Research studies

The nature of Turkish-Iranian relations for the period 2002-2014 and its impact on Iraq. Historical study

 

Prepared by the researcher :  Prof. Dr. Ahmed Jassim Ibrahim

Democratic Arab Center

Journal of Iranian orbits : Thirteenth Issue – September 2021

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin

Nationales ISSN-Zentrum für Deutschland
ISSN  2626-4927
Journal of Iranian orbits

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Abstract

The US occupation of Iraq in 2003 contributed to strengthening Turkish-Iranian relations based on the two countries’ awareness of the nature of the dangers that emerged from the motives of the US occupation of Iraq, whether with regard to Turkish fear of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, or Iranian concern about an American attack on Iran because of its program nuclear, or for other reasons. The conservative movement’s receipt of power and its commitments in Iran may contribute to the deterioration of Turkish-Iranian relations because of its hard-line approach, ideological commitments and its refusal to dialogue with the United States. As well as the use of Iranian nuclear weapons to strengthen Iran’s position in the competitive arenas with Turkey, especially in the Central Asian republics.

American pressure is an important factor in hindering the development of Turkish-Iranian relations, especially since Turkey is an ally of the United States while Iran is an enemy, and the influence of this factor increases with the increase in The intensity of the US-Iranian confrontation, whether with regard to its nuclear program, or because of what the United States claims of Iranian interference in the Iraqi affairs. However, the joint threats that the two countries face, especially after the US occupation of Iraq in March 2003, prompted more coordination Joint cooperation and the two countries bombed Kurdish villages in northern Iraq to target the positions of the Kurdish fighters who launch successive attacks against them, as they have been active in recent months in launching operations on the Iranian borders, and in return the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been active in launching military operations inside Turkish territory. The operations had a mutual understanding, which was expressed through the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister (Ali Babacan) to Iran in October 2007 and the visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister (Manouchehr Mottaki) to Iraq and the invitation of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. (Nuri al-Maliki) Iran to play an important and effective role, in Peaceful settlement of the Iraqi-Turkish crisis, and this process also found Syrian support, which was expressed through the visit of President (Bashar al-Assad) in October of 2007, who affirmed Turkey’s right to defend itself. Factors and variables towards further development of Turkish-Iranian relations.

the importance of studying

The study of Turkish-Iranian relations is receiving increasing attention from academics, researchers and politicians, due to the great weight represented by the two countries due to their strategic location, demographic components, military capabilities, (Iran) possession of energy sources, and their proximity to energy stocks in the Arabian Gulf and Caspian Sea, but rather because they are A corridor for the transit of energy from these two regions to the outside world, as well as their political impact on the course of events in the Middle East, especially its important issues (the Arab-Zionist conflict) and the export of oil. Regional and international, represented by the American campaign against “terrorism” and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the escalation of American threats to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Between them, most of the studies that researched topics related to Turkey and Iran dealt with foreign policy The two countries or their political systems individually, or their relations with other countries such as the United States, Israel, the Arab Gulf, or other issues without addressing the relations between them, and that is why this study came to fill this void, and to complete what the previous studies started.

Study Approach

In our study we relied on the following methods:.

1-The historical approach: to find out the history of Turkish-Iranian relations or the history of the two countries’ relations with other regional and international powers such as the United States.

2- Analytical method: through methods of analyzing situations and information in preparation for reaching the appropriate results on the reality and future of Turkish-Iranian relations.

3- The comparative approach: which we relied on, especially in the context of our study of the political systems in both countries, and the study of the variables affecting the relations between them, and their position on the crises of the Arab Gulf.

Study hypothesis

The study starts from a basic hypothesis that the Turkish-Iranian relations have been characterized by instability and instability, as the internal and external variables contributed to affecting these relations towards their progress and decline. This hypothesis resulted in a number of questions, as follows:

1-What is the impact of the ideological contradiction and theadoption of different political systems (the Islamic system, the secular system) on the reality and future of Turkish-Iranian relations?

2- What are the most prominent internal and external variables affecting Turkish-Iranian relations?

Introduction.

The Turkish-Iranian relations have been governed by geographical, civilizational and cultural considerations, as Iran, like Turkey, is located on the transit line of the South Asian-European connection. As well as the cultural exchange between the Turks and the Persians, which is one of the oldest and most intertwined cultural exchanges for Turkey. For two thousand years, Iran was the geopolitical rival of any group that ruled Anatolia, including the Byzantines, but despite the geopolitical tensions between Iran and Turkey that existed even when it was Iran is a Sunni state. Iran did not become the main ideological and ideological competitor to the Ottoman Empire until after the religious conversion and the conversion of Shiism as a state doctrine in 1500.

The Turkish-Iranian relations witnessed a major transformation process after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which came in the wake of the fall of the Shah’s regime (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi), which sought to get Iran out of the circle of Western alliances and play an active regional role, as the main center of resistance to the American power in the Middle East. The Middle East, which sought to reach the global role in accordance with the principle of exporting the revolution.

While relations were characterized by a sharp deterioration after 1988 AD as a result of the occurrence of many things that affected the relationship between the two countries. During that period, more actions took place that generated a kind of tension between them, due to two incidents, the first of which: the Iranian embassy in Ankara refused to follow the approach of foreign embassies In the media, on the anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish newspapers expressed this position as unacceptable, and the second case was in 1989 AD when Iran compared the Turkish President “Kanaan Evren” to the author of the book The Satanic Verses*, which caused more resentment among officials, especially among the circles The army, and when “Hashemi Rafsanjani” came to power in 1989, there began a gradual improvement in Turkish-Iranian relations as the new president made more changes, including the removal of hard-line Islamists from important centers in the state. Turkish-Iranian relations began to develop positively due to the fact that Many regional developments, and thus witnessed an advanced stage during the nineties of the last century, as for the position of the two countries on the second Gulf War (1990-1991 AD), their position was contrary to The war, because it disrupted the strategic balance in the region, and relations began to proceed normally, but with the events of September 11, 2001, Iran moved closer to Turkey, especially since the Iranian side, which began to fear that this American campaign against terrorism would affect its movement towards Iran after Iraq, and this is a form Iran has great fear and contributed to the rapprochement between the two countries. After the events of September 2001, the PKK began cooperating with the (Free Life Party) in Iran to carry out activities against police stations on the Turkish-Iranian border. The matter and relations began to proceed normally, but with the events of September 11, 2001 Iran has drawn close to Turkey, especially since the Iranian side, which began to fear that this American campaign against terrorism will affect Iran, after Iraq This constituted a great fear for Iran and contributed to the rapprochement between the two countries.[1] (After the events of September 2001, the PKK began cooperating with the (Free Life Party) located in Iran to carry out activities against police stations on the Turkish-Iranian border, which led to an increase in cooperation between Turkey and Iran For the first time, the relations between the two countries are witnessing joint operations.

