Implications of US strategy for the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on the Middle East

Prepared by the researche : Dr.Mazin khaleel Irahim – Alfarahidi University Faculty Economic and Business Administration, Department of Accounting
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
Journal of International Law for Research Studies : Twentieth Issue – October 2025
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
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Abstract
The Russian-Ukrainian war represented a geopolitical conflict with far-reaching global ramifications. Its impact extends beyond Eastern Europe to the Middle East, where the strategic interests of global and regional powers intersect. The American strategy toward the Russian-Ukrainian war is multidimensional and intertwined. The American strategy has numerous repercussions for the Middle East, including economic ones, which have burdened the economies of Middle Eastern countries, which rely on importing basic commodities from Europe. It has also led to shifts in alliances, diversification of international relations, and a shift away from reliance on a single party. It has also led to increased regional tensions, as some regional powers seek to exploit the situation to enhance their influence. The American strategy toward the Russian-Ukrainian war is characterized by continuous evolution, adapting to changes in the field and political situation, and seeking to achieve its strategic objectives within a complex and changing international environment. Its most prominent manifestations are the increase in “military build-ups,” the adoption of a policy of “flexible alliances,” and strategies of “deterring adversaries,” in addition to the existence of a state of “political and diplomatic deadlock,” as well as the “international division” into two axes, each of which seeks to maximize its potential benefit from the current crises.
Introduction
With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Middle Eastern society faced challenges represented in the fluctuation of food security, on which the region has relied for decades, as the region faces successive losses represented by high food and energy prices and tight financial conditions on a number of countries due to the economic repercussions left by the world, and the war also left repercussions on the American strategy in general and on the Middle East in particular, especially with regard to the American political and economic conditions as well as its development projects.
The United States in the region has tended to reposition its military presence in a number of areas, especially those with Chinese influence, as it seeks to restore the situation to the status quo ante of the war due to the decline of the American presence
in the region after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The Problem of Research
The Middle East region enjoys many natural resources and energy sources that have made it the focus of attention of flag countries, whose area is determined according to the interests of major countries, as it has been forming one of the areas of competition and conflict in the world over the past decades, as the region is considered an integration between the military, economic, social and political security level, as the economic aspect enjoys different wealth and is one of the areas that have straits and global commercial sea lanes. In terms of security, they constitute areas with concentration and desert borders, and from a political point of view, they work as the owner of the balance between East and West in the world, and therefore the United States of America is one of the first countries that have gave its attention towards the region, due to the previous factors, but the American strategy in the region is affected by the repercussions of international changes and developments, and therefore the main question of the research is as follows:
How much does the Ukraine conflict affect U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East?
And which in turn branches out of a number of sub-questions, as follows:
- What is the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
- What factors led to the Russian-Ukrainian war?
- What is the U.S. strategy in the Middle East?
- What are the repercussions of the war on U.S. policies toward the Middle East?
Research Methodology
Due to the multiplicity of trends in which the research is conducted, the commitment to a specific approach has been restricted as a theoretical framework for research and analysis, but it has exceeded this trend by trying to apply a number of approaches that are compatible with the phenomenon of research under study, in order to provide an integrated framework on the phenomenon of research, as follows:
- Descriptive Analytical Approach: The descriptive analytical approach is used in the study of the phenomenon as it is in reality by describing it accurately and expressing it quantitatively as well as qualitatively, which leads to bridging information related to the phenomenon, analyzing and interpreting it and trying to find solutions to it, and then reaching accurate results through which generalizations and conclusions about the phenomenon under study are drawn, and the researcher has relied on the method in order to monitor all the factors that called the United States of America to pay attention for the region and its interests as well as the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on those interests and American strategy in the region.
- The Approach of the National Interest: National interests constitute the driving force and the main determinant of the directions of state policies, and any difference in the interpretation of the concept of national interests by the decision-making authorities will inevitably lead to similar changes in the content of those policies, and the national interest approach depends on the fact that achieving these interests is the ultimate and supreme goal of any state policy, and this approach is characterized by highlighting the continuity of international politics within the framework of the national interest.
The researcher relied on the approach in order to explain the desire of the United States of America to go to the region under study as a result of its distinction in resources and energy sources that are the basis on which countries rely as a result of international, regional, economic and security developments represented in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which cast a shadow on the Middle East, and which would drive the growing intensity of international competition in the region because of its energy and other resources.
Parts of the Research
The research will be divided into two chapters, each chapter consists of two sections, as follows:
Chapter One: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict.
The first section: the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
The second section: the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Chapter Two: The Impact of War on U.S. Policies Toward the Middle East.
The first section: the American strategy in the Middle East.
The second section: the repercussions of the war on the policies of the United States of America towards the Middle East.
Chapter One
Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
We cannot deny that Ukraine has geopolitical importance, and this has led to Ukraine’s exposure over the years to so many forms of occupation, and this is a result of its strategic and distinctive location, as it works to link both the continent of Europe and Asia, in addition to the diversity of natural resources that exist in Ukraine, and this in turn has led to making it coveted, and even a conflict zone by all colonial powers that have passed through the ages.
