US and Illegal Implications Under the Pretext of Self-Defense and Their Relation to Western and Zionist Liberal Thought in Controlling Comprehensive Arab Political Geography

Prepared by the researche : Muhammad Hamran, Yemen, 2025

Democratic Arabic Center

Abstract

This research provides a legal and geographical analysis of the U.S. military intervention in Yemen on March 15, 2025, which was carried out under the pretext of self-defense and protecting maritime navigation. It examines potential legal loopholes and accusations of illegitimacy surrounding U.S. military operations, focusing on principles of international law such as the prohibition of the use of force, the right to self-defense, and the necessity of obtaining authorization from the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the research analyzes the geostrategic implications of U.S. intervention, the role of regional actors, and its impact on Arab political geography.

1. Introduction

The research draws on maritime legal opinions and analyzes the legal assessment of the U.S. military intervention in Yemen (March 15, 2025). Reports indicate that the U.S. National Defense Council, the House of Representatives, Congress, and U.S. Central Command initiated military operations inside Yemen, targeting the Houthi group—the Sana’a government—as an alleged target. This intervention was notably marked by a lack of detailed public announcements regarding the operational codename, specific political and military objectives, classification within the scope of military engagements (operation, campaign, or series of airstrikes), precise geographical boundaries of the targeted military zone, expected duration, financial mechanisms supporting the engagement, and comprehensive legal justifications beyond general claims of self-defense and maritime security.

This initial ambiguity naturally raised significant legal questions about the legitimacy of this hypothetical military action under established international legal frameworks. This report aims to conduct a comprehensive analysis of potential legal gaps and accusations of illegitimacy in U.S. military operations against the Yemeni people under the pretext of targeting the Houthis, whom the U.S. has classified as a terrorist organization—a classification not adopted by the UN.

Moreover, U.S. military operations by Central Command constitute a breach of the principles for which it was established in the region, ostensibly to protect maritime security. In reality, they seek to impose U.S. and Western military hegemony with British participation, violating international legal rules set by the UN General Assembly in 1971 to keep the region free of weapons. The U.S., however, violates these laws by deploying nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to the region, constituting an excessive use of force.

U.S. CENTCOM claims adherence to the rules of engagement and denies receiving reports of humanitarian or maritime violations. However, in reality, reports and documented evidence have been submitted implicating the U.S. in war crimes, humanitarian violations, and breaches of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding maritime navigation and military activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs). These violations include the destruction of Yemeni infrastructure, the killing of women and children, and the bombing of the Ras Isa port in Hodeidah, which serves as the primary source of livelihood for 80% of Yemen’s population.

From a maritime geostrategic analysis perspective, the study emphasizes the need for maritime geostrategic states to discuss and find legal solutions, given that the events are linked to the spatial distribution of maritime zones and their impact on land. Such interventions may arise based on established international legal principles and relevant research. The analysis specifically addresses the principle of non-use of force, the right to self-defense in the context of state and non-state actors, the necessity of UN Security Council authorization, potential war crimes, the legal implications of undefined operational criteria, the critical importance of transparency and accountability, Yemen’s sovereignty, and the role of regional actors such as the Arab League.

Additionally, the study examines the invocation of “maritime security” as a potential justification for the use of force, the role of U.S. military commands—particularly Central Command—in managing conflicts and creating ambiguous zones in the region as a pretext for intervention in Yemeni and Arab affairs since 1990–2025 under the guise of protecting U.S. interests and allies. It also explores interventions in altering political systems to serve U.S. political agendas for sustaining unipolar global dominance.

2. The Fundamental Principle of Non-Use of Force and the Right to Self-Defense

The prohibition of the use of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is a cornerstone of international law governing state conduct in international relations. This article explicitly mandates that all member states refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This prohibition is widely considered a peremptory norm (jus cogens) in international legal discourse—a fundamental principle that cannot be derogated from.

