Prepared by the researche : Yesmin Elhemaly – Researcher specialized in African and political
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
The African Sahel region today represents one of the most sensitive areas in the contemporary international system due to its unique geographical position, which makes it a bridge between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Arab and African worlds. This location has endowed the region with a dual strategic significance, transforming it into a major crossroads for security, economic, and migration-related interests at both the regional and international levels. Moreover, the abundance of largely untapped natural resources, combined with the fragility of political and economic structures, has turned the Sahel into an open arena for competition among major powers and a testing ground for different models of external intervention in crisis management. With the escalation of cross-border threats, the Sahel is no longer a purely African issue, but rather an integral component of global security dynamics.
At the heart of these transformations stand armed groups and transnational terrorist organizations as the most influential actors reshaping the security landscape of the Sahel. Beginning in northern Mali and extending through Burkina Faso and Niger, these groups have expanded by exploiting security vacuums, weak state institutions, and vast uncontrolled geographical spaces. The intertwining of terrorism with smuggling networks and organized crime has further complicated the scene, as conflicts are no longer purely ideological in nature but have become closely linked to illicit economic interests. This reality has made security in the Sahelian states deeply interconnected, such that instability in any single country immediately reverberates across the wider regional environment.
This security deterioration has coincided with profound shifts in the balance of international intervention, particularly following the decline of the French role and the rise of alternative actors seeking to fill the vacuum, foremost among them Russia, alongside American attempts to reposition through indirect instruments. Within this complex environment, the crisis of governance and political legitimacy has become a central factor in deepening the overall crisis, especially in Mali, which has witnessed a series of military coups and an acute crisis of trust between the authorities and society. Moreover, the emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States as a new regional framework reflects an effort to reshape regional power balances outside traditional institutional structures, a step that carries both opportunities and challenges at the same time.
First: The Importance of the African Sahel Region in the International System
The African Sahel derives its significance in the international system from its critical geographical location, which makes it a connective link between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, and between the Arab and Mediterranean spheres on the one hand and the African interior on the other. This position has transformed the region into a strategic corridor for population movements and trade, as well as for non-traditional security threats, most notably terrorism, irregular migration, and transnational organized crime. With the declining capacity of central states to fully impose their sovereignty over their territories, borders in this region have become increasingly fragile, granting the Sahel heightened security importance in the calculations of regional and international powers. The region is no longer viewed as a poor or marginal geographical zone, but rather as an influential strategic space in global security equations, particularly given its direct linkage to the security of the Mediterranean and Europe.
Beyond its geographical dimension, the Sahel has gained growing importance due to its vast and largely underutilized natural resources, such as gold, uranium, oil, gas, and rare minerals. These resources now lie at the heart of international competition over energy and supply chains. This strategic economic dimension has turned the Sahel into a site of intense rivalry among major powers, which increasingly view the region not only as a security front but also as a future reservoir of vital resources. The major paradox, however, lies in the coexistence of this natural wealth with high levels of poverty and economic fragility, creating fertile conditions for social protests, engagement in the illicit economy, and recruitment by armed groups. Thus, economic significance intertwines with structural vulnerability in a highly complex equation.
The importance of the Sahel is further deepened in light of transformations within the international system itself, as the world witnesses a relative decline of unipolar dominance and the rise of powers seeking to redistribute influence within regions that were traditionally under Western control. In this context, the Sahel has emerged as an open arena for the redrawing of geopolitical influence, particularly following the retreat of the French presence, which for decades represented a direct extension of the old colonial influence. This shift has opened the door to new actors, most notably Russia, alongside expanding Chinese roles of a primarily economic nature. Consequently, the Sahel has become part of a broader international struggle over influence that transcends the local dimensions of its crises and reflects deeper structural imbalances within the global order.
The international significance of the Sahel cannot be separated from its humanitarian and social dimensions, as it represents one of the most fragile regions in the world in terms of food security, education, healthcare, and climate change. Desertification, drought, and declining water resources are mounting pressures that exacerbate poverty and displacement and push thousands of young people toward irregular migration or engagement in various forms of violence. These challenges make the Sahel an early-warning hotspot for complex global crises, where security, environmental, economic, and humanitarian dimensions intersect. Therefore, the future of this region is not merely a regional concern but is intrinsically linked to the capacity of the international community to manage the compounded crises that have become a defining feature of the twenty-first century.
