The European Union’s Shaking Grounds Between The Geopolitical Challenges of Russia’s Russkiy and China’s Peaceful Rise
Prepared by the researche : Mariam Bensaoud – Ph D in International Relations with High Achievement Degree Qualification from Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkiye.
Democratic Arabic Center
Journal of extremism and armed groups : Eighteenth Issue – February 2025
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
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Abstract
This study investigates the dual geopolitical challenges facing the European Union (EU) due to Russia’s hybrid warfare strategies and China’s economic expansion through the 16+1 initiative. Russia destabilizes the EU by employing cyber operations, disinformation, and covert tactics, undermining EU cohesion and security. Meanwhile, China presents an appealing alternative to Eastern European nations, offering economic partnerships that challenge the EU influence. The research employs a qualitative methodology, analyzing official policy documents, expert reports, and geopolitical strategies to evaluate the extent of these threats and their impact on EU policies. By examining Russia’s ideological and hybrid warfare, as well as China’s peaceful rise, the study highlights structural vulnerabilities in the EU’s integration model and the limitations of its security approach. The findings emphasize the need for comprehensive reforms to strengthen political cohesion, improve strategic communication, and enhance defense measures. Addressing these external threats requires renewed collaboration among member states and a more unified geopolitical strategy for the future.
It is almost universally acknowledged that the European integration model and its success have not been the best in recent years. Challenges arising from shortfalls of economic model on unemployment, flow of refugees after Syrian crises and the EU dividing Iraq war foreign policy are but few to mention. The impact of Brexit on the EU, coupled with the emergence of a pro-Russian American President and the unprecedented ascendance of pro-Russian far-right movements across Europe, from west to east, constitutes a significant challenge to the Union in this century.
The escalating global security challenges, particularly those in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, have exposed the deep-seated and concealed resentments that have plagued the Union since its inception. The repeated terrorist attacks on European capitals such as Paris spread a discourse that went hand in hand and co-sounded Russian rising nationalism and extremism, reaching Euroscepticism and anti-Westernism. This all started with the dividing Iraq War which had brought to surface the hidden divide in foreign and security policy between the Union members giving rise to the Old versus New Europe division within the Union. An old Europe, composed of Western countries opposing the American offensive versus the new joining countries that are pro-American and pro-NATO as a reflection of the history of that part of Europe. That same history is haunting the European Union today in more dangerous forms such as Russian military and strategic plans for its Russian world defined as countries with historical soviet links.
The Russian discourse and presence in Eastern European countries has progressed from posing a political or strategic risk by having Russia present in those countries to infiltration of the core and Western countries via a new Russian military and security strategy known as Hybrid Warfare. The Russian strategy targets the European mind with the goal of destroying the European integration dream appeal while spreading Russian veins by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the new security context and the divide between Europe’s west and east. The competition between the Russian Eurasian model and union and the European model has reached new heights today, bringing new prospects in the security field. Challenges that are destabilizing enough to necessitate the full efficiency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security in meeting its article 5 goal of protecting its members from foreign intrusion not only in old but also in new forms: disinformation, propaganda, and money.
However, while Russia has succeeded in infiltrating members of the Eastern European partnership and guarantee the sidelining of key EU members such as Bulgaria and Hungary, resistance from countries such as Latvia, Ukraine and Georgia highlight a new way forward to the challenges to the European control over the region, which is not Russia but China.
China’s Sixteen Plus One (16+1) cooperation and initiative seems to be a perfect deal for all Eastern countries to meet their economic prosperity goals, have a back against Russia and a power to use to leverage against the EU shortfalls toward the region. China’s attractive model for the region which has received great enthusiasm and acceptance among the countries and which claims to align with European objectives and legal rules could not fit any easily with European fears of a rising Chinese giant. This article explores these eastern challenges from Russia and China’s plans toward Eastern Europe. It first explores Russia’s launched hybrid warfare on Europe, its challenges to the Union and NATO and explores the EU’s action plan to tackle the threat. Highlighting both Russia’s and the EU’s failure to provide a promising future for Eastern Europe and to treat the countries equally, this study investigates how China’s entry into the picture serves as a perfect fit for Eastern Europe while challenging the EU on many fronts and on legal, peaceful grounds.
Research Problem:
The European Union (EU) faces significant geopolitical challenges stemming from Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics and China’s expanding economic influence in Eastern Europe. These challenges threaten the stability of EU member states, highlight vulnerabilities in its integration model, and raise concerns about the effectiveness of the Union’s defense and strategic policies. Understanding how these forces shape the EU’s geopolitical environment and exploring viable responses are critical to safeguarding its political and economic future.
Research Questions:
- How does Russia’s hybrid warfare, including disinformation campaigns and covert activities, impact the security and cohesion of the European Union?
- What strategic opportunities and threats does China’s 16+1 initiative present to Eastern European countries and the EU as a whole?
- How effective are the EU’s current strategies in countering Russia’s and China’s influence in Eastern Europe?
- What reforms can the EU implement to strengthen its political, economic, and security frameworks in response to these geopolitical challenges?
- How do geopolitical pressures from Russia and China reveal weaknesses in the EU’s integration model and defense strategies?
To answer these questions, the research employs a qualitative methodology, analyzing official policy documents, expert reports, and geopolitical strategies to evaluate the extent of these threats and their impact on EU policies. By examining Russia’s ideological and hybrid warfare as well as China’s peaceful rise, the study highlights structural vulnerabilities in the EU’s integration model and the limitations of its security approach. The findings emphasize the need for comprehensive reforms to strengthen political cohesion, improve strategic communication, and enhance defense measures. Addressing these external threats requires renewed collaboration among member states and a more unified geopolitical strategy for the future. The article also provides recommendations for future studies on this subject based on the findings of this research.
