Prepared by the researche : Yesmin Elhemaly – political Researcher specialized in African
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
Days after the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau seized power, soldiers in Benin announced on state television the dismissal of President Patrice Talon and the takeover of authority, reflecting the growing political turmoil in West Africa and the rising role of the military as the decisive actor in times of crisis. This development cannot be separated from the broader regional context, which is witnessing a gradual erosion of civilian legitimacy in favor of “national salvation” narratives adopted by coups. The event raises fundamental questions about the fragility of constitutional structures and the ability of elected institutions to withstand security and economic pressures. It also highlights the deep interconnection between crises in neighboring states, as coups are no longer isolated incidents but part of a widening regional pattern.
Developments in Benin demonstrate that the “snowball effect,” often used to analyze the spread of political phenomena, is now strongly present in West Africa. Crises begin in one country and rapidly roll over into neighboring states, driven by similar structural challenges and declining public trust in ruling elites. Just as coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger paved the way for the normalization of military intervention in politics, the coup in Guinea-Bissau added new momentum to this trajectory before the contagion reached Benin. This rapid acceleration indicates that coups are no longer merely reactions to immediate domestic crises, but have become a political model emulated in environments marked by poverty, corruption, and security breakdowns, where the military is seen as the last resort for restoring the balance of power.
Domestically, the coup in Benin opens the door to an ambiguous phase marked by political and economic uncertainty, amid the possible suspension of constitutional institutions and the restructuring of power outside popular will. A state once known for its relative democratic stability compared to some of its neighbors now faces a severe test of the resilience of its social contract. The repercussions of the coup extend beyond politics to affect the economy, investment, and foreign relations, as anxiety spreads among economic actors and development paths are disrupted. Meanwhile, the military typically seeks to portray itself as a corrective force capable of imposing stability; however, regional experiences show that such “coercive stability” is often fragile and temporary.
At the regional and international levels, the coup in Benin further complicates the calculations of regional powers and international partners—particularly France, the European Union, and regional organizations such as ECOWAS—which face a recurring challenge in responding to successive coups without losing what remains of their political influence. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure have proven of limited effectiveness in previous cases, while military councils exploit the discourse of sovereignty and rejection of “foreign interference” to bolster their domestic legitimacy. In this context, West Africa appears to have entered a profound phase of political reconfiguration, in which the “snowball” rolls from one coup to another, threatening to redraw the region’s political map along non-democratic lines, with serious long-term risks to regional stability.
Axis One: The Timing of the Coup
The timing of the military coup in Benin was highly significant, as it coincided with the country’s approach to a pivotal legislative election that was supposed to provide a political outlet after years of restrictions on the opposition. The decision to allow the Democratic Party—the largest opposition force—to participate in the early 2026 parliamentary elections represented a rare breach in the wall of political deadlock and revived hopes of reintegrating broad segments of the public into the political process. However, the coup abruptly cut off this path, sending a clear message that the real balance of power within the state runs deeper than mere electoral arrangements. This coincidence reflects the acute sensitivity of the political moment, as the country stood at a crossroads between a potential constitutional opening and a military setback that turned the clock back.
The timing of the coup also carries a clear indication that the military moved at a moment when it felt the political landscape was on the verge of change in ways that could threaten the interests of powerful actors within the ruling system. Allowing the strong opposition to return to the parliamentary scene foreshadowed a possible redistribution of influence within the legislature and, eventually, an impact on the presidential equation itself—especially with the approaching end of Patrice Talon’s second term. In this sense, the coup appears to have been preemptive rather than a reaction to an acute security crisis, aimed at disrupting a political trajectory that could have reshaped power centers through civilian mechanisms. Thus, the timing does not seem random but rather carefully calculated to block any transformations that might curtail the military’s role or restore the opposition’s political standing.
Moreover, the timing of the coup reflects Benin’s direct exposure to a regional climate increasingly saturated with military takeovers. The move came just days after the coup in Guinea-Bissau and within a West African environment that has grown more tolerant of military intervention in politics. This regional context grants coups a form of “de facto legitimacy” and lowers the cost of carrying them out compared to earlier phases, when international rejection was sharper and more decisive. From this perspective, the timing of the Benin coup can be read as part of an escalating wave that benefits from the declining effectiveness of regional and international pressure and from the erosion of deterrence mechanisms once led by organizations such as ECOWAS, which have so far appeared unable to halt this trajectory.
