Prepared by the researche : Ahmed Hussein Abodeif EL- Badawey – Political researcher
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
In recent years, the Sahel region has witnessed escalating tensions and a growing state of instability that threatens the future of the entire region. This reality raises serious questions about what lies ahead amid complex security and political challenges. In Chad, the country has continued to suffer internal turmoil since the assassination of President Idriss Déby in 2021. The subsequent transitional period has been marked by fragile institutions, public unrest, and a rising opposition movement, all unfolding alongside an intensification of armed attacks.
Mali has become a textbook example of a state struggling to emerge from crisis, with persistent internal conflict, foreign interventions, successive military coups, and the spread of terrorist groups across its northern and central regions. In Niger, the July 2023 military coup further complicated the situation in a country once considered one of the West’s last reliable allies in the fight against terrorism—opening the door to heightened regional and international tensions. Similarly, repeated coups and deepening security vacuums in Burkina Faso have enabled armed groups to expand their reach and terrorize local communities. Taken together, these developments place the future of the Sahel at a critical crossroads, demanding an urgent reassessment of support mechanisms and stabilization strategies before it is too late.
According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, Sahel countries now dominate the list of the world’s most terrorism-affected states. Six African countries from the region ranked among the top ten globally. Burkina Faso led the list with more than 1,500 deaths from terrorist attacks in 2024 alone, averaging 14 deaths per attack—double the 2023 average. Mali ranked fourth worldwide, followed by Niger in fifth place, both recording sharp increases in fatalities. Nigeria, Somalia, and Cameroon also appeared on the list. Collectively, these six countries accounted for 51% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024. This ranking reflects the severity of the security crisis and serves as a stark warning of the expanding scale of violence and insecurity, placing the Sahel at the epicenter of global terrorist activity.
The surge in terrorist activity in the Sahel cannot be separated from the region’s deeply rooted structural crises. Extreme poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic divisions, and recurring political coups have created fertile ground for armed groups to expand. The Sahel recorded the world’s largest increase in terrorism-related deaths in 2024, with 3,885 fatalities, even as overall deaths declined across sub-Saharan Africa. Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State (ISIS) exploit institutional fragility and security gaps, particularly in rural areas. Their operations are financed through illicit economic activities, including drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. These groups often present themselves as alternative authorities, collecting taxes and providing “protection,” further undermining already weak state institutions.
The Sahel has become one of the world’s most active regions for armed groups with diverse ideologies, affiliations, and sources of funding. Among the most prominent are the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), JNIM (affiliated with al-Qaeda), and Boko Haram. JNIM was formed in 2017 through the merger of several local factions and has become al-Qaeda’s main regional branch, wielding wide influence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. ISIS operates through two primary branches—one in the Sahel and another in West Africa—with a strong presence in Mali and Niger. In Nigeria, Boko Haram continues its long-standing insurgency despite internal divisions. These groups employ a wide range of violent tactics—including bombings, armed raids, and kidnappings—to expand their influence while exploiting local grievances and ethnic conflicts to entrench themselves.
Mali, in particular, is experiencing mounting internal and external tensions under the military leadership of Assimi Goïta. His regime recently dissolved all political parties and suspended political activity under the pretext of maintaining public order. These measures have triggered widespread protests by opposition movements and civil society groups demanding a return to civilian rule and democratic governance. Internally, the government continues to struggle to assert control over the northern and central regions, facing resistance from both jihadist groups and Tuareg separatists. Despite receiving support from Russia and Türkiye, the government has failed to achieve full territorial control. Externally, Mali’s relations with neighboring Algeria have sharply deteriorated after Bamako accused Algiers of shooting down a Malian drone, prompting both countries to recall their ambassadors and close their airspace. These developments underscore the fragility of Mali’s political and security environment, pushing the country toward deeper regional isolation and raising concerns over broader instability across the Sahel.