I- Russian-European War in Eastern Europe: Ideologies
Before delving into Russia’s unconventional warfare campaign in Europe, it is critical to place it in context. Located right between two different governance giants, eastern Europe can be said to be a victim of a war on ideologies between Western liberalism and democracy versus Russian authoritarian model. It is critical to recognize the stark differences between both actors in order to gain a better understanding of their ideological conflict. On the one hand, we have a Union promoting a concept of supranationalism that seeks to transcend unilateral state-limited visions of nationalism. It promotes freedom of speech, negotiation, transparency, and, if necessary, intervention when others are in need or there is a violation of human rights. On the other hand, there is a highly nationalist state actor that is not only determined to protect its sovereignty and defines any attempt to undermine it as offensive, but it also broadens its sovereignty rights to include interfering in old Soviet colonies around the iron curtain. A country where information is tightly controlled by the state, from television, radio, and social networking sites. Russia also frames – in its official strategic and foreign policy plans- the EU’s enlargement plan as purely offensive to Russian national security.
When it comes to individual freedoms, Russia could not be more intolerant of the European model by framing family values as national security, too. Given its declining population and historical ambitions of expanding the Russian world, Russia finds the EU’s enlarged sphere of influence at its borders deeply offensive. In the middle, between both actors, is a few small countries that have been torn by both blocs’ power and ideological competition throughout its history. It is divided between those who are pro-Russia, others that have historically been pro-Western and anti-Soviet such as Finland and those who have been torn up by the two blocs competition and prefer instead to stay alone and peaceful with both such as Ukraine. A choice which Ukraine could not afford given its location right at the mouth of Russia.[1]
Russia’s new strategic security approach toward Eastern Europe stems from its fear of the spread of European rule of law to its neighbors, as well as the need to deal with its neighbors on a rule-of-law basis, which contradicts its approach. As some scholars coined it, Russia’s new approach is a way to protect anarchy from the EU’s rule of law model.[2]
The nature of both actors, their histories, defining governance doctrines, and very different conceptions of sovereignty are all reflected in their power struggle for Eastern Europe.
II- Russia’s Hybrid Warfare against Europe
Definition
As a general concept, Hybrid threats refer to all types of non-traditional security threats that need more than a conventional military defense strategy. It consists of groups, actors or states that can fight states in unprecedented and unexpected ways. To tackle these challenges, states will require both old and new defense tools to tackle them; that is both military and beyond military measures such as intelligence. These threats include terrorism, security challenges related to irregular migration and cyber-attacks on official and government organizations’ websites such as presidential candidates’ email hacking.[3]
In the context of Russia and Europe, Hybrid Warfare and threats have been defined particularly in relation to Russia as a combination of both overt and covert tools. This implies the use of both military and nonmilitary tools to destabilize stability, peace and unity in target states. According to NATO, the way to fight such hybrid threats is best defined as a war from “Tweets to Tanks”.[4] When it comes to Russia’s hybrid warfare it is specifically defined as a war of disinformation, cyber-attacks on states’ and organizations’ website, money laundering, support for the opposition and use of tools such as language, religion and minorities to spread Russian support against Euroscepticism. The use of propaganda, of energy dependence politics in eastern Europe to manipulate in addition to media efforts and the spread of extremism all come under covert warfare tools. These are carried in addition to overt tools of deploying bases, occupying or annexing in the eastern region as in the cases of eastern Ukraine and Crimea to intimidate Europe. In other words, NATO defines Russia’s hybrid warfare as “disguised intentions” which are composed of “a mixture of military and non-military means of aggression, a combination of overt and covert operations and measures from propaganda, disinformation to use of irregular ties, tweets and tanks, soldiers in uniform, soldiers out of uniform, in cyberspace and sometimes things that happen in our borders”.[5] The strategy, according to scholars, targets the minds of civilians and uses psychological tools to demoralize and depress its enemy by raising opposition and instability within its borders with covert measures.[6]
According to EU officials, this Russian warfare is a form of neo-fascism that threatens European liberal democracy and doctrine as well as the transatlantic ties. European officials have declared the Russian approach as a serious threat to national stability around Europe and against national security around the continent which made it worthy of a serious security approach to tackle it in military and non-military terms.
Russia’s newly adopted security strategy is a direct reaction to limitations of its military capabilities which make it short of being able to confront the west in a large full-scale war. The 2008 Russian failure in Georgia had alarmed the Russian army about its need for modernization, not only of military capabilities and technologies but also in terms of divisions, training etc. Russia’s declining demography with EU’s sanctions had direct effects on its military capabilities which put it far behind Western capabilities (800,000 less troops than NATO). Its inability to allocate sufficient funds for defense, recruit enough soldiers, and adequately train them led Russia to adopt a new military strategy focused on non-military means. Russia turned to investing in information and cyber technology, targeting resources such as geography, time and surprise through covert operations.[7]
In its 2013 Foreign Policy Strategy, Russia adopted the concept of Myagkaya Sila which translated as soft force. Soft force according to its strategic plan was to consist of direct coercion, destabilization by means that are not hard or military. Such means were rather to consist of propaganda by dominating state controlled Russian TVs with nationalism discourse and anti-Westernism. It also consists of politicizing gas and oil exports to punish pro-Western neighbors especially Finland or other states that are fully dependent on it for their energy supply. [8]
In an official military strategy, Russia adopted the covert indirect means as part of modern warfare strategy against the west. This was adopted in a doctrine known as Gerasimov Doctrine which entails modernization of Russian military as inclusion of operations with special forces by using internal oppositions in target countries and the power of informational action along with armed forces. The military strategy devised special forces to meet the new strategy goals called the GRU (Military Intelligence Spetsnoz Forces). [9] Also, in its foreign policy from 2008 to 2013, Russia has made it clear what its vision toward its neighbors was. The preservation of Russian orthodox civilization and the unity of the Russian world, defined on historical ties to the Soviet Union were the major national objectives of the federation. In line with these objectives, Russia sought for itself the promotion of a new world order propagated by it which consisted of the following key points:
The ability to operate freely in neighboring countries, as part of its duty to safeguard its sovereignty and historical sphere of influence. Which directly infers, the inability of those countries to exercise their sovereign rights and lead an independent foreign policy from Russia. Second, the ability and readiness to use military means to interfere in other countries where expatriates were in danger. The term expatriates, here, also referred to as compatriots can refer to a very loose and undefined community from Russian immigrants, minorities who speak Russian to anyone who can speak Russian and has sympathy or support toward Russia. These are characteristics of Russia’s Russkiy Mir vision toward Eastern Europe. Another objective was ignoring or even supporting violations of international law in the region, support practices such as corruption and dictate best forms of governance by supporting pro-Russian candidates to office and punishing or if necessary invading where pro-Western candidates take office.[10] This reflects a complete capture of Russia on the country’s sovereignty in terms of local as well as foreign politics. According to a military official, Russia’ hybrid warfare was to be carried out through a number of measures including, most importantly, the management of combatants in unified informational system.[11]
The general Russian world vision included a common economic space with eastern countries, a Eurasian economic union, and a revitalization of regional military cooperation in multilateral form, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or bilaterally, by expanding Russia’s military presence in vulnerable countries such as Armenia and Ukraine and establishing bases in Georgia. This is done not through a mutual consensus for such cooperation, but as a purely dictated and decided vision by Russia for Eastern Europe, whose destiny has decided to be exclusively with Russia and no one else.[12]
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Practice
Russia’s new warfare against Europe can be manifested in a variety of ways, but it can be divided into two sub-strategies: one that is both covert and overt in Eastern Europe, and another that is covert toward the rest of Europe via far-right support.