The first axis: – Turkish-Iranian relations in the era of the Justice and Development Party and its impact on Iraq

After the events of September 11, 2001, Turkish-Iranian relations began to improve after the intention of the United States of America to intervene in Iraq appeared. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated on November 7, 2001 that his country, if it did not support any American military campaign against any of its neighbors, Iraq and Iran Within the framework of the campaign launched by the United States known as the “War on Terror” after considering both Iraq and Iran within the “axis of evil,” because his country has close interests and relations with each of them. Therefore, Ecevit advised the United States of America not to expand the war against terrorism, because that It will be an unacceptable act and Turkey will not support it at all. Also, surprisingly, after former US President George W. Bush announced that Iran is part of the (Axis of Evil), the very secular President of the Turkish Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, visited Tehran and called for priorities New developments in building economic relations between Turkey and Iran, as the economic ties between the two countries increased significantly, especially in the field of energy. Also, Turkish companies began to show interest in expanding their participation in the Iranian economy.[2]

There is another factor that prompted Turkey to strengthen its relations with Iran, as Turkey considered that the biggest potential security threat to it was the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and in this context, Turkey expressed its alarm at the close alliance shown by the United States of America towards the Kurds of Iraq, and this What prompted it to closer its relations with Iran, as well as the PKK launching attacks on police stations on the border with Iran, which increased the rapprochement between Turkey and Iran as joint military operations took place for the first time in the history of the two countries.[3]

Iran also considered the Justice and Development Party’s victory in the parliamentary elections in 2002 and its formation of the government as a positive development between Turkey and Iran. In fact, there has been no significant change in Ankara’s policy toward Tehran. But it seems that the improvement in relations between Turkey and Iran after the Justice and Development Party took over was linked to a set of variables that had a prominent impact on the development of cooperation between the two countries (Turkey and Iran).[4]

  1- Turkish-Iranian fears of the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq

The Kurdish issue is one of the most important challenges facing the two countries, as there were common fears of the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, as there was a convergence of views in recent years between Turkey and Iran on the importance of the Iraqi territorial integrity and the unified position between the two countries towards the elements of the PKK, The years 2006 and 2007 witnessed close Turkish and Iranian cooperation in joint operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party and its Iranian counterpart, the Free Life Party, as there were reports indicating that Washington was supplying separatist minority movements inside Iran, including the Iranian Kurds. Therefore, the Turkish-Iranian cooperation was a source of alarm. Washington, as Ankara’s awareness of Washington’s reluctance to take action against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a source of agitation for Ankara and prompted it to cooperate with Iran.[5]

1-2  Development in economic relations between Turkey and Iran                       

Economic factors are among the most important factors affecting the relations between the two countries, as the volume of exchange between Turkey and Iran reached ten billion dollars, as Iran ranked third after Russia and Ukraine in the volume of trade exchange with Turkey among its neighbors, and Iran is one of the most important sources of supplying Turkey With energy, Iranian gas is one of Turkey’s largest imports from the Middle East. Therefore, in April 2007, Turkey and Iran announced plans to establish a strategic alliance based on the energy project. This project requires drilling new oil and gas wells and transporting energy through Greece to Europe[6]. Turkey has pledged two billion dollars to market and transport Iranian natural gas, and the two countries are also planning to facilitate the export of Iranian oil through pipelines to Ceyhan port on the Mediterranean. The Turkish move came at a time when Washington was seeking to tighten sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. The problem between Turkey and the United States of America deepened by signing a memorandum of understanding in mid-September 2008 between Turkey and Iran, in order to establish a huge project in the region for energy production. This project also faced strong opposition from Israel, and this was expressed by an Israeli minister who said (the energy agreement between Turkey and Iran is the worst), and the Israeli Minister of Infrastructure Ben Eliezer said that “the energy cooperation agreement between Turkey and Iran will work on encourage Iran.[7]

On the other hand, Turkish President Abdullah Gul welcomed the decision to cancel customs duties until 1015 among the member states of the (ICO) summit, which he was called to during its convening in Tehran in 2009, as this decision was considered important for Turkey, because if this is achieved, Turkish exports will To Iran can increase significantly, because at present it is noted that the energy balance between the two countries is in favor of Iran largely because of the energy facto.[8]

Despite the development in Turkish-Iranian relations, the sanctions imposed by Western banks on Iran are considered one of the most important obstacles to the development of relations between the two countries. Therefore, Iran has proposed establishing a joint bank, and conducting business in the local currency of the two countries in order to overcome the problems represented by the sanctions. Which Iran sees as one of the biggest obstacles to Turkish companies’ export.[9]

  1-3  The Turkish position on the Iranian nuclear file  

The policy pursued by the Turkish government towards Iran, especially its nuclear program, has led to the development of relations between the two countries, as the Turkish leaders supported Iran’s right to develop a full cycle of nuclear fuel. But they opposed Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, because Turkey evaluates the Iranian nuclear program from several angles, first: Turkey is concerned that Iran’s development of nuclear weapons will lead to the emergence of a new arms race in the region. Second: Turkey considers Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons an important factor that strengthens Iran’s position in the undeclared bilateral competition between the.[10]

But despite these fears, since the beginning of the Iranian crisis, Turkey has completely avoided siding with the United States of America, and besides that, it has worked on using the language of balance, in which it says that Iran’s nuclear activities have peaceful goals, as Turkey does not see the nuclear program. Iran is an imminent danger, and the government is still convinced that diplomatic dialogue with Tehran is the best option to persuade Iran to abandon its attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, and Turkey is strongly offering to resort to the military option to prevent Iran from making further progress in nuclear technology. It was also objecting to On the policy of double standards in the region on the issue of nuclear weapons, and for this reason, Turkey supported the offer made by Syria in the agenda of the United Nations, aiming to completely free the Middle East region of nuclear weapons, which mainly targets Israel. Likewise, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision when he voted against the decision to impose more UN sanctions on Iran in June 2010, instead of abstaining from voting, as was expected[11]. Turkey is also trying to benefit from nuclear technology, which led Turkey to launch an initiative jointly with Brazil to reach a deal under which nuclear fuel would be exchanged with Iran. The agreement proposed by Turkey and Brazil is based on Iran depositing 1200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in Turkey at once, In return for obtaining the same amount of low-enriched uranium, and that this agreement is the only tangible diplomatic achievement regarding Iran’s nuclear file, and Turkey is still hesitant to take further steps to isolate Iran and agree to the deployment of the United States of America and NATO ballistic missile defense systems on Turkish soi.[12]

Therefore, in the context of Turkey’s pursuit of its goal of fostering friendly relations with Iran, it demanded not to refer to any country as the threat that constitutes the rationale for building the NATO missile defense system in exchange for its approval of the alliance’s decision to start developing ballistic missile defense systems at the Lisbon Summit of NATO The Atlantic in November 2010[13]. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also announced that his country is ready to play the role of mediator after the United States of America announced its readiness to enter into a dialogue with Iran, and if comprehensive negotiations are achieved between the United States of America and Iran, it is possible that Turkey will have a positive contribution, because the views of Turkey Iranian officials towards Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul are positive, and they consider the proposals made by Turkey based on intentions and not as a result of Western pressure, but despite this, the difficulties facing these mediation efforts should not be underestimated, because resolving the outstanding problems between Iran and the United States of America is a solution. Finally, in a short period of time is considered unlikely.[14]