Second: Armed Groups and Transnational Terrorism
Armed groups and transnational terrorist organizations have become the most influential actors shaping the security landscape in the African Sahel. These organizations are no longer merely isolated local phenomena but have evolved into interconnected regional networks operating across state borders. The collapse of state authority in several areas, along with the expansion of vast zones beyond effective governmental control, has created an ideal environment for their spread. The harsh desert terrain has provided these groups with safe havens for movement and redeployment. With the limited military and security capacities of Sahelian states, these organizations have become capable of launching sophisticated attacks, controlling strategic routes, and imposing parallel systems of governance in certain areas. This reality has transformed terrorism from a limited security threat into a structural phenomenon that is reshaping maps of power both within states and across the region as a whole.
The activity of terrorist groups in the Sahel is closely intertwined with smuggling networks and organized crime, in a mutually beneficial relationship. Armed groups provide protection for networks involved in arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and human trafficking in exchange for financial resources and logistical support. This has linked terrorism in the Sahel to a transnational shadow economy. Such an interconnection has stripped much of the ideological rhetoric of its substance and turned violence into a tool for material gain as much as a means for imposing political influence. Control over smuggling routes has also given these groups an indirect bargaining power with certain local and regional actors, further complicating counterterrorism efforts and rendering traditional security approaches insufficient to dismantle their complex structures.
As the activities of these groups have expanded, the threat has ceased to be confined to any single state. Instead, security across the Sahel has become organically interconnected, whereby instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger produces almost immediate repercussions in neighboring countries. This transnational character has given terrorism a highly dangerous regional dimension and imposed severe pressure on traditional mechanisms of security cooperation, which have proven incapable of sustainably containing the threat. Repeated attacks against national armies and international missions have also undermined public confidence in the state’s ability to provide protection, creating a psychological and political vacuum that armed groups have exploited to entrench their social presence by presenting themselves as alternative security providers in marginalized areas.
The expansion of terrorism in the Sahel cannot be understood in isolation from the deep social and economic dimensions of the crisis. Extreme poverty, the absence of employment opportunities, and the collapse of educational systems constitute major drivers feeding cycles of violence. Thousands of young people find themselves confronted with two equally harsh options: irregular migration or joining armed groups that offer quick income and a sense of belonging. In addition, ethnic tensions and conflicts over resources, particularly between farmers and herders, have created fertile ground for fueling hatred and both forced and voluntary recruitment. In this sense, terrorism in the Sahel is not merely a security phenomenon, but rather the outcome of a compounded crisis that reflects the failure of the developmental state even before the failure of the military state.
Third: Shifts in the Balance of International Intervention
In recent years, the African Sahel region has witnessed profound shifts in the balance of international intervention, reflecting at their core changes in the priorities of major powers and the limits of their capacity to manage complex crises. After years of intensive French military presence through Operation Barkhane, this presence began to gradually recede under the pressure of escalating terrorist attacks, popular protests rejecting foreign intervention, and a clear failure to establish sustainable stability. This withdrawal was not merely a tactical redeployment, but rather a strategic transformation that reopened fundamental questions about the effectiveness of traditional military interventions in environments where security challenges are deeply intertwined with economic and social dimensions. With the decline of the French role, the security and political vacuum became more evident, opening the door for new actors to advance and fill this space according to different agendas.
In contrast to the retreat of French influence, the Russian role has emerged as one of the most prominent features of the changing balance of international intervention in the Sahel, primarily through military and security cooperation with the new military-led regimes. This presence has relied on a different approach based on the direct support of ruling authorities and the provision of rapid security services in exchange for political and economic privileges, particularly in the mining and natural resource sectors. While this model has provided immediate backing for incumbent authorities in their confrontation with armed groups, it has simultaneously deepened the isolation of these states from their Western partners and reproduced new patterns of dependency. Moreover, the irregular nature of this intervention, based on private security companies and opaque networks of influence, raises serious legal and ethical concerns and casts doubt on its sustainability and its ability to generate long-term stability.