Thus, the hypothetical U.S. intervention in Yemen would, on its face, constitute a violation of this fundamental principle unless justified under one of the limited exceptions explicitly recognized in international law. The primary exceptions to this prohibition are the inherent right of self-defense, as stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, or through explicit authorization by the UN Security Council.

Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a UN member state, a right that persists until the Security Council takes necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. Any measures taken by member states in exercising this right are subject to the fundamental requirement of immediate reporting to the Security Council.

Traditionally, the scope of Article 51 has been interpreted as a narrow exception to the comprehensive prohibition on the use of force, primarily intended to address situations involving armed attacks by one state against another. The alleged involvement of a non-state actor—in this case, the Sana’a government (Houthis)—as the instigator of actions necessitating intervention adds a significant layer of complexity to the legal analysis, as the traditional framework of self-defense was largely conceived in the context of inter-state relations.

3. Complexities of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors

Customary international law outlines key criteria governing the legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense, including the existence of an armed attack, necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. The ICJ has established a threshold for what constitutes an “armed attack” for the purpose of applying Article 51. A contentious debate surrounds whether acts of violence committed by non-state actors qualify as an armed attack justifying self-defense against the state from whose territory these actors operate.

The unwillingness or inability of a state to address a threat itself remains a highly disputed point in international legal discourse, lacking universal acceptance within the international community. In the context of the U.S. intervention in Yemen, a crucial legal question arises: do the actions attributed to the Sana’a government (Houthis) rise to the level of an “armed attack” that would lawfully justify a U.S. military response against Yemen?

The principle of necessity dictates that the use of force in self-defense must be genuinely necessary to respond to an armed attack, meaning it should be a last resort, and the response should occur without undue delay. The Caroline test, of historical significance, sets a stringent standard for necessity, requiring that the threat be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” While preemptive self-defense against an imminent threat remains a subject of ongoing debate and some state practice, preemptive self-defense against a potential but not imminent future threat is generally considered inconsistent with international law.

In the presented scenario, the U.S. would need to convincingly demonstrate that military intervention is the only possible option to counter an imminent and overwhelming threat posed by the Sana’a government (Houthis).

The principle of proportionality requires that measures taken in self-defense be proportionate to the armed attack, reflecting the scale, nature, and severity of the attack itself, and must not be excessive relative to the objective of repelling the attack. The generally accepted objective of self-defense is to halt or repel an ongoing attack. In the hypothetical scenario, the scope and nature of U.S. military action must be carefully assessed in light of the alleged threat posed by the Sana’a government to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality.

Lastly, the principle of immediacy suggests that defensive action should ideally occur immediately following the armed attack. The timing of the U.S. intervention in relation to any specific actions taken by the Sana’a government would be a significant factor in assessing its legitimacy under international law.

The applicability of self-defense against non-state actors is a particularly complex issue in contemporary international law. While Article 51 explicitly refers to attacks against UN member states, state practice—especially since the events of September 11, 2001—has shown an increasing tendency to invoke the right of self-defense in response to actions by non-state actors operating from the territory of another state. However, this practice remains highly contested among states and international legal scholars and lacks universal acceptance.

Some states, including Brazil, China, Mexico, and Sri Lanka, adopt a restrictive view, firmly rejecting the use of force against non-state actors without explicit consent from the territorial state (Haque, 2021). China’s position emphasizes that such actions should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states under the guise of counterterrorism or preemptive self-defense.

Austria has taken a middle-ground stance, suggesting that the use of force may be lawful if the territorial state is “unable, due to a complete absence of state authority and effective control over its territory, to prevent or suppress operations.”

Conversely, several states, including the U.S., the UK, and Australia, assert a broader right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors on another state’s territory. Even within this group, there are differences in emphasis. Some states, such as Australia, Estonia, the Netherlands, and the UK, explicitly state that force should only be used in response to an actual or imminent armed attack, particularly when the territorial state is unwilling or unable to prevent such attacks.