Finally, the timing of the coup also carries an important social dimension, as it coincided with a state of accumulated popular frustration stemming from political restrictions and legal conditions widely viewed as unfair in the electoral process—such as the requirement to secure 20 percent in all constituencies. Although allowing the opposition to participate was a step toward easing tensions, public trust between the street and the authorities had not yet been restored. In this context, the coup exploited a moment of partial political disarray, as a solid national consensus capable of safeguarding the constitutional path had not yet taken shape. Thus, the timing of the coup struck a fragile, unfinished process, benefiting from a vacuum of trust and from the skepticism of segments of public opinion regarding the very viability of the political process.
Axis Two: The Current Situation in the Country
The military coup in Benin has occurred at a moment where chronic security crises intersect with escalating economic pressures and growing social fragility, rendering the current landscape highly complex and deeply intertwined. A state long presented as a relative model of stability in West Africa is now exposed to multi-level instability scenarios that extend beyond a mere change in power to encompass accumulated structural challenges. The current situation reveals that the coup did not occur in a vacuum, but rather on ground burdened by border tensions, economic slowdown, and latent social frustration. With the potential suspension of constitutional institutions and political decision-making in disarray, the future of stability becomes contingent on the new authority’s ability to contain these overlapping crises without slipping into a purely security-driven logic that deepens imbalances instead of resolving them.
First: Economic Conditions
Benin’s economic conditions have entered a phase of growing anxiety following the coup, given the organic link between political stability and the flow of investments and foreign aid. The Beninese economy relies heavily on international partnerships, port revenues, and cross-border trade—sectors that are highly sensitive to political turbulence. With the first signs of uncertainty, business confidence is expected to decline, existing investment projects may be postponed, and the cost of external financing is likely to rise. Any potential sanctions imposed by regional organizations or international partners would directly impact public finances, which already suffer from limited resources and expanding social obligations.
The Beninese economy is also under pressure from the security situation in the north, where armed attacks and growing cross-border threats have disrupted agricultural and commercial activities in vital regions. The north constitutes an important hub for the production of basic crops and for trade exchanges with Niger, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. As violence intensifies, transportation and insurance costs have risen, and border-market activity has declined, negatively affecting the incomes of thousands of families. Moreover, displacement from conflict-affected areas has increased pressure on urban centers and intensified demand for services at a time when the state’s financial capacity to respond remains limited.
In addition, the coup poses a direct challenge to development and economic reform programs that depended on international financing and donor institutions. The suspension or reassessment of several programs is highly likely amid political uncertainty. Declining growth may also lead to rising unemployment—especially among youth—thereby deepening the cycle of social vulnerability and increasing susceptibility to recruitment by armed groups and organized crime networks. Thus, political turmoil becomes an accelerating factor for latent economic crises, generating dual pressure on the new authority to manage the economy without sufficient legitimacy or external support.
Second: Security Conditions
Security represents the most serious challenge in Benin’s current landscape. For years, the country has been facing an unprecedented escalation in the activities of extremist groups emanating from the Sahel. Northern regions, particularly those bordering Burkina Faso and Niger, have turned into open theaters of repeated attacks targeting security forces, wildlife rangers, and village populations. These threats place continuous pressure on the military institution, which has been compelled to manage a prolonged war of attrition in a harsh geographic environment marked by porous borders. Following the coup, the security burden becomes even more complex, as efforts may be divided between consolidating internal power and confronting external terrorist threats.
The security challenge extends beyond terrorism to include the growing activities of organized crime and banditry, especially along the Nigerian border. Smuggling, kidnapping, arms trafficking, and fuel trade networks have increasingly intersected with extremist group activity, creating a composite security environment in which it becomes difficult to distinguish between terrorism and criminality. This overlap undermines the state’s role as the sole provider of security and reinforces the logic of “alternative security” based on tribal protection or informal arrangements, further weakening the authority of formal institutions. As trust in the state erodes, borders become more penetrable and peripheral areas turn into fertile environments for security disorder.
The security scene is further complicated by the decline in regional cooperation due to strained relations with neighboring states that are themselves undergoing turbulent political transitions. Border closures, the suspension of security agreements, and weakened intelligence coordination all limit the effectiveness of collective responses to cross-border threats. In this context, Benin finds itself facing growing security isolation amid a multifaceted regional danger. With the military now in power, the test will be whether it can rebuild channels of cooperation without allowing sovereignty calculations to clash with the imperatives of collective security—a decisive factor in shaping the future of stability.
