The USA and USSR policy during the cold war with and plication on the Korean war

Prepared by the researcher: Eman Abo Zeid

Democratic Arab Center

1- Introduction

The Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the aftermath of the surrender of Hitler’s Germany. In 1941, Nazi aggression against the USSR turned the Soviet regime into an ally of the Western democracies.
But in the post world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between those who had once been allies.
The States and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps.

The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly world into two opposing camps The, particularly the continent of Europe.

Although the two Great Powers never fought directly, they by crises of varying intensitypushed the world to the brink of nuclear war on several occasions.
nuclear deterrence was the only effective means of preventing a military confrontation. Ironically, this ‘balance of terror’ actually served as a stimulus for the arms race. Why should we study Korean Between the Superpowers?
We can find a lot of reasons on the head of them achieving a very progressive stage in So far, the ongoing conflict in the arms of the Korea.(1)

confrontation. Ironically, this ‘balance of terror’ actually served as a stimulus for the arms race. Why should we study Korean Between the Superpowers?
We can find a lot of reasons on the head of them achieving a very progressive stage in So far, the ongoing conflict in the arms of the Korea.
Keywords: Korean War, 1950-1953; Division of the Korean Peninsula; Military Occupation of the United States governments; Military Imbalance between North and South Korea; North
and the Soviet Union in theTwo Parts of Korea; UN Resolution Calling for General Election .
2 -Question of the study:
These securities to try to understand the impact of war on Korea split-Korean and the USA role in the war and USSR why this constant hostility to now between the United States and Korea? Does the existence of two forces helped the war broke out and it became more a conflict of interest?

3 – Main concepts:
Cold War, the term refers to the sharp competition that existed between the communist countries and Western countries in the period since the end of World War II until the end of the eighties of the twentieth century, and was one of the parties to the competition is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (previously) and its allies the Communists who knew the Eastern bloc. At the other end, the United States and its allies Democrats, who named the Western bloc. The conflict between the two sides of the Cold War has been called due to the lack of inclusion of little value hot wars. Main concepts
There are different definitions of cold war, the Cold War is a term used to describe the state of conflict and tension and competition that there was between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies from the period mid-forties until the early nineties.(2)

1.‘‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 1990,’’ New York Times, November.
2. Robert L. Hutchings, ‘‘Soviet Dilemmas in Eastern Europe,’’ in United States—East European Relations in the 1990s, ed. Richard F. Staar (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 15–34.
Crane Russak, 1989), 15–34.

The first faction: The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953
1-The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953.

The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, desired to secure

the Korean peninsula and incorporate it in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe—as a springboard to attack Russia—and asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union.

Because of this policy and strategic posture, the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-48) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause.

Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and Soviet aid for nation building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of full American intervention in the projected war.

With full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from China, Kim.
1 – sung attacked South Korea with forces that were better armed, equipped, and prepared than their counterparts in South Korea categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side,
including the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula and
the Korean peninsula and incorporate it in a communist bloc.

Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe—as a springboard to attack Russia—and asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union.

Because of this policy and strategic posture, the Soviet military government in North Korea
(1945-1948) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations.
The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union.(3)

3.History and the Politics of Edited by Pauli Kettunen Edita Publishing Ltd
University of Helsinki Department of Social Science History 2008,p4.

Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim .
2- sung asked for Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim And secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause. Judging it needed a buffer zone against the West and Soviet aid for nation building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of full American intervention in the projected war.

With full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from China, Kim Il-sung attacked South Korea with forces that were better armed, equipped, and prepared than their counterparts in South Korea.(4) .

In order to clarify the direct causes of the war, that is, that North Korea attacked South Korea, this article tries to uncover some answers as to why and how the two Koreas, instead of one, were established on the Korean peninsula in the first place, what roles the United States and the Soviet Union played in the course of having the two Korean governments established in Korea, and, assuming that the two parts of Korea were the same in almost all arenas including military after the Pacific War (1941-45), how North Korea became able to launch a full-scale
military offensive against the South in 1950 with its armed forces, better armed, equipped, trained, and prepared than those of South Korea, while South Korea was not able even to defend itself.