Niger is also grappling with escalating security and political tensions, making it one of the most volatile states in the Sahel in 2024. The number of terrorist attacks rose to 101, killing 930 people—499 of them soldiers—revealing the immense pressure on national security forces. The July 2023 coup intensified internal instability and created a power vacuum exploited by jihadist groups such as JNIM and ISIS, particularly after the withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2024. Threats are not only external; internal military unrest has also emerged, most notably at the Tirmit base, where mutinous soldiers detained senior officers in protest over poor conditions and delayed salaries. These incidents highlight dangerous fractures within the armed forces, which are already overstretched across vast desert terrain and increasingly weakened by the absence of Western logistical support. Niger’s path toward stability thus appears increasingly uncertain as it navigates between internal collapse and external threats.
As for Burkina Faso, it has become the world’s most dangerous epicenter of terrorism. In 2024, the country recorded 1,532 deaths from terrorist violence—representing one-fifth of all such deaths globally. Nevertheless, the government achieved a relative reduction in attacks and casualties during the second half of the year by enforcing tighter security measures, particularly following the August 2024 massacre in Djibo that claimed 200 lives. Despite this, conditions in the north remain dire. Djibo is still under siege, facing acute shortages of food and medicine. Serious human rights concerns have also emerged, with credible reports accusing government forces and pro-government militias of executing 100 civilians from the Fulani ethnic group in March 2024. These allegations raise fears of escalating ethnic conflict in a country already shattered by institutional weakness and fragile social cohesion.
With regard to Chad, the country is witnessing rising security tensions following the announcement of Mohamed Idriss Déby’s victory in the presidential elections. The opposition rejected the results, accusing the government of electoral fraud, which triggered sporadic protests and clashes with security forces. Internally, political and ethnic divisions are deepening, raising the specter of broader unrest if immediate de-escalation measures are not taken. Regionally, tensions have intensified between Chad and Sudan’s military council, as Khartoum accuses N’Djamena of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a brutal conflict with the Sudanese army. This accusation could open a new front of tension between the two states and further complicate the already fragile security landscape of the Sahel.
International Competition in the African Sahel
In recent years, the African Sahel has transformed into a central arena for international competition, driven by the intersection of security concerns, energy interests, strategic minerals, migration, and counterterrorism efforts. This competition is no longer limited to France and its traditional partners but has expanded to include major and rising powers such as Russia, China, and Türkiye, alongside a calculated American return and European attempts at strategic repositioning. This shift occurs amid the collapse of old security architectures, the partial withdrawal of Western forces following successive military coups, and the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) under a sovereignty-driven logic based on “multi-alignment.” As a result, Sahelian states are now managing their foreign relations through power-balancing rather than dependence on a single محور, while international actors seek to divide influence in one of the world’s most strategically fragile yet resource-rich regions.
First: Russia
Russia’s expansion in the African Sahel is based on a direct security-oriented approach that revolves around exchanging military protection for access to natural resources. The military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger provided Moscow with a golden opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the French withdrawal through the deployment of the “Africa Corps,” which replaced the Wagner Group. Russia presents itself as a “politically unconditional” ally that offers training, weapons, and combat support without democratic or human rights obligations. In return, it has secured broad concessions in the gold, uranium, and oil sectors, enabling it to partially offset the effects of Western sanctions. However, this influence is facing mounting challenges, most notably the growing attacks by armed groups against Russian presence and the erosion of its popular legitimacy due to reported abuses. This makes the Russian model militarily effective but strategically fragile in the long term.
Second: China
China’s strategy in the Sahel is centered on economic influence while avoiding direct military entanglement. Beijing focuses on investing in infrastructure, energy, and mining within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has become a key trading partner for Sahelian states, particularly in mining, railways, and hydropower. Unlike Russia, China avoids large-scale military engagement, limiting its role to modest arms supplies and training while maintaining a low-profile security presence. This approach grants Beijing political stability and official acceptance but weakens its ability to protect its investments in a highly volatile security environment. At the same time, its expansion into rare minerals reflects its drive to secure global supply chains for industry and technology, placing the Sahel firmly within the geoeconomic equation of Sino–American global rivalry.