Third: Social Conditions
At the social level, the current situation in Benin reflects a growing state of fragility, where the repercussions of violence intersect with daily livelihood pressures. Displacement from the north has led to the emergence of new pockets of poverty in cities and increased demand for housing, healthcare, and education services without adequate resources to meet them. The widening scope of insecurity has also deepened collective anxiety and weakened trust in the state’s ability to protect its citizens. In the context of the coup, societal confusion has intensified amid uncertainty regarding the future of rights, freedoms, and the contours of the coming political system.
Pre-coup political restrictions and the curtailment of partisan participation have further widened the gap between the public and the ruling elite. Large segments of youth feel excluded from the public sphere both economically and politically, driving some toward irregular migration or fragile informal economic activities, while others may drift into circles of violence and crime. Additionally, tensions between farmers and herders in the north—exacerbated by military deployment—have deepened local grievances and created socially volatile hotspots vulnerable to explosion at any moment.
At a deeper level, the social situation in Benin reflects a structural crisis of trust between state and society, fueled by years of developmental disparity between the more privileged south and the more fragile north. With the coup, many fear that these imbalances will be reproduced within a more rigid framework that is less responsive to social demands. If security measures are not coupled with deep social and economic reforms, the risk of social explosion will remain present even if the intensity of armed violence declines. Thus, genuine stability becomes contingent upon rebuilding the social contract on inclusive foundations and principles of developmental justice.
Axis Three: Regional and International Repercussions of the Military Coup in Benin
The military coup in Benin reflects highly sensitive regional repercussions, particularly as it occurred only days after the coup in Guinea-Bissau, reinforcing the logic of “political contagion” across the West African space. This rapid succession of civilian government collapses delivers a severe blow to the regional stability system led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The coup is no longer an exceptional event, but has become a viable political option within military institutions amid the weakening of collective deterrence. This situation undermines mutual trust among states and disrupts security and economic coordination, particularly in critical areas such as counterterrorism and border control. It also deepens an atmosphere of strategic uncertainty, as remaining civilian governments fear the direct political intervention of their armies, threatening the unity of regional decision-making and the future of integration in West Africa.
The regional repercussions extend beyond the political dimension into the security sphere, as Benin’s coup represents yet another link in the dismantling of the collective defensive wall of the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea regions. Countries already under military rule—such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau—have become less committed to joint mechanisms and more inclined toward unilateral policies. With Benin entering this trajectory, the fragility of the southern security belt of the Sahel deepens, opening the door for the southward expansion of extremist groups toward coastal areas. Moreover, the coup disrupts intelligence and military cooperation with regional partners and imposes political constraints on joint operations that had been vital for containing cross-border armed groups. This threatens to transform Benin from a buffer state into an open arena for security penetration.
At the international level, the Benin coup places Western partners—most notably France, the European Union, and the United States—before a new strategic dilemma. Benin had been regarded as a relatively stable country and a key logistical and strategic hub in counterterrorism efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. With the collapse of the constitutional path, these partnerships now face the risk of suspension or reassessment, whether through the freezing of aid or the imposition of political and economic sanctions. The repeated cycle of coups also weakens the credibility of the Western pro-democracy narrative and creates space for rival international actors, such as Russia and China, to expand their presence through pragmatic approaches that place limited emphasis on regime type and prioritize security and economic interests instead.
In a broader context, the Benin coup reveals a profound shift in the balance of the regional order in West Africa, where the democratic model is retreating in favor of a model of “stability through force.” This transformation carries long-term implications for the image of the region within the international system, its capacity to attract investment, and its ability to ensure maritime and commercial security in the Gulf of Guinea. It also risks reproducing closed systems of governance that may deepen crises rather than resolve them. In the absence of a unified international strategy to address the wave of coups, the landscape remains open to multiple possibilities: diplomatic escalation, fragile containment, or even a broader slide toward redrawing the political and security map of the region on non-democratic foundations.
Axis Four: Possible Scenarios in Benin
The military coup in Benin opens the door to multiple future trajectories that cannot be reduced to a single clear direction. These trajectories are shaped by the interaction of internal factors related to the nature of the state, the military institution, the economy, and society, alongside external pressures imposed by a volatile regional environment and the stances of international powers. Despite its relatively democratic record, Benin today faces a fragile transitional situation amid escalating security threats, economic slowdown, and political disarray. Accordingly, the future of the upcoming phase depends not only on the intentions of the military council, but also on its actual ability to govern the state, contain public unrest, and manage relations with ECOWAS and international partners without sliding into suffocating isolation. Within this context, five main scenarios emerge as the most plausible in the foreseeable future.
