Research studies

Biden Administration: Transitions of US Foreign Policy Towards Iran

 

Prepared by the researcher   :  Dr. Mohamed Abdelaziem Elchime – Associate. Prof. Political Science, Helwan University

Democratic Arab Center

Journal of Iranian orbits : Twelfth Issue – June 2021

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin.

Nationales ISSN-Zentrum für Deutschland
ISSN  2626-4927
Journal of Iranian orbits

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Abstract

The developments regarding the US relationship with Iran are proceeding with the changes that took place after the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States, at an accelerating pace, as the comparison of goals and priorities for both the administration of former US President Donald Trump and the administration of the current President Joe Biden, they intersect on three axes, this arises a question about aspects of change in US policy in the Middle East during the Biden era.

Biden’s success has contributed to this momentum related to the Iran file, as the parties concerned, based on his positions, and the positions of members of his transitional administration, rushed to lay down their perception and demands, at the same time that the two main parties in the crisis are trying to develop an appropriate conception to enter the new phase of the expected negotiations, while strengthening all Party to his cards to achieve the maximum possible gain. In light of these positions, and the perceptions of the parties and the clear divergences, the question arises about which options the Biden administration can head to in dealing with the Iran file, what are the opportunities, and challenges facing each option, and which options can be predicted more realistic?

Introduction

The prowess of the American president is measured by his effective performance in the foreign policy file. Therefore, every new elected president seeks to adopt a different approach from his predecessor, and to prove that he has surpassed all his mistakes. Perhaps the administration of US President “Donald Trump” is a good example of this, as his administration sought to adopt a different approach from former President “Barack Obama” in US foreign policy files. Therefore, the new democratic administration will seek to adopt a different approach to President Trump’s approach to foreign policy, on the pretext that it has several flaws [1].

In opposition to President “Trump” orientations based on the “America first” approach, and his open hostility to multilateral international organizations, which was reflected in his decisions to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization and the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the threat to withdraw from NATO, Pulling the United States out of Paris Climate Change Agreement; The Democratic President, “Joe Biden” adopted a foreign policy that affirmed the United States’ leadership of International regime and its institutions established by Washington in the wake of the end of World War II, as he pledged to return to the World Health Organization and other United Nations bodies, and to revive American companies and alliances in Europe and East Asia, Which was the cornerstone of US foreign policy for decades, which Trump worked to scorn, and the United States built a network of allies and companies to help them face global challenges, especially the abusive behaviors and human rights violations by China, and the US commitment to international agreements, foremost among which is Paris Agreement Climate change, and the Iran nuclear deal if Tehran returns to compliance with its provisions [2].

Therefore, Iran is relying on the administration of US President, “Joe Biden” to renegotiate with it on the nuclear deal, and thus the possibility of gradually lifting the economic sanctions imposed on it, and re-exports of Iranian crude to international markets, after it faced severe difficulties in exporting as a result of the “maximum pressure” campaign. The administration of former US President, “Donald Trump” imposed it on it in the past two years.

Although there are some analyzes that indicate that the new US administration will not give importance to addressing major foreign policy issues immediately during its first days, as there will be a focus on dealing with the domestic challenges that resulted from the Covid 19 pandemic, but that strategy will have an international dimension, and connect the states United with free societies and western democratic countries in the global response to the virus. So Biden advisers have warned that he may be slower to engage with the Middle East than some are expecting.

So, if we may wonder, will US President Joe Biden bring something new to the Middle East? Yeah. This is the direct answer to this question. It is over in American foreign policy. The difference between US foreign policy under President George W. Bush and President Bill Clinton is negligible, just additional initiatives in making it roughly the same. The Cold War ended while Republican George Bush was leading the United States. President George Bush acted this development in the legal system, the trade system, and the commercial institutions, mainly multilateral, and President Bill Clinton did so with wisdom and moderation the experienced, as he was matching the policies of international liberalism without exaggeration.