Based on what was realized during the talks held by President Abdullah Gul in May 2009 in Tehran, the Iranians are not convinced that the United States of America is serious about inaugurating a new phase, and that changing the language of Obama’s rhetoric regarding Iran is important, but it is not sufficient on its own on the one hand. Others: There are serious doubts about Iran’s desire for mediation carried out by Turkey, and this was evident when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a press statement while Turkish President Abdullah Gul was in Iran that there was no need for mediation. Which competed in the region, a trump card if these talks were achieved[15]. Thus, we can conclude that the positive Turkish role towards Iran, and the Turkish government led by the Justice and Development Party taking a neutral foreign policy, increases Ankara’s mediation opportunities and enhances its regional position, as well as that Iran is fully aware of Turkey’s contributions to building energy projects that Iran is strongly interested in and the contributions of Turkey is in the platform of regional cooperation. Moreover, Iran’s development of its relations with Turkey as a balancing element in the region enables it to confront the Arabs’ accusations of spreading the Shiite sect, and all of this would strengthen Turkish-Iranian relations[16].

the  second axis:  Turkish-Iranian interactions in the Arab region and in light of the transformations (the Arab Spring)

The Arab region constitutes one of the most important arenas for interaction between Turkey and Iran, as the Levantine Arab region in particular is considered the vital area for both of them and an arena for competition between the two countries. Despite the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations, due to the policies pursued by the Turkish government because of its refusal to participate in the war on Iraq, it was met with This step is highly appreciated by Iran. Also, relations between the two sides have been strengthened, especially during the tense Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli relations, as the Turkish position was welcomed by Iran after the intensive efforts made by the Turkish government to cease fire during the Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 2006, Also, the verbal altercation between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos Forum in 2009 due to the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, increased Iranian admiration for the Turkish position[17]. But despite this, there is Iranian fear of Turkey’s policy in the Arab region. It is following with great concern the mediations that Turkey is doing between Syria and Israel. Iran is afraid of Turkey’s intention to exclude its influence in the region, and also that Iran does not look comfortably at the classification of Turkey by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. As a strategic partner. As for Turkey, it has tried to distance itself (albeit publicly) from the accusations leveled at Iran and related to the Iranian desire to create a Shiite crescent.[18]

Finally, we must highlight the Iranian and Turkish position on the Arab revolutions, the so-called (Arab Spring), as they are the largest neighboring countries in a number of Arab countries, although the interest of these two countries in what is happening is not the same, or even similar in its aspect and objectives, as it is noted here that the two countries differ in dealing with those revolutions that bear all From Iran and Turkey, there is a special vision for the region that is compatible with the foreign policy orientations of both countries and in a way that serves the grand strategy of each of them. It can be said that the Turkish and Iranian position on those revolutions was suspicious for different reasons and motives, as the Iranian position on those revolutions ranged between caution and support And support in some cases, with the exception of the Syrian revolution, as the Arab revolutions are considered according to the regime’s perspective represented by the highest authority in it – i.e. the Supreme Leader and Guardian Jurist Ali Khamenei, and after him the President of the Republic and the Speaker of Parliament – as an extension of the Iranian revolution in 1979, and these Arab revolutions express an Islamic awakening led by Muslim peoples, and revolves around the same values ​​of the Iranian revolution represented in the overthrow of “tyrants” and “agents of the West,” hostility to the United States of America and Israel, and Support the oppressed and the oppressed against global arrogance in a way that contributes to the establishment of an Islamic Middle East. As for the way to achieve this[19], it is understood from the Iranian statements that it is desirable to take place through the peoples, especially the Islamic movements that suffered and struggled, and there is no objection to coups if they serve this purpose As the Iranian government was supportive of the revolution in Egypt, and hoped that an Islamic model would prevail that would be influenced by it, or at least allow it to influence it or enter it to integrate with it, and it also hoped that the new countries would base their foreign policy on hostility with the United States of America, and that escalation would take place. Military action against (Israel) according to the Iranian vision as a criterion for the extent of friendship that Tehran can have with the newly born regimes. The Iranian discourse in this field is based on three mechanisms: the ideological tendency, the subjective experience, the achievements of the regional arms in confronting the United States of America and Israel, and the Islamic orientation of some social segments such as the Muslim Brotherhood. While we note that the Turkish position on Egypt, as Turkey hoped after the (Arab Spring Revolution) that its model would prevail based on: democracy, political rationality, Islamic moderation, partisan pluralism, rule of law, national and independent foreign policy that does not conflict with relations with various powers International, whether Western or other powers in countries that change their regimes. The Turkish discourse in this field is based on three mechanisms: moderate discourse, assistance in explaining its experience and all that is required to implement it, and reliance on its balance of soft power. To the extent that the Syrian crisis poses a challenge to the strength of the relationship between Turkey and Iran, Egypt represents an opportunity for each of them to realize their regional vision[20].

It is clear that there is a Turkish-Iranian competition in Egypt, but the Turkish role appears to be more advanced, at least in the form. This positive effect was evident during the Egyptian uprising through the way in which the uprisings in Tahrir Square of different orientations and affiliations received the speech of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip. Erdogan, which included advice to the Egyptian leadership, compared to the violent response they made to the speech of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Khamenei. There also seemed to be a form of being influenced by the Turkish trend through the rational and moderate discourse – so far – of Islamic currents in general (Reform and Ennahda, the Freedom and Justice Party, the New Center Party, the pursuit of a civil state, not a religious one…etc.[21]

Iran was excessively supportive and supportive of the revolution in Bahrain, as it hoped that the protests in Bahrain would succeed in transforming the popular forces into a political force with great influence inside Bahrain, and that the success of that revolution would give Tehran another Arab window to expand and influence to penetrate the Gulf Cooperation Council.[22] We note that Turkey’s position on the demonstrations in Bahrain was cautious, as Turkey was afraid of sectarian strife that would not keep anyone out of its influence. Therefore, Turkey considered Iranian statements regarding Bahrain as irresponsible. During the Bahraini crisis, Turkey tried to play a mediating role to contain the crisis, and its official message was represented in three basic elements: the need to preserve the security and stability of the Gulf, respect for the sovereignty and unity of Bahrain, and also to move forward with reform. Therefore, the difference between the Iranian and Turkish sides appeared to be clear in the position of sending the Peninsula Shield forces to Bahrain. Which the first considered a military invasion, while the second only warned of the escalation of tension in the region. In parallel with the Bahraini authorities’ demand for restraint for fear of reaching a new Karbala, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, Turkey stressed its rejection of any external interference that affects Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in A clear indication of Iranian interference.[23]

As for the position of the two countries on the revolution in Syria, it is completely different, as Iran has expressed its rejection of the revolution in Syria, and this was expressed by the Director of the Center for Iranian-Arab Studies (Mohammed Salih Sadiqian) when he said, “Iran supports the movement of the Arab revolution in other countries, but not in Syria.” Because it is resisting Israel, and Tehran is building its relations with the Arab countries, based on the degree of its opposition to Israel.” For Turkey, the revolution in Syria is of special importance, as the contagion of protests to Syria is a different matter, because it has major repercussions on the political map and regional balances in the Middle East. Syria, for Turkey, is key to more than one regional issue, including one of resistance in Lebanon and Palestine. Iraq, Arab-Iranian relations and the contact between fundamentalist and secular currents, in addition to the conflict with Israel, and that Syria, due to its central geographical location, remains the most important Turkish gateway to the Middle East, and since the biggest problem that Turkey faces is the Kurdish problem, the Kurdish strip inside Syria on The border with Turkey raises Ankara’s serious concern in case the situation in Syria becomes confused.[24]

