Prepared by the researche : Maska Elmahjoub – PhD in political science and international relations University Cady Ayyad Morroco.
Democratic Arabic Center
Journal of Afro-Asian Studies : Twenty-Third Issue – November 2024
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
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Abstract
Disarmament is a challenge for United Nations, the international community wants to remove the threat of war. It sought to address the means by which nations could do so. The UN was created to “protect future generations from the horrors of war”. It had to face the prospect of a war without winners or losers. Such a war would leave behind universal ruin. The UN had a compelling duty.
Nevertheless, there is a growing sense of disappointment that the UN has become dysfunctional. It is no longer a forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament.
This article aims to evaluate the efforts made by the UN in this field, and then highlight the major difficulties it faces.
The problem of disarmament is inseparable from peace. The solution of one cannot be achieved without the solution of the other. Disarmament evokes “the idea of a world in which states would have given up the means of fighting, in other words, they would have scrapped their battleships and aircraft carriers, blown up their fortifications, disbanded their regiments and kept only the necessary police forces”i. For Raymond Aronii, disarmament would “concern above all and especially the atomic and thermonuclear bombs on the one hand, and the vehicles on the other”iii.
Of course, the international community wants to remove the threat of war. It sought to address the means by which nations could do so. The first efforts were made before the UN. They sought to find a universal agreement on the problem. However, at the time, international society was in chaos, so his attempts were timid and unsuccessful. After the First World War, international society began to organize itself. And disarmament efforts began to take on a new character. They were much more reassuring.
When the League of Nations was created, disarmament was placed at the centre of its concerns. Since then, it has remained closely linked to the development of a collective security system.
The UN was created to “protect future generations from the horrors of war”. It had to face the prospect of a war without winners or losers. Such a war would leave behind universal ruin. The UN had a compelling duty. It had to address the problem, and try to find a solution. The problem was a big one. The UN was stuck. It was unable to stop a mad arms race.
We will try to see the efforts made by the UN in this field, and then highlight the major difficulties it faces, in the light of which a resounding failure is revealed.
1: The normative framework: A Charter with little concern for disarmament and treaties with little respect.
The competence of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is based on two provisions of the Charter, namely:
Article 11 which concerns the prerogatives of the General Assembly:
‘’The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both’’
Article 26, which relates to the functions and powers of the Security Council:
“In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating , with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”
Compared to the League of Nations pact, the Charter does not give as much importance to the problem of disarmament. It is not defined as an essential objective. The maintenance of peace would not depend on it. The Charter does not contain a mandatory provision at this level. It does not oblige its signatories to provide information on the status of their military assets. Moreover, the UN has never condemned private arms manufacturing.
The founding fathers of the Charter established an extensive system of collective security. This makes disarmament conditional on security. The Security Council is responsible for drawing up the necessary plans to limit armaments, while the Assembly considers the general principles whenever it wants to make recommendations that it considers appropriate.
The negotiations to date have gone through several stages:
On 24 January 1946, the General Assembly created the Atomic Energy Commissioniv, which was to assume an urgent mandate to control atomic energy. It oversaw the exchange of scientific intelligence, with a view to keeping it purely peaceful. This commission was also responsible for eliminating weapons of mass destructionv. After two years of work and two hundred meetings, the Commission informed the Council that its work had reached a dead end. This first attempt had failedvi.
The failure of disarmament attempts was evident. There were antagonistic positions, with opponents. They were reluctant to compromise. The United Nations found it necessary to revise the method. It adopted a more global approach. And it abandoned the use of separate commissions. As a result, the General Assembly at its fifth session acted on a proposal by President Truman. The latter suggested replacing the existing commissions by a single body. On 13 December 1950, the General Assembly entrusted a committee (Committee of Twelve) with the task of considering how to achieve the merger of the two bodies responsible for examining disarmament problems.
In 1950, a new phase opened, the Committee of Twelve created the Single Commission. It was to tackle the control of atomic energy. It also studied the reduction of conventional armaments. France, Great Britain and the United States supported this proposal. The following are the main tasks of the new body:
Exchange of information on armaments and personnel
On-site verification of information provided through an international inspection system.
Maintenance of the control of atomic energy established by the Baruch Planvii.