This was a wonderful stage of continuity in US foreign policy, in which you hardly notice the difference between the policies of a Republican and a Democratic president. The ruling party and the conservative Democratic Party. This stage ended with the second coming of George Bush to the presidency, and from that day every new American president comes to the presidency with a party agenda and ideological biases different from his predecessor, even President Donald Trump, who carried with him the agenda and ideology of his party, a column of his own concepts and methods, so the unique American foreign policy we witnessed was During the forty-year sentence. So, the new democratic president, bringing with him his party’s ideology on the one hand, and his method. On the other hand. What will US foreign policy look like during his era[3].

Thus, this research paper presents a hypothesis about the mechanisms of changes in US foreign policy within the framework of the plans and approach of President Trump about and approach of the current president, Biden. And to answer questions regarding analysis and describe the approaches of each of them? And what are the foundations of their approach in dealing with Iran and the orientation of the future of these approaches during the term of the current president, Biden? And studying the cards that could achieve gains that Iran and the Biden administration are preparing to enter the negotiations phase.

First- Why did Trump refrain from attacking Iran?

The recent shift by US President Donald Trump may be the most important calm whistle the Middle East has received in recent times. All the key factors that could justify US military attack on Iran seem to have come together in a convincing mix. Boiling in the Gulf was fast and many factors [4].

When oil tankers — Saudi Arabia, Japan and others — were hit by naval attacks, the finger was pointed without any clear signs of Iran. Then the Houthis in Yemen, supported by Iran, entered the picture. On several occasions, they fired rockets at Jizan airport and Abha airport in Saudi Arabia. After that Tehran’s statement said it had shortened the period of time limiting the amount of uranium enrichment, meaning that it would break the nuclear agreement. There have been other statements, such as statements by army and Revolutionary Guard commanders who have threatened that although they are not interested in a violent confrontation, they will not hesitate to hit American targets if Iran is attacked.

A day later, we reached a climax: the downing of the American aircraft marching by Iran. The legitimacy of the attack is maturing. “The Bank of Objectives” opened its doors, I gave the order to activate the forces, and suddenly there is nothing. They returned to the starting point.

Thus, the justification for attacking Iran (hitting tankers and dropping the plane) was based on weak proofs. There is not enough evidence to ignite a confrontation that could develop by a blink of an eye into a regional war. Also, regarding the details of the marching plane there was no agreement. The Americans said they did not violate Iranian airspace, and in Tehran they offered a contradictory explanation.

Evidence of this kind serves Israel in order to justify attacking Hamas in the local arena which does not affect the entire Middle East, but it cannot be enough for a superpower that wants to prepare for its allies to be directly hit. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, at least publicly, have declared that they do not want war in the Gulf [5].

The third proof in the Allied Triangle is Israel. The security community here estimates that Iran can operate its actors in Lebanon and Syria, either as a response to the attack or as a means of pressure on the US administration. But the Israeli government, which had to adopt Saudi Arabia’s position — because it was on the Iranian agenda — was silent. Trump chose to explain his reluctance to attack because he wanted to prevent the killing of 150 Iranians. This human explanation would have shaken feelings if Trump had not been the one who continued to arm the Saudi army that would kill thousands of people in Yemen; if he was not the American president who was not in the act because thousands of Syrians and Iraqis had been wounded in the US war against a ” Who does not see the distance meters immigrants trying to enter his country from Mexico. In general, was the estimate of the expected death of 150 people unknown prior to the decision to attack?

We can attribute to US intelligence agencies that they know how to estimate the expected death toll. It is only important to know when dealing with these dead people have changed from unavoidable environmental damage to a humanitarian disaster the United States cannot allow itself to happen. But the important thing is not only Trump’s decision-making process, if it is possible to analyze how the orders are derived, but the effects of his recent decisions on the battlefield in the Gulf and beyond. The US administration has a vision and aspirations for Iran’s behavior, but has no strategy to achieve them. The sanctions imposed by Trump on Iran are one of the most painful sanctions the state has ever known. But eight months after it was imposed, Tehran did not back down.