While the U.S. emphasizes necessity and proportionality, it has not always explicitly referenced the imminence requirement for each subsequent action following an initial lawful resort to force against a group.

The “unwilling or unable” doctrine itself lacks a clear, universally agreed-upon normative framework. Although international law traditionally obliges the victim state to assess whether the territorial state is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat, the debate on specific criteria for this assessment has been limited. This lack of clarity undermines the doctrine’s legitimacy and effectiveness in limiting the use of force.

Some scholars trace the roots of this doctrine to the law of neutrality, while critics argue that its increasing reliance since 2001 threatens to undermine the UN collective security system and violate state sovereignty.

In the context of the hypothetical U.S. intervention, the U.S. claim of self-defense, based on protecting maritime navigation, requires a strong legal argument (Deeks, 2012). This argument must demonstrate that the actions attributed to the Sana’a government (Houthis) in Yemen amount to an “armed attack” attributable to them and that Yemen is possibly unwilling or unable to effectively counter this threat.

Mere claims of protecting maritime navigation as justification may not automatically meet the stringent requirements of self-defense under international law. Freedom of navigation is clearly defined under international law in the EEZ, which is restricted and not an absolute freedom like the high seas.

The Sana’a government has indeed launched numerous attacks on Israeli-affiliated ships and those of cooperating nations in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, including missile and drone strikes, as well as the hijacking of an Israeli-linked vessel. The Yemeni military spokesperson has explicitly stated the objective of these operations and the naval blockade—closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait—until Israeli military operations cease and withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories is achieved, a matter Yemen considers a national and Arab security priority.

At the same time, the Sana’a government and the Yemeni Armed Forces, under Article 14 of the 1991 Yemeni Constitution, are responsible for permitting passage and ensuring freedom of navigation, provided it does not compromise Yemeni national security and sovereignty. Yemeni laws affirm sovereignty and jurisdiction over its EEZ, and Yemen has the right, under international law, to deploy its armed forces to protect maritime navigation and trade in the region.

These attacks have raised significant security concerns. However, whether these attacks constitute an “armed attack” against the U.S. or trigger the right of collective self-defense for other states whose ships are targeted remains a subject of ongoing legal debate (Lloyd, 2025).

The study confirms that the U.S. motives for waging war are illegitimate and aim to achieve issues of U.S. military hegemony in the region through the use of military force, imposing Western liberal theories of maritime security and freedom of navigation, rather than falling within the framework of the alleged U.S. self-defense claimed by Trump and his defense secretary.

Several foundational elements are absent, including:

• The location of the incident in Yemen’s EEZ, not the U.S. EEZ.
• The events occurred in the Red Sea, a historically Yemeni and Arab semi-enclosed sea (Hamran, 2023), not international waters.
• The principle of clear threat, necessity, proportionality, and excessiveness—evidenced by the deployment of multiple modern U.S. strike aircraft carriers and British and Israeli participation in excessive military actions in Yemen—contradicts ICJ principles.
• Arab and regional rejection from a regional theory perspective, as Arab and regional states have not joined the U.S.-led coalition against Yemen.
• The principle of non-necessity, as articulated by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on May 2, 2025, when he rejected U.S. requests for Egypt to allow U.S. warships and commercial vessels to pass without paying fees, stating that the U.S. could easily stop the war in Gaza, lift the blockade, and pressure Israel to prevent the displacement of Palestinians—actions that would lead the Houthis to cease hostilities without necessitating a U.S. war on Yemen.

From a legal interpretation standpoint, the U.S. claim of self-defense is weak, as U.S. commercial interests have not been significantly harmed, with only 4% of U.S. trade relying on the Red Sea. Thus, the necessity for military intervention is unsubstantiated, and its operations challenge and reject UN Human Rights Council and International Criminal Court (ICC) rulings.

The Israeli entity and Western powers, under U.S. policy, must reconsider the concept of absolute self-defense, which they have used to control and fragment comprehensive Arab political geography. This approach has not achieved global security and stability.