For its part, Turkey believes that the people’s demands for more freedoms and democracy, and the lifting of all restrictions related to political and human rights are legitimate demands, and that friendship with the Syrian regime cannot be at the expense of the Syrian people, especially if they refuse to implement quick and radical reforms[25]. Turkey also believes that the change must take place internally and quickly in order to avoid external interference that Ankara cannot stand in if the Syrian regime ignores the warnings addressed to it. As a result, Turkey began to advise Syria on how to proceed in the path of reform, but the Syrian regime’s escalation of its repressive operations against the Syrian people prompted Turkey to change its position. As soon as the League of Arab States imposed its economic sanctions on the Syrian regime on November 27, 2011 (which included Ceasing dealings with the Central Bank of Syria and halting government commercial exchanges, as well as freezing the financial balances of the Syrian government, stopping financial transactions with it, and stopping financing any government trade exchanges by Arab banks with the Central Bank of Syria). Until Turkey supported those sanctions and at the same time imposed economic sanctions against the Syrian government, in addition to Turkey’s affirmation through its Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, “that Turkey will suspend its strategic cooperation with Damascus and stop all arms exports to it, as well as freeze all Turkish loans to Syria. Thus, we find From what has been shown that the Turkish and Iranian position on the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, we note that each of them has goals that it seeks to achieve. Iran, since the victory of its revolution, has tried to introduce the Arab world into its historical moment and its strict Islam, while Turkey is trying to promote in the Arab region democratic Islam and political reform.[26]

 1-1.Turkey, Iran and the third Gulf War      

With the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war and its consequences, especially in the area of Iraq possessing a large army, large stockpiles of weapons, developing its combat capabilities, and seeking to invest them at the regional level, the United States of America began to think realistically about changing the Iraqi regime and toppling it, and invested the entry of The Iraqi forces, Kuwait, on August 2, 1990, to achieve this goal following the operations of the international coalition on January 17, 1991. However, several variables prevented this, due to the United States’ realization that regime change would allow the arrival of radical religious forces whose orientations do not coincide with the American approach. For this reason, the American military operations were satisfied with the aim of expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but they did not abandon their goal of overthrowing the Iraqi regime.

That is why I took the initiative to tighten the screws on the Iraqi government, and impose an economic siege on Iraq to prevent it from rebuilding its military capabilities or developing its economic structure, and then officially adopted the goal of overthrowing the Iraqi government when former US President (Bill Clinton) ratified on January 31 of the year 1998 ” The Iraq Liberation Law, and according to Article 3 of the law, the goal of US policy is to remove (Saddam Hussein) from power. The law also provided for $97 million in aid to the Iraqi opposition.[27]

The United States used the excuse that Iraq did not cooperate with the International Committee charged with monitoring weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (UNMOVIC) to justify its occupation of Iraq in April 2003.

After occupying Iraq, the United States planned to stay in it for a long time, and its adoption of a new strategy based on transferring its military center of gravity in the Arabian Gulf to Iraq, to ​​face new tasks that resulted from the post-Cold War requirements, especially in the context of responding to the events of September 11, 2001. And he made Iraq a mainstay for its military presence, not only in the Arab Gulf region, but also in the Middle East, and in the strategic square region, which Iraq is located in the heart of, which includes the Persian Gulf, Northwest Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, which allows it to confront the countries hostile to it, which are specifically (Iran and Syria) and adjusting the balance of power in the circle of the Arab-Zionist conflict, by overthrowing a regime hostile to the United States, as well as controlling Iraqi oil, as former US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said that the main reason for the invasion of Iraq while dealing With North Korea diplomatically, Iraq is swimming in a sea of ​​oil.[28]

 1-2. the Turkish-Iranian position on the third Gulf War                                               

Iraq enjoys great importance from the Turkish and Iranian perspective. From the Turkish perspective, the importance is due to the following reasons:[29]

  1. The Iraqi region of Mosul and Kirkuk was on the map of Turkey, which was approved by the Turkish Grand National Council in a secret session on January 28, 1920 in (Istanbul), which was known as the (National Pact), and during the discussions of the Turkish Grand National Council on the eve of the treaty ( Lausanne) 1923, the Turks were forced to abandon the mandate of Mosul and Kirkuk in favor of Iraq after British pressure, and Ataturk’s position was that the restoration of Mosul and Kirkuk would be possible when Turkey was an active force and when international conditions were appropriate, and despite Turkey’s abandonment of Mosul and Kirkuk officially under The June 1926 Treaty between Turkey, Britain and Iraq, but it remained firmly rooted in the Turkish political mind, and this was clearly expressed during the second Gulf War.
  2. Turkey is a non-oil country, and energy imports constitute a heavy burden on the Turkish economy, and the oil richness of the Mosul and Kirkuk regions constitutes an incentive for Turkey’s interest in this region, whether through the oil transportation lines (Kirkuk – Yumar Taliq), or by laying hands on it by changing the map Iraq or obtaining an oil advantage with a new regime in Baghdad.
  3. The presence of a Turkmen majority in the oil[30]-rich region of Kirkuk, estimated at 400,000 to 1 million, helps the current state of disintegration in Iraq on Turkey’s ability to use it as a pressure card when necessary.
  4. The obsession with disintegration is one of the concerns suffered by the Turkish regime, which resulted from the Sèvres agreement in August 1920, which called for the establishment of an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia and a Kurdish autonomous region in southeastern Anatolia. From the Turkish perspective, the Kurds are more dangerous than the

Armenians for three reasons.

5- The Kurds have a dense presence in the southeastern regions of Turkey, with about (10-12) million Kurds.

6 – The Kurds have fought in the midst of revolutions and rebellions that have not stopped since 1925.

C- The presence of a Kurdish bloc south of Turkey, specifically in northern Iraq, numbering five million, and it is an extension of the Kurds of Turkey, and what increases its danger is that the Kurds of Iraq have made strides in order to embody their cultural identity and national character, especially after the second Gulf War and its consequences From forming an independent government, parliament, and other state institutions.

7-Today, northern Iraq represents a main base for the (PKK), which retreated in northern Iraq, especially after its military defeats at the end of the nineties and the arrest of its leader (Abdullah Ocalan) in February 1999. Turkish forces carry out military operations from time to time in Iraqi territory to prevent any infiltration attempts from northern Iraq to southern Turkey.

8-. Iraq represents a very vital economic importance, and the volume of Turkish foreign trade with Iraq is twice its total volume with the Arab countries, and Turkey’s losses after the imposition of the economic embargo on Iraq after the second Gulf War were estimated at about (50 billion dollars), and that is why Turkey worked to break the economic siege To compensate for some of its losses, Turkish companies are linked to large contracts and investments in Iraq, and the Turkish government hopes to play a broad economic role in the event of lifting the economic embargo on Iraq.

9- Turkey was interested in the extent of Iraq’s development of its military capabilities, which affects the Turkish national security.

