The Logic of Practice in Qatari Mediation Diplomacy and the Effectiveness of Regional Governance: An Empirical Study on the Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

Prepared by the researche

• Liu Lihua – Doctoral Student at the School of International Studies and an assistant research fellow at the Institute of International and Regional Studies, Sun Yat-sen University
• Li Huawei – Master’s Student, Graduate Institute of Translation and Interpretation, University of International Studies, Shanghai, Shanghai International Studies University

DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH

Journal of Political Science and Law : Forty-five Issue – September 2025

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin

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Abstract  

As the smallest, most diplomatically active country in the Gulf region, Qatar has successfully forged geopolitical influence beyond its geographical size through a strategic portfolio of “energy-money-media.” This research uses the mediation practices of the 2024 Gaza ceasefire agreement as a starting point to reveal how Qatar has developed a unique model of what can be called “leverage-enhanced mediation diplomacy”, under the structural constraints imposed by major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Qatar has forged a distinct mediator identity in the asymmetrical power structure through the strategic use of its sovereign fund, Al Jazeera’s agenda-setting capabilities, and the accumulation of symbolic capital through unconventional diplomacy such as humanitarian aid. However, the sustainability of this model faces the dual challenges of the Agency’s dilemmas and weak institutional supply, while its ultimately effectiveness is determined by the strategic tolerance threshold adopted by the region’s hegemonic states.

First, the paradox of the practice of great diplomacy in small countries

The geopolitical order in the Middle East is undergoing its most significant structural transformation since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. The strategic game between traditional regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran) and global superpowers (the United States, Russia) has reached a stalemate, creating unique geopolitical opportunities for medium-sized countries like Qatar. The ceasefire agreement reached in the Gaza Strip in May 2024 marks the first substantial breakthrough by medium-sized countries in the Gulf region in the process of mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict —— Qatar not only successfully facilitated a phased ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel, but also gained the authority to oversee the implementation of the agreement through its leadership of the “humanitarian prisoner exchange” mechanism. This phenomenon poses dual challenges to existing international relations theoretical paradigms: first, the traditional realist framework struggles to adequately explain how medium-sized countries with relatively limited material power can gain a voice in conflict governance; second, constructivist theories ‘explanations of norm diffusion mechanisms fail to fully interpret the economic resource-to-political influence conversion mechanism in Qatar’s mediation model. Qatar’s successful practice demonstrates that, under conditions of power vacuum and strategic deadlock, small states can reshape the rule system of regional conflict governance through flexible diplomatic strategies, economic leverage, and regional influence, thereby opening up new strategic spaces within the traditional geopolitical landscape dominated by major powers. This article aims to construct a “mediation capital” analytical framework, deconstructing the practical effectiveness and structural constraints of Qatar’s mediation diplomacy from three dimensions: strategic asset portfolio, institutional discourse, and hedging strategies.

Second, the three-dimensional composition of mediation capital

Existing research on the theoretical interpretation of small-state diplomacy has limitations. Ulrichsen (2014) emphasizes the essence of Qatar’s “risk-aversion strategy,” but overlooks its ability to proactively shape regional agendas;^[1] Roberts (2017) focuses on Al Jazeera’s media power, yet underestimates the core role of economic leverage. ^[2]Traditional international relations theory has significant limitations in explaining the mediation behavior of medium-sized countries like Qatar. Structural realism stresses that the distribution of power within the international system constrains state behavior, arguing that the agency of small and medium-sized countries is limited by the distribution of material power (Waltz, 1979). ^[3]However, Qatar’s crucial mediation role in the 2024 Gaza ceasefire agreement challenges the simplified equation of “power equals influence.” Constructivism expands research on the behavior of small and medium-sized countries through norm diffusion theory, but its “norm life cycle” model still struggles to explain the mechanism of transforming economic capital into political influence, especially in Qatar’s practice of constructing regional discourse power through energy economics (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998).^[4]

These theoretical limitations highlight the inadequacies in studying the strategic autonomy of small and medium-sized states.