Analysis and standard explanations indicate that large losses received by Iran as a result of the withdrawal of major companies from investing in the state, and that most of its oil customers stopped buying oil from them, but there is no information, or estimates of the period of time that Iran can continue to withstand In these difficult circumstances. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continued to survive for more than a decade under a more severe sanctions regime imposed on Iran, until a total war only defeated the regime. There is no evidence that the regime in Iran will act anymore. But the administration is not proposing any real strategy for a situation in which Iran sticks to its policy and does not agree to negotiations on a new nuclear deal. Does he ready to launch a full-scale war to overthrow the regime in Iran?     [6]

Tehran’s decision to go beyond the limits of the nuclear deal appears to give the United States and Western countries that have signed it a pretext to attack Iran. But such coordinated action requires agreement between the signatories, which is not there, and there is a doubt that it will be reached. A number of EU countries are working hard, albeit without much success, to form a path that goes beyond sanctions. Russia and China certainly will not support the war against Iran.
The United States can at the same time, find itself as a sole competitor to Iran and to international hostility. It is true that the international anti-American coalition created following Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement did not satisfy Trump, but there is a fundamental difference between political action and war. In such circumstances, Washington does not seem to have a convincing road map.

The dilemma that any military confrontation should face is whether it is divided into several attacks aimed at “conveying a message” or “preserving the attack as a last resort,” but at the time using full force. In other circumstances, the process of responding to operations in the Gulf could have been exhausted by, “message-oriented attacks”, painful and one-time. But in this arena too, certain attacks can rapidly develop into international war. It seems that this consideration, not the loss of the lives of Iranian citizens, is what stopped Trump this time from the implementation of the US president’s decision. Israel will certainly tell him that he has raised this rate of response and that Iran will interpret it as an American weakness. On the one hand, Israel has lost a double chance to convey a strong message to Iran, as well as the United States, not Israel, to send the message. But even if the message is sent. It is not a linear process that ensures the desired result. Israel has learned this well on other fronts when the United States has applied this lesson in its arena [7].

Second-The Biden Administration and Foreign Policy

President Biden’s Middle East policy is part of his foreign policy in general, which is affected by a number of factors, and bears some characteristics, as follows [8]:

1- US President Joe Biden has a special interest in foreign policy. He was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for several years, including four years during which he chaired this committee. President Biden’s membership and activity on the Foreign Relations Committee afforded him the opportunity to build significant international experience. The experience and foreign interests of President Biden suggest he will take an active role in the foreign policy during his presidency.

2- President Biden has clear visions about foreign policy and international relations. During his long years as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden consistently expressed a vision drawn from the values and ideology of international liberalism, and this vision will represent an important source for foreign policy for his administration around the world, Including the Middle East.

3- The ideological beliefs and political positions of President Biden are characterized by moderation, as he represents the moderate wing in the Democratic Party. For President Biden, ideology seems closer to advice than to political doctrine that is being pursued rigidly.

4- A large number of President Biden’s administration staff comes from a professional, not political, background, which limits the impact of ideological and political factors in making foreign policy decisions, and gives more weight to the views of institutions related to foreign policy-making and defense. The Minister of Defense is a former general, and the head of the CIA is a professional diplomat, while the Secretary of State comes from a professional background in the National Security Council, and the Director of National Intelligence comes from a professional background in the field of intelligence and national security.

5- President Biden believes that the United States should return to lead the world again. He expressed this view in a lengthy article published during the presidential election campaign. In this sense, President Biden will adopt a foreign policy that contradicts the foreign policy applied by former President Trump, which started from an isolationist ideology that did not see in the world partners and allies of the United States, but only saw in it countries trying to exploit the United States and seize its wealth, or countries that could be held Profitable deals with it.

6- President Biden does not have any vengeful motives that push him to oppose former President Trump’s policies simply because they came from his politically and ideologically different predecessor. Despite the deep ideological divide in the United States, the next stage in American politics will not be a simple opposite application of President Trump’s policies, but rather it will involve some of the continuity of the policies that have been implemented during the last four years.

7- As described by former President Trump, China will continue to be the most important strategic threat to the United States, and in this very important aspect, the US foreign policy of the Trump administration will be largely a continuation of the policy of the previous administration, and different from the policy that was followed during the era of President Obama. The National Security Strategy issued during the era of President Trump described the situation in International regime as a system of strategic competition between major powers, and President Biden does not have a view that is contrary to that. Rather, this understanding of the nature of China and International regime represents a new consensus in the United States, regardless of party affiliation. This is a major shift in US foreign policy. If we compare what President Biden said and wrote about China recently, we would find that it differs significantly from the US national security strategy issued in 2015, under President Obama, indicating that the Biden administration is not a new administration for President Obama, despite That a large number of key figures in the new administration were part of the Obama administration.