Since 1918–2025, the Israeli entity, the West, and the U.S. have killed the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, including the Yemeni people, under the pretext of self-defense from a Western liberal perspective—not within the framework of international and humanitarian theories of self-defense (Al-Ghad, 2025).

The Westphalian and Sykes-Picot theories have failed to achieve security and impose Arab political boundaries. It is time to realize the unity and cohesion of comprehensive political geography in the United Yemeni and Arab States by 2025.

4. The Requirement of UN Security Council Authorization

The UN Charter entrusts the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, the Council is authorized to permit the use of force if a threat to international peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression is identified.

This authorization is typically requested and granted under Article 42 of Chapter VII. The fundamental principle of the UN Charter strongly favors collective security action taken by the Security Council over unilateral uses of force by states.

Military interventions conducted without explicit UN Security Council authorization are considered illegal under international law, as they violate the fundamental prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The primary exceptions to this rule are the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 and, in some disputed circumstances, intervention by invitation of a legitimate government.

In the hypothetical scenario of U.S. intervention in Yemen, the absence of explicit UN Security Council authorization would necessitate heavy reliance on self-defense justification or intervention by invitation (neither of which is indicated in the scenario) to establish its legitimacy.

Russia’s condemnation of the U.S. intervention in Yemen and the bombing of the Ras Isa port in April 2025 further underscores the lack of international consensus that would typically accompany Security Council-authorized actions.

The concept of humanitarian intervention—using military force in another state without its consent to address or prevent mass human rights violations—is highly contentious in international law and is not widely recognized as a legitimate exception to the prohibition on the use of force absent UN Security Council authorization.

The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle holds that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in cases of mass atrocities when a state fails to protect its population. However, this principle ideally operates within the framework of UN Security Council authorization.

While the researcher references potential humanitarian war crimes, humanitarian concerns are not presented as the primary justification for U.S. intervention. Even if such concerns existed, unilateral action without Security Council approval would remain a legal challenge and would likely be deemed unlawful by many states.

The debate surrounding interventions like Kosovo—which some considered “illegal but legitimate”—highlights the tension between legality and broader legitimacy considerations in the absence of Security Council authorization (Simon Chesterman, 2002).

Thus, the tragedy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq without justification or legitimate UN authorization is repeated in Operation Decisive Storm, with U.S. leaders later apologizing—like Tony Blair, Bush, Obama, and defense secretaries—justifying their actions based on flawed intelligence about Iraqi chemical weapons.

This reinforces the study’s hypothesis of a global imbalance and the lack of credibility of the UN Security Council in protecting the world, attributed to the dominance of global powers using the veto. The study aims to abolish the veto and expand the Security Council to include Arab and Islamic representation, given that Muslims constitute two billion of the world’s population and deserve a seat, as current Council decisions do not meet their aspirations.

5. Potential War Crimes Under International Law

War crimes are defined as grave violations of international humanitarian law committed during armed conflicts. These include serious breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts.

The Rome Statute of the ICC provides a comprehensive list of war crimes applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. Humanitarian war crimes specifically target civilians and other protected persons, while maritime war crimes pertain to violations of the laws of naval warfare under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The absence of clearly defined military zones and objectives in the hypothetical U.S. intervention increases the risk of indiscriminate attacks, raising the likelihood of war crimes. Many actions within the described military operation led by U.S. Central Command could constitute war crimes against Yemeni civilians, contradicting its stated principles and objectives of protecting maritime security and regional stability.

The U.S. claim that Iran is a destabilizing factor threatening the region is contradicted by the reality that Central Command itself threatens maritime security and global stability.

6. The Legal Significance of Undefined Military Objectives, Scope, and Duration

International humanitarian law stipulates that attacks must be limited to military objectives, typically defined as objects that make an effective contribution to military action by their nature, location, purpose, or use, and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the prevailing circumstances.