Without the fact of two Koreas, military imbalance between them, and their different sponsors, the Soviet Union and the United States, North Korea would not have dared to attack the South, and there might not have be The Korean War, like many wars in history, did not take place in a vacuum. It broke out because the North Koreans attacked South Korea with confidence that they could win the war and communize the entire Korean peninsula. North Korean confidence to win the fighting against the South was based not on hope but on high confidence that North Korean forces were able to secure an easy victory in the war.(5).

In fact, the North Korean forces were far superior to those of the South in all possible categories of the possible categories of the fighting capabilities and abilities.

4..Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1941-1947 p. 243; Lisle A.
5.. Rose, After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), p. 51
In fact, the North Korean forces were far superior to those of the South in all possible categories of the possible categories of the fighting capabilities and abilities.

They were fully armed with heavy weapons and equipment supplied by the Soviet Union, well trained by the prudent guidance of Soviet military education and training advisers, greatly reinforced with the Korean soldiers and combat leadership, well-matured in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) period, and given a coordinated fighting plan prepared by the Soviet military war-planning advisers.

Having judged from the facts, North Korea and its sponsors, the Soviet Union and Communist China, anticipated an easy victory over South Korea, provided that the United States would not rapidly intervene with its forces.

With these expectations and anxieties, North Korea attacked South Korea on June25, 1950, which became the immediate and direct cause of the Korean War.(6)

2- Division of the Korean Peninsula Along the 38th Parallel

At the last stage of the Pacific War, the United States and the Soviet Union, the temporary allied powers in the war against Nazi Germany in Europe, became at odds with each other.

In dealing with the establishment of the government of the occupied areas, the Truman administration adhered to the principle of national self-determination, whereas the Soviet government under Stalin was mainly concerned about its own security.

6.. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 348-349.4
President Truman, a staunch supporter of selfdetermination, its own security. President Truman, a staunch supporter of selfdetermination, principle and the shrewd Soviet political manipulations in the occupied zone, conspicuously, in Poland and Rumania. Stalin, an intransigent communist, being obsessed with fear of being encircled by the capitalist nations He was determined to establish buffer states amenable to the Soviet Union around the Soviet border.
After Nazi Germany was destroyed in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union had little in common.
As a result, the main outcome of the Potsdam Conference(July 16-August 2, 1945) was a feeling of mutual distrust running beneath the ostensibly friendly talks between the United States and the Soviet delegates.

Ihe ambivalent feelings of President Truman were explicitly expressed when he said “Stalin was a S. O. B.,” and “I guess he thinks I’m one too.

Gone indeed was the temporary allied relationship arranged for the fighting against Nazi Germany between the United States and the Soviet Union.

After the United States dropped the A-bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945 respectively and the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945, the Japanese government made its offer of surrender on August 10, 1945.2 The sudden collapse of defeating Japan to dealing with the Japanese surrender. (7).

7. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vo l. 13, p. 205.
Chapter Two international situation.
Position of the United States from the war in Korea

1- ung’s idea and he initiated the war, though he acted with the support of the USSR and China.
• There is no evidence that Joseph Stalin, a cautious predator wary of confrontation with the US, was prepared to inaugurate global war as a follow-up to a successful invasion of Korea.

• It was one thing to encourage an ally to grab a weak American client state seemingly abandoned by Washington. It was quite another thing to contemplate war over lands that the US had recently fought to protect from German or Japanese tyranny. Omar Bradley, who joined the at the time and said it was necessary to “draw the line somewhere, “recanted this view later in life, admitting that many officials incorrectly presumed the Soviets were behind every adverse Communist move internationally.(8)
• With no overriding security interest at stake, Washington might have tried alternatives short of full-scale participation in the war.
• Some top military officials proposed relying on air and naval support.
At least one analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft
analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons could have halted the North Korean attack. (9) .
Other ideas included bringing the matter to the United Natio ns, a US blockade of the DPRK, UN-approved economic sanctions, and the rescue andf the DPRK, UN-approved economic sanctions, and the rescue and retrofit of South Korean military units in Japan. Unfortunately, none of these steps seem likely to have halted Kim’s offensive once begun or otherwise prevented the North’s conquest of the peninsula.

Richard Whelan explained “American intervention in Korea was primarily symbolic in
intention; it was meant to demonstrate to the world America’s willingness and ability aid friends and allies in their struggle to resist Soviet domination. It was a matter of credibility and prestige. (10)

8. Whelan, p. 140; Schaller, p. 186.
9. Thornton, p. 178.
10.Whelan, p. 52.

• Yet the US, having withdrawn, left no combat troops, and provided no security guarantee, had to Korea.
President Truman and his aides had to make many difficult decisions under difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, administration mistakes did much toircumstances. Nevertheless, administration mistakes did much to trigger the Korea War, expand the conflict to China, and militarize the Cold War around the world. The conflict’s malign impact is still being felt on the Korean peninsula and beyond.