When it comes to Eastern European countries, Russia has adopted a variety of measures in hybrid warfare ranging from propaganda, money, opposition to direct intervention. Russian hybrid warfare in Eastern European countries such as Ukraine before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, consisted of strategies such as cyberwarfare, hacking official public government websites, spreading fake news through the creation of similar official websites based in Russia, training, funding and arming violent separatists. Spreading propaganda against Ukrainian army as offensive, using energy as a geostrategic weapon and increasing arsenal of heavy weapons. Money, according to scholars has so far been Russia’s biggest hybrid warfare tool.[13]
In Slovakia, Russia had funded extremist voices in magazines and other media such as Zem a Veck which editor was travelling to Moscow for a new media project including a tv channel with support from Russia, the same voice would later be behind the magazine calling for Slovakia’s withdrawal from the EU. A state media outlet called TASR was to have a content sharing deal with Russian backed outlets called Sputnik.[14]
Eastern Ukraine case serves as a case in point for this Russian modernized warfare and it was the alarm to wake the EU and NATO to the threat knocking their doors. Since its independence, Russia has worked hard to keep hold on pro-Russian candidates to be in office and to keep Ukraine from going into the European and Western orbit of influence by joining the Union. To do so, Russia has worked on this on many fronts, keeping the country destabilized to not ever be able to meet the membership criteria and using multiple hybrid warfare measures. After the failure of the Russian backed primary minister to office Viktor Yanuko and the following orange revolution leading to the election of the pro-Western Victor Yushhenko, Russia could not but launch a war on the country especially after signing the Association Agreement with the EU. Fears that the country would enter into the EU customs Union and Russia’s inability to have a hand inside the government made it turn to investing in propaganda and opposition. Russia worked on spreading propaganda against the army and using proxy activities to support ‘proxies’ or local rebels with weaponry. It also sent Russian volunteers on the lines of opposition disguised as Green men or local fighters. More than that, Russia invaded eastern Ukraine on the pretext to protect Russian compatriots based on its Russkiy ideology. It has also for long time used gas between Russia and Ukraine which links both countries oligarchies to exercise power over the country. The 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine triggered high instability and insecurity feeling on the side of the EU and NATO members.[15]
Also, in Georgia, Russia backed separatists and took control of the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1993. Following pro-Western president Mikheil Saak attempts to take control of them, Russia invaded Georgia and recognized both Abakhziya and South Ossetia as independent.[16] In Moldova, Russia has worked on supporting the rise of pro-Russian leaders who could co-sound its opposition to the EU association agreement such as Igor Dondon. Russia, also maintains its forces in the territory under a label of peacekeeping forces.[17]
Russia also used money laundering in several other countries, including Latvia and Moldova, as well as funding propaganda and disinformation. An organized crime and corruption report published in 2014 revealed the “Russian Laundromat” case, which involved money laundering between Russian companies and banks in Moldova and Latvia.
Megadeal project is another money warfare measure by Russia, where 12.2 billion euros were contracted by Russia to build new nuclear reactors in Hungary for the cultivation of pro-Russian businessmen who gained political office and worked on reflecting Russian political agenda in their own, both in the country and the EU.[18] These are just a few examples of Russia undermining anticorruption efforts by leveraging corruption, private actors, and connections to expand its influence in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Serbia, and Slovakia. The most successful of Russia’s actions resulted in the rise of elites in countries such as Slovakia who raised slogans such as ‘nonblocness’ in opposition to the EU membership or rapprochement.[19]
The WannaCrypt attack that took place in May 2017 was a famous example of Russian cyber warfare which affected 150 countries and targeted all computers running on Microsoft windows, encrypted their data and asked for payments in Bitcoin Cryptocurrency from its victims.[20]
Another example of new warfare tools is energy politics, as seen with the Gazprom company, which worked on fostering Russian influence in the region through the gas sector. Strategic analysts defined the company as Russia’s strongest foreign policy tool in the region in response to the company’s strong presence in the region and its political influence, especially on countries such as Armenia by exploiting its security and energy dependence on Russia, which explains its membership in the Russian Eurasian Union along with Belarus.[21] Russia also targeted Russian minorities as a key component of its new military strategy. It also invested in language and television stations. Following European countries’ blocking of Russian language stations, Russia used strategic communication by funding television stations in international languages with a wide broadcasting reach in Arabic, English, French, German, and Spanish. All reflected Russian views and interests. Disinformation strategies directly targeted two audiences; one was Russian speaking populations in Baltic and the other was wider Western audiences. Russia ‘s largest Russian speaking audience is in Bulgaria and it offers a good explanation of the country’s high support toward Russia in the EU and highly positive relations in trade and security even after joining the Union.[22]
Another aspect of soft force warfare is the use of appealing discourses, the expansion of Russian language and culture, and religious foundations for political action through church support. Russia’s adopted discourse of shared “Great Patriotic War” which is the founding ideology of the federation is also used to appeal to neighboring countries and justify Russia’s breach of its sovereignty rights.[23] The discourse primarily appeals to states with positive links to the Soviet Union, while it is least appealing to countries like Ukraine that have suffered the most damage and human loss as a result of the Soviet Union. Russia also invented the concept of “compatriots” in a broad sense to justify its links, financial support, and even military intervention in neighboring countries against whomever it deems “compatriots.” This can extend from Russian speaking minorities to any persons who align with Russia spiritually, culturally and even politically from any nationality around the world.[24]