In addition, Ukraine enjoys strategic importance resulting from its distinguished geographical location and the availability of natural resources in its territory, in addition to the presence of ethnographic and demographic diversity, and all these features were accompanied by negative aspects reflected in the weakness of Ukrainian policy and its inability to govern itself with a strong independent policy and through various eras and times until the present, which made Ukraine a station and an open field for occupation and division by strong and competing countries, especially Ukraine’s neighbors such as Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire up to the stage of the reign of the Soviet Union. Ukraine came under its control until the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The First Section
The Nature of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
Therefore, it is possible to explain the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war by identifying the features and characteristics of the Republic of Ukraine, as well as giving a historical background to the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, leading to the Crimean crisis and from there to what the crisis reached by 2022, in order to reach effective results that show the reality of this conflict.
First: Ukraine Features and Characteristics
The Republic of Ukraine is an Eastern European country, and the word ‘Ukraine’ means ‘at the border’ because it formed the geographical border of the old Russian country with Europe, and it has an important geographical location, as its ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are the southern gates leading to the warm seas, Western Europe and all continents ([1]).
Ukraine is located southwest of the European section of the Russian Federation and is bordered to the north by the Republic of Belarus, to the northeast and east by the Russian Federation, to the south by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, to the southwest by the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Hungary, and to the west by Slovakia and Poland, the location of Ukraine connects the East and West, specifically between the Russian Federation and the West, which makes it in a state of attraction and conflict between Russia and the West over its location and capabilities in terms of area, and the availability of natural resources in the subsoil and fertility of its soil and land for agriculture (it was German Nazi troops transport black Ukrainian soil by train to Germany for fertility), provide agricultural products and food, as well as cheap labor, as there are many industries shared with Russia such as metallurgy, aviation, space and weapons.
The area of Ukraine is (603,700) square kilometers with a coastal strip which is up to (2782) kilometers, and it is ranked (44) in the world, in terms of area, and under this area the geographical reality of Ukraine is formed from several geographical forms, in which the fertile plains or steppes and plateaus. Additionally, there are mountains in which there are the Carpathian Mountains in the west, as well as the mountains in the Crimea in the far south along the coast, and the Danube Delta forms to the southwest, i.e. Border with Romania .
Ukraine as a unified state consists of (24) oblasts and the autonomous Republic of Crimea, and among its duration are two cities with special legal status: the first of which is the city of Kiev as the capital of Ukraine, and the second is the city of Sevastopol, which includes the Russian Black Sea fleet (according to the lease agreement between them),[2] and the twenty-four regions and Crimea are divided into (94) rayons, any province or administrative unit of the second level, and the levels of administrative units vary as cities, (oblast) or (rayon) in their subordination to the state, as in Kiev. These administrative units are urban settlements, similar to rural communities but more urbanized, with industrial, educational, transport and communication institutions, as well as units representing villages[3].
As for the demographic composition in Ukraine, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the population of Ukraine has reached (46) million people, representing (77.8%) of Ukrainians, with minorities of Russians though relatively large in number, and of Belarusians and Romanians. The official and only language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language with the circulation and use of the Russian language, and with regard to religion in Ukraine, it is the Eastern Orthodox Christian religion, which has clearly influenced literature and architecture in Ukraine.
Ukraine is an industrial country and an exporter of civil and military equipment and technology in particular. It is the second military force in Europe after Russia, and the number of its official army is (788) thousand highly trained soldiers, and has a huge nuclear arsenal which was delivered to Russia within the framework of the START Treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons signed in 1994. It also owns factories for advanced military production and exports aircraft and tanks. In the scientific field, it is a very advanced country, especially in the field of space, and owns (16) satellites for exploration purposes Ukraine ranks 29th economically in the world, and is taking serious steps towards further economic progress, especially after changing its policies to the free market following the collapse of the Soviet Union[4].
Second: The Historical Roots of Russian-Ukrainian Relations
Russia and Ukraine, the two neighboring countries, have been linked by ancient and strong relations, as historical writings say that the first to establish the Ukrainian Renaissance are the Eastern Slavs in the ninth century AD, which was the beginning of the modern history of Ukraine, so this country known as “Kiev Ross” became the medieval center of the Eastern Slavs over three centuries, and the Russians regard the Ukrainian city of Kiev as “the mother of Russian cities” and the center of the Eastern Orthodox civilization.
1- The Formation of the Soviet Union and the Cold War Phase:
Many historical events have unfolded in a particular geographical region, marked by bloody conflicts and fierce wars over control and domination, during which Ukrainian territories were divided multiple times. After the Great Northern War (1700–1721), they were split among several regional powers. By the 19th century, most of Ukraine had fallen under the Russian Empire, while the remainder came under Austro-Hungarian control. Consequently, the two states share numerous and profound ties in both the past and present. Additionally, both Russia and Ukraine adhere to the Eastern Orthodox Church. Church ().[5]
This region has formed an area of historical conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and between Russia and the European West, as Western Christianity, Slavic Orthodoxy, and Turkish Islam clashed for more than a thousand years, and this is shown by the demographics of Ukraine, which reflects the image of the European-Russian conflict, the majority of the population of the Ukrainian west is Ukrainian Catholics, while the Russian Orthodox element is predominant in the Ukrainian east and south. After the end of the Russian Civil War (1918–1921) with the Bolsheviks’ victory, three additional republics were established alongside the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic: Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia. Each republic was granted a constitution similar to that of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. By late 1922, these republics joined the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to form what became known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
The stage of Ukraine’s accession to the Soviet Union constituted a fundamental turning point in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, as it was during the rule of the former Soviet leader “Stalin” when “Nikita Khrushchev” of Ukrainian origin ruled Ukraine, with an iron fist and was able to establish the communist state in it. Following taking the reins of the Soviet Union, he separated Crimea from Russia and annexed it to Ukraine in 1954, as the decision to annex the island came from a strategic perspective regarding the reality of the Soviet Union as a whole and the priorities of protecting its security and stability, as the ideological base on which its formation was established, and which was circulated to all members under its umbrella, allowed the deduction of Crimea from Russia and its annexation to Ukraine, after the communist doctrine abolished the popular and national differences between the countries of the Union at the time, which allowed to overlook the status of Crimea, considering the whole of Ukraine as part of the mother Soviet Union.