Third: The European Union
The European role in the Sahel is currently undergoing a phase of strategic contraction after its security and military approaches suffered clear failures, whether through France’s “Operation Barkhane” or the EU’s training missions. Coups and rising anti-Western sentiment have led to the withdrawal of most European forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, depriving Europe of its traditional tools of influence. Nevertheless, the EU continues to view the Sahel as a forward defense line against terrorism, irregular migration, and organized crime, as well as a gateway to strategic resources. Accordingly, it is now moving toward restructuring its presence through a selective approach focused on education, civil society, energy, and mining rather than direct security confrontation. However, this shift remains contingent on Europe’s ability to adapt to the reality of “multi-partner alignment” and intensifying competition with Russia, Türkiye, and China.
Fourth: Türkiye
Türkiye represents the most dynamic model of rising influence in the Sahel, having shifted from being merely a military supplier to becoming a comprehensive security actor. Ankara capitalized on the French withdrawal and the decline of the U.S. role to expand its defense partnerships with Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad through the export of drones, armored vehicles, surveillance systems, as well as training programs and logistical support. Türkiye’s strategy is characterized by low cost, rapid response, and flexible political conditions, which has earned it broad acceptance among military regimes. At the same time, Ankara seeks to link its security footprint to gaining access to gold, uranium, and energy sectors. Thus, Türkiye’s presence is no longer temporary but has become a structural component of the Sahel’s power equation and a relative balancing force against Russian expansion.
Fifth: The United States
U.S. policy toward the Sahel is undergoing a phase of cautious re-engagement after a period of relative disengagement. Washington seeks to preserve its security role without extensive on-the-ground involvement. Its primary instruments include the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), intelligence support, and the building of local military capacities, in addition to diplomatic engagement in conflict management. Economically, the United States is working to reshape its trade relationship with Africa, especially with the impending expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), with growing emphasis on securing rare minerals essential for military and technological industries. Washington recognizes that losing the Sahel to Russia and China constitutes a long-term strategic threat. Therefore, it adopts a “smart presence” approach based on indirect influence rather than dense military deployment, while attempting to balance major powers without direct confrontation.
Axis Three: The Security Situation in the African Sahel
The security situation in the African Sahel is experiencing an unprecedented phase of rapid collapse, most clearly embodied by the siege of Bamako imposed by the al-Qaeda–affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Through the deliberate disruption of fuel supply routes, the group has effectively strangled Mali’s critical energy and transport arteries. This siege was not a transient military maneuver, but rather a compound pressure tool aimed at weakening the state economically and socially. It resulted in near-total paralysis of daily life, the closure of schools, and the disintegration of essential public services. This development reveals a strategic shift by jihadist groups from hit-and-run attacks toward long-term siege warfare and internal state exhaustion—reflecting a qualitative leap in their planning, organizational sophistication, and territorial control.
The danger deepens as the possibility of state collapse in Mali has shifted from a theoretical scenario to a realistic and actionable outcome—either through a forced settlement with armed groups or through the breakdown of the regime under renewed internal military pressure. A potential takeover of power by JNIM would represent an extremely dangerous precedent in Africa, as it would, for the first time, open the door for an al-Qaeda–affiliated organization to govern an internationally recognized state. This would effectively transform Mali into a full-fledged jihadist sanctuary, akin to Afghanistan after 2021. Such a development would not threaten Mali alone; it would signal the transformation of West Africa’s Sahel into a structured export hub for transnational terrorism, enabling jihadist groups to plan, train, and recruit free from any effective international constraints.