The Soviet delegate declared that he could not agree with this statement, which once again expressed the obstinacy of the Western powers. They showed no change in this respect. In doing so, he in turn defined the tasks which his government was giving to this new commission, the most essential of which were:
The unconditional and immediate abolition of nuclear weapons,
The creation of a monitoring body within the Security Council to carry out the implementation of this abolition and the reduction of conventional weapons.
Exchange of information on the respective strengths of the major powers,
Reduction of the permanent members of the Security Council by one third.
These attempts showed the irreducible nature of opposing conceptions, and the slim chances of a common agreement. Thus, the general climate was bleak. There was no agreement on a possible compromise. Under these circumstances, the General Assembly adopted the proposals put forward by the Western powers. Such a move provoked opposition from the Soviet bloc.
Nowadays, there are many agreements in this area, are negotiated outcomes between governments. Nevertheless, they involve technical difficulties and political judgments. This process will lead to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The International Atomic Energy Agency: a weak organisation
On 8 December 1958, the American President, in his famous speech, proposed the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency. It would be responsible for controlling the materials used to create hydrogen and atomic bombs. This agency also affirmed its willingness to cooperate with the USSR in order to use atomic energy in a peaceful mannerviii.
Eisenhower’s plan suggests that :
The Soviets and Americans should conduct an extensive exchange of military information on establishments of all kinds,
Verification would be by means of aerial reconnaissance,
The two powers agreed to tolerate overflights of their territories to allow photographic views to be taken.
Eisenhower proposed a peaceful use of atomic energy. Because of the failure of the Baruch Plan, and the impasse in disarmament negotiations, the US President wanted to look for less ambitious measures that would have a better chance of success. Aware of the importance of persuading the Soviets, he asked them to enter into bilateral negotiations on his plan. There were a series of notes addressed to the USSR. These included the note of 19 March 1954, which set out the “Draft International Atomic Energy Agency”. Section B.3 proposes the modalities of control, and the conditions to be prescribed by the organization:
“… to ensure compliance with health and safety standards and to verify that allocated fissile material is used for the intended purpose, the Agency would be authorized to prescribe certain design or operating conditions, impose health and safety regulations, require the maintenance of operating records and specifications, decide on the disposition of fissile material by-products and wastes, reserve the right of oversight, and require interim reports. The Agency would also have the right to verify the status of allocated material stocks and compliance with the conditions set…”ix
After intense negotiations and unanimous approval of its statute by 81 nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1956. It is an organization that aims to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And it aims to achieve universal disarmament.
“…acts in accordance with the purposes and principles adopted by the United Nations for the promotion of international peace and co-operation, in pursuance of the policy of the United Nations for the achievement of universally assured disarmament, and in conformity with any international agreement reached in pursuance of that policy’’x.
In 1958, a draft resolution on the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons was introduced by the Irish delegation. It was the starting point for subsequent UN action on nuclear non- proliferation. All of these efforts culminated in the development of a treaty.
The “nuclear non-proliferation” treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970xi, the treaty was unanimously accepted by the international community. These obligations are accompanied by a system of international safeguards (Article III). Added to this is an assurance of the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Article VI).
All these obligations have been extended, through a further mechanism. The latter includes two important decisions. They are entitled “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament” and “Strengthening the Treaty Review Process”. The first decision is on “principles and objectives”. It was to encourage states. States should make efforts to get everyone to sign up to this treatyxii.
Despite these recommendations, states have not kept their promises. Four states have not joined the treaty (Cuba, India, Pakistan, Israel). Even worse , in 1998, they conducted tests in the South Asian region.
In 1999, Jayntha Dhanpalaxiii warned of the dangers that he saw in the future of the international treaty’s provisions: “First, if the current nuclear-weapon states persist indefinitely in making no substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament, I fear that the global consensus on the taboo of nuclear weapons proliferation will gradually erode, with an ever-increasing number of countries likely to reconsider their nuclear choices, Secondly, I fear that the process of globalization combined with the growing economic and political pressure to export dual-use technologies will ultimately erode the taboos of Article I (“not to assist in any way…”) and Article II (“not to seek or receive any assistance…”). The Treaty would be in great danger if either norm were to disappear’’xiv.