The proposal of the mediation capital theory marks a paradigm shift in the study of diplomacy for small and medium-sized countries. Bercovitch (1986) divides mediation strategies into three categories: communication facilitation (where the mediator acts as a “mouthpiece,” helping both sides convey information); control (where the mediator exerts pressure or threats, such as major powers using economic sanctions to force concessions from conflicting parties); and problem-solving (where the mediator proposes specific solutions). ^[5]This provides methodological guidance for studying Qatar’s mediation diplomacy. Haass (1976)’s “coordinator theory”^[6] emphasizes the importance of asymmetric dependency, offering a theoretical lens to explain how Qatar builds a mediation network through non-state actors like the Qatar Foundation. In terms of strategic assets, Wright (2013) uses quantitative research to reveal how strategic investments by Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund translate into a unique position in conflict mediation. ^[7]This finding resonates with Hampson (1996)’ s “compensatory power resources” concept, both pointing to the possibility of small and medium-sized countries breaking through security dilemmas through the accumulation of resources in non-traditional areas. He argues that the mediator’s ability to mobilize resources is a core condition for facilitating agreement implementation.^[8] Through case studies (such as Cambodia and El Salvador), he demonstrates that material resources like economic aid and technical assistance can provide incentives for cooperation among conflicting parties.

The study of institutional discourse dimensions has advanced the concept of mediation capital. Bially Mattern (2005) provided a critical revision to Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power.” She argued that soft power is not entirely non-coercive, further revealing the role of symbolic capital accumulation in rule restructuring. ^[9]By emphasizing the three dimensions of discourse-practice-symbolism, she stressed how symbolic capital is transformed into institutional discourse through discourse and practice, providing a key tool for analyzing Qatar’s soft power strategy. Existing research faces three theoretical gaps: first, traditional small state studies (such as Keohane, 1969) focus excessively on Nordic countries, neglecting the uniqueness of energy-based nations;^[10] second, mediation studies (such as Bercovitch, 1986) exhibit Western-centric tendencies,^[11] lacking theoretical construction of Middle Eastern mediation mechanisms; third, energy politics research (such as Yergin, 2012) has yet to establish the mechanism linking energy

capital with conflict mediation.^[12] These gaps offer room for innovation in the concept of mediation capital, particularly by integrating Nye’s (1990) framework of soft power^[13] to construct a dynamic model of the transformation from economic capital to political capital. Schelling’s (1960) “strategic action concept” ^[14]also provides an analytical tool for explaining the equilibrium breakthrough points of medium and small states in great power competition.

The mediation capital concept, through a three-dimensional framework of strategic asset portfolios, institutional discourse, and hedging strategies, transcends the limitations of traditional international relations theories in explaining the behavior of small and medium-sized countries. However, existing research still needs to deepen in the following directions: 1) Establishing quantitative analysis models for energy capital and mediation effectiveness; 2) Comparing the differences in mediation mechanisms among small and medium-sized countries in different regions; 3) Introducing new variables of the digital age (such as cyberspace discourse power) to reconstruct the effects of mediation capital. The refinement of this theoretical framework will provide a critical analytical tool for studying the behavior of medium-sized countries in the changing global power landscape of the 21st century.

This paper uses the concept framework of “mediation capital”, which includes the following elements:

(1) Convertibility of strategic assets

The $460 billion in assets managed by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) form the core leverage of its “mediation diplomacy.” QIA establishes a “hedged-linked” economic network through targeted investments.^[15] Qatar provides humanitarian aid primarily centered around the Gaza Strip through the Qatar Charity Foundation and the Qatari government. Qatar covers the civil servant salary system in Gaza in the form of financial assistance. The monthly aid amount is $30 million, with about $10 million allocated to poor families in Gaza, another $10 million for purchasing fuel from Israel, and the third part, $10 million, for paying salaries;^[16][17] this embedded economic impact gives it substantial control over Hamas’s actions.