The United States, for its part, has moved toward a more cautious policy centered on reducing direct engagement and enhancing indirect containment tools through training, intelligence support, and capacity-building for local partners. This shift reflects a growing awareness of the complexities of the Sahel conflict and the limitations of hard power in environments marked by state fragility and eroding legitimacy. At the same time, Washington seeks to maintain a degree of influence that prevents the region from slipping entirely into competing spheres of influence, whether Russian or Chinese. Nevertheless, this approach remains constrained by the challenge of balancing the reduction of political and military costs of intervention with the preservation of a credible deterrent capacity against the expansion of terrorist groups and the deepening penetration of other international powers.
The United Nations and regional actors complete this intertwined landscape. The experience of the MINUSMA mission in Mali has demonstrated the limits of UN action in high-risk environments and exposed the fragility of traditional peacekeeping tools in the face of well-armed and highly mobile non-state groups. Furthermore, the declining role of regional organizations such as ECOWAS in managing political crises, particularly in the wake of successive coups, has revealed a deep crisis within the collective security architecture of West Africa. In sum, the Sahel is no longer governed by a single pattern of international intervention but has become an open arena of competition among diverse models of influence, ranging from direct military involvement and irregular security engagement to long-term economic penetration, within an international context characterized by multipolarity and the erosion of traditional regulatory mechanisms.
Fourth: The Crisis of Governance and Political Legitimacy in the Sahel States
The crisis of governance and political legitimacy in the Sahel states represents one of the deep-rooted causes that have fueled the accelerating security collapse, particularly in Mali, which has become the clearest model of state erosion in the region. Since 2012, Mali has entered a vicious cycle of military coups, armed conflicts, and the loss of control over vast parts of its territory, leading to a profound breakdown of trust between the state and society. This erosion of legitimacy has not resulted solely from coups, but rather from the cumulative failure of political elites to manage ethnic diversity, equitably distribute wealth, and build institutions capable of responding to the challenges of development and security. As the state weakened, political authority ceased to be acquired exclusively through constitutional mechanisms and increasingly became dependent on military force and the balance of arms, thereby deepening the crisis of governance and stripping the political system of its representative foundations.
The security crisis in Mali has also contributed to the reproduction of a new pattern of rule based on what may be termed “legitimacy of necessity,” whereby military regimes justified their seizure of power as a means of saving the state from terrorism and collapse. Yet this form of legitimacy is inherently fragile, as it rests on the logic of emergency rather than on a genuine social contract, exposing the state to the permanent risk of recurrent coups and the recycling of the same military elites. The concentration of power in the hands of the armed forces has further weakened political life, eliminated what remained of the balance between branches of government, and marginalized civilian actors and political parties, thereby rendering the public sphere increasingly closed. Within such an environment, critical decisions are taken within narrow circles without meaningful societal oversight, deepening the rift between the state and society.
The repercussions of the legitimacy crisis have not been confined to Mali alone, but have extended to most Sahelian states that have likewise experienced waves of coups or political upheavals, as in Burkina Faso and Niger. This broader pattern reflects a shared structural dysfunction in governance, manifested in weak institutions, the erosion of trust in democratic trajectories, and the inability of the state to provide security and basic services. As the credibility of political systems has diminished, armies have increasingly been portrayed as the ultimate saviors, while civilian elites are depicted as symbols of failure and corruption. This shift has undermined the principle of the peaceful transfer of power and entrenched the logic of the “security state” at the expense of the “civil state,” threatening to prolong political instability even if a degree of temporary security calm is achieved.
In this context, the crisis of governance and the security crisis are intertwined in a complex reciprocal relationship: weakened legitimacy fuels the expansion of armed groups, while escalating violence further justifies political contraction and exceptional rule. A state that fails to protect its citizens loses one of its most fundamental sources of legitimacy, while armed groups exploit this vacuum to present themselves as de facto authorities, either through coercion or through alternative forms of social control. Moreover, the persistence of economic crises, the absence of meaningful development, and the widening scope of poverty further undermine the capacity of ruling regimes to build inclusive national consensus. Accordingly, the crisis of governance in the Sahel, and in Mali in particular, constitutes a compounded structural crisis that cannot be resolved through security solutions alone, but rather requires a comprehensive re-foundation of the relationship between the state and society.