Additionally, religious affinity was used to forge closer ties and occasionally to defend political and military actions, such as the annexation of Crimea or the continuation of Russian presence in the region. This was primarily accomplished by referring to Prince Vladimir, who was baptized there, as having common ties to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.[25] Russia puts on its shoulders the responsibility to protect such common values against any foreign intrusion and defines traditional rational values and links as a high national security priority. Russia also sought influence from Church which had made announcements that Russia could only become powerful through a Russian world consolidation which referred to Eastern European countries subordination to its rule. The church also used its website to urge Russian “compatriots” to come to the service of Russia.[26] In competition with Western soft power methods, Russia created the Russkiy Mir Foundation which aim is to spread the Russian language learning and create a favorable public opinion among civilians.[27]
Russia has also been blamed for shortfalls of Eastern Partnership in countries such as Armenia and Belarus by working against the current of European initiatives to combat corruption. It was believed instead that Russia spread a grand-scale corruption in both Armenia and Belarus in key democratic institutions such as elections by buying votes and politicians and corrupting courts.[28]
Russian modern/hybrid warfare has not stopped at Eastern Europe but also tried to stretch to as far as the U.K and France by targeting rising frustrations against the EU from immigration flows and unemployment rise. This is mainly to do with the unprecedented rise of the far right which is suspected to be funded by Russia in France, UK, Netherlands, Austria, Czech and Hungary. Cases include the Front National 9 million Euro Loan from Russian Bank in 2014 as well as extensive Russian links in Austria. Austria’s MPs visit to Crimea to recognize its annexation and reports on Russian spies using Austrian Newspapers and targeting labor party leaders in the UK against the EU. The far-right political parties linked to Russia include the Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, Northern League in Italy and France’s Front National.[29] The Front National close links to senior Russian figures such as Dmitry Dogozin which discourse of “clean up Moscow’s Trash” targeting immigrants was well co-founded by the FN leader le Pen who in many occasions did not hesitate to praise Russia’s policy and stance for its national interests which was “right for Russia and for Russians” against Western orbit vision. Russia is also believed to have been behind the Bulgarian anti-EU attack movement and Bulgarian nationalists who are pro-Putin. The same extended to Slovakia. Successful as it is, far right political parties and movements could not sound as perfectly as Putin on many issues ranging from hostility toward immigrants to showing opposition to the EU and common Euro currency as well as co-sounding him on conservatism and orthodoxy. The far right expressed similar views on LGBT rights as Putin that went against the liberalism preached by liberal democracy. Family as an entity was to be defined in its original conservative terms, and no alternative was possible. Family values and nationalist identities such as “purely Russian, French, polish etc.” were promoted as against diversity, immigration, diaspora or openness. The dangers of the spread of such views in the context of democracy and liberalism offered by the EU countries which cannot constrain information freedom or freedom of such movements is much visible in the extreme outcome of Brexit.[30] Similar trends around Europe in its west and East would very much bring a destruction if not an end to the Union. The spread of negative public opinion against it as deep and strong as held by the far right and their sympathizers is dangerous enough to the continuity and proper functioning of the EU and brings into the table foundational questions about its functioning from decision making to beyond.
A Russia that is haunting the European liberal, democratic and unified dream from within and without from its own populations to its eastern partnership could not but make the EU wake to a totally different context in security and political challenges to its continuity. Russia’s orchestrated hybrid warfare strategy with the changing structural context which naturally highlighted EU shortfalls after Iraq and Syria and the flow of refugees and even more than that Brexit could not be of less than a nightmare and a serious risk to the Union. On the other hand, the challenges posed by the liberal doctrine itself poses more challenge to the Union as if it falls to tackling these risks by adopting the same language of Russia or constraining freedom of information, internet, media etc. the Union would be going against its own principles which would almost equal a smooth suicide. Recent times do not seem to be the EU ‘s best or luckiest days especially considering the rise of Trump and his open and straightforward support and co-sounding of Putin on several issues such as conservatism, LGBT rights, immigrants etc. Trump has even offered Putin a green light in Eastern European Sphere. This makes the EU a single fighter in multifield war fronts while been weakened by the decrease of public opinion among its own civilians, a crucial member leaving and a non-coherent foreign and security policy among members in the face of giants of threats. The EU’s bilateral tools to tackle the dangers of eastern Europe such as the European Neighborhood Policy, Common Security and Defense Policy as well as Eastern Partnership were not only weakened but were also themselves directly attacked by Russia. The following section elaborates on the EU’s efforts to tackle this threat and to renovate its security approach to best face this non-traditional unconventional form of threat from Russia.
III- The EU -NATO Collaboration on Russia’s Hybrid Warfare
While the EU could not address the Russian threat in its current weakened state, NATO did not have enough tools to deal with the rising Russian threat either. This is mainly because of the organization’s old approach to security which is mainly focused on military. The EU and NATO’s collaboration however is an unprecedented move and carries promises to tackle the Russian threat relatively well. The collaboration has focused on developing strategies on hybrid warfare and threat. Its major focus has been on information and intelligence and developing cyber defense against Russia’s disinformation attacks.