2- Post-Cold War Period
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, all its countries came out economically exhausted affected by the consequences of the communist regime era, so all their eyes turned towards the West, especially the United States of America and Europe, and attempts began to draw a new foreign policy and cultural integration with the West, and on the other hand, the West felt the pride of the victory of the capitalist system and the failure of the socialist experience, which later gave the European Union the opportunity to expand eastward in the largest expansion process in 2004 with the accession of (12) countries of the former Soviet Union to the European Union ([6]).
Since their exit from the Soviet Union, these countries have declined the level of their engagement with Russia to the minimum level of interaction that preserves their vital interests, while Russia sensed the importance of a kind of association that can maintain relations between them and yesterday’s partners, in a way that preserves their strategic interests and the interests of millions of Russians who settled in those countries during the Soviet era, as well as fear of US hegemony and reasons related to Russian national security. It realized that they could not manage without yesterday’s partners.
Therefore, the Association of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed in December 1991, and it included, in addition to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the five Islamic countries of Central Asia, as well as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia, for a total of (12) countries, nine whose mission is to address the security and military issues of their countries, as they were unable to find a state of harmony between them, as they witnessed many differences in the views between their leaders on those security and military treatments. Some wanted independent armed forces of the CIS countries, such as the leaders of Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, each with its own reasons, for example, Ukraine was driven to do so by the rejection of Russian hegemony over it, and the state of discord between Russia and Ukraine appeared almost continuously, as the two countries witnessed several sharp conflicts, of which the issue of Crimea was one of the most important topics ([7]).
The 1990s witnessed a rapprochement between Russia and the United States, at the expense of Russia’s role in the international system. The US-Russian cooperation document, signed at Camp David in 1992 between President Bush and President Yeltsin, included the principle of cooperation between the two parties, ending the rivalry of the past era (the Cold War), reducing the arsenal of strategic weapons and working for greater rapprochement between the two peoples[8].
Although Russia is no longer an enemy, it still views NATO with hostility and hatred, so talking about annexing Russia to NATO was unrealistic; Russia – far from its understandable pride – does not seek to be a member of a US-led alliance, and it became preoccupied with arranging its own status for the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which Ukraine is a part, and the Commonwealth of Independent States appeared as its inability to transform into a strong and unified grouping, and semi-unions began to appear later. Regional growth with the participation of Russia, including the Eurasian Economic Community, which was formed in 2000, and the Treaty of the Joint Economic Area, signed in 2003, which includes the establishment of a common customs union and a free trade area, but it found a lukewarm welcome in Ukraine among pro-Western circles and more inclined towards integration with Europe. The primary goal of keeping Ukraine as an observer rather than a full member of the Eurasian group was to preserve its opportunities for further integration with Europe. ([9]).
In 2002, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine announced Ukraine’s intention to join NATO, which was confirmed by a decree signed by President Leonid Kuchma in July of the same year, a call that has been repeated and renewed since 1996, and in 1998 a national strategy was adopted for this purpose, like the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which were eager to become an integral part of a free Europe and unwilling to become a geopolitical land left between NATO and Russia ().[10]
The Second Section
Russo-Ukrainian War
The relationship that existed between Ukraine and the European Union was the reason for the start of the Ukrainian uprising revolutions in less than ten years, but, in fact, these relations were only a symbolic embodiment of a set of strategic problems in addition to the political and economic problems that Ukraine experienced as an independent country. We find that there is a close link between the stability of Ukraine and the security of energy supplies to Europe, and this has prompted the European Union to start preparing talks. These talks ended with the offer made by the Union to the Ukrainian President, which was considered by the Ukrainian President Yanukovych as a harsh offer and will not be sufficient in order to work to meet the needs of Ukraine, especially in the financial aspect.
After the European offer was rejected, Russian President Putin made an offer to the Ukrainian president represented in an aid offer, which was worth (fifteen billion dollars). In addition, he had made a set of facilities in the prices of gas, and Putin came that this offer is enough in order to maintain Ukraine to be outside the influence of the European Union, and the Ukrainian president has imagined that it will be enough in order to work to put an end for protesting movements that took place in the country at this time ([11]).
The protests have worsened, so the demonstrators have seen this as a good opportunity, in order to work to achieve the goals of the Orange Revolution and work to achieve more and more political reforms, and this resulted, after two months of protests, that the Ukrainian Prime Minister has submitted his resignation from his own post and at the same time the Ukrainian Parliament canceled a set of legislation which he had preferred and which was one of the reasons that led to the internal crisis. It has evolved, in addition to the fact that the number of crowds has increased, and this matter indicates the existence of Ukrainian insistence, as the situation has become escalating, especially when the Ukrainian police used live bullets and one of the citizens was killed, and this was in (2014) and it was the beginning of a new chapter in the succession of death numbers clearly and through direct beating.