Security fragility is also compounded by the escalation of regional conflicts between Sahel states and their neighbors, as demonstrated by the forced landing of a Nigerian military aircraft in Burkina Faso and the arrest of its crew, followed by unprecedented air force mobilization. This incident reflects the transformation of political tensions into a level of potential direct military confrontation, particularly amid the withdrawal of Sahel states from ECOWAS and the establishment of a closed military alliance among themselves. Instead of serving as a collective deterrence shield, this alliance has become an additional driver of regional polarization and the erosion of mediation mechanisms, thereby raising the likelihood of confrontation between the camp of constitutional legitimacy and that of military regimes.
In the same context, the failure of the gamble on the Russian military approach as a substitute for Western support is becoming increasingly evident. The forces of the Africa Corps have proven unable to prevent the siege of Bamako or to protect villages and critical corridors, while human rights abuses have escalated and massacres have expanded in scale. This failure has further weakened national armies and fueled the proliferation of undisciplined local militias, which have compounded the crisis rather than contained it. Between the southward expansion of armed groups toward coastal states and the collapse of internal security balances within the Sahel, the region is moving toward a phase of generalized security fluidity, where civil wars intersect with terrorism and organized crime, in the absence of any effective collective framework for control or deterrence.
The Future of the African Sahel
In the near term, the future of the African Sahel is moving toward deeper structural instability amid an unprecedented escalation in security threats that no longer merely exhaust states but increasingly threaten their very existence. The continued siege of Bamako, the expanding influence of al-Qaeda–linked groups, and the erosion of regular armies’ ability to regain the initiative all indicate that the balance of power is gradually tilting in favor of non-state actors. In this context, the scenario of Mali’s collapse or its subjection to a forced settlement with armed groups is no longer a theoretical possibility but a realistic and imminent outcome should the current military and political deadlock persist. Any qualitative breakthrough by armed groups into major urban centers would propel the “jihadist state” model beyond the phase of insurgency into one of direct political control.
Within this framework, the idea of transforming the Alliance of Sahel States into a regional confederation appears to be a fragile project lacking the basic conditions for sustainability in a collapsing security environment. The establishment of a confederal entity presupposes a minimum level of stability, institutional cohesion, and effective border control—elements that are today undergoing rapid erosion. Any potential fall of Mali into the hands of armed groups would, in practice, undermine the very security and political foundation upon which this alliance is built, pushing Burkina Faso and Niger into an extremely perilous defensive position. Indeed, the confederation project itself could shift from being an instrument for consolidating sovereignty into a strategic liability that accelerates the disintegration of the regional order rather than unifying it—especially in the absence of international support and the retreat of traditional regional security umbrellas.
Over the longer term, the continuation of this trajectory will transform the Sahel into an open space for the reproduction of transnational chaos, where armed jihadism converges with smuggling economies, irregular migration, and organized crime. This trajectory threatens to turn the region into a permanent hub of instability with cascading effects extending into the Gulf of Guinea, North Africa, and Europe. As state authority falters and social resilience collapses under the pressures of poverty and violence, armed groups become ever more capable of recruitment, territorial expansion, and the imposition of parallel systems of governance. Thus, the future of the Sahel does not stop at its current crises; it is heading toward a dangerous reconfiguration of power and influence maps—unless a comprehensive political, security, and developmental intervention emerges that addresses the root causes of collapse rather than merely managing its consequences.
In light of the unprecedented escalation of security and political challenges confronting the African Sahel, it is evident that the region’s future stands at a critical crossroads between total collapse and a fragile path toward stability, contingent upon profound structural reforms. The continued expansion of armed groups, the erosion of state authority, and the entanglement of international and regional conflicts have severely undermined any endogenous capacity to contain these crises without coordinated and comprehensive intervention. Reliance on military solutions alone is no longer sufficient; rather, an integrated approach is required—one that combines security, development, institutional rebuilding, and the treatment of the root causes of poverty and social fragility. Moreover, regional unity, the revival of collective action mechanisms, and the restructuring of international partnerships on balanced foundations constitute decisive conditions for avoiding collapse scenarios. Today, the Sahel is not merely facing a passing crisis, but an existential struggle that will shape the contours of its stability for decades to come.