The first step was to create a joint excellence center which mission was to help in NATO’s objective of fighting Russia from ‘Tweets to Tanks’ by collecting information on Russia’s cyberwarfare attacks, tracking them and defending against them. The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats chose as its location Finland which also carries the symbolism of Finland efficient defense against the Soviet Iron Curtain. The center is supposed to be able to meet the hybrid threats with hybrid reactions given the uncertainty and unexpected ways in which Russia would be attacking. Ironically, however, the center could only be attacked by Russia immediately after its website was created. The attack was in the form of an exact website, with its name based on Russia (.ru) and publishing wrong information.[31] Other actions include the Hybrid Fusion Cell in European External Action Service, European Defense Fund also used for Hybrid relevant programs such as cyber-defense, a joint EU NATO crisis management exercise. Additionally, the European Commission made the decision to build an EU cybersecurity Agency and develop a cyber-diplomacy which would respond to cyber-attacks by sanctions and joint investigations. The European External Action Service also tried to attract international partners such as Japan, China, South Korea and the U.S to have common cyber dialogues and strategies against cyberattacks. The EU and the NATO Joint Cooperation also established a Cyber Defense Center in Estonia, Energy Security Center in Lithuania and Strategic Communication Center in Latvia. The EU also promised to increase the cooperation among its own core institutions.[32]
While these steps by the EU and the NATO seem to be optimistic and determined in coping with the Russian threat, it remains, however, a reality that there are challenges beyond what these centers and cyber diplomacy could do. The first and simple challenge to confront the EU and NATO joint defense is reforming their decision-making process given that the type of attack requires a high-speed reaction and more than that a well-coordinated and resilient prevention rather than simple reaction.[33] The second obvious challenge remains peculiar to the EU and its nature itself. The EU hybrid defense and its joint actions with the NATO for implementation and coordination are subject to necessary consent among the EU members and their willingness to punish Russia and to develop such strategies.
The EU is known for its old divide between old and new Europe, and its eastern members’ sympathies towards Russia may be a weak point in managing coordinated action for a longer period of time. Both Hungary and Bulgaria remain close allies of Russia, and even though they are EU members, they have increased their trade with Russia to 70% while decreasing their security and defense expenditures.[34] It remains, thus, crucial as to whether such countries would agree to perceive Russia as a threat in the first place, especially given Russia covert approach in its warfare. The EU’s long standing challenge of persuading its members to go beyond their national perceptions of security, their own national interests is most likely to also be reflected in its approach toward Russia. Having Russian sympathizers right inside the house is mostly not to help neither. This is especially true if such countries respond to such threats as a result of European sanctions by calling for the reduction of sanctions in order to push Russia away from home. Russia would benefit from investing in hard force as well. In other words, the challenge for the EU is to go deeper into fixing its model shortfalls and its failure to achieve a real political unity beyond economic gains. While the EU kept its union primarily economic, Russia took advantage of the Union’s political and security gaps. Intelligence and information centers would help the EU advance in its security approach, but they are very technical methods that miss the core target aimed at by Russia. The EU has to strengthen its own union, work to establish links beyond economics, keep its promises, and reform its economic approach to benefit individuals beyond states. Unemployment, as a result of the EU’s unreformed economic approach, created a fertile ground for Russia’s attack to bear fruit.
Aside from that, the EU’s approach to Eastern Europe allowed Russia to deepen its infiltration. The EU had taken a similar approach to its eastern partners, which was purely economic and devoid of political and deeply strategic or political visions. Eastern Europe was eager to flee Russia’s offense to the EU if this one welcomed it properly and fulfilled its promises of considering it “European”.[35] The EU’s wary approach toward eastern partners and its non-credible promises of membership[36] which were never close to concretization as well as the unequal development between the west and the east of the continent has left room to the growth and rise of pro-Russian and anti-EU figures. The EU portrayed a double standard when it politicized tools of reward, such as visa liberalization, by offering it to Moldova while keeping Georgia waiting indefinitely until it developed its suspension system to protect itself against the flow of eastern populations.[37] The EU’s failure to bring into fruition the Eastern Countries’ dream of becoming European, and its approach toward them in unequal terms as less than European, was one of the major weakness points of the EU to protect the East from Russian infiltration. Additionally, it is also reported that the EU did not commit itself to the spread of democratic and liberal norms in the area which was an irrational approach on the face of a rising and openly threatening Russia. The EU has adopted a technocratic approach toward its Eastern Partnership countries and turned a blind eye to all the corruption practices, the oligarchic links that were growing and fostering among Russia and Eastern elites.[38] The challenge posed by Russia in Eastern Europe to the EU appears to be very deep and has developed over a long period of time, with the EU sleeping on a comfortable side, waiting for its growing monster in the east to knock on its doors not only through public opinion manipulation and hybrid threats but also through a military invasion of strategic Eastern European states such as Ukraine.
To put it differently, the EU and NATO should adopt different strategies, short-term and immediate strategies to meet immediate threats such as warfare through the established centers, as well as longer-term strategies that work to correct the deficiencies of both organizations and their approach toward Eastern Countries. The EU should not only combat Russian information attacks, but also establish its own information tunnels to raise awareness about the Russian threat and offense in full legal, liberal, honest, and democratic terms. Strengthening its media presence and expertise, as well as correcting its Eastern partnership and neighborhood policy, while aiming for political unity beyond Europe, would greatly benefit the EU’s threatened continuity.
Meanwhile, and having elaborated on the dangers of Russia to the EU, its expansive and offensive approach toward Eastern Europe, it is important now to turn the angle toward another important geopolitical challenge to both the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe.
While the EU and Russia both failed Eastern European countries by failing to lift them up economically and create stability and peace in them, and by keeping them at a disadvantage to themselves, China brought new cards to the table that work in the opposite direction of both the EU and Russia’s failed ones.
IV- China’s Peaceful Rise in Europe
Opportunity to the East, Challenge to the West
On the other side of the two competing Russian and European poles lying at the two extremes of the spectrum between democratic liberalism and conservative authoritarianism is a rising China which has adopted a different approach from both and which is best suited to Eastern European countries. Part of its strategy to grow as a peaceful and global economic power that would have its own institutional order and a One Belt One Road project that would link it to the rest of the world, China’s opportunity to the East could not be less than perfect as a way out both from European shortfalls as well as Russian offensives. Eastern Europe also offers a valuable strategic and geopolitical double-edged sword for China to get to the European market while also smoothly cutting off a strategic source of growth for Russia.