Russia took advantage of this matter and began to prepare propaganda, which in turn suggests to Ukrainian citizens of Russian origin, especially those inside the island of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, that what is known as Ukrainian extremists will seize the country and that they will cause many massacres against Russian-speaking individuals. This has led to the resort of the Ukrainian parliament, which witnessed in every way the defection of many of the ruling party and their joining the opposition to the procedures for implementing the agreements in an attempt by them to respond to all the demands that exist in the street, in addition to their efforts to prevent and limit the indicators related to reaching civil wars.
We find that among the decisions taken by the Ukrainian parliament is the restoration of the constitution (2004) again, through which work is done to determine the powers of the president in addition to working to strengthen the powers of the parliament, in addition to the fact that he worked to drop the law on preventing demonstrators and issued a law for the release of (Yulia Yamoshenko), who was put in prison by the court loyal to the president, and in the end the vote was to impeach the president and the majority of members agreed to this Resolution ([12]).
However, before this decision was approved, it was preceded by the signing of an agreement reached by the Ukrainian president with opposition leaders and through European mediation in order to work on ending the political crisis, which stipulated the preparation for early elections and the formation of a transitional government and amending the constitution. Both the US president and the Russian president put this agreement between the opposition and the government under rapid implementation. Despite this agreement, the turning point and consequence of the popular protests that took place in Ukraine were that the Ukrainian president left his palace and tried to escape but was moved to his party’s
stronghold in the east of the country.
Nevertheless, as ties began to be weakened and Russia was forced to reduce its control over Ukraine, the conditions became ideal for building an independent state. The collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, manipulated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, led to the effect of two special impacts regarding Russia, which can be illustrated below:
- Russia became aware that Ukraine would have become more difficult if not impossible to be controlled, and countermeasures were put in place so as not to lose one of the links that benefited Russia and expanded its international [13].
- The question of national belonging reopens some unresolved issues in areas where the fragile coexistence of Russian and Ukrainian monarchies remains disputed, as it is the case of the south-eastern regions that have already been discussed and have been frozen since the end of the cold war.
We find that the Russian government has strived to work to exploit opportunities related to the turmoil experienced by Ukraine, through military interventions that have been carried out in Crimea, and under its intention to defend Russian citizens in the region, the eastern regions that are present in Ukraine have large numbers of Russian nationalism and this is on the side of Crimea. This in turn has led to an increase in the escalation of American-European anger against Russian moves ([14]).
Second: The Evolution of the Course of the Ukrainian-Russian War between Motives and the Mechanism:
It can be said that the Russian military plan has begun to try to change the Ukrainian regime, although it did not announce this and headed to several axes, the most important of which is the axis passing through the city of Kharkiv, which reaches Kiev, but stopped after the fourth week, and the presence of a convoy of more than 40 kilometers of Russian armored vehicles was monitored, but it stopped for three weeks before advancing to the Kiev region, and this was explained by many considerations that were interpreted by military circles for multiple considerations that we will trace in the following lines:
- The cessation of that convoy indicates that there is a retreat in Russia’s military plan to occupy Kiev, as there was a realization in Russia that there is a process of attrition being arranged by NATO and with advanced weapons to deplete the forces entering Kiev, which forced the military campaign to stop, but at the same time it showed that the continuation of the campaign for nearly three weeks without air strikes reflects the extent of its success in destroying the Ukrainian air force almost completely.
- There was a halt in Russian military operations until signs of a change in strategy emerged. This included a retreat from advancing toward the capital, regrouping forces, and shifting focus once again to the south. Concurrently, reports indicated changes in military and intelligence leadership within the Russian security apparatus. These changes were linked to several factors, including infiltration by intelligence agencies into certain military and intelligence circles, which exposed plans for the military expansion of the operation. This also reflected accountability measures against military leaders who had failed to achieve the objectives set by the Russian leadership[15].
- The Russian forces then moved to regroup their troops in the east and south, improving their tactical positions to focus on the southern and eastern regions. This included taking control of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, expelling the Ukrainian forces that were concentrated in some areas of the region, and destroying them. Additionally, they laid siege to the city of Mariupol, which is considered the most important military port on the Black Sea in the Sea of Azov region. Mariupol is the main port for exporting Ukrainian grain to Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, securing control of Mariupol would enable military operations to move to the next region, which is Odessa.
- If we examine the Russian doctrine, we find that it relies on the principle of escalation with the aim of containing escalation. Accordingly, there has been a focus on intensifying operations in the eastern region, as it is considered close to Russian territory and therefore not exposed to Ukrainian strikes. This plan succeeded in capturing Mariupol, making it the first strategic city to be taken since the beginning of the military invasion. This indicates that Russia has achieved a form of victory, as the fighters in Mariupol were part of the National Guard, previously accused by Russia of belonging to Nazi forces. Thus, eliminating this battalion becomes a significant card in Russia’s hands.([16])
Thus, Putin’s decision to launch a war against Ukraine can be considered a strategic mistake. Whether he succeeds in occupying Ukraine or fails, the consequences of the invasion will be extremely costly for Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shattered the objectives Russia had worked to build for several years, such as straining American-European relations. However, the opposite has occurred; the war has contributed to deepening and strengthening American-European relations and unifying the Western front in addressing the Russian-Ukrainian war. ([17]).
Third: The Reasons for the Prolongation of the Russian-Ukrainian War.