Clearly defined military objectives are essential to ensure compliance with the principle of distinction, which obliges warring parties to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, as well as between combatants and civilians.

Without clearly defined objectives, the risk of indiscriminate attacks that fail to make these necessary distinctions increases, potentially harming civilians and civilian infrastructure.

The lack of clearly defined operational scope and duration for the hypothetical U.S. military intervention further complicates the legal analysis. Without knowledge of the geographical boundaries and intended duration of the operation, it becomes extremely difficult to assess whether the use of force is proportionate to the stated objectives of self-defense and maritime security protection.

A prolonged and geographically extensive military operation with poorly defined standards may raise concerns about its overall proportionality and potential to cause widespread and long-term harm to civilian populations.

Moreover, the absence of transparency regarding these fundamental aspects of the intervention could undermine public trust and fuel suspicions about the true motives and legality of the operation. Some may interpret this ambiguity as a deliberate attempt to evade scrutiny of the operation’s compliance with international law.

7. Transparency and Accountability in Military Operations

While there is no single comprehensive treaty explicitly mandating full transparency in military planning and execution, a growing body of international standards and expectations emphasizes its importance in ensuring accountability and maintaining the legitimacy of military actions.

States are increasingly recognized as obligated to conduct thorough and impartial investigations into credible allegations of civilian harm resulting from their military operations. The alleged failure of the U.S. to define many key aspects of its military intervention in Yemen before its commencement indicates a lack of transparency that may be viewed unfavorably under these evolving international standards.

The growing global emphasis on transparency in military matters suggests that the U.S. approach in this hypothetical scenario may be considered inconsistent with current best practices and expectations.

Accountability for harm to civilians in armed conflicts has become a critical imperative in international law and policy. Effective investigations into civilian harm incidents are essential to uphold the rule of law and provide some measure of redress for victims.

These investigations must adhere to principles of independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness, and transparency to be credible. Their objectives should include establishing the facts of the incident, assessing its legality under international law, identifying any contributing factors, and laying the groundwork for appropriate remedial measures, such as compensation or other forms of reparation for civilian harm.

In the context of the hypothetical U.S. intervention in Yemen, the U.S. would likely face significant pressure from the international community to conduct comprehensive and transparent investigations into any civilian casualties or damage resulting from its military operations. Failure to do so could lead to further accusations of illegitimacy and potentially expose the U.S. to legal challenges in international forums.

U.S. Central Command has committed humanitarian violations in Iraq based on a racist American belief in “bad guys,” with tanks running over civilian vehicles under the pretext of targeting “bad men” without trial, violating ICJ and ICC rules.

8. Legal Implications of Military Operations from International Waters and Yemen’s Sovereignty

The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are fundamental pillars of the international legal system, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and consistently upheld in customary international law. These principles affirm each state’s exclusive authority over its territory and prohibit interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Thus, any military operations conducted by the U.S. within Yemen’s borders without its consent would constitute a violation of its sovereignty unless these actions could be legally justified under a recognized exception to the prohibition on the use of force, such as self-defense.

The U.S. claim that its operations do not involve the use of bases in Arab states appears to acknowledge the sensitive nature of sovereignty concerns in the region.

International law recognizes the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, allowing ships of all states to traverse international waters without interference. However, this freedom does not extend to violating the sovereignty of another state.

Maritime freedom in the EEZ is not equivalent to freedom on the high seas, and freedom of navigation does not grant the right to launch military attacks—even from international waters—against targets within Yemeni territory without strong legal justification, such as self-defense.

The mere launching of U.S. military operations from international waters does not automatically legitimize the use of force against a sovereign state. The legality of such actions depends on whether the intervention itself is justified under broader principles of international law governing the use of force.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulates the rights and obligations of states concerning various maritime zones. While UNCLOS guarantees freedom of navigation on the high seas, it also recognizes coastal states’ sovereignty over their territorial waters, extending up to 12 nautical miles from their baselines, and grants certain sovereign rights and jurisdiction within their EEZs, which can extend up to 200 nautical miles.