For this expert, the absence of negotiations remains a source of disappointment. He cites NATO’s strategic doctrine, announced at the April 1999 summit. This doctrine reaffirmed the principle of the first use of nuclear weapons. For NATO, it is useful, and a means of deterrence, especially against non-nuclear attacks. He also cites Russian strategic doctrine, which also reaffirms the principle of first use of such weapons. According to Jayntha, there is another indicator of risk. This is the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a work program.
Thus, it fails to make progress, especially on disarmament issues such as
Nuclear disarmament issues
Prevention of an arms race in outer space
Security assurances and the ban on the production of fissile material
As for the creation of a zone in the Middle East, he felt that there was little progress. With regard to the ratification of the Pelindabaxv Treaty and the signing of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treatyxvi, the results were not satisfactory. The 50 NPT States Parties have not concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. It notes with regret that the IAEA remains unable to verify “that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been declared to the Agency”xvii. All of these warnings deserved to be taken seriously. Today, North Korea is apparently a clear example of a UN failure. Clearly, it is likely to become a nuclear power. The international community has struggled in vain to prevent this from happening again. On 3 September 2017, it conducted the sixth test of what appears to be a hydrogen bomb. This test was preceded by other successful ones, and now it has an intercontinental ballistic missile. US intelligence confirms this, saying that it has more than 60 nuclear warheadsxviii. In 2006, after the first nuclear test, the Security Council prohibited “the supply, the transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, products and technology”xix that can contribute to this programme.
‘’All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of any arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and related materiel, through their territories or by their nationals, using their flag vessels or aircraft, and shall prohibit financial transactions, training activities, including the hosting of trainers, advisers or other persons for purposes related to military, paramilitary or police training, services or assistance related to the manufacture, maintenance or use of arms, as well as the sending of items to or from the DPRK for repair, maintenance, refurbishment, testing, reverse engineering and marketing’’xx
These sanctions are universal. This means that they are binding on all states in the world. Each state is responsible for their implementation on its territory. Military and nuclear technologies are regulated. There is a national export control system. In theory, all states should have the capacity to enforce sanctions. Export control has become mandatory since the entry into force of Resolution 1540 in 2004xxi. In this sense, the Security Council made an important decision: weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a threat to international peace and securityxxii:
“Considering further that there is an urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery…… Considering also that most States have entered into legally binding obligations or other commitments under treaties to which they are party to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to monitor and secure stockpiles of risk materials and to provide for their physical protection, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material or those recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources‘xxiii’
Through the resolution 1540, the Security Council wants to have an effective response to the threats. It aims to achieve the non-proliferation of these weapons. The UN can react under Chapter VII of the Charter. This resolution stipulates that states must:
Refrain from providing support to non-state actors
Adapt the legislative framework to provide for criminalization
Put in place internal controls, including on related matters.
In fact, this resolution responds to the threats that the proliferation of “nuclear, chemical and biological” weapons can cause to international peace and security. It aims to contain these threats. It urges states to criminalize illegal activities. It also requires that measures be put in place to prohibit the misuse of controlled items.
Despite the decisions taken by the UN, the organization is still struggling to impose itself. It has not been able to enforce the resolution. This has led to an uneven implementation of sanctions. The North Korean missiles clearly illustrate this failure. In this sense, the ‘’RUSI Whitehall’’ report describes the UN sanctions regime as “a house without foundationsxxiv.
The report highlights important factors. These explain the failure of the sanctions regime in North Korea, among them, North Korea’s ability to circumvent sanctions. There is a panel of experts in charge of this sanctions regime. This panel believes that Pyongyang’s illicit networks complicate their task, and that these networks are growing in size and scope. Thus, their capabilities may reduce the effectiveness of sanctions.
The second factor concerns the behavior of states. They take individual actions. In principle, each state must respect the decisions of the Council. And to transpose them into national law. But in practice, it is quite different, which makes states dishonest for not applying sanctions
in an appropriate manner. These shortcomings allow Korea to persist in its illicit activities. The final factor concerns private sector activities. The latter undermines the impact of UN sanctions, being independent of state behavior. In fact, Security Council resolutions bind the actions of states, but not those of non-state actors. Private sector actions can only face restrictions if states transpose the advisory requirements into national law.
According to the same report, the sanctions have not been able to produce a change, as they lack force. This is compounded by insufficient cooperation from its trade ally, China. These sanctions need to be adopted both multilaterally and unilaterally if the international community is to address these shortcomingsxxv.