(2) The ability to construct institutional discourse

Al Jazeera,^[18] as the world’s third-largest news organization , grants Qatar unique agenda-setting power and serves as a tool for shaping its national image and conducting diplomacy. It plays a crucial role in enhancing Qatar’s international reputation, boosting the country’s soft power, and helping Hamad (Amir of the state of Qatar / Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani / Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani) break the isolation he faced after taking office.

While disseminating the official ideology of Qatar, Al Jazeera also incites opposition within Arab countries by creating public opinion, making it an important instrument for Qatar’s regional intervention policies. ^[19]During the Gaza mediation process, the media employed selective reporting strategies: on one hand, amplifying civilian casualties caused by Israeli military actions, and on the other, downplaying the destructive impact of Hamas rocket attacks. Through meticulous design of visual language and reporting frameworks, the media redefined the conflict as a “humanitarian crisis theater”: using close-up shots to emphasize the visual impact of civilian casualties, while employing macro statistics to mitigate the specific destruction caused by rocket attacks. This “visibility politics” operation successfully shifted the focus of the conflict from military confrontation to humanitarian dimensions, providing Qatar with a moral legitimacy for its intervention. The mutual reinforcement of media power and mediator status constitutes a unique advantage in Qatar’s diplomacy.

(3) Dynamic balance of hedging strategies

Qatar has developed a sophisticated hedging mechanism in the competition among regional powers: 1) Militarily dependent on the United States (U.S.), it has established deep military ties through the Al-Udeid Air Base, securing institutional guarantees under the U.S.-Qatar Defense Cooperation Agreement. In return, Qatar pays high dollar base operating costs to secure tacit approval from the U.S. for its regime’s security.^[20] Moreover, the UAE government restricts U.S. airstrikes from its territory against neighboring countries, leading the U.S. Air Force to redeploy several fighter squadrons from UAE bases to Qatar, further enhancing Qatar’s importance in the regional security architecture.

 2) Economically, through LNG ( LNG also,Liquefied natural gas is natural gas that has been cooled to liquid form for ease and safety of non-pressurized storage or transport)cooperation with various economies, it has formed a chain of interests linking “production capacity-market access-political support.” In 2023, Italy imported 6.8 billion cubic meters from Qatar, France imported 2.3 billion cubic meters, and Belgium imported 4.3 billion cubic meters. ^[21]After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Qatar’s share of European LNG exports rose from 5% in 2021 to 17% in 2023, with Germany securing a 15-year long-term contract for 2 million tons per year. In recent years, Qatar signed a 27-year contract with China National Petroleum Corporation to link Asian LNG indices, enhancing its strategic flexibility in dealing with volatility in single regions or resource markets, geopolitical events, and economic cycles.^[22]

3) Ideologically, it maintains an ambiguous relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood as leverage against Saudi Wahhabi ideological hegemony, ^[23]while also maintaining cooperative relations with Western countries. This “multi-directional alliance” strategy has enabled Qatar to

gain a unique strategic position in regional affairs. According to the Gulf Research Center (GRC) 2024 report, after Saudi Arabia reconciled with Iran, Qatar quickly shifted its mediation focus to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Through an innovative “humanitarian prisoner exchange” mechanism, it successfully consolidated its status as a regional mediator. ^[24]This strategic adjustment not only avoided diluting its strategic value but also demonstrated Qatar’s flexibility and foresight in diplomatic tactics.

Third,

Mechanism innovation and implementation difficulties of the Gaza ceasefire agreement

The ceasefire agreement reached in Gaza in 2024 marked a significant breakthrough in the design of its mechanisms, with the core being the establishment of a “three-dimensional guarantee mechanism.” This mechanism is jointly guaranteed by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, providing support and assurance for the implementation of the agreement from three dimensions: military security, economic management, and humanitarian oversight. Among these, the United States, as the security guarantor, offers Israel clear security commitments in exchange for a suspension of large-scale military operations. This military stabilization arrangement has created the basic conditions for the initial implementation of the agreement, effectively reducing the risk of renewed conflict during the early stages of the agreement.^[25][26]

Qatar has taken on the role of economic guarantor, responsible for overseeing substantial reconstruction funds, which may be disbursed in the form of vouchers rather than cash. This ensures transparency and phased release of these funds, ^[27]thereby minimizing corruption and misuse in fund management and preventing Hamas from using them for military purposes. ^[28]This approach breaks away from traditional funding models, providing more efficient and sustainable support for subsequent reconstruction efforts.