Any U.S. military activities conducted within Yemen’s territorial waters without its explicit consent would constitute a violation of both UNCLOS and customary international law unless justified by a valid reason, such as self-defense.

Operating from international waters may allow U.S. ships to avoid direct physical intrusion into Yemen’s territorial waters, but the act of projecting military force into Yemeni territory from these waters still raises significant concerns about violating Yemen’s sovereignty under international law.

The U.S. would need to ensure that its actions are consistent with Yemen’s navigational rights and security interests as a coastal state under UNCLOS.

Trump and Central Command’s abandonment of protecting marine life and their use of the marine environment in the study area to achieve commercial profits—under the U.S. economic imperialist theory and the “America First” pretext—prioritize U.S. interests at the expense of global populations through military force. This approach obstructs marine organizations’ efforts to protect marine life under the 2013 sustainability agenda.

9. The Role and Perspective of Regional Actors: The Arab League

The Arab League Charter emphasizes the principles of sovereignty and independence of member states, with the overarching aim of promoting inter-Arab relations and coordinating political activities. Article VI of the Charter provides a mechanism for any member state facing aggression or the threat of aggression from another state to request an immediate meeting of the League Council.

Decisions taken by the Council on measures to confront such aggression typically require a unanimous vote, excluding the vote of the aggressor state. In the context of the hypothetical U.S. military intervention in Yemen, the absence of any indication that the U.S. sought or obtained Arab League approval suggests a lack of regional consensus on the legitimacy or necessity of this action.

While Arab League approval is not a strict legal requirement under international law for the legitimacy of military intervention (unless it is a collective self-defense action specifically authorized by the League on behalf of a member state), it carries significant political weight and can substantially influence the perceived legitimacy of such action, particularly within the Arab world.

However, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, which received some support from certain Arab League members, faced substantial criticism at both regional and international levels. The U.S. decision to launch a military operation in Yemen targeting the Sana’a government (Houthis) without clear Arab League approval or endorsement could alienate key regional partners and further inflame anti-American sentiment in the region.

Many may interpret the absence of regional support for the intervention as a sign that the action lacks broad-based backing and may not be conducive to long-term regional stability. This reinforces the researcher’s hypothesis of referring the matter to the ICC and activating a comprehensive Arab court.

10. “Maritime Security” as a Justification for the Use of Force

As of 2025, there is no consensus within the UN or the international community on a definition of maritime security. The concept of “maritime security” encompasses a wide range of issues, including ensuring the safety of navigation, combating piracy, preventing maritime terrorism, and countering other illegal activities at sea.

Generally, the use of force in the context of maritime security operations is limited to law enforcement purposes and must adhere to the principles of necessity and proportionality. The right of self-defense is a recognized legal basis for the use of force in the maritime domain.

While maritime security is undoubtedly a legitimate concern for the international community, any use of force to address threats to it must be consistent with the overarching principles of international law, including the fundamental prohibition on the use of force against sovereign states as stipulated in the UN Charter.

The U.S. attempts to impose a maritime concept and theory of maritime security and freedom of navigation in EEZs, limiting the maritime sovereignty of coastal states in line with U.S. laws and decisions from a Western liberal perspective. This has not gained acceptance from Yemen or regional states regarding maritime navigation in EEZs, including foreign military activities.

Additionally, the U.S. justification for imposing naval blockades on other nations under its laws represents an application of the Western liberal theory, which has not been accepted by Yemen or regional states concerning maritime navigation in EEZs, particularly foreign military activities.

Targeting a non-state actor like the Sana’a government (Houthis), whether in international waters or within the territorial boundaries of another sovereign state, presents complex legal challenges. The U.S. may invoke the “unwilling or unable” principle to justify its actions if Yemen is deemed unwilling or unable to prevent Houthi attacks on maritime navigation.