China targeting Eastern Europe took the form of The Sixteen Plus One (16+1) initiative which was met by extremely high hopes and optimism and was very positively welcomed by Eastern European countries as the opportunity of the century. Unlike Russia and the EU, China treats Eastern European countries not only as equal sovereign states but as valuable ones for whom it shares concerns and works on equal mutual growth. China promising a bright economic future for Eastern European countries would serve the region in playing both the EU and Russia on different sides. It serves them to leverage against the EU carelessness toward them by bringing in a strong economic force and by getting a strong back against Russia’s offenses. China’s initiative comes as a corrective option to the unequal development of the EU and a defense against historical vulnerabilities toward Russia by decreasing dependence on it. What distinguishes the Chinese initiative is its peaceful objectives, which are declared to be consistent with EU objectives and are legally based on EU legal rules and documents.
The initiative stated that one of its primary goals was to promote European integration through development in Eastern Europe. This poses a double challenge to the EU because its appeal to Eastern countries cannot be undermined by any rational argument. Trying to push China away for pure EU interests, out of fear of China’s presence and access to the European market, would actually push Eastern countries more away from the EU and toward China given that these countries have been getting very less benefits from the EU whether on development or other.
Part of China’s One Belt One Road initiative, which aims at having a direct route for Chinese goods to the European market in less time than normal, consists of a cooperation including eleven central and eastern European EU members as well as five Balkan states in the process of EU membership negotiation. The initiative started right in the context of the EU weakening financial crisis in 2008 and promises fostering economic and trade cooperation as well as connectivity projects in Central Eastern Europe. In 2013, China ‘s One Belt One Road initiative worked on developed infrastructure projects that would facilitate China’s access to the European market by connecting Asia to Europe. The project’s original mission was part of China’s goals to export China’s excess capital and labor abroad as well as build its global power in economic and institutional terms. It is also a geopolitical move to constrain Russia in its favored and major sphere of influence as China did in Central Asia through the same strategy in institutional and economic terms.[39]
The initiative resulted in a common institutional cooperation called China-CEEC which works on developing many projects ranging from transportation to think tanks and education spreading Chinese soft power in the region. The institutional framework works as a strong platform to bind the region to China’s economic and trade projects by offering more than just economic partnerships to other fields. A tool known in international institutional theories as nesting or linkages which is one of the best measures to maintain cooperation by binding states in a number of platforms and fields.
The China CEEC cooperation is closely linked to China’s foreign policy strategy on China’s global growth which has been executed in different parts of the world. With a Secretariat located in Beijing, the cooperation works closely under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cooperation maintains regular ministerial conferences such as on energy Cooperation in Bucharest and the one on creating a common secretariat for maritime issues. Under the institutional platform and cooperation, Eastern European countries which have been looking forward to the Chinese initiative with great enthusiasm and China have been working on developing several common ambitious projects in different fields. Promising to make 2018 the China-CEEC year, the cooperation worked on creating multiple think tanks, an Interbank-Association and an Investment Cooperation Fund. It also seeks to create industrial parks in areas of capacity, energy, logistics and agriculture. Projects on connectivity are also among priorities to promote links between Eastern Europe and China through land, sea, air and internet. Focus is also given to expanding cultural exchanges and enhancing cooperation on tourism between countries and China. China also especially targets youth cooperation in areas of Chinese traditional medicine, sports, women and children protection. Other common projects include scientific forums and forums in field of education and science through the China-CEEC high level Symposium, China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and thank tanks, green space, etc. China set a special credit facility worth $10 Billion for the member countries to access in the form of a preferential loan to be taken for implementation of the cooperation projects by applying to China’s financial institutions. China and CEE members also agreed on increasing trade to $100 billion by 2017, an objective that fell short of being met by 2017 and used as a criticism along with green space development by opponents of the cooperation from the EU side. A railway was also constructed to link China to Hungary and Serbia. The cooperation also works on fostering sectorial coordination centers such as a China-CEEC Tourism Promotion Agency in Budapest and an Investment Promotion Agency in Warsaw and Beijing. [40]
A memorandum of understanding was also signed between Hungary and China called the “Suzhow Guidelines” related to the OBOR initiative.[41] A China-Europe Land Sea Express Line was also negotiated including Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary to transport goods to EU. A Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) was established among all members.[42]
The initiative and cooperation were met by extremely positive welcoming by all states in the area that promoted themselves as best destinations for China’s investment and praised China as best ally for their needs. Hungary which is the location of China’s most ambitious project in Europe, the Belgrade-Budapest railway, showed a high symbolism of welcoming China’s initiative by welcoming Chinese officials and CEEC member states officials regardless of EU’s accusations against it for the project. Latvia, expressed the will to launch a stretch to the Hungarian Belgrade-Budapest railway while also committing itself to developing cooperation on transportation, logistics, infrastructure, trade and others. Bulgaria, also branded Plovdiv as the “oldest city on the silk road” while hosting the 16+1 forum. Poland developed its own plan for a new airport hub which would be combined with a high-speed railway connecting Asia and Europe. Slovenia, on the other hand, promoted itself a major logistic hub for the cooperation in central Europe with logistic centers in Ljubljana, Mariba and Koper.[43]
The Chinese initiative bringing the countries to work together present various challenges to the EU. Besides the Chinese threat itself to the European market and goods competition, the cooperation promises to increase the countries’ independence from the Union by granting them higher benefits from cooperation. The cooperation attaching no strings and conditionality on the countries for interfering on their governance type and internal affairs or treating them in inferior terms to purely European western countries works as a direct institutional competitor to the EU. Not only does it provide an economic alternative to meet what the EU could not meet in the region, which is development, but it also offers an alternative institutional platform with objectives and missions that are unique to itself, which may weaken the EU’s upper hand over the countries.
Bringing the countries together in a platform where China does not dictate brings it with high chances of driving the countries toward building a regional identity rather than trying to fit themselves into the EU’s identity, which has long proved difficult if not impossible at all. The common histories and challenges faced by these countries play an important role in fostering such an outcome of the institutional platform launched by China. In fact, criticism of the EU has already begun to pour in since the formation of the cooperation, such as the Macedonian president’s statement on the EU’s neglect of the Balkans, which has pushed them toward China. Similar statements and pressure on the EU will inevitably follow, using China as a standard and alternative.