The Turkish government headed by Bulent Ecevit was concerned about the American position on Iraq, especially in the nineties and the beginning of the current century. On its relations with it, because of its vital interests with the United States, such as the Baku-Ceyhan line and the continuation of military cooperation between them, and the American understanding of the Cyprus problem, and the American condoning of the hard-line Turkish policy towards the Kurds, and the use of force against them.[31]

The Turkish government focused its attention on the financial support it could obtain from the United States, and support its agreements with the International Monetary Fund to obtain financial loans of up to sixteen billion dollars, at a time when it exceeded its ability to repay its previous debt service, for which estimates conflicted between (120-230) billion dollars, and Turkey attaches great importance to supporting its efforts to join the European Union, which has not ceased to confirm its doubts about its ability to achieve the political and economic standards of the European Union, but the policy of the (Ecevit) government towards Iraq reflected the views of Turkish business groups, Which has long attributed the reasons for the deterioration of the Turkish economy to the continuation of the economic embargo on Iraq, and also reflected the military establishment’s fears of plans targeting Iraq and the region, and the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq.[32]

The Turks’ fears centered on the possibility of their country’s economic crises exacerbating with the implementation of the United States’ military strike on Iraq, and Turkey’s loss of nearly one billion dollars annually, which is the volume of irregular inter-trade with Iraq, which was scheduled to reach three billion at the end of 2003, and Turkey It will lose its trade with the Persian Gulf through Iraqi territory with the occurrence of the American strike.[33]

At first, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced on November 7, 2001 that his country would not support any military campaign against any of its neighbors, Iraq and Iran, as part of the American war against terrorism, because his country had close interests and relations with each of them, as Ecevit advised the United States. The United States not to expand the war against terrorism to include the two countries, because that would be an unacceptable act, and Turkey would not support it at all. On July 21, 2001, the Turkish Prime Minister (Ecevit) warned the United States against engaging in a long war, if it decided to launch a military campaign against Iraq to topple the regime (Saddam Hussein), noting that the military, technical and economic level in Iraq cannot be compared with other countries against which the United States has fought wars in the past, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. Then he stressed on another occasion that his country does not want to create crises or clash with the United States Just as you do not want the region to witness a new war.[34]

With the escalation of the crisis between Iraq and the United States in August 2002, which took on new dimensions and reached the point of threatening to use force against Iraq, Turkey had its own position, which differed from its position in 1991, and this is evident in the statements of a number of Turkish officials, “As Suleiman emphasized Demirel expressed his total rejection of the United States’ use of force against Iraq… and that Turkey is not in favor of changing the regime in Iraq. He also said, “Iraq should be within the framework of the international community, and we are with the unity and independence of Iraq.[35]

On August 22, 2002, the First Deputy of the Right Path Party, Hussein Akinci, spoke about the importance of the participation of neighboring countries in the opinion on the lack of agreement with the American plans to strike Iraq. Akinci added, “Problems occurred between Iraq and Turkey during the second Gulf War, and one of its results was that it caused great damage.” For both sides, we, as a party, have given importance to the Turkish-Iraqi relations, and in the event we reach power, we will pay attention to it.[36]

The Vice-President of the Republican People’s Party “Enal Batu” indicated that “in the event of an American attack on Iraq, we will not provide support to the United States, and Iraq can count on us in this field.[37]

During the visit of the former US Deputy Secretary of Defense “Paul Wolfowitz” to Turkey in July of 2002, (Wolfowitz) asked Turkey to participate in the war, and to open a northern front, taking into account the Turkish demands, to which he answered as follows: The United States will maintain the unity of Iraq And it will oppose an independent Kurdish state, and it will help Turkey economically to compensate for any potential losses as a result of the war, and the United States will note the special status of the Turkmens, and will ensure the continuation of IMF aid.[38]

Wolfowitz’s visit to Turkey was repeated again in December 2002, that is, after the Justice and Development Party took power following the parliamentary elections in November 2002. The first visit was during the era of Bulent Ecevit, who was one of the staunch opponents of the American war. On Iraq, or Turkey’s participation in it, and the United States saw that the opportunity for Turkey’s participation in the war may appear after the arrival of the Justice and Development Party, which is looking for American international coverage that will devote their new legitimacy to power towards their local opponents, especially the military establishment, and the administration of President George W. Bush considered The new authority is a very important model for the participation of a Muslim country in the war against Iraq, which is why the United States asked Turkey to open its lands for the stationing and passage of American forces, Turkey’s participation in the war and the opening of a northern front against Iraq in exchange for political and economic gains.[39]

Hilmi Azkouk, the former chief of staff of the Turkish army, declared on January 8, 2003, “that his country opposes entering the war against Iraq, and that no one should portray Ankara as a “thug of the region”, and that the United Nations’ disputes with Baghdad should be settled peacefully and that the efforts of the United Nations should be settled peacefully. The peaceful solution must go to the end.” He added, “The army has a strong influence on political life, and will have a strong say in any decision regarding support for the United States, which accuses Iraq of developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.[40]

Turkey was subjected to various pressures from several sides, the most important of which was the United States, which demanded that it allow about 62,000 American soldiers to work in its lands in exchange for economic and political privileges. From the previous Iraqi government, which gave it oil in return for refusing the war decision, as well as a strong popular opposition refusing to participate in the war.[41]

The AKP’s response came through its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who declared, “He is against an American military strike on neighboring Iraq, and that Turkey is committed to United Nations resolutions. He also stressed that if the international inspectors return with positive reports from Baghdad, there is no need for military action against it.” And that his party will work to resolve the Iraqi crisis peacefully and politically.[42]

As for (Abdullah Kul), deputy head of the party, he indicated that his party’s position is as follows: “Iraq is a rich country, and one of the countries in the region with the highest level of education, while there are oil-rich Arab countries, but they have not reached the level of Iraqi education.. But on the other hand, Iraq must take measures for a democratic transition.[43]

Turkey was not satisfied with that, but it moved realistically to prevent war, by moving against the countries that have the right of veto in the Security Council, especially France, the Russian Federation, and China, to persuade it not to agree to a resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq, and it deliberately extended the negotiations that were It is taking place between it and the United States and the repeated postponement of the final response to the American demands.[44]

Under the threat of the economic factor and persuading Turkey of the inevitability of waging war by the United States, the Justice and Development Party government sought at the end of January of the year 2002 to lure the Turkish Grand National Council to the American side, hence the government’s approval on January 31 of the same year, On the idea of ​​stationing US military forces on Turkish territory, the decision was taken based on pressure exerted by the Turkish National Security Council on the leaders of the Justice and Development Party. (Ankara) are discussing whether they will support an American intervention or not, what is being discussed in fact is the best timing for the decision.” But we end up with the worst-case scenario,” he added, “We still believe in the chances of peace because it is not possible to combine military measures by allowing US forces and the chance for peace.[45]

The Turkish political position witnessed important shifts in the first half of February 2003, in the direction of participation in the war, and Abdullah Gul, the former Turkish Prime Minister, stated that “Turkey did everything in its power, and that if a war broke out outside Turkey’s will, it should not expose our national interests.” At the time, we cannot say that we are outside of this matter, and it requires that we move together from the angle of our national interests with the United States, our strategic partner and ally,” while (Erdogan) spoke “that Turkey should not remain outside the equation, and if we stay outside it, it will not be possible to We will be in a position to direct developments in the end, and Turkey must have an influential role within the decision-making mechanism in the phase of rebuilding Iraq.[46]