However, as previously mentioned, this doctrine lacks universal acceptance and remains contested in international legal discourse. To lawfully justify military intervention in Yemen against the Sana’a government (Houthis) in the name of maritime security, the U.S. would need to demonstrate a clear and direct link between Houthi actions and an imminent threat to its national security or international shipping, necessitating a robust response within Yemeni territory.

The U.S. claim that its operations do not involve the use of bases in Arab states may aim to distance itself from accusations of violating state sovereignty. However, the launch of U.S. fighter jets from aircraft carriers positioned in Yemen’s EEZ in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden constitutes a blatant violation of Yemeni, Arab, Islamic, and regional sovereignty.

This was rejected by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who stated that the sons and coastal states of the Red Sea are responsible for achieving maritime security in the region—not the U.S. or any external force under international law.

A primary objective of the study is to achieve a unified Arab political and maritime strategic administration for the comprehensive Arab and regional framework by 2025.

However, the fundamental legal question remains: Is the use of force itself justified under prevailing principles of international law?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a framework for addressing maritime security threats, primarily through state cooperation. While UNCLOS primarily binds states, it establishes the basis for investigation and enforcement measures against activities threatening navigation safety.

Conventions like the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention provide a legal basis for states to exercise jurisdiction over acts of maritime terrorism committed by non-state actors. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) facilitates international cooperation to enhance maritime security (Dominguez, 2024).

11. Legality vs. Legitimacy: A Critical Distinction

It is crucial to distinguish between legality and legitimacy in military intervention. Legality refers to whether an intervention complies with the binding rules of international law, while legitimacy encompasses a broader normative belief that the action is morally justified and has widespread international acceptance.

An intervention can be legal but perceived as illegitimate, or illegal but considered legitimate by some. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which lacked UN Security Council authorization, is often cited as an example of an action some considered illegal but legitimate due to the humanitarian crisis it aimed to address.

Conversely, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was widely regarded as both illegal and illegitimate by much of the international community.

In the case of the hypothetical U.S. intervention in Yemen, the lack of transparency and absence of UN Security Council authorization could create a significant gap between its legality and perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

The perceived legitimacy of the intervention could significantly influence other states’ willingness to support it and affect long-term regional stability.

12. State Responsibility for the Actions of Non-State Actors

Under international law, the general principle is that a state is only responsible for its own conduct—the actions or omissions of its organs or agents. As a matter of principle, a state is not responsible for the conduct of individuals or non-state actors.

However, there are limited exceptions to this general rule where the conduct of a non-state actor may be attributed to the state, resulting in state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed by that actor.

One exception is when the non-state actor acts as a de facto organ of the state. This occurs when the non-state actor is under the complete control and subordination of the state. In such cases, its actions are attributed to the state in the same manner as those of the state’s official organs.

Another exception arises when a state empowers a non-state entity to exercise some governmental authority, provided the entity is acting in that capacity.

Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility addresses situations where a non-state actor acts under the instructions, direction, or control of a state.

The ICJ has set a high threshold for this, requiring “effective control” by the state over the specific acts of the non-state actor that violate international law. General support, funding, or training is typically insufficient to meet this standard unless the state specifically ordered or directed the particular unlawful acts.

The ICJ reaffirmed this stringent standard in the Bosnian Genocide case.

Furthermore, under Article 11 of the ILC Articles, if a state subsequently acknowledges and adopts the conduct of a non-state actor as its own, that conduct is considered an act of the state.

Additionally, states have a due diligence obligation under customary international law and treaty law to take all reasonably available measures to prevent non-state actors within their territory from violating the rights of third states.

This is closely related to the “unwilling or unable” principle, where a state’s failure to prevent attacks by non-state actors may lead another state to take action.

In the context of the hypothetical U.S. intervention, if the U.S. seeks to justify its actions as a response to an armed attack from Yemen, it would need to prove that Houthi attacks are attributable to the Yemeni state under one of these recognized standards.