Countries like Georgia, for example, have adopted cooperation with China as a defensive measure against Russia. The country’s high enthusiasm in co-sponsoring the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum to discuss the One Road One Belt project and signing free trade agreements with the country comes in the context of Georgia’s struggle to keep Russia out and far away.[44]
Having said that, it is important to note that China has stated unequivocally that the cooperation is not against the EU’s interests or objectives. In fact, China stated unequivocally that its intentions were to build on the EU’s efforts in the region, as well as to contribute to fostering a healthier and stronger European integration by bridging the economic gap between Western and Central Eastern European countries.
According to China, a more economically prosperous and better developed Central Eastern European countries would be easily to fit in the European Union than the current situation. China went on coordinating its policy toward the CEE region according to the general China-EU partnership scope and adopted the EU legislation and integration goals as part of foundational principles.[45]
The cooperation basic foundational documents are based on China’s 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation and on the EU’s legislation as a basis for cooperation. According to China, the China-CEEC cooperation goes in line with the bigger China-EU partnership as well as with the EU integration project.[46]
The EU’s Reactions and Defense
The EU, however, could not hide its fears and concerns from China’s initiative in the region by accusing it of being more than an economic institution and not void of political objectives. In 2015 a resolution was adopted by the EU parliament calling on EU member states to speak as a united voice against Chinese expansive diplomacy while also criticizing the China-CEEC cooperation putting aside human rights as objectives. The EU, accused the Belgrade-Budapest Railway of violating the EU common procurement law and criticized China’s failure to meet its greenspace and employment goals in the region. China’s Belt Road Initiative in the region was accused by the EU of breaking procurement laws, which resulted in an investigation and the suspension of some projects. However, this did not stop many other platforms of cooperation from quickly becoming successful.In response to the EU’s legal claims, China insisted that the initiative and cooperation were based on the EU’s own legislative rules and were not in violation of them.[47] Interestingly, in 2017 the EU went for developing a new procurement strategy which emphasized on green space, social cohesion, small economies as well as digital transformation of procurement.[48] Although the EU made a good move, it is unclear if it would be sufficient to draw CEE nations back from China or to permanently halt the China Belt Road initiative. Given the grandiose enthusiasm with which CEE countries have looked forward to Chinese cooperation, it is natural to expect the EU’s reaction to become problematic if it lasts too long or attempts to halt the cooperation. Not to stretch the imagination too far, but it would not be difficult for these countries to threaten the EU with suspension if China’s offered cooperation platform promised to yield more fruits than the EU’s and the latter consisted of a non-proactive approach to dealing with China’s threat to its regional interests.
Again, as mentioned in the previous section, the EU’s problem is its superficial, technical approach, which overlooks critical issues. Even when faced with challenges as a result of its superficial approach held for years, the EU continues to choose superficial solutions that could be counterproductive and make matters worse. While technical tools can still be used to combat Russia, dealing with the Chinese threat will be far more difficult. This is primarily due to the country’s political neutrality, promising economic benefits from cooperation, peaceful normative discourse toward the EU and CEE, and emphasis on EU legal bases as the foundation of its cooperation.
Responding to such a threat with offense would be detrimental to the EU’s interests and would demonstrate the EU’s inability to orchestrate a strategic response to China’s domestic competition. Constraining CEE countries by law can be interpreted as a continuation of the EU’s attempt to keep them under its thumb while failing to provide them with equal sovereign rights to promote their own development interests, which were not met by the Union.
Conclusion
This study sought to investigate emerging structural challenges to the EU from the East. It has examined unprecedented security challenges emerging from Russia, also known as Hybrid Warfare and Threats. It addressed the scope of these threats’ effects on the EU’s eastern partners, as well as their infiltration of EU members. It investigated the extent of the threat from Russia, its background, framework, and ambitions. It also provided a critical assessment of the EU and NATO’s collaboration and efforts to deal with Russia’s unprecedented security threats, which both organizations were not prepared to address. The article also examined the rising economic, institutional threat from China. It argued that while the EU and NATO’s collaboration and efforts may be able to deal with Russia relatively well, pushing China away will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is primarily because China’s initiative provides the best defense tool and way out for Eastern countries to deal with the EU’s inadequate strategy toward them and Russia’s offensive strategy, which threatens their independence and sovereignty. China’s rise and peaceful representation, which promises central eastern countries to grow together while granting them full equality rights with the economic powerhouse, could not be a better way out of the EU-Russia subordinating relations. In this regard, the article considers China and Russia’s rise against the EU as a clear warning about the EU’s long-maligned and coordinated integration plan in the east. Both threats reveal more about the EU’s weaknesses and failures than about China and Russia’s own strengths.
The article calls on the EU to build an inward-looking defense before an outward looking one. While the designed strategies to deal with Russia’s information threats seem to be fine they are again superficial, and they do not dig deeper into where the EU failed its model and project to its East. To save itself from a challenging East, the EU would have to design a model that can correct the failures of the past, the broken promises toward eastern countries and the inconsistent actions and talks. The EU challenges should make it reform its model in a way that is appealing enough to cope with attractions from China and Russia while also developing its security and defense measures in non-conventional ways.
The study concludes that the EU’s response to China is inconsequential, as it solely addresses China through a lens of apprehension. The enthusiasm of Eastern nations for China’s strategic initiatives and optimistic prospects, coupled with their enduring conflict with an indifferent EU and an aggressive Russia—both of which have historically undermined them through minimal concessions and rewards lacking substantial long-term advantages—creates a compelling rationale for these countries to gravitate towards China without hesitation.
Ultimately, to safeguard itself against an ascendant China and an aggressive Russia, the EU must reform its model to enhance its internal political cohesion and reinforce its institutional, economic, and democratic commitments to the East. The EU’s economic emphasis has reached a critical juncture, necessitating the enhancement of its normative and political influence while fortifying itself on various fronts to address challenges posed by Russia, China, Brexit, and other factors.