There are numerous reasons behind the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war, chief among them being the success of NATO, the United States, and Britain in fully preparing for the conflict and efficiently organizing operations to deplete Russian forces. However, the Russian forces have recently become aware of this and subsequently adjusted their strategies. It is worth noting that one goal Russia has managed to achieve is preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and acquiring nuclear weapons. The side effects of the military operations have led to increased armament among European countries, such as Germany, which has significantly ramped up its military capabilities. American and British arms manufacturers have, of course, benefited from this, with billions flowing into their industries.[18]
This has also been accompanied by an unprecedented military expansion of NATO in countries neighboring Russia, with a concentration of U.S. and NATO forces in these states. This prompted traditionally neutral countries, such as Sweden and Finland, to apply for NATO membership, highlighting that developments are not in Russia’s favor. The sanctions imposed on Russia are unprecedented and have had severe economic consequences for the country. Additionally, they could weaken the regime’s popularity if it fails to achieve domestic successes. As a result, Russia’s focus on its military operations was a strategic, actionable objective aimed at presenting it as a domestic military achievement to counteract the impact of Western economic sanctions.
The researcher believes that the Russian-Ukrainian war is the main purpose of which Russia considers Ukraine’s accession to NATO as a threat to its national security, and this was shown in the announcement of the Russian side put forward this idea for fear of the presence of special forces of the alliance on the Russian borders. Therefore, military operations are considered a deterrent method to protect its national security, but we find that the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West will extend their impact for long periods, as a result of the isolation that the Russian economy will suffer away from the global economy. In the light of those sanctions, Russia will not be able to modernize the Russian economy and economic diversification as well as improving the competitiveness of the state, but on the other hand, some experts have indicated that Russia can replace this by forming strong economic ties with China, and we see that this crisis is similar to the Cuban crisis that ended with the settlement between the United States of America and Russia and that the fate of the Russian-Ukrainian war may end in this way. However, each party will receive privileges in return for this, especially that there are repercussions for all countries, not only at the political level, but also at the economic and security levels.
Chapter Two
The Impact of the War on the Policies of the United States of America towards the Middle East
The US National Security Strategy, which is usually issued by US administrations, acquires great importance as it includes the president’s visions and perceptions about US interests at the global level, in addition to the threats and risks facing these interests and ways to confront them. Thus, it can be considered a “fixed perception” of American interests, which enjoy a fair amount of permanence and stability. On the other hand, the president’s concepts and perceptions of the risks that threaten these interests and ways to address them, and it should be noted that these concepts and perceptions are changing. It changes with each new U.S. president, hence the distinction between each of these documents.
The 48-page strategy, published on October 12, 2022, focuses on what is known as the “decisive decade,” which marks the second decade of this century (2020-2030). This strategy aims to advance the vital interests of the United States and enable it to outperform its geopolitical rivals, as well as addressing common challenges, and setting the world on a path to a brighter tomorrow. The strategy also notes that “the world’s need for American leadership is as great and optimistic as it has never been,” and that the United States is currently engaged in a major strategic competition to shape the international order.
If the strategy paid great attention to the American internal circumstances and identified three main axes for its advancement: protecting the security of the American people, expanding economic prosperity and opportunity, and promoting and defending democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. In the field of foreign policy, it considered China to be the biggest and most serious challenge, as it increasingly seeks to reshape the international system in its favor. Russia, on the other hand, ranks second in this strategy as a source of threat to the security and stability of Europe and global nuclear security.
The U.S. strategic direction toward establishing a “network of alliances and partnerships in Europe and the Indo-Pacific” was formed to strengthen the United States’ ability to address challenges and threats. Other concerns focused on three challenges that the strategy considered “transnational”, such as pandemics and climate change.
The First Section
U.S. Strategy in the Middle East
The Middle East region enjoys great strategic importance in US policies, thanks to its geographical location and huge energy reserves. In addition to its central role in global security and economic issues, this region is considered a center for many vital interests of the United States, such as securing energy sources, combating international terrorism, promoting regional stability, and maintaining its position as a leader of the international system. This is in addition to the relations with Middle Eastern countries, especially the Arab Gulf states, which play a key role in shaping the U.S. policy toward major international issues, making the region a crucial element in shaping Washington’s strategies on the global stage.
Certainly, there has been a great debate that has taken place, and may still be ongoing, in American political circles since the administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017) about the relative decline of the importance of the Middle East in the US foreign policy agenda, with the United States focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the subsequent developments showed the return of American interest in the Middle East due to its great importance in the global role of the United States during this transitional phase of the development of the international system.
The geostrategic importance of the Middle East in American contexts, both past and present, is related to a number of fundamental variables that make this region central to American politics. Historically, the Middle East has been a crossroads of civilizations and a region of competition between major powers, thanks to its location linking three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), in addition to being a vital trade corridor and a major source of energy, especially oil and gas, destined for global markets.[19]
During the Cold War period, the Middle East became an arena for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both powers sought to strengthen their influence through various regional alliances and alignments. For their part, the United States focused on supporting traditional powers such as Turkey, Egypt, the Arab Gulf states, and Iran during the Shah’s reign, due to their geostrategic location and regional influence. Such countries as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon witnessed conflicts and proxy wars between the two superpowers. The restructuring of the system of regional alliances, such as the shift of Egyptian politics and the restructuring of Iranian politics in the seventies from the Soviet Union to the United States, was a landmark event.