Given the complexity of the relationship between the Sana’a government (Houthis) and various factions within Yemen, determining the required level of control or endorsement by the Yemeni state to trigger state responsibility under international law would likely present a significant legal challenge.

13. Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict

International humanitarian law, alongside other branches of international law, provides a legal framework for protecting the natural environment during armed conflicts. Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.

Customary international law also reflects this prohibition. Additionally, reprisal attacks against the natural environment are prohibited. The ILC has adopted draft principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, aimed at enhancing environmental protection before, during, and after armed conflicts.

These principles emphasize the need to respect and protect the environment in accordance with applicable international law, including the law of armed conflict, and state that no part of the environment may be attacked unless it has become a military objective.

While the primary focus of the user’s inquiry is not environmental protection, it is important to note that any military action should consider the potential environmental consequences of its actions, particularly given the undefined scope and objectives in this hypothetical scenario.

Houthi attacks have already caused environmental damage, such as the sinking of the M/V Rubymar in March 2024, and the U.S. military should take all feasible precautions to minimize further environmental harm during its operations.

14. Yemen’s Perspective on the Intervention

Yemen’s perspective on the hypothetical U.S. military intervention is likely complex and diverse, influenced by the ongoing internal conflict and the various political actors involved.

The Houthi movement, as the direct target of the intervention, would undoubtedly view it as a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty and an act of aggression. The movement has consistently opposed foreign intervention in Yemen and would likely frame the U.S. action within a broader anti-Yemen agenda.

The internationally recognized Yemeni government, which has been engaged in a prolonged conflict with the Houthis, may have a more nuanced perspective. Some factions within the anti-Houthi coalition might welcome U.S. military support in their fight against the Houthis.

However, there may also be concerns about intervention violating Yemen’s sovereignty and potentially further destabilizing the country. Previous U.S. military actions in Yemen, particularly drone strikes and support for the Saudi-led coalition, have been controversial and generated resentment among segments of the Yemeni population. This history could shape reactions to any new U.S. military intervention.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement in southern Yemen, has previously distanced itself from the Houthis. The Yemeni government has expressed willingness to cooperate with international efforts to ensure maritime security. Their perspective on U.S. intervention may depend on how it aligns with their strategic objectives and relationship with the U.S.

Overall, a significant portion of the Yemeni people and various political factions are likely to view U.S. military intervention as an unwarranted violation of Yemen’s sovereignty, particularly in the absence of clear approval from a broadly representative and recognized Yemeni government.

15.Conclusion

The hypothetical U.S. military intervention in Yemen on March 15, 2025, ostensibly targeting the Houthi group (Sana’a government) and protecting maritime navigation, is likely to face substantial accusations of illegitimacy under international law.

On its face, this intervention violates the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Absent UN Security Council authorization, the U.S. would need to convincingly demonstrate that its actions fall within the narrow exception of self-defense under Article 51.

However, applying the principle of self-defense against a non-state actor operating within the territory of another sovereign state is legally complex and subject to stringent standards, including the existence of an armed attack, necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.

The stated justifications of self-defense and maritime security protection would be subject to rigorous scrutiny under these standards, particularly in light of the contested “unwilling or unable” doctrine and the high threshold for attributing non-state actor actions to a state.

The lack of transparency regarding the intervention’s objectives, scope, and duration raises serious concerns about its compliance with fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, particularly distinction and proportionality, and increases the risk of potential war crimes against Yemeni civilians.

Military actions that fail to clearly distinguish between combatants and civilians or that cause disproportionate harm to civilians may constitute serious violations of international law.

Furthermore, conducting military operations from international waters into the territory of a sovereign state like Yemen without its consent and without clear justification under international law raises significant concerns about violating Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The absence of Arab League approval or endorsement further weakens the political legitimacy of the intervention in the region.

A comprehensive legal assessment of this hypothetical intervention would require careful examination of all available facts and evidence at the time to determine whether the stringent conditions for the lawful use of force in self-defense had indeed been met.

16.

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