The negotiations that took place in February between the United States and Turkey were complex and comprehensive, centered on the conditions for Turkish participation in the war, and were divided into three main economic, military and political axes. In the economic axis, it was agreed to grant Turkey soft loans amounting to (24) billion dollars and a gift of 6 ) billion dollars, provided that the gift will be under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund, in order to cover potential losses in the event of the outbreak of war. In the military axis, it was agreed that 60-70,000 American soldiers would be stationed on Turkish soil, and then cross them to northern Iraq, to ​​enter northern Iraq is about twice this number of Turkish forces without participating in military operations unless the situation compels it. As for the political axis, it was the most complex, as Turkey demanded that the Kurds not arm the Kurds with advanced weapons (missiles and heavy artillery), and that the Turkmens, like the Arabs and the Kurds, be a founding element In the new constitution, and not to adopt the formula of federalism in the new Iraq.[47]

However, the United States did not give a clear answer that would reassure the Turks in terms of the level of armament of the Kurds and the formula of federalism, which raised doubts in Turkey about the position of the United States towards the Kurds during the war and their position in the new Iraq, and this led to confusion among members of the National Security Council and among the representatives of the party Justice and Development, especially after the massive Kurdish demonstrations in northern Iraq against the entry of the Turkish army into northern Iraq, and accusing the United States of inciting these demonstrations to blackmail Turkey, and push it to submit to American conditions to participate in the war.[48]

After great pressure on Turkey, the government headed by Abdullah Kul submitted a memorandum to the Turkish Grand National Council, to approve the deployment of US forces on Turkish soil, and to send Turkish forces to northern Iraq, and the Turkish Grand National Council thwarted the government’s memorandum on the first of March 200,[49] which should have allowed 62,000 American soldiers to take Turkish territory as a starting point for combat operations against Iraq, and thus the United States lost the northern front, and this was a shock to the United States. No one in Washington expected that Turkey would reject the American request, because of its realization That Turkey will not neglect its first and main ally in the Cold War,[50] and by rejecting the memorandum, Turkey lost 6 billion dollars in war reparations, and long-term discounted loans of 24 billion dollars were provided by the United States to Turkish policy makers, taking into account the economic costs since the Gulf War in 1991.[51]

The reasons for the fall of the memorandum can be summarized as follows:[52]

  • The failure of the Turks to obtain sufficient guarantees about the future of the Kurds and their role in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, which sowed doubts among the various parties of the Turkish state about the intentions of the United States, and prompted the Turkish Grand National Council to reflect the state’s climate in the bet to prevent war on The rule is that it is not possible without Turkey, and in order to avoid the unexpected and negative consequences it may have on Turkey.
  • The mistakes of the United States in dealing with Turkey, the government and public opinion. In the days preceding the decision of the Turkish Grand National Council, an American arrogant language prevailed, which touched Turkey’s sensitivities. When US President George W. Bush received the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, Yasar Bakish and Ali Babacan on February 14, he said To them, “Gentlemen, there is nothing you do on Turkish soil. Go to your country and pass this agreement in your parliament.” At the same time, the American media were publishing articles and caricatures depicting Turkey as a merchant who only cares about making money.
  • The impression given by all of the state’s staff is that they are not completely convinced of the Turkish participation. One day before the memorandum was presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Turkish National Security Council met, and did not refer to the memorandum in a word, nor to the necessity of Turkey’s participation in the war, and he promised that Not a strong signal on the part of the military and the government.
  • The campaign led by the Turkish President (Ahmed Necdet Sezer) and the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Bulent Arbenc), which confirmed that any Turkish participation without international legitimacy is a violation of Article (92) of the provisions of the Constitution, and this affected a number of deputies.
  • 94% of the Turkish public opinion opposes the Turkish participation in the war, and the entire Islamic street opposes it.

Paul (Wolfowitz) promised that Turkey had made a big mistake by not providing enough support to the United States in the war against Iraq, and (Wolfowitz) called on the Turkish government to admit its mistake so that a new page could be opened in the relations between the two countries, and the Turkish President (Ahmet Necdet Sezer) replied, And his Foreign Minister (Abdullah Kol) was characterized by diplomacy, as the spokesman for (Caesar) spoke about the close friendship that has bound the two countries for many years, and that it is not required that there be a one hundred percent agreement between them on the Iraqi crisis, stressing that (Wolfowitz) statements reflect Differences in views, but Abdullah Cole called for seeing the other side of Wolfowitz’s speech, which is the affirmation of the United States’ desire to develop relations and return them to their previous era. [53]

The Wall Street Journal criticized Turkey’s failure to convince its public opinion and parliament, remembering the benefits that Turkey would have reaped from this deal, and the newspaper added: Now the Turks should not be under the illusion that they will get a share of Iraqi oil, and the decision of the National Council has led The great Turkish response to the American administration’s reaction, because the northern front at the latter is very important, and such a decision may lead to obstructing the military plans on this front, but the United States replaced that through special strategic transport capabilities, especially the giant aircraft (F-17). in assembling its forces in northern Iraq, and through the cooperation of Iraqi Kurds with it.[54]

One of the results of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision to deprive Turkey of US economic aid, by pressuring the Turkish Grand National Assembly to vote in favor of the decision to open Turkish airspace against American fighters, as the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted on March 21, 2003 with a majority of 332 votes Against 202 votes, based on pressure from Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) on his party members represented in the parliament. [55]

On the other hand, any Iranian position towards Iraq stems from the fact that the latter represents the first regional obstacle that stands in front of its regional ambitions, and that is why no era has been without a hidden or open conflict between Iraq and Iran. Rather, the Gulf regional interactions are explained in terms of regional competition between its two sides, Iraq and Iran. For these reasons, Iran sought to isolate and weaken Iraq.[56]

However, the matter was somewhat different with the outbreak of the third Gulf War, as Iran took the initiative to announce its rejection of the war, as Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced on February 11, 2002 that Iran would not allow any violation of its airspace by the United States in the event of a launch The war on Iraq, as former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami promised that the outbreak of this war will lead to an increase in violence, and stressed that his country opposes going to war or any unilateral intervention against its neighbor. As for the Chairman of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, he stressed that Iraq’s neighboring countries and Including Iran, which will not allow the United States to plunder the Iraqi oil sources, and that Iran will be one of the most neighboring countries that will suffer the consequences of a possible war against Iraq.[57]

The issue of the war on race sparked controversy inside Iran, as happened in the second Gulf War, as conservatives stressed the need to continue to boycott the United States and not to resume relations with it. Some Iranian officials even issued warnings to the United States, especially the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah (Ali Khamenei). As for Hashemi Rafsanjani (chairman of the Expediency Council), he referred to Iran’s positive pivotal regional role, which cannot be ignored or marginalized, as happened in Afghanistan, while reformists, especially in the Shura Council, called for a dialogue with Iranian officials to ward off the dangers facing Iran. Supporters of this current blame Iraq to the extent that some reformist representatives called on January 12, 2003, for the foreign minister (Kamal Kharazi) and the president (Khatami) not to receive the former Iraqi foreign minister (Naji Sabri), and threatened to withdraw confidence from the first and prompt the other to resign. These deputies set a set of conditions and called on Iraq to meet them before the visit, including an apology to Iran for the Iraqi-Iranian war, paying compensation for that war worth a thousand billion dollars, and closing the file of the prisoners. Ray, but Iraq canceled that visit.[58]

At the same time, the Iranian government called on Iraq to implement Security Council resolutions to remove pretexts from the United States that justify launching war on Iraq, but it also called for giving the international inspectors sufficient time to complete their mission in search of weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary-General of the National Security Council stated Iranian Hassan Rouhani on March 15, 2003 said, “If the Americans’ goal is to disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, then all the countries of the region support that, but if they want to change the regime, it would violate the legitimacy of the United Nations, and all countries in the region reject that.” [59]

Iran sought to take a position of neutrality towards the third Gulf War through the following pillars:[60]

  1. There is no fighting against the American forces or obstruction of their operations.
  2. No participation in military operations against Iraq.
  3. No fighting alongside Iraqi forces.