The importance of the Middle East to the United States remains today as a result of several key factors, most notably energy resources, as the region contains about 48% of the world’s oil reserves and 40% of natural gas reserves, making it a vital region for the global economy, which affects energy security both in the United States and the world. Moreover, the region is a major hub for global shipping, with about 20 percent of oil trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning any disruption in this corridor could threaten international economic stability.[20]
The security and political situation in the Middle East plays a prominent role in the attention of the United States, as the region is witnessing transformations and conflicts affecting the world stage. This is clearly reflected in the rivalry between regional powers and the rise of unconventional powers such as armed organizations and militias, which pushes the United States to maintain a strong military presence in the region to protect its interests and ensure stability.
Moreover, the United States seeks to balance the regional influence of rival powers such as Iran, Russia and China. Iran seeks to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, while Russia is working to strengthen its military and political presence in Syria and other countries in the region. China’s role is increasing, economically, politically, and at a later stage in terms of security, in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf region, where these dynamics make the Middle East a competitive arena between the world powers. This increases the region’s importance in U.S. strategies.[21]
The political means used by the United States to achieve its goals in the Middle East are part of Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power.” These media include media and cultural exchange tools, and have been developed since 1990. The soft power tools in US foreign policy towards the Middle East are to exploit the media to publish statements by American officials that support democratic transition and include the necessary reports on the state of democracy to the State Department, providing US diplomatic missions with experts in the field of propaganda for democratic transition, in addition to using international conferences to pressure non-democratic countries.
The economic means used by the United States of America to achieve its interests in the Middle East are economic assistance, which includes all the resources of goods, services, technologies and know-how, in addition to financial grants and soft or non-concessional loans. This assistance is transferred from donors to recipients, taking into account the identity of both donors and recipients, their goals, relationships, the existence of voluntariness on both sides, as well as the availability of preconditions or pressures.
The United States of America is the largest initiative for development and economic assistance, known as the Marshall Plan. This project aims to provide economic assistance to Western European countries for their reconstruction and contribute to addressing the damage caused by World War II, economically and in infrastructure that was severely damaged as a result of the conflict. The project was named after General George Marshall, and it began as an emergency grant from the United States to Western European countries to help rebuild what was destroyed by the war. The United States expanded the project from 1948 to 1951, with a total of $13 billion in aid, benefiting most Western European countries.
The Second Section
The Repercussions of the War on the Policies of the United States of America towards the Middle East
Recently, there have been a series of qualitative shifts in Joe Biden administration’s approach to dealing with U.S. allies in the Middle East. This came after relations between Washington and some of its regional allies witnessed some tensions, in addition to the messages sent by the Democratic administration about the decline in its security and political commitments towards the issues of the region. Some procedures were interpreted as an American repudiation of support for the interests of its allies in the region, most notably Washington’s decision to remove the Iran-backed Houthi militia from the list of foreign terrorist organizations. The analytical vision of the transformation of the US role in the Middle East comes from three main levels, as follows:
- The Complexity and Intricacy of International Relations: The recent period has witnessed a remarkable escalation in many complex interactions that are characterized by a state of “uncertainty” in front of the agenda of the US administration headed by Joe Biden, which requires quick and effective decisions, including the Corona pandemic, climate change, the conflict with China, in addition to the Russian-Ukrainian war and its effects on the security of the Western bloc.[22]
- Growing Internal US Pressures: Internal pressures in the United States have increased as a result of successive international crises, which have exacerbated many negative effects on various fields within the country. The most prominent of which are the high unemployment rates, the decline in intra-regional investments, the slowdown of foreign trade, in addition to the limited value and supply chains. The country has witnessed an increase in the intensity of partisan polarization, especially with the approach of the U.S. midterm congressional elections in November 2022.
- The Existence of Regional Uncertainty: It involves the uncertainty and obscurity of the international environment and the identification of specific paths that made the decision-maker in Washington, especially with regard to the limited prospects for a solution to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Given the changes brought about by the Russian-Ukrainian war in US foreign policy towards the Middle East, there are several key features that have reshaped Washington’s agenda towards this region, according to the
following elements:
- Resetting Relations with Allies: S. assessments seek to get out of the Arab region, but with changes in the environment of international interactions, it has become necessary to reposition itself in the region and repair relations with traditional allies in the region. This aims to achieve a number of US goals, most notably securing Arab oil and gas supplies as an alternative to Russian energy.
- Circumventing Chinese Influence: It is one of the most prominent motives related to circumventing Chinese expansion in the Arab region, as the activities of Chinese companies are concentrated in the Middle East, especially in the field of technology, and these activities affect the American presence and interests. In the light of the increasing volume of Chinese investments in infrastructure and industrial sectors in Arab countries, Washington’s fears of the possibility of establishing Chinese military bases or fulcrums for the Chinese military presence in the region.
- Swaying the Arab Region against Moscow: The Arab bloc was keen to take a position that tends towards neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis, despite the presence of tendencies among some Arab countries approaching the Russian position. Biden, therefore, seeks to reposition the United States in the region, hoping to attract some countries to adopt critical positions on the Russian military intervention and align with Western countries in the camp
opposing Moscow.[23]
The potential repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the Middle East, especially with regard to the US strategy towards the region, can also be presented as follows:
- The Return of American Engagement in the Middle East: There are revisions among decision-makers in Washington related to the importance of abandoning the policies of “American exit / end the role”, in exchange for strengthening consensual roles with traditional and rising powers in the region. The United States is still present in the region.