 Soviet and U.S. Assessments
What did Soviet and U.S. leaders make of these developments? Newly declassified documents from the Soviet and U.S. archives reveal strikingly similar conclusions about the crisis of Communist rule in Eastern Europe.
A secret memorandum from the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Aleksandr Yakovlev, dated February 1989,13 described the ‘‘prolonged crisis of the model of socialism’’ in Eastern Europe and the ‘‘lack of legitimacy’’ of those political systems.

‘‘The ruling parties cannot rule in the old way any more,’’ yet ‘‘new ‘rules of the game’ have not been worked out.’’ In this precrisis situation, the memorandum system through repression. Of the three—reform, revolution, continued, three future scenarios presented themselves:

peaceful path of democratization led by the ruling parties, regime capitulation following a political crisis, and preservation of the existing system through repression. Of the three—reform, revolution, or repression—the first was seen as preferable, in that the analysis presumed that the ruling parties would be able to retaincontrol of the situation internally and would remain allied with Moscow externally.

11- From the National Security Archive, George Washington University,
Washington, DC.Bogomolov Institute (The Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System)
was presented at a conference held in Alexandria, Virginia, July 6–8, 1988, and
A similar but more cautious treatment of the same topic by the
Bogomolov Institute (The Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System)
was presented at a conference held in Alexandria, Virginia, July 6–8, 1988, and
published in Problems of Communism 37, nos. 3–4 (May–August 1988.

Results:
This article challenges the conventional view that Europe’s global influence is declining.
Since 1989 realists have predicted Europe’s demise, as well as greater intra-European and transatlantic conflict.
This outcome suggests the superior predictive power of liberal international relations theory, which stresses the importance of the varied national interests of states, reflecting specific social coalitions, patterns of global interdependence and domestic institutions.

According to a liberal analysis, Europe is and will foreseeably remain the only superpower besides the United States in a bipolar world – and its relative power is rising. Europe is the world’s pre-eminent civilian power, and its second military power, far more influential than China or India.

None of this is likely to change much, because Europe’s influence rests on stable factors such as high per capita income, long-term institutional advantages and convergence of underlying national interests between European countries and other great powers, notably the United States.

The war of Korea was the first big challenge that the United Nations had to face a few years since its foundation.

All the UN bodies had to work at their best in order to avoid a crisis that might expand in
the rest of the area.

However, the Security Council plagued by the Cold-War differences between the superpowers didn’t solve the problem, and member states put forward their national
an enduring solution to the problem.

This case also gives us a great chance to examine the way the UN crisis management system functions, and see which parts of the UN Charter were implemented and which were neglected instead.

The hostilities in Korea formally ended on July 27 1953 with negotiations being held outside the United Nations.

Families were separated and a whole nation is divided for almost 60 years.
Judging by the result, the UN system completely failed to deal with the Korean crisis. Your work at the Historical Security Council of THESSISMUN 2012, will not just be to replicate what happened in the 1950s You will start at the exact same point and date (June 25 1950) and country policies and interest

will continue to be the same. However, you will have the chance to put the pieces of the puzzle in a different way in order to reach a realistic solution to the problem.

References

1.‘‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 1990,’’ New York Times, November.

2. Robert L. Hutchings, ‘‘Soviet Dilemmas in Eastern Europe,’’ in United States—East European Relations in the 1990s, ed. Richard F. Staar (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 15– 34.

3. Crane Russak, 1989), 15–34. 3.History and the Politics of Edited by Pauli University of Helsinki Department of Social Science History 2008,p4.

4..Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 p. 243; Lisle A.

5.. Rose, After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), p. 51

6. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 348-349.4

U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vo l. 13, p. 7.

8. From the National Security Archive, George Washington University,
Washington, DC.Bogomolov Institute (The Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System)
was presented at a conference held in Alexandria, Virginia, July 6–8, 1988, and

9.“The Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. 3” North-Holland page 85
10 .Obedorfer D, “The Two Koreas: A contemporary history”, Addidon – Wesley (1997) page 8