First: Consolidation of Military Rule under the Cover of a Transitional Phase
This scenario is based on the military retaining power for an extended transitional period under the pretext of restoring political and security stability and restructuring institutional frameworks, without committing to a clear timetable or offering real guarantees for a return to civilian rule. This model has become common in West Africa, where “transitions” often turn into de facto authorities. In Benin, the military may justify this trajectory by pointing to rising terrorist threats in the north and the need to impose full control over state institutions. However, this scenario remains fragile due to the military’s limited civilian expertise in managing the economy and the growing likelihood of internal divisions within the armed forces between power-seeking factions and economic interest groups, making stability largely superficial and prone to collapse with any social or financial shock.
Second: Failure of the Coup and a Return to the Constitutional Path
This scenario assumes that the military council will be unable to entrench its authority due to escalating internal resistance—politically and socially—and intense regional and international pressure led by ECOWAS with European and UN backing. In this case, public rejection may expand, particularly in major cities, labor unions, and universities, alongside internal splits within the military itself between supporters and opponents of the power seizure. With the tightening of economic and financial sanctions and the suspension of aid, the coup authorities’ capacity to govern, pay salaries, and ensure basic services would steadily erode, accelerating the collapse of their functional legitimacy. At that point, a political settlement may be imposed that restores power to a civilian transitional government, with the army formally removed from the political scene under strict regional supervision.
Third: A Social Explosion that Reshuffles the Cards
This scenario assumes the failure of military rule to contain economic and social pressures, leading to widespread popular protests spearheaded by youth groups affected by unemployment, rising prices, and declining public services. In this situation, the crisis would no longer remain purely political but would transform into a comprehensive legitimacy crisis that challenges the very entitlement of military rule. In the absence of unified civilian leadership, these protests could take on a chaotic character, opening the door to direct confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, or even to fractures within the army itself. The danger of this scenario lies in the fact that it does not necessarily lead to an orderly democratic transition, but may instead plunge the country into a prolonged cycle of instability that further undermines what remains of state institutions.
Fourth: Recycling the Old Regime with New Faces
Under this path, the coup is formally contained by sidelining some military leaders from the forefront and reproducing the previous system through alliances that bring together old civilian figures with military leaders who are less confrontational toward external actors. The aim here is to absorb regional and international pressure without introducing fundamental changes to the structure of power or its mode of governance. This type of “formally soft” transition preserves existing economic and security patronage networks with only a change in faces. While this scenario may offer temporary stability and restore the flow of aid, it carries within it the seeds of future upheaval because it fails to address the deep-rooted causes of the crisis related to good governance, social justice, and genuine political representation.
Fifth: The Spread of the Coup Contagion to Fragile Neighboring States
This scenario assumes that Benin’s coup could become a catalyst for the spread of coup attempts to neighboring countries that also suffer from political and security fragility, particularly within the Gulf of Guinea region. If the military succeeds in consolidating its rule in Benin without incurring significant regional costs, this may encourage factions within other armies to replicate the model. In this case, the danger would not be confined to Benin alone but would extend to the entire balance of stability in West Africa. This scenario threatens to dismantle what remains of the regional order based on civilian governance and to reshape the region according to a logic of “coercive stability,” with all its inherent risks of rising terrorism, expanding organized crime, and the wider retreat of democracy.
Conclusion
In light of the above, it becomes clear that the military coup in Benin does not represent a transient political shift, but rather reflects a deep structural crisis affecting both state balances and the regional order simultaneously. The current Beninese landscape oscillates between internal fragility and external pressure, amid a burdened economy, unstable security, and a socially vulnerable fabric. What heightens the gravity of this moment is Benin’s position within a regional arc witnessing an accelerating rise of military rule at the expense of democratic pathways. Between scenarios of military entrenchment, hybrid settlement, social explosion, or coup failure, the country’s future remains open at a historic crossroads. The decisive factor in determining the final direction ultimately hinges on the ability of society, active domestic forces, and the regional institution to curb the logic of force and restore constitutional legitimacy before the snowball effect spreads further across West Africa.