Egypt’s role is reflected in controlling the entry of supplies at the Rafah border crossing and establishing verifiable humanitarian routes.^[29] As a regional power, Egypt leverages its geographical and political advantages in Gaza to play a crucial role in supply and oversight. This mechanism not only ensures timely delivery of humanitarian aid but also reduces the risk of aid materials entering the wrong channels through strict supervision of material flow, ensuring that the implementation of agreements is not interfered with by external forces.

The essence of this multidimensional guarantee mechanism is to upgrade the traditional “confidence-building measures” (CBMs) into “results-oriented mediation.” Traditional CBMs focus on reducing hostility and misunderstanding between conflicting parties, typically through a series of small, incremental measures aimed at enhancing mutual trust. However, these measures

often lack long-term sustainability and fail to effectively drive substantial political change.

In contrast, the 2024 agreement linked the release of reconstruction funds to phased achievements, forming a more concrete and results-oriented mediation model. The successful implementation of each phase is directly related to the further release of funds, ensuring that all parties can see tangible progress during the execution of the agreement, thus promoting its sustained implementation. This approach not only enhances the transparency of the agreement but also increases its “attractiveness” —— meaning that all parties can clearly see the substantial changes brought about by the ceasefire agreement, rather than relying solely on abstract political commitments.

Despite this, the mechanism still faces three structural challenges. First, the agreement deliberately avoids fundamental contentious issues such as Jerusalem’s status and settlement expansion. While the strategy of “tackling easier issues first” helps reach a ceasefire consensus in the short term, it overlooks the root causes of the conflict, sowing seeds for future complications. Second, the lack of institutional participation from regional organizations like the Arab League in the monitoring system limits its effectiveness and undermines the regional legitimacy and broad acceptance of the agreement. Finally, Qatar plays a crucial role as an economic guarantor in the agreement, but its “economic leverage” may fail over time. Qatar is facing systematic smear campaigns initiated by Israeli political forces, alleging that it funds Hamas and has not used its influence to exert sufficient pressure on these efforts to release Israeli detainees. ^[30]This could weaken Qatar’s willingness to implement the agreement.

In fact, despite the agreement receiving widespread attention for its innovative mechanisms, its actual implementation has been slow and limited in effectiveness. Since the end of 2024, the ceasefire agreement has not been effectively implemented, as small-scale clashes between Hamas and Israel persist. The U.S. pressure on Israel has not fully curbed its military actions. Meanwhile, reconstruction funds managed by Qatar have been difficult to distribute due to deteriorating security conditions, and aid channels have been repeatedly blocked and delayed. Although the tripartite guarantee mechanism is innovative, it appears inadequate in the current complex regional landscape and highly adversarial atmosphere.

Therefore, the current ceasefire agreement has yet to establish a stable implementation path, presenting a paradox where “mechanisms come first but results lag behind.” To break this deadlock, it is necessary not only to enhance the coordination effectiveness of the tripartite guarantee mechanism but also to introduce an inclusive regional oversight platform, and gradually promote in-depth dialogue on substantive political issues. Only then can we prevent “innovative mechanisms” from becoming mere formalities, truly advancing the Gaza ceasefire agreement beyond its short-lived predicament and achieving sustainable peace.

Fourth, the restrictive factors in the reconstruction of regional order

Although Qatar has actively shaped its image as a “mediator state” in recent years and frequently mediated regional conflicts, the effectiveness of its mediation diplomacy is still constrained by multiple structural constraints. These constraints are institutional, long-term and multi-interwoven, which limit the expansion of Qatar’s mediation capital from different dimensions.

