities show a marked improvement over those of the Islamic State of Iraq. In 2018, the Pentagon, the intelligence agency, and the UN all issued identical statistics estimating that between 20,000 and 30,000 Islamic State militants were present in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Europe remained seriously threatened by the organization’s networks, coordinated groups, individual sleeper cells, and “lone wolves.” [17]
With the rapid spread of the coronavirus, the group’s strategic use of the epidemic to launch assaults in various locations, escalate its online propaganda activities, and strengthen recruitment and mobilization in the virtual realm became an even more perilous battleground. The organization is refining its web narrative on many topics, including evolving perspectives on the involvement of women in warfare and an increasing emphasis on “foreign terrorist operations.”
Notably, due to its decentralized and adaptable network of unauthorized publications, the group’s ideology has persisted online despite all attempts to suppress its propaganda. Nevertheless, the enduring presence of the concept of a virtual caliphate poses an equal threat to the viability of a geographical caliphate. The risk resides in the idea that ISIS’s military failures in Iraq and Syria inevitably correspond to the group’s irreversible military, social, and political downfall.In reality, there is considerable evidence that the organization has long planned to withstand the loss of territory by moving, adapting, and resorting to low-intensity combat techniques such as terrorism, assassinations, hit-and-run operations, and other tactics.[18]
The present picture on the ground is dramatically different from 2011, when many assumed the organization had been destroyed and dismantled. On the other hand, while looking at the current situation of ISIS in the region, it is vital to realize that it has been seriously impacted. So far, the process of eliminating the caliphate project remains unfinished even though the international coalition and its regional allies have essentially retaken all of the land originally occupied by the organization. The effort has also succeeded in stopping the large influx of foreign fighters to ISIS and other regional Islamist groups. These losses also significantly harmed his propaganda. Thus, the Islamic State has undoubtedly been at its weakest since 2014; however, it is not gone yet.
CONCLUSION
Despite their leaders being killed, their organizations being dismantled, their territory being lost, and their military defeat, jihadist groups have shown over the last several decades that they are capable of rising again.
The emergence of al-Qaeda in 1987, the creation of the first “state” with the proclamation of the “Islamic State of Iraq” in 2006, the creation of the second “state” following the proclamation of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” in 2013, the declaration of the “caliphate” in June 2014, and the seamless adoption of alternative tactics and new command and organizational structures—all demonstrate the extent to which these two organizations can endure, reappear, and spread at various times, places, and forms.
However, counterterrorism approaches have led to the emergence of more radical jihadist groups, with the United States choosing a military strategy, which has contributed to the temporary fall of these organizations. However, these efforts have proven ineffective in countering the two organizations, allowing them to adapt and enhance their threats.
Accordingly, challenges relevant to the phenomena of terrorist organizations throughout the area as a whole will continue. For example, foreign fighters may choose to travel and deploy themselves by joining other branches of the organization or relocating to other areas, or they may choose to remain at home and carry out terrorist attacks against nations that participated in the multinational counterterrorism coalition. In addition, fighters may be able to join new organizations or link with current jihadist groups that are already active in the area, particularly those who are currently in Syria, Iraq, and other hot locations in Africa.
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Jones, Seth G., A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (RAND, 2014)
Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida (RAND, 2008)
Pokalova, Elena, Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters: Threats and Challenges to the West (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)
JOURNALS:
Altier, Mary Beth, Emma Leonard Boyle, et al., «Returning to the Fight: An Empirical Analysis of Terrorist Reengagement and Recidivism,» Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.33, N.4 (May 2021).
Altier, Mary Beth, Christian N. Thoroughgood, et al., «Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology,» Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, N.5 (September 2014).
Lasmar, Jorge Mascarenhas, and Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca, «Adapting for Survival,» Carta Internacional, Vol.14, N.1 (May 2019).
Mahmut Cengiz, «ISIS or al-Qaeda: Which Looms as the Greater Threat to Global Security,» Small Wars Journal, October 01, 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-or-al-qaeda-which-looms-greater-threat-global-security (accessed July 14, 2024).
Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg, «The Islamic State after the Caliphate,» Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.13, N.1 (2019)
Official documents:
Development Services Group, «Annex of Statistical Information 2019: Country Report on Terrorism 2019», Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center, US Department of State, 10 June 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Annex-of-Statistical-Information.pdf.
Reports:
Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney, February 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf
Websites:
“Islamic State group names its new leader as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi,” Bbc.com, October. 31, 2019.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785
[1]Burke, Paul, et al., editors. Global Jihadist Terrorism: Terrorist Groups, Zones of Armed Conflict, and National Counter-Terrorism Strategies. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021.
[2]Jason Burke, “What Is Al-Qaeda,” Chap. 1 of Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, London: Tauris, 2003, pp. 7–22.
[3]Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida. Rand, 2008. p. 120.
[4]Mahmut Cengiz. ISIS or al-Qaeda: Which Looms as the Greater Threat to Global Security?
Small Wars Journal, October 01, 2022.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Jones, Seth G. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. RAND, 2014.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, February 2024. p17.
[10]Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg. “The Islamic State after the Caliphate.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 2–11.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Mohammad Abu Rumman,editors. After the Caliphate: Ideology, Propaganda, Organization, and Global Jihad ; Will ISIS Make a Comeback? Amman Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021.
[13]Ibid.
[14]“Islamic State group names its new leader as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi,” BBC.com, October. 31, 2019. (accessed Mar. 02, 2025).https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785
[15]Abu Rumman, Op.Cit.,p19.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Lasmar, Jorge Mascarenhas, and Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca. “Adapting for Survival.” Carta Internacional, vol. 14, no. 1, May 2019, pp. 103–26.