- Focus on Vital US Interests in the Region: The Biden administration is tied to the region through a set of vital interests, most notably ensuring the security of energy resources in the short and medium terms. These considerations are particularly crucial in light of balancing the repercussions of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and its negative impact on gas supplies to the Western bloc. Additionally, Washington prioritizes several critical issues in the region, such as maintaining a secure oil passage and avoiding the presence of hostile forces.
- Military Repositioning in the Arab region: They constituted the most important basic determinants that shape the American movements in the Middle East, as the Democratic administration in the US government is working to develop the patterns of the American presence in the region, which is commensurate with regional developments without using the traditional pattern of deploying regular forces in the region, where the United States adopts through the development of infrastructure, logistical transport networks and ports with the countries of the region.
- Chinese Barter: As a result of China’s continued expansion in the region and its rising regional and global influence, the American decision-maker has been compelled to respond, especially with the growing evidence of efforts to develop relations between China and several regional partners in the area. This has led to a reassessment of regional development and economic projects on the table. Consequently, the United States has moved to re-establish paths of rapprochement with its traditional partners in the region, counterbalancing their existing relations with Beijing, in addition to defining its approach to dealing with China and vital areas of interest.
- Controlling Security Arrangements in the Arab region: This point relates to the contents of the American vision regarding security construction in the Arab world, in addition to the volume of Arab investments in choosing the most appropriate security model for regional construction. For example, US President Joe Biden seeks to promote what is known as the “NATO of the Middle East”, by linking air defense systems in Israel and Arab countries, with the aim of confronting the “Iranian threat”, which was rejected by the Arab powers. In return, the following period on July 14, 2022, witnessed the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister’s emphasis on “subsidizing Jerusalem”, while emphasizing the US commitment to “building a strong regional structure” to advance regional integration with Israel over time, and expanding the circle of cooperation to include more Arab countries, carrying the term “regional structure” used in the statement more political than military, along with the establishment of a “Combined Task Force”.[24]
- Controlling what is related to the Iranian issue: It is one of the most important Arab investments with regard to the US regime’s barter for the outcomes of the negotiations based on the Iranian nuclear agreement. For example, the agreement does not stipulate freezing the Iranian nuclear program, but rather stopping the missile program, curbing Iranian influence in accordance with the Egyptian position on the issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation.
From the above, we conclude that the Russian-Ukrainian war has prompted the United States of America to change its strategy towards the Middle East as a result of various developments and changes, which made it seek to reconsider development projects in the region while resetting security arrangements.
Results:
The results of the research came in a number of points as follows:
- Ukraine is located in the southwestern part of Europe, bordered to the north by the Republic of Belarus, to the northeast and east by the Russian Federation, to the south by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, to the southwest by the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Hungary, and to the west by Slovakia and Poland. Ukraine’s location is characterized by being a connecting point between East and West, which makes it the focus of attraction and conflict between Russia and the West due to its strategic location and great potential. Ukraine has a vast area and rich natural resources, in addition to the fertility of its soil that makes it an ideal agricultural area, as the German Nazi forces transported Ukrainian black soil to Germany for its high fertility. Ukraine provides a variety of agricultural products and food, as well as a cheap labor force, which contributes to the existence of joint industries with Russia in areas such as metallurgy, aviation, space and weapons.
- The stage of Ukraine’s accession to the Soviet Union is a decisive turning point in the history of relations between Russia and Ukraine. During the reign of the former Soviet leader “Stalin”, “Nikita Khrushchev”, of Ukrainian origin, took over the administration of Ukraine with an iron fist, and succeeded in consolidating the communist system there. When Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet Union, he made a decision to separate Crimea from Russia and annex it to Ukraine in 1954. This decision arose from a strategic perspective related to the general situation of the Soviet Union and the priorities for protecting its security and stability. The ideological base adopted by Khrushchev was based on the need to circulate it to all members under the umbrella of the Union, which allowed him to cut off Crimea from Russia and annex it to Ukraine.
Research Recommendations
- Any attempt to achieve progress in resolving the issue, particularly amid the growing Arab normalization with Tel Aviv, comes alongside the pressure to halt ongoing Israeli settlement activities, existing Judaization policies, and the blockade imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This coincides with the need for the fundamental principles governing American and international approaches to the Palestinian cause to align with the Arab consensus vision, which prioritizes the two-state solution.
- It is essential to address Arab issues, especially in conflicts marked by critical conditions, with Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen at the forefront.
- The tendency of the countries of the world to try to settle the situation between the two countries by peaceful means in order to reduce the intensity of competition between them, which pushes stability in the international environment, including the global and regional economic stability of the Middle
Bibliography
First: Arabic References
- Amna Muhammad Ali, “The Crimean Crisis and its Repercussions on Russian-Ukrainian Relations”, Journal of International Studies, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, Issue (68), 2017, p. 152
- Iman Zahran, The Implications of NATO Enlargement, on the Security Arrangements of the European Bloc, International Politics, 2022, available at the following link
: https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/ 18303.
- Iman Zahran, Transformations of US policy towards the Middle East in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Arab and Regional Horizons Magazine, vol.11, 2022, p.220.
- Hamza Jamoul, Ukraine and the International Chessboard, Al-Akhbar Journalist, Issue (2233), (2014).
- Hamid Shihab, “Regional and International Competition in the Islamic Republics of Central Asia”, Journal of International Studies, Baghdad, Issue (28), 2005, p. 18
- Suhair El-Sherbiny, Economic sanctions and their potential effects on Russia, Ukraine and the European Union, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, March 2, 2022.