Recommendation for Future Research
Future research should explore more detailed and comparative analyses of the European Union’s (EU) strategic responses to the dual geopolitical threats posed by Russia and China. A deeper investigation into the effectiveness of NATO-EU collaborative efforts against hybrid warfare would provide valuable insights into improving security frameworks. Additionally, studies examining the long-term implications of China’s 16+1 initiative on EU economic cohesion and legal frameworks are critical. Researchers should also consider analyzing the socio-political impact of these external influences on Eastern European member states, particularly how public opinion and governance models evolve in response. Cross-disciplinary research integrating political science, international law, and cybersecurity studies could offer a more comprehensive understanding of emerging threats. Lastly, exploring the role of digital diplomacy, strategic communication, and information warfare in shaping EU resilience will help policymakers design proactive strategies for safeguarding the Union’s political, economic, and strategic interests.
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[1] Giray Sadık, Europe’s Hybrid Threats: What Kind of Power Does the EU Need in 21st Century, 2017, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: UK.
[2] Magriet Dremt, Rob Hendriks and Dick Zandee, “New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses”, Clingedael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2015.
[3] Sadik, p. 13
[4] Fortuna’s Corner, “EU-NATO Hybrid Threat Center Launched in Finland”, Fortuna’s Corner, 2017
https://fortunascorner.com/2017/10/04/eu-nato-hybrid-threat-center-launched-finland/.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “NATO Welcomes the Opening of European Center for Hybrid Warfare”, NATO, 11 April, 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143143.htm
[5] Fortuna’s Corner, 2017
[6] Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “Background Notes: Hybrid War-A New Security Challenge for Europe”, Parliamentary Dimension: Latvia, 2015.
[7] Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, pp. 12-15,
[8] Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, p. 10
[9] Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, p. 11-12
[10] Latvian Presidency of the Council, 2015.
Sadik, p. 19.
[11] Latvian Presidency of the Council, 2015.
[12] Dominik P. Jankowski and Pawel Swiezak, “Security Policy in Eastern Europe: Challenges for the EU”, Institute for Western Affairs, 2012, Bulletin No. 105.
[13]The US Embassy in Hungary, Threats and Challenges of Hybrid Warfare for European Security, The US Embassy in Hungary 2017.
https://hu.usembassy.gov/threats-challenges-hybrid-warfare-european-security/
Emily Tamkin, “The Real Russian Threat to Central Eastern Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2017.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to-central-eastern-europe-2/
Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, pp. 12-15
Latvian Presidency of the Council of European Union, 2015
[14] Emily Tamkin, “The Real Russian Threat to Central Eastern Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2017.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/the-real-russian-threat-to-central-eastern-europe-2/
[15] Ian Bond, “Contested Space: Eastern Europe Between Russia and the EU”, Center for European Reform, 2017.
Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, p. 10
[16] Bond, p. 4
[17] Bond, p. 5
[18] Bond, p. 17
[19] Jankowski and Swiezak, p. 2
[20] The European Institute for Security Studies, Conference Report: Hybrid Threats and the EU: State of Play and Future Progress, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017.
[21] Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, pp. 10, 11, 44
[22] Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, p. 45
[23] Bond, p. 11
[24] Bond, p. 11-13,
[25] Bond, p. 12,
[26] Bond, p. 14,
[27] Bond, p. 14,
[28] Bond, 14,
[29] Peter Foster, “Russia Accused of Clandestine Funding of European Parties as US Conducts Major Review of Vladimir Putin’s Strategy”, The Telegraph, 2016.
[30] Alina Polyakova, “Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far Right”, World Affairs, 2014. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/strange-bedfellows-putin-and-europe%E2%80%99s-far-right
Alina Polyakova, “Putinism and the European Far Right”, Institute of Modern Russia, 2016.
https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2500-putinism-and-the-european-far-right
[31]The European Union External Action, “EU and NATO inaugurate a European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats”, European Union External Action 2017.
Reid Standish, “Finland Opens a New Center to Fight Hybrid Threats from Russia and Beyond”, GlobalPost, 2017.
Teri Shultz, “EU-NATO Hybrid Threat Center Launched in Finland”, DW, 2017.
http://www.dw.com/en/eu-nato-hybrid-threat-center-launched-in-finland/a-40784773
[32] Latvian Presidency of the Council, 2015.
[33] Latvian Presidency of the Council, 2015
[34] Bond, p. 17.
[35] Bond, p. 1
[36] Bond, p. 3
[37] Bond, p. 18
[38] Bond, p. 1
[39] Eszterhai Viktor, “The Presentation of the 16+1 Cooperation”, Pageo: Geopolikal Kutatointezet, 2017.
http://www.geopolitika.hu/en/2017/10/23/the-presentation-of-the-16-1-cooperation/
[40] Xinhua, “Spotlight: Promising 16+1 Cooperation helps European Development”, Integration, China-CEEC, 2017.
http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1514944.htm
Agnese Zagata, “Meeting of China-CEEC Business Council and Business Support Organizations: Latvia 2017”, Investment and Development Agency of Latvia, 2017.
http://ceec-china-latvia.org/registration
Kong Tianping, “The 16+1 Framework and Economic Relations Between China and the Central and Eastern European Countries”, Council for European Studies, 2015.
Kaczmarski Marcin, “China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing”, Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich, 2015.
China’s Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with CEE Countries, China-CEEC, 2015.
http://www.ceec-china-logistics.org/databank/images/docs/9/60/Chinas-Twelve-Measures.pdf
[41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of China, The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, China-CEEC, 2016.
http://www.ceec-china-logistics.org/databank/images/docs/9/64/The-Suzhou-Guidelines.pdf
[42] Cooperation Between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, “Riga Declaration, the Declaration of the 1st Central and Eastern European Countries and China Transport Ministers Meeting”, CEEC-CHINA TMM1, 2016.
http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zywj/ldrhhcgwj/202112/t20211222_10474162.htm
[43] Lucrezia poggeti, “China’s Charm Offensive in Eastern Europe Challenges EU Cohesion”, The Diplomat, 2017.
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-charm-offensive-in-eastern-europe-challenges-eu-cohesion/
[44] Bond, p. 16
[45] Xinhua, 2017
[46] Viktor, 2017
[47] Poggetti, 2017
[48] The European Commission, “Growth: Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneuship and SMEs”, The European Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation_en