8- Rebuilding the Western Alliance is the most visible issue on Biden’s foreign policy program. The Western alliance has come under a lot of pressures during the years of President Trump’s rule. In this context, the United States will strengthen the relationship with the main European allies, as President Biden believes that the United States is more powerful to the extent that it has allies, and that it will be more able to achieve its goals as long as it works in a collective framework.

9- Democratic values represent the most important link between members of the Western alliance, as President Biden sees it. The US President promised to organize a democratic summit during the first year of his presidency. This suggests that the issues of democracy and rights will return to play an important role in US foreign policy [9].

10- Confronting China and rebuilding the Western alliance are two interlinked issues in the vision of President Biden, who believes that the United States will be stronger against China if it engages in this confrontation through an international alliance and not alone.

11- Super national global issues, especially issues of a climate change, and an epidemic control, occupies a prominent place in the Biden administration’s foreign policy.

Third- The Middle East is on Biden’s list of interests

The presidential winner Joe Biden was not interested in explaining his platform for the Middle East, during the campaign. Although there is an important section on a foreign policy in Biden’s an election program, this part did not include anything useful regarding the Middle East, except for a criticism that was repeatedly repeated for former President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran. Because the foreign policy row occupied only a small area of the controversy during the election campaigns, there was no opportunity to develop and clarify President Biden’s vision for the Middle East [10].

President Biden is no stranger to the Middle East. His long experience in the Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress, and his position as Vice President enabled him to get close to the issues of the region. President Biden’s staff has a lot of experience in the region. Defense Secretary General Lloyd Austin was commander of Central Command responsible for the Middle East. William Burns, the CIA chief nominee was ambassador to Jordan, in addition to his previous position as Deputy Secretary of State. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was on the team of National Security Advisors to President Obama and Vice President Biden. Perhaps these experiences helped shape the Middle East’s position within the new administration’s areas of interest.
In addition to scatter, statements issued by President Biden regarding the Middle East, the most important and detailed source of what this administration intends to do in the region is the appointment and confirmation hearings, which the Senate held for President Biden’s candidates to fill positions related to foreign affairs, in which he participated even Now the foreign and defense ministers, and the director of national intelligence. These sessions indicated that the Biden administration does not intend to get involved militarily in the region, as neither the administration nor the public opinion is ready to digest new American wars in the Middle East. At the same time, this administration is not with the American withdrawal from the region. It is more likely that President Biden’s administration will maintain an appropriate level of military presence in the region, even if it hopes that it will not be forced to use it. In return, the Biden administration intends to rely heavily on diplomacy, and work with its regional allies, hoping that the combination of a limited military presence, active diplomacy and work with allies will be sufficient to achieve US goals [11].

The real problem facing this administration is the lack of clarity of American objectives in the Middle East. It is not known exactly what goals the US administration is seeking to achieve in the region, after the importance of oil declined and Israel was able to defend itself. These goals were replaced at an earlier stage by the policy of promoting the democracy, which caused the region to enter into a major crisis, and it was abandoned, without being replaced by a new consistent policy.

The follow-up to the statements of the new administration’s officials showed that this administration has a clear interest and the position related to the Iranian nuclear program, the war in Yemen, human rights, the American presence in the region, and work with allies, while it seems that it is still at the stage of developing its policy on other issues, especially Libya, Syria and the issue. Palestinian and Russian presence in the region[12].

Fourth- Iran and the Nuclear Program

The agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program is Biden’s most obvious Middle East a policy point, and it is administration’s most important priority in the region. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is a part of the United States’ policy to prevent nuclear proliferation in the world. The United States believes that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will trigger nuclear arms race in the region, and will also increase the possibility of an armed conflict between major regional powers, as the part of Iran’s regional competitors’ insistence on preventing latter from becoming a nuclear power, even if this necessitates launching War against it.