- Ali Fadli, The Russo-Ukrainian War: Putin’s Strategic Mistake, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2022.
- Qasim Muhammad Obaid, Muhammad Maysar Fathi, “International Crises and the Future of Global Geostrategic Balances (The Syrian and Ukrainian Crisis as a Model)”, Journal of Political Issues, Al-Nahrain University, Baghdad, Issue (43-44), 2016, p. 86
- Mohammad Safwan Gulak, “Ukraine’s crisis between politics, economy and geography”, Al Jazeera Net, December 19, 2013, at the following website:
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2013/12/19
- Muhammad Mujahid Al-Zayat, Why the Ukrainian War Has Been Prolonged So Now, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, (May 5, 2022).
- Mohamed Mahmoud Al-Sayed, A Western Vision of the Russian War in Ukraine, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, Issue 17, (March 2022).
- Mona Suleiman, Possible Repercussions and Paths of the Russian Military Operation, Journal of International Politics, 2022, available at: https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/ 18240.
- Nawar Muhammad Rabie, “The Political Crisis in Ukraine and the Tensions of East and West”, Journal of Political and International, Al-Mustansiriya University, Baghdad, Issue (26-27), 2015, p. 20
- Nourhan Al-Sheikh, The repercussions of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine on the region, Future Center for Research and Future Studies, March 2, 2022.
- Yusuf Ali Mohammed, The Ukrainian Crisis (Roots, Backgrounds, Future) in the Hands of the Crisis, Research and Studies Center, Islam and International Relations, (2016).
Second: Foreign References
- Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Changing Strategic Importance of the Middle East and North Africa,” CSIS, January 24, 2023, https://shorturl.at/eBQVi
- Jeffrey Feltman et al., “The new geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s role in a changing region,” Brookings, January 2019, https://shorturl.at/YUazO
- Tony Badran, “Strategic Geography Of The Middle East,” Hoover Institution, June 27, 2019, https://shorturl.at/X3HnL
[1]Nawar Mohammed Rabie, “The Political Crisis in Ukraine and the Tensions of East and West”, Journal of Political and International, Al-Mustansiriya University, Baghdad, Issue (26-27), 2015, p. 20
On [2]21 April 2010, Ukrainian President Yanukovich and Russian President Medvedev reached an agreement under which the Russian lease of offshore installations in Crimea was extended for 25 years starting in 2017 with an additional 5-year renewal option (until 2042-2047) in exchange for a reduced multi-year contract to supply Ukraine with natural gas (this deal is controversial in Ukraine).
[3]Nawar Muhammad Rabie, op. cit., p. 23.
[4]Qasim Muhammad Obaid, Muhammad Maysar Fathi, “International Crises and the Future of Global Geostrategic Balances (The Syrian and Ukrainian Crisis as a Model)”, Journal of Political Issues, Al-Nahrain University, Baghdad, Issue (43-44), 2016, p. 86
[5]Amna Muhammad Ali, “The Crimean Crisis and its Repercussions on Russian-Ukrainian Relations”, Journal of International Studies, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, Issue (68), 2017, p. 152
[6]Amna Muhammad Ali, op. cit., p. 154.
[7]Hamid Shihab, “Regional and International Competition in the Region of the Islamic Republics of Central Asia”, Journal of International Studies, Baghdad, No. 28, 2005, p. 18.
[8]Ibid., p. 19.
[9]Menna Muhammad Ali, op. cit., p. 155.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Hamza Jamoul, Ukraine and the International Chessboard, Al-Akhbar Journalist, Issue (2233), (2014).
[12]Hamza Jamoul, ibid, Al-Akhbar newspaper, issue (2233), (2014).
[13]Nourhan Al-Sheikh, The repercussions of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine on the region, Future Center for Research and Future Studies, 2 March 2022.
[14]Yusuf Ali Mohammed, The Ukrainian Crisis (Roots, Backgrounds, Future) in the Hands of the Crisis, Center for Research and Studies, Islam and International Relations, (2016).
Mohamed [15] Mahmoud Al-Sayed, A Western Vision of the Russian War in Ukraine, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, Issue 17, (March 2022).
[16] Muhammad Mujahid al-Zayat, Why the Ukrainian War Has Been Prolonged So Far, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, (May 5, 2022).
[17] Ali Fadli, The Russo-Ukrainian War: Putin’s Strategic Mistake, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2022.
[18] Suhair El-Sherbiny, Economic sanctions and their potential effects on Russia, Ukraine and the European Union, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, March 2, 2022.
[19] Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Changing Strategic Importance of the Middle East and North Africa,” CSIS, January 24, 2023, https://shorturl.at/eBQVi
[20] Tony Badran, “Strategic Geography Of The Middle East,” Hoover Institution, June 27, 2019, https://shorturl.at/X3HnL.
[21] Jeffrey Feltman et al., “The new geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s role in a changing region,” Brookings, January 2019, https://shorturl.at/YUazO
[22] Iman Zahran, Transformations of US policy towards the Middle East in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Arab and Regional Horizons Magazine, vol. 11, 2022, p. 220.
[23] Iman Zahran, The Implications of NATO Enlargement on the Security Arrangements of the European Bloc, International Politics, 2022, available at: https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/ 18303.aspx
[24] Mona Suleiman, Possible Repercussions and Paths of the Russian Military Operation, Journal of International Politics, 2022, available at: https://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/ 18240.aspx