In general, there is a growing sense of disappointment that the UN has become dysfunctional. It is no longer a forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. The last disarmament conference was held on 26 August in Geneva, at the same time as the Russian takeover of the Zaporija nuclear plant. This tense context makes the bombings more intense, so an atomic catastrophe is felt.
The norm cannot control the behaviour of those who reject its legitimacy. For decades, violations of anti-nuclear norms have been committed by the five powers. They flout their disarmament commitments, especially the provisions of Article 6 of the NPT. The asymmetry between declarations and non-proliferation control creates a nuclear apartheidxxvi.
i Raymond Aron, Peace and war between nations, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 2004, p 629.
ii Raymond Aron is French philosopher and sociologist (Paris 1905-Paris 1983), was professor in the institute of political studies, Sorbonne, and practical school of high studies in Paris.
iii Ibid, p 630
iv On 23 October 1956, 81 member countries of the United Nations adopted the Statute of an International Atomic Energy Agency, which was to become operational in Vienna before the end of 1957.
v Goldschmit Bertrant, ”The Origins of the International Atomic Energy Agency”, IEA Bulletin, Vol 19, N4. p 14.
vi Ibid.
viiThe Baruch Plan consisted in the creation of an international organization to which would be handed the legal ownership and absolute control of all uranium and thorium deposits throughout the world, it would be in charge of scientific research and the processing of raw materials in its own plants, of the silent sale of dangerous by-products, of the investigation and punishment in all countries of all illegal operations (extraction or clandestine storage of uranium, construction or use of prohibited devices, etc.). ), the United States undertook, as soon as the institution was set up, to cease the manufacture of atomic bombs, to destroy existing stocks and to communicate all the information in its possession, on condition that each of the major powers renounce its right of veto in the Security Council in the field of the use of atomic energy.
viii ‘’Eisenhower proposes an international atomic agency’’, the guardian, archive 1953, 9 Decembre 2016, l’article est disponible sur le lien suivant: www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/iaea-international- atomic-agency-eisenhower-un-1953 .
ix John A. Hall, ”The International Atomic Energy Agency: its origin, its beginnings, a continuing purpose: scientific cooperation in the service of peace”, IAEA Bulletin, 2/1987, pp 48.
x Available at the following link: http://www.un.org/fr/sections/issues-depth/atomic-energy/index.html.
xi According to this treaty, nuclear-weapon states (states that have exploded a nuclear weapon as of 1 January 1967) shall not in any way assist or encourage a non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). The NPT defines five states in this way (USA, USSR, UK, France and the People’s Republic of China). According to the NPT, all other States are non-nuclear-weapon States, as long as they are parties to the NPT;
xii Jayantha DHANAPALA , ”Strengthening the NPT Regime: Global Challenges and Opportunities”, IAEA Bulletin, N41, 4/1999. p 5.
xiii Jayantha Dhanapala, a Sri Lankan diplomat, is a member of the Board of Patrons of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and was a member of the Board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
xiv Ibid.
xv It aims to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, under which “each party undertakes : Not to undertake research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or exercise control over any nuclear explosive device by any means or in any place… Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of any nuclear explosive device; …To refrain from any act intended to assist or encourage the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of any nuclear explosive device by any State. Article 3 Treaty of Pilandaba.
xvi The Bangkok Treaty aims to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia. It was opened for signature in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 December 1995 and entered into force on 28 March 1997.
xvii Jayantha DHANAPALA , Op cit, p 6.
xviii Daniel Salisbury, Why UN sanctions against North Korea’s missile program failed, the conversation, 7 July , 2017. Disponible sur le lien suivant //www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-u-n-sanctions-against-north- koreas-missile-program-failed/.
xix Resolution 2270(2016)
xx Resolution 2270 (2016)
xxi Resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 28 April 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and was followed by resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) and 2055 (2012). It establishes the 1540 Committee.
xxii S/RES/1540 (2004).
xxiii Ibid.
xxiv Andrea Berge, ‘’the sanctions regime is thus in many respects a house without foundations , A house without foundations The North Korea Sanctions Regime and its implementation”, RUSI Whitehall Report 3-17, June 2017, p 3.
xxv Ibid, p 2.
xxvi Ramesh Thakur, the United Nations, Peace and security, Cambridge University press, 2006, p 163.