(1) Pressure transmission of Saudi Arabia’s regional integration strategy

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, through major geo-economic projects such as NEOM and Red Sea Development, is reshaping the region’s economy-security-governance nexus. This vision not only accelerates Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation but also reflects its growing ambition to assert leadership in shaping the regional order.

Against this backdrop, Qatar has reinforced its role as a “regional mediator” through its involvement in the Gaza mediation, which has, in effect, undermined the symbolic capital and discursive authority Saudi Arabia relies on in its bid to be recognized as the leader of the Arab world.

In response to Doha’s increasingly prominent diplomatic presence, Saudi Arabia has promoted the establishment of a “Joint Mediation Committee” within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) framework. This institutional mechanism is aimed at diluting Qatar’s dominance in regional mediation, and at re-establishing Saudi Arabia’s central role through a structured platform. This form of institutional competition compels Qatar to maintain a delicate balance between asserting its diplomatic agency and preserving the integrity of the Gulf cooperation framework.

Moreover, deep-seated divisions within the Arab world—in both ideological orientations and geopolitical alignments—pose institutional constraints on Qatar’s mediation pathway. Secular regimes such as Egypt and Jordan remain skeptical and resistant to Qatar’s ties with Islamic political forces, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, thereby undermining the legitimacy and inclusiveness of Qatar’s mediation initiatives at the level of pan-Arab consensus.

While Qatar possesses the willingness and capacity to mediate, it faces multiple challenges in terms of political neutrality, ideological compatibility, and security risk management, which hinder the institutionalization and structural advancement of its mediation efforts.

(2) Iran’s strategic countermeasures as part of the “Resistance Axis.”

Iran has long regarded Qatar’s mediation diplomacy as an indirect mechanism through which it seeks to project influence within the framework of its “Axis of Resistance” strategy—particularly in issues involving non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Given Qatar’s relatively stable communication channels with Hamas and its critical role in humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts in Gaza, some regional actors increasingly perceive Doha’s mediatory stance as strategically linked to Iran’s regional agenda. In this context, Iran does not outright reject Qatar’s mediation efforts; rather, it seeks to incorporate them into the logic of reproducing its own regional sphere of influence. On the one hand, Tehran permits Qatari involvement in the mediation of low-intensity conflicts in order to preserve strategic maneuverability for its proxy network. On the other hand, it continues to support and supply key proxy actors, thereby weakening the ability

of other stakeholders—particularly Western or moderate Arab states—to build consensus during mediation processes.

This dynamic is exemplified by Iran’s continued transfer of precision-guided weapons and advanced military technology to Hezbollah via the Syrian corridor, which significantly undermines the operational feasibility of ceasefire negotiations and imposes sustained pressure on Qatari-led mediation mechanisms. This dual-track strategy places Qatar in a structural dilemma: it must maintain its neutrality as a mediator while simultaneously managing the externalized risks of regional insecurity. As a result, the credibility and effectiveness of Qatar’s mediation efforts are increasingly constrained.

This situation further deteriorated following the “Rising Lion” military operation conducted in the early hours of June 13, 2025. During the operation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched large-scale, precision strikes on multiple military bases, missile facilities, and suspected nuclear-related sites within Iranian territory, aiming to curb Iran’s growing regional assertiveness and nuclear capabilities. The Iranian government immediately characterized the attack as a “serious violation of national sovereignty” and responded with cross-border retaliation via its regional proxies, including indirect strikes on northern Israeli military targets by the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

These developments sharply escalated the regional security situation and drastically narrowed the diplomatic space for third-party mediators such as Qatar, which has traditionally relied on a “low-intensity, high-engagement” model of diplomacy. Amid the current climate of heightened confrontation, any form of indirect dialogue or temporary ceasefire mechanism has become increasingly elusive, with mediation efforts shifting rapidly from “disrupted communication” to “collapsed trust.”