President Biden was close to the negotiations that ended with the signing of the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015, ex officio as Vice President Barack Obama; A number of officials who had chosen them to occupy key positions in his administration also participated in these negotiations which may reinforce the belief that a number of officials in the new administration view the nuclear agreement with Iran as their own achievement, and they seek to restore it, after it was undermined by the previous administration [13].

A return to the 2015 agreement is what Tehran is demanding, but such a return will not be easy, as many waters have flowed under bridges in the Middle East, during the past five years, and the most important of these changes are that more than half the life of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which is to be entered into. At a sunset clause in 2025. It has passed. The short period remaining in the life of the agreement does not make a simple return to it attractive, especially since Iran has already upgraded its nuclear capabilities since President Trump’s administration withdrew from the agreement. The process of reaching the nuclear agreement with Iran included many mechanisms and tests of confidence between the two parties, but after the withdrawal of the United States and the resumption of uranium enrichment by Iran, the trust between the two sides suffered a major setback, and it will take a time and an effort to restore it [14].

When the Iran a nuclear deal was reached in 2015, the Obama administration ignored many of the fundamental reservations expressed by the US allies in the region, especially the Arab Gulf states and Israel. The experiences of the last five years have shown that these reservations were not merely unfounded illusions or fears. The Iranian missile program has achieved very rapid progress, which has made it a real securities’ threat to the countries of the region, and Iran has been involved in the actual use of its missile capabilities when it attacked Saudi oil facilities in the summer of 2019, and it exported missiles of its production to various militias around the region, from the Houthis to Hezbollah to organizations. The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. In addition, Iran has strengthened its ability to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the region through the militias that it helped form in Lebanon and Iraq [15].

These risks are as difficult to ignore now as they were five years ago. This was reflected in statements issued by US officials during the appointment confirmation sessions. Among the most important things that Anthony Blinken said in this context, and other officials confirmed it, is the timeframe of the nuclear agreement, as well as the Iranian missile program, and Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of other countries will be on the negotiating table with Iran.

The new American thinking on the Iranian nuclear file included a change in the framework of the negotiations, by proposing the participation of Gulf states and Israel, in the negotiations, directly or indirectly, in an order to take into an account the concerns of these parties, concerns that were ignored when the nuclear agreement was first reached.

These new ideas are very important, but several problems remain. Presenting these ideas are, in fact, equating to negotiating a new agreement, not just returning to the previous agreement, which Iran rejects. On the other hand, there are the US partners in negotiating the nuclear deal, especially the European trio: Britain, France and Germany. The United States places high hopes on restoring the cohesion of the Western alliance, and it is not known whether these countries share their desire to negotiate new elements that were not included in the previous agreement or not [16].

Furthermore, it is not clear until now whether the Biden administration will stick to these positions until the end, and what alternatives it has if these positions cause negotiations to stumble, and whether this actually reflects its policy, or whether the issuance of these statements are to satisfy Hardcore members of Congress, or it is an opening offer in negotiations with Iran.

An indirect contact has already begun between the American and Iranian sides, as reports indicate that representatives of the new administration has met with representatives of Iran, which means that the Biden administration places this issue at the top of its priorities[17]. The United States may take steps to show good intentions towards Iran to encourage latter to act in a positive behavior, including the possibility of facilitating Iran’s access to a loan from the International Monetary Fund to counter the effects of Covid-19, or making available some of the Iranian seized assets to finance the purchase of humanitarian needs linked to the global epidemic. While measures such as these is not a fundamental concession on the part of the United States, they may be sufficient to encourage Iran to act positively [18].

Conclusion

The US election at 2020 is a particular importance to Iran. Although Iranian leaders expressed their indifference to the results, they indicated that Tehran would welcome any change in Washington’s policy towards Iran. Before the elections, Iran believes that, Trump’s re-election meant another four years of a confrontation and severe sanctions on the Iranian economy. On the other hand, Biden’s election with his different rhetoric and experience in dealing with Iran, during the Obama era, before Trump’s arrival in a power, could lead to change and break the deadlock between Iran and the United States.