Nevertheless, Iran has condemned the war and called for it not to happen, not only because this is in harmony with the positions of the countries of the region and the world only, but also Iran’s real fears of a new American expansion on its borders next to oil sources and export routes, after the expansion in Afghanistan and some Central Asian countries along the Caspian Sea and its wealth Certainly, Iran is aware of the dangers of the coming threat after Iraq, as the United States, through its war on Iraq, is paving the way to change the region’s regimes, spread democracy and defend human rights, which could represent justifications for military action against Iran.[61]

After the occupation of Iraq in April of 2003, Iran took in November of the same year a major step towards the United States, which was to stop the uranium enrichment program, but after being reassured about the results of the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the failure of an Iraqi force hostile to it to rule Simultaneously with the American difficulties in Iraq, it tended to resume its uranium enrichment program at a time when the Iranian elections brought the conservative movement into the parliamentary and presidential elections.[62]

It seems that the internal developments in Iraq were in Iran’s interest, both from the point of view of Iran benefiting from it to enhance its regional status, or from the point of view of curbing the tendency of some hard-line wings within the US administration towards military action against Iran. Iran has benefited from the US occupation of Iraq, which It overthrew a regime that differed ideologically with it and its enemies in all respects, as it resulted in the arrival of political forces with close ties to Iran, which strengthened Iran’s regional influence, especially after Iran turned, because of its strong relations with the Iraqi arena, into a difficult number. In the Iraqi forces equation, one of the sources of their balance and imbalance, which would prompt the United States, if it wanted to stabilize the situation in Iraq, to ​​coordinate with Iran or request its assistance, especially with regard to preventing the infiltration of fighters across its borders into Iraq to carry out military operations against the forces American.[63]

Accordingly, Iran seeks to shape the future of Iraq in a way that permanently secures its western borders, and makes Iran the dominant regional power.[64] It is able to control those in charge of it and direct them to what its national interests require and what its political system requires.[65]

  1-3. Turkish-Iranian cooperation in the third Gulf War:

The Turkish awareness of the importance of the war on Iraq and its current and future effects, not only in Iraq, but also on its neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Iran and Syria, is an important factor in making Turkish efforts to find a unified regional position before its outbreak, and even after its end, the Turkish effort in this field has not stop.

The policy of the US administration had a role in this field, which began with strong campaigns against a number of countries before the matter came to them in Iraq, which aroused the concern of those countries, and made it in their interest not to enable the United States to settle in Iraq. The United States threatened Syria with a military campaign Similar, it launched a campaign of incitement against Iran, and exerted strong pressure on Saudi Arabia, while its relations with Turkey had not recovered from the setback that it suffered during the war era, and the war planners in the United States believed that the escalation with neighboring countries might contribute to strengthening their grip in the region. Iraq, which is the belief that was later proven wrong.[66]

In this regard, reference can be made to the article written by (Linure Gevik), editor-in-chief of (Turkish daily news), in which he stated, “The countries neighboring Iraq, such as Syria and Iran, oppose the use of force against Iraq, and we feel that this may lead to the entire region being unfair. Stable, we addressed some Arab countries to address the United States alone, that any activity against Iraq would affect the rest of the neighboring countries, especially Iran and Syria, which are adjacent to Turkey, and accordingly Turkey should consult them according to the 1994 talks, and Iraq should join them”.[67]

In a meeting of a delegation from the Iraqi Friendship, Peace and Solidarity Organization that visited Ankara on August 22, 2002 with Kurtkin, Director of the Middle East in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the latter indicated that “it must be emphasized that there is a common security for Syria, Iran, Turkey and Jordan, which did not participate in the United States.” In its view of the United States against Iraq, regarding dividing Iraq into three countries, because this may affect the countries of the region, as well as many countries outside the regional region,” Kurtkin added, “and here it must be recognized that Iraq is a developed country in the field of industry, education and trade, and there are Common lines between Iraq and Turkey lie in the oil pipelines, and during the previous events, Turkey paid a lot and its losses amounted to 40 billion dollars so far, and therefore stability must prevail in the region, as it has to do with regional security, and in the event that the United States wages war against Iraq, this will cause damage to regional security, even though it is not considered a limited war, knowing that Iraq is one of our friendly countries in international relations.” [68]

From this standpoint, Turkey officially invited several regional countries, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, to participate in a regional summit in the Turkish capital, Ankara, on January 23, 2003, to discuss ways to find a peaceful solution to the crisis between Iraq and the United States. Turkey announced a project calling for a peaceful solution. The leaders participating in the summit were scheduled to go to Iraq and send the Turkish Prime Minister (Abdullah Kul) to Iraq, and a copy of the statement was handed over to US President (George W. Bush), and the final statement included the following essential points:[69]

  1. That Iraq continue its cooperation with (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and clearly demonstrate a more effective position by providing a complete inventory of all information and materials that Iraq has regarding its weapons of mass destruction capabilities, in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1441
  2. To confirm its commitments under the relevant Security Council resolutions regarding ongoing monitoring and documentation.
  3. To initiate the implementation of a policy that would unequivocally spread confidence among Iraq’s neighbors, respect internationally recognized borders, in accordance with existing treaties and agreements, and resolve outstanding issues with Iraq’s neighbors.
  4. To take firm steps towards national reconciliation that would preserve Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are fully determined to support Iraq’s sovereignty and national unity. This determination, combined with the guarantee established in the relevant Security Council resolutions, provides a firm guarantee for the Iraqi people to build a future in. Safety, freedom and prosperity.
  5. The Security Council, acting on behalf of all members of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, bears the humanitarian responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

At the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which was held to address the Iraqi issue, the Syrians, with Turkish and Iranian support, tried to include in the final statement of the conference an affirmation of the Arabness of Iraq. Iraq from the draft final statement, and that it was replaced by the Syrian proposal to welcome the role played by the League of Arab States in preparing the atmosphere for the upcoming Iraqi elections.[70]

This Turkish-Iranian position is a remarkable development at the level of regional relations, especially since the two countries used to look cautiously and negatively at the Arab idea, and its practical manifestations, whether it was towards Arab unity projects, or regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States. Egypt during the fifties was at the fore in Arab politics, and this development seemed to reduce the importance of Turkey and Iran at the regional level, and the negative Iranian view towards the Arab idea intensified with the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war during the eighties, and it is possible to refer to important international and regional factors behind the development in the position Turkey and Iran towards Arabism, with the decline in tensions in Arab-Turkish-Iranian relations, factors of convergent interests emerged in the field of international politics. Pan-Arabism was associated with the call for independence and concern for local and regional particularities of a national and religious nature, and this is what we also see among the ruling leaders in Turkey. And Iran, and the weakness of the idea of ​​(Arabism) and the decline in its influence on the popular and official levels, and therefore support for the idea of ​​(Arabism) does not arrange Turkey and Iran have significant obligations, and it does not threaten the interests of either country, and it does not conflict with the projects of the Turkish and Iranian governments in the region.[71]