For Qatar, this evolving environment is eroding the very foundations of its traditional mediation strategy—namely, its ability to act as a bridging force within a narrow window of consensus. More critically, as Iran’s proxy network becomes further entrenched in regional conflicts, the feasibility of Qatar’s preferred model of non-coercive, multilateral mediation is steadily diminishing, now facing profound challenges amid a structurally antagonistic landscape.

(3) The pragmatic turn of American Middle East strategy

In recent years, the U.S.-Middle East strategy has shown a trend of pragmatic restructuring, with its core being the “goal-oriented” reshaping of regional mechanisms. The United States has led the establishment of small multilateral platforms such as the New Quartet, the Negev Forum, and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and has revived the U.S.-Crown of the Gulf Cooperation Council cooperation agenda. While not explicitly excluding Qatar, it has weakened its status as a “single agent.”

This trend towards substitutability has changed the structural basis of Qatar’s diplomatic capital in two dimensions:

1. The leverage in negotiations over military bases has weakened. The United States has designated the UAE as a “major defense partner,”^[31] and the Al-Udeid Air Base, serving as the

forward command post for U.S. Central Command, is seeing its strategic value being diverted by the Al-Dhafra base in the UAE. This has reduced Qatar’s bargaining power on issues such as base renewal and strategic deployment, diminishing its influence in security cooperation.

2. Enhanced substitutability of energy cooperation. With the UAE National Oil Company expanding its LNG export plans, the United States is gradually reducing its single dependence on Qatar’s natural gas. Driven by changes in global energy supply and demand structure and green energy strategies, the strategic weight of Qatar’s energy bargaining power is experiencing marginal decline.

In response to this structural weakening of diplomatic capital, Qatar is responding through a multilateral strategic balance:

On the one hand, it may further deepen military cooperation with Turkey to stabilize the bargaining space for regional security. Turkey’s military presence in key geopolitical nodes such as Syria and Libya have become a balancing lever for Qatar in the Iran-Israel game.

On the other hand, Qatar is also strengthening its economic and trade strategic synergy with China. As a positive responder to the “Belt and Road” initiative, Qatar has deeply embedded itself in infrastructure, energy investment and financial cooperation with China, thus hedging its structural dependence on the United States to some extent.

But this multifaceted diplomatic strategy also harbors geopolitical risks. If Qatar continues to strengthen its collaboration with non-Western powers like China and Turkey, it could further challenge the United States ‘strategic coordination intentions within the China-Arab alliance, particularly in the dominant arrangements of energy and security mechanisms. Therefore, the future of Qatar’s mediation diplomacy will depend on its precise balancing and dynamic adjustments among the three dimensions of “security-economy-discourse.”

(4) The dual influence of Israeli factors

As a key-actor in the mediation process, Israel’s influence on Qatar’s mediation capital presents a complex pattern of “functional cooperation” and “structural constraints”:

On the one hand, Qatar and Israel have established a relatively stable technical-intelligence cooperation in recent years regarding the ceasefire in Gaza. To counter the impact from the Iranian axis system, Qatar has increased practical cooperation with Israeli intelligence agencies in recent years, particularly establishing a regular meeting and information-sharing mechanism with Mossad, focusing on clues about arms transfers. Mossad has set up a routine communication mechanism with the Qatari diplomatic team, concentrating on sensitive issues such as internal factional divisions within Hamas and the flow of Iranian weapons. This cooperation enhances Qatar’s tactical effectiveness in conflict management, giving its mediation role stronger technical execution capabilities.

On the other hand, Qatar’s close ties with Israel may undermine its symbolic legitimacy in the broader Arab and Islamic world. While intelligence cooperation between Qatar and Israel has enhanced Qatar’s ability to oversee the implementation of agreements, it has also cast doubt on its “reputational capital” in Arab public opinion. As a result, Qatar’s mediation strategy faces a “reputation dilemma”: on one hand, it needs practical security tools; on the other, it must maintain the moral recognition of its “independence” within the Arab-Islamic world. Some Arab countries

and public opinion have long held high levels of vigilance and hostility toward Israel. Cooperation between Qatar and Israel could be interpreted as a pragmatic deal that “deviates from the Palestinian national position,” thereby challenging its legitimacy.