While President Trump scrapped the Obama nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 and imposed a strategy of “maximum pressure” based on renaming the agreement in his name, Biden promised to reinstate the deal itself. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is pivotal in any future dealings between Iran and the United States, not only because it was the biggest achievement in the past four decades, but also because it could represent the true test of Biden’s shift toward Iran, thus partially restoring Iran’s confidence in dealing with Washington, that trust that Trump has destroyed [19].

Biden’s foreign policy rhetoric toward the Middle East indicates a change that could restructure US-Iranian policy on the JCPOA and beyond. Biden is ready to return the United States to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, marking a fundamental shift from Trump’s approach. If Biden’s proposed policy towards Iran is realized on the ground, he will end the strategy of maximum pressure — after reaching an understanding with Tehran — and will take a conciliatory approach toward Iran.

Although Biden’s compliance-versus-compliance methodology is not ideal for dealing with Iran, which will focus on the need to address the scars of violation of the JCPOA by Trump, it can still be used as a transitional framework for moving towards a normal engagement policy. Although this will be a difficult and possibly long process, a return to the JCPOA can pave the way for more cooperation on other issues. There are legal, technical, and political issues — which are the most important — that will hinder this methodology, but it will not be able to stop it provided there is strong political will in both Washington and Tehran.

Biden’s policy toward the Middle East will also have a decisive effect on his policy toward Iran. Unlike the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it is unlikely there will be a fundamental change in Trump’s policy towards the Middle East, yet there will be changes in the rhetoric and policy. Biden’s rhetoric about Iran’s regional enemies and rivals suggests that his approach will be more balanced compared to his predecessor’s obsession with Iran. Although the Biden administration is expected to maintain close ties with its traditional clients, and allies in the Middle East, it is also likely to pursue a more balanced approach for two main reasons: to reduce direct US engagement on unnecessary issues and direct its focus towards the growing power of China [20].

However, some clear differences between Iran and the United States in the Middle East will remain. Biden’s speech indicates that although his administration’s priorities will focus more on Iranian nuclear issues than on the Middle East, he will not deviate much from the American tradition of putting pressure on Iran in addition to rhetoric demanding a change in its regional behavior. However, it is not yet clear what kind of change his administration will seek. This is important; Because there is not much that the United States can do to advance its interests in the main regional files that Iran is undertaking, including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, or even Yemen.
Trump’s policy toward Iran and the way his administration handled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will overshadow Iran’s approach to the new U.S. administration. For Iranians, a departure from Trump’s approach — based on making gains at the expense of losing others — is welcome, but the new framework for cooperation and the Biden administration’s willingness to take responsibility for violating the JCPOA while addressing the scars of three years of the maximum pressure strategy will determine Tehran’s dealings with that administration. As for regional issues, the failure of the United States to return to the JCPOA commitments, and the guarantee of Iranian gains will make it unlikely that Iran will cooperate with the United States on regional issues. It is therefore, difficult to envision a change at Iranian regional policy as long as the JCPOA remains restricted [21].

References

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  17. Parisa Hafezi, “Iran hopes for a change in ‘destructive U.S. policies’ after Biden win,” Reuters, November 7, 2020. (https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-election-iran/iranhopes-for-a-change-in-destructive-u-s-policies-after-bidenwin-idUSKBN27N0N8)
  18. Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, “Trump’s Iran Achievement,” National Review, December 17, 2020. (https:// www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2020/12/31/trumpsiran-achievement)
  19. S. E. Rasmussen, and L. Norman, Iran’s Nuclear Program: How Close Is Tehran to Developing Nuclear Weapons? Wall Street Journal, 2021, 13 January, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572.
  20. Quint Forgey, “Biden slams Trump’s Iran strategy as a ‘self-inflicted disaster'”. Politico. January 21, 2021, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/20/joe-biden-trump-iran-1372607
  21. U.S. and Iran to start indirect talks to salvage nuclear deal, April 3,2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/04/03/world/politics-diplomacy-world/iran-nuclear-deal-us/
  22. Vice President Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020. (https://www.cnn. com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joebiden/index.html)

[1] Ellie Geranmayeh, Reviving the Revolutionaries: How Trump’s Maximum Pressure Is Shifting Iran’s Domestic Politics, European Council on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/reviving_the_revolutionaries_how_trumps_maximum_pressure_is_shifting_irans.