The Future of the Sahel and Emerging Alliances
The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, which includes Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, represents a striking strategic shift in the structure of regional interactions in West Africa. It emerged within the context of a clear rupture with traditional regional frameworks, foremost among them the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This alliance did not arise merely as a political reaction to external sanctions and pressures, but also reflects the desire of the ruling military regimes to construct an alternative sovereign framework that frees them from the diplomatic and institutional constraints imposed by traditional regional organizations. Accordingly, the alliance has evolved from a purely security-based arrangement into a political project that redefines the concept of regional legitimacy and puts forward a new vision of relations between Sahelian states and their regional and international surroundings, based on the logic of strategic autonomy and the reduction of external tutelage.
On the security level, the alliance seeks to establish a collective approach to confronting transnational armed groups through the coordination of military operations, the exchange of intelligence, and the unification of threat assessments. This direction reflects a growing awareness that unilateral responses to the crisis are no longer viable given the complex regional nature of the threats. However, the primary challenge facing this endeavor lies in the severe limitations of financial and military resources, weak logistical infrastructures, and the heavy legacy of mutual distrust among national armies. Moreover, the growing reliance on alternative external support, particularly from Russia, places the alliance’s security decision-making autonomy under real scrutiny and raises questions about its ability to formulate an independent security model free from international polarization.
Politically, the Alliance of Sahel States represents an attempt to reshape the balance of power within the region by constructing a new محور خارج المنظومة الإقليمية التقليدية that had been led by states with relatively stable civilian systems. This shift deepens regional fragmentation and entrenches a new dualism between “sovereign military regimes” on the one hand and “civilian regimes integrated into the Western sphere” on the other. Such polarization is likely to complicate prospects for building broad regional consensus on issues of security, development, and economic integration. Furthermore, weakening ECOWAS does not affect the political domain alone, but also disrupts mechanisms of economic and trade cooperation, with direct negative repercussions on local communities that depend heavily on cross-border movement of goods and people.
The future of this alliance ultimately remains contingent upon its ability to deliver tangible results on the ground, whether in the security, economic, or social domains. If it succeeds in curbing the influence of armed groups and improving living conditions for local populations, it may acquire a degree of regional and popular legitimacy and potentially emerge as an alternative model for regional cooperation in fragile contexts. If it fails to do so and instead turns into a closed political bloc governed by the interests of isolated military regimes, it will face the risks of internal fragmentation and growing dependence on external powers. In both scenarios, the Alliance of Sahel States reflects not merely a reconfiguration of regional alliances, but a profound transitional phase in the structure of the West African regional order.
The cumulative transformations unfolding in the African Sahel reveal that the region stands at a historic crossroads, where security crises intersect with crises of governance and development, and where domestic calculations intertwine with the strategic stakes of international powers. The Sahel is no longer a marginal and unstable geographical periphery; it has become a central arena in global security equations by virtue of its location, resources, and the nature of the threats originating from or transiting through it. The real danger, however, lies not only in the escalation of violence, but in the structural character of the crisis itself, whereby armed groups feed on state fragility, while violence in turn deepens the erosion of political legitimacy, creating a vicious cycle that cannot be broken through security solutions alone. Accordingly, the future of the Sahel is organically linked to the ability of its states to move beyond crisis management toward genuine state-building.
At the heart of this landscape, Mali stands out as the clearest indicator of the nature of the ongoing transformations, having shifted from an internal crisis into a driver of the reconfiguration of regional and international balances. Its crisis has triggered a chain of accelerated dynamics, from successive military coups to the withdrawal of traditional powers, the rise of new actors, and the re-engineering of regional alliances. The trajectory of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) reflects a bold attempt to redefine the equation of security and sovereignty outside the traditional frameworks, yet it remains a project fraught with risks in light of limited resources, the complexity of the regional environment, and the pressures of international polarization. The success or failure of this alliance will not affect the three member states alone, but will leave a profound imprint on the future of the West African regional order as a whole.
Accordingly, the future of the Sahel cannot be reduced to a single closed scenario; it remains open to multiple pathways, ranging from a slide into deeper fragmentation and disorder, to a gradual transition toward a fragile form of stability, or the launch of a long reformist trajectory aimed at rebuilding the state on new foundations of legitimacy, development, and social integration. The likelihood of any of these scenarios, however, will remain contingent upon the ability of local actors to seize the initiative, as well as the willingness of the international community to move beyond a narrow security-centered logic of intervention toward a comprehensive approach that addresses the roots of the crisis rather than merely its symptoms. In the final analysis, the Sahel is not merely a conflict arena, but a real test of the international system’s capacity to manage complex crises in a world steadily moving toward greater instability.