In addition, Israel does not view Qatar as a “fully neutral” third-party mediator but incorporates its functionality into its strategic tool for pressuring Hamas. This “instrumental trust” is a structural game strategy of Israel, which involves accepting financial aid and political coordination from Qatar when needed and marginalizing it when not. Therefore, Qatar must continuously adjust its mediation path between “usability” and “irreplaceability” to maintain a strategic balance in its relationship with Israel.

1. Implications

In recent years, Qatar has gradually established itself as a key player in regional mediation through flexible diplomatic strategies and institutional engagement amid the complex and volatile landscape of the Middle East. Although its strategic approach has not produced a universally applicable institutional model, Qatar serves as a representative case of how small states can embed themselves into multilateral orders through institutional innovation. This experience offers valuable practical insights for emerging major powers seeking to participate in regional governance through non-confrontational means.

Qatar’s mediation model emphasizes functional issue selection and the acceptability of engagement pathways. By focusing on long-term mediation practices in non-traditional security domains such as education, humanitarian aid, and energy cooperation, Qatar has effectively avoided the geopolitical risks associated with highly politicized issues, thereby enhancing the feasibility and sustainability of its mediation efforts. This experience suggests that systemically rising powers, when navigating the complex power dynamics of the Middle East, should prioritize entry points with low sensitivity and high relevance. Such an approach would help cultivate “development-oriented mediation” capabilities and strategically extend their role from development cooperation to institutional governance.

Qatar integrates mediation mechanisms with financial instruments and institutional provision, forming an interactive structure of “mediation–reconstruction–institutional embedding.” In its efforts in regions such as the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, Qatar often complements its mediation with financial assistance, infrastructure investment, and social governance collaboration, thereby enhancing the policy relevance and governance sustainability of its initiatives. This offers a useful reference for developing countries’ engagement in regional governance: to build developmental support mechanisms in parallel with mediation efforts, and to establish organic linkages between mediation platforms, governance issues, and financial instruments—thus enhancing institutional influence and discursive penetration.

The formation of Qatar’s mediation capital also benefits from its strategic use of media resources and public diplomacy platforms. Outlets such as Al Jazeera not only help Qatar project its regional narratives but also enhance its international visibility and discursive authority in mediation affairs. This experience underscores that the construction of mediation mechanisms must incorporate media logic and the shaping of public opinion environments. Especially in today’s multipolar information landscape, institutional transparency and international trust have become essential prerequisites for the sustainable operation of mediation mechanisms.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

Qatar maintains close ties with the United States and the European Union, yet it also seeks to build good relations with major powers like Russia and Iran, aiming to construct a “multipolar balance” strategy. In complex conflicts such as those in Ukraine or the Middle East, major powers like the U.S., Russia, and China vie for influence, often forcing smaller countries to mediate within the framework of these major powers. While Qatar’s mediation of the Israeli-Hamas conflict has achieved some success, it must also navigate the intricate dynamics involving the U.S., Iran, Turkey, and others. The blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on Qatar from 2017 to 2021 is a case in point, illustrating how regional powers can constrain mediators.

The core characteristic of Qatar’s diplomatic strategy lies in its construction of a multi-layered security redundancy system within the framework of great power competition, thereby breaking through the geographical structural constraints of being a “weak small country.” In the realm of security, it has formed a triple defense network centered on U.S. military presence, supported by secondary Turkish military cooperation, and supplemented by European technical assistance, achieving diversified and dispersed military reliance; in the economic dimension, Qatar relies on the monetization of energy, complemented by the operations of its sovereign wealth fund and the incubation of non-oil and gas industries, to build a relatively stable shock-resistant composite economic structure; at the ideological level, it maintains a tripartite relation of “traditional monarchical legitimacy—overextension of pan-Islamism—control of modern media discourse,” demonstrating high strategic precision and self-regulation capabilities.