[2] Democratic Party of the United States, 2020 Democratic Party Platform, July 31, 2020, https:// www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-07-31-Democratic-Party-PlatformFor-Distribution.pdf.

[3] A. Applebaum, (2021, 7 January), What Trump and His Mob Taught the World About America, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/what-trump-and-his-mob-taught-world-about-america/617579/

[4] Quint Forgey, (June 20, 2019). “Biden slams Trump’s Iran strategy as a ‘self-inflicted disaster'”. Politico. January 21, 2021, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/20/joe-biden-trump-iran-1372607

[5] Michael Sharnoff, “Iran has driven Israel and the Gulf Arab states together,” The Washington Post, January 3, 2018. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/03/iran-has-driven-israel-and-the-gulf-arabstates-together)

-Jared Malsin, “U.S. Forces Return to Saudi Arabia to Deter Attacks by Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2020. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forces-return-to-saudi-arabia-todeter-attacks-by-iran-11582713002)

-Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War,” The New York Times, October 4, 2019. (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/ world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html)

[6] Vice President Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020. (https://www.cnn. com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joebiden/index.html)

[7] Katrina Manson, “Biden plans to reset ‘America First’ foreign policy”, The Financial Times, October 19, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/dc11d51e-71bb-46ac-9dfb-6e2b5f43b452

[8] Joe Biden, “Joe Biden: There’s a Smarter Way to Be Tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/index.html.

[9] Democratic Party of the United States, 2020 Democratic Party Platform, July 31, Op.cit.

[10] Josh Rogin, “U.S. foreign policy might be too broken for Biden to fix”, The Washington Post, October 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/us-foreign-policy-might-be-too-broken-for-biden-to-fix/2020/10/08/b82cfcf0-09a0-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html

[11] Karen DeYoung, “Biden foreign policy begins with telling the world: ‘America’s back’”, The ‏ Washington post, October 21, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-foreign-policy-begins-with-telling-the-world-americas-back/2020/10/21/2fc0e528-1348-11eb-bc10-40b25382f1be_story.html

[12] Ishaan Tharoor, “What the U.S. election means for the Middle East”, The Washington Post, October 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/10/13/us-election-biden-trump-middle-east-netanyahu-israel-iran-saudi-arabia/

[13] S. E. Rasmussen, and L. Norman, (2021, 13 January), Iran’s Nuclear Program: How Close Is Tehran to Developing Nuclear Weapons? Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572.

[14] Josh Rogin, “U.S. foreign policy might be too broken for Biden to fix”, Op.cit.

[15] Fabian Hinz, A Roadmap to Pragmatic Dialogue on the Iranian Missile Programme, European Leadership Network, March 6, 2019, https://www. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/a-roadmap-to-pragmatic-dialogue-on-the-iranian-missile-program/.

[16] France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, joint statement, January 14, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/joint-statement-by-theforeign-ministers-of-france-germany-and-the-united.

[17] U.S. and Iran to start indirect talks to salvage nuclear deal, April 3,2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/04/03/world/politics-diplomacy-world/iran-nuclear-deal-us/

[18] Lara Jakes,; Crowley, Michael; Sanger, David E.; Fassihi, Farnaz (February 18, 2021). “Biden Administration Formally Offers to Restart Nuclear Talks With Iran”. The New York Times. February 20, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear.html

[19] Andrew England and Katrina Manson, “US and Middle East: strongmen contemplate post-Trump era”, Financial Times, September 20, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/132ad76d-0ad4-4cf8-9dc7-acd1797c9e6d

[20] Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.

[21] Parisa Hafezi, “Iran hopes for a change in ‘destructive U.S. policies’ after Biden win,” Reuters, November 7, 2020. (https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-election-iran/iranhopes-for-a-change-in-destructive-u-s-policies-after-bidenwin-idUSKBN27N0N8)

– Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, “Trump’s Iran Achievement,” National Review, December 17, 2020. (https:// www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2020/12/31/trumpsiran-achievement)

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