This strategic combination has shaped a typical “leverage mediation diplomacy” model, which involves setting agendas, creating platforms, and allocating funds to transform limited material resources into excessive influence, aiming to play the role of a “functional intermediary” in a fragmented order. However, the effectiveness of this model heavily depends on the dynamic balance of external structures, and its “influence lever” is easily influenced by changes in the rhythm of great power competition, exhibiting significant path dependence and structural uncertainty.

Especially in the current Middle East, which has entered the restructuring stage of “post-American order”, the traditional hegemonic conflict governance framework is increasingly declining, and the multi-polar competition, non-state actors and cross-border security issues are on the rise. Although Qatar’s mediation role has achieved effective results in local conflicts, it faces the following two structural constraints:

First, the agent’s dilemma continues to deepen. Qatar’s close ties with non-state actors like Hamas, while granting it the “mediation capital” of low entry barriers, also undermine its neutrality and credibility in the eyes of certain countries. For instance, the Israeli government has repeatedly and publicly criticized Qatar for “providing financial support to Hamas,” questioning the fairness and strategic motives behind its mediation efforts, thereby exerting pressure on its regional discourse space.

Second, the institutional supply capacity is relatively insufficient. Qatar’s mediation largely relies on bilateral coordination and event-driven informal mechanisms, lacking a stable and replicable regional security framework. This makes its mediation practices flexible but unable to transcend the limitations of “crisis response—conflict mitigation—lack of sustained order-building,” always lingering in the role of mediator and failing to advance to the higher stage of “order shaper.” From a broader perspective of state capability, Lina Khatib (2013) has pointed out that Qatar’s foreign strategy lacks a unified framework, with tensions between domestic reform demands and diplomatic overextension. In the context of insufficient credibility in public diplomacy information and the proliferation of external partner networks, its pragmatic diplomacy gradually reveals governance boundaries, manifested in high-risk behavior choices and lagging credibility building. ^[32]For example, the Israeli government once criticized Qatar’s mediation efforts, arguing that its relationship with Hamas affects the fairness of its mediation.

In the current evolution of global governance towards “decentralization and multi-stakeholder collaboration,” Qatar’s strategic model, while not offering a universally applicable institutional model, still holds significant reference value as a typical paradigm for “small states embedding themselves in multilateral order through institutional innovation.” For developing countries, which are actively participating in Middle East governance and shaping issues related to the Global South, the Qatari experience provides the following three insights:

First of all, we should attach importance to the segmentation of functional issues and the strategic cultivation of leading capabilities. Qatar’s entry into the regional governance agenda in education, humanitarian affairs, energy and other fields provides inspiration for other countries to promote three types of cooperation issues of “water-energy-digital security” under the “Belt and Road” framework.

Secondly, we can explore the establishment of a linkage mechanism of “finance, mediation and institutional supply” to enhance the institutional support for regional mediation. For example, we can jointly set up the “Gulf Development Fund”, which is embedded in the agenda of infrastructure, employment promotion and social governance, so as to realize the connection between “hard construction” and “soft governance”.

Finally, it is essential to actively promote the construction of digital diplomacy platforms and enhance the transparency and agenda-setting capabilities of public diplomacy. Drawing on Qatar’s strategic use of media resources such as Al Jazeera, other countries can explore co-building a “digital mediation platform” with regional countries. This platform would integrate functions like remote arbitration, conflict analysis, and online public opinion management, thereby enhancing the institutional expression capabilities of Southern countries in emerging issues.

Overall, the core contribution of Qatar’s strategy does not lie in its success in restructuring the regional order, but in demonstrating the possible path for “microstates to gain strategic leverage through institutional means despite structural disadvantages.” This paradigm may provide unique theoretical material and practical references for countries in the Global South to shape their role in global governance in the post-Western era.

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