The Turkish-Iranian common goals are to preserve the unity and sovereignty of Iraq and prevent its fragmentation, and the establishment of the federal system in Iraq on an ethnic basis is the door that leads to the failure to achieve this goal, and this was accompanied by the Iraqi constitution, which establishes a Kurdish federation to which Kirkuk (the main stronghold) Turkmen) after the normalization of the situation in it and the referendum on its fate at the end of 2007, and Turkish suspicions about the intentions of the Kurds increased after the demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah, which were carried out by the Kurds on February 14 of the year 2004, which demanded a Kurdish state that includes the Kurds of Turkey and Iran, which is what It is opposed by Turkey and neighboring countries, Syria-Iran-Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which agree in the opinion that federalism in Iraq can be based on geography, not ethnicity.[72]

The Turkish policy towards Iraq may be described as its desire to maintain the territorial unity of Iraq, and its opposition to partition projects, and in particular to impede the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. As a result, Turkey did not hesitate to respond strongly if it was necessary to stand up to a Kurdish state. (Kristan) in northern Iraq, which constitutes a great attraction to the southeastern part of Turkey, and while Turkey opposes the emergence of a Kurdish state, it opposes increasing the influence of another state such as Iran.[73]

As for the Iranian side, it enjoyed close relations with the Iraqi Kurdish parties throughout the era of Saddam Hussein’s rule and with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and thanks to these relations, Iran enjoyed a security guarantee that northern Iraq would not be used as a launching pad for attacks on it. , which called for an Iranian-Turkish-Syria rapprochement, and the Kurdish issue gained special importance in Turkish-Iranian-Syrian relations, in light of fears of granting the Kurds a federation that might end with complete independence, and those fears increased after the revelation of the Zionist role in northern Iraq, especially after the occupation of Iraq in the year 2003.[74]

On this basis, the three countries (Turkey, Iran and Syria) participated in the goal of preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and this goal was embodied in the framework of the meeting of the neighboring countries of Iraq, as well as Egypt as a country with great weight in the region. Riyadh 18/4/2003, Tehran 28/5/2003 and Damascus 2/11/2003 The foreign ministers of Iraq’s neighbors affirmed their rejection of any measure that could lead to the fragmentation of Iraq and their respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, in response to a joint Turkish, Iranian and Syrian desire because the project The (Kurdish) state in northern Iraq, if achieved, may lead to the accession of the southeast of Anatolia to it and parts of Iran and Syria, even if this part differs in size and area, and this explains the presence of some units of the Turkish army in northern Iraq and the occupation of some of its parts so far.[75]

The contacts did not stop at the level of foreign ministers, but went beyond them to the level of heads of governments and states, and began with the visit of Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Otari to Turkey in mid-2004, and the visit of Turkish Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) to Tehran to confront US projects that may allow the Kurds to get Iraq on a kind of independence, which would encourage the Kurds of Turkey, Iran and Syria to demand the same. The regional movement of Turkey, Iran and Syria was not only a response to the possibility of comprehensive changes in the whole region, but also to what is happening in northern Iraq, and to the demands of the Kurdish parties This is evidenced by the visit of Syrian President (Bashar al-Assad) to Turkey in January 2004, where red lines were set on the establishment of a Kurdish state, as Erdogan’s visit to Iran on July 27, 2004 raised the potential dangers of the Kurdish north in light of Two factors: the first is that the United States has not provided guarantees that it will stand against the aspirations of the Kurds to establish a Kurdish state or an independent Kurdish entity. Kia, Iran and Syria, the Syrian-Turkish and Turkish-Iranian bilateral meetings came to reinforce the requirements of the necessity of cooperation between the three countries.[76]

Based on this common understanding, on the 4th of September 2006, the Iranian forces bombed (PKK) positions in Iraqi border areas using artillery and missiles, and Iran has been carrying out operations for about a year to counter the infiltration operations carried out by the Iranian (PJAK) group – Kurdish close to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).[77]

During a meeting with the head of the Expediency Council (Hashemi Rafsanjani) with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in May 2007, Rafsanjani stressed the importance of Turkish-Syrian-Iranian cooperation, in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq and restore security to this country. Joint action between Iran, Turkey and Syria can be influential not only in the Iraqi issue, but also in the Lebanese and Palestinian issues. As for (Erdogan), he indicated that Turkey and Iran’s views on Iraq are close, saying we are on the side of the unity of the Iraqi territories, and we oppose its division, and we will try Our best efforts to establish security in Iraq.[78]

The Turkish-Iranian cooperation regarding the Iraqi issue was embedded in the conflict factors, related to each party’s attempt to impose its ideological and political model on Iraq, taking advantage of the new conditions represented by the weakness of the central authority, and the political and security vacuum that exists in Iraq. Turkey seemed motivated to present its secular model to the Iraqis, which is The argument is presented on its ability to perform the task of linking Iraq with the West, through its call for solidarity and calm in light of the uncalculated effects of extremist and fundamentalist currents that Iraq is suffering from, looking for opportunities for change at any cost. And planting it in the perceptions of large sectors in Iraq, and to change the existing reality, and this model was sometimes characterized by violence ,[79] and it seems that the US administration is concerned with developing Turkish positions and employing them for their own benefit, unlike what is happening with Iranian positions.[80]

 1-4 .The results of the third Gulf War on Turkey and its impact on Turkish-Iranian relations:

There is no doubt that one of the most prominent Turkish gains from not participating in the war against Iraq is the world’s expression of its respect for the democratic process in Turkey, following the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003, which rejected the government’s memorandum to participate in the war against Iraq despite the situation The traditionalist of Turkey, loyal and consistent with the policies of the United States, especially in crucial issues, and Turkey’s non-participation in the war had an impact on Arab public opinion and helped develop Turkish relations with Arab countries.[81]

On the other hand, the war had negative effects on Turkey, represented by its inability to implement many of the promises it made before the war, such as intervening in northern Iraq in the event of the entry of Iraqi Kurds to the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, and rejecting the Turkmen minority falling under the control of the Kurds, and Turkey was an extension The eighties and nineties of the last century, until the outbreak of the war, had the freedom to enter northern Iraq to hunt down the PKK fighters, while the war led to the United States preventing the Turkish army from entering northern Iraq without coordination with it, and the Turkish army completely lost the freedom of movement that it It had previously had military forces remaining on the border with Iraq, as well as excluding Turkish companies from the reconstruction contracts concluded by the Coalition Provisional Authority with foreign companies, and stopping the pipeline (Kirkuk-Yomur Taleq) as a result of the successive bombings it was exposed to after the war, and Turkey realized Its trade and economic relations with Iraq are in a much lower way than they were before the war.[82]

The war had an impact on Turkish-American relations, as Turkey, which represented a close ally of the United States in the Middle East and the world, but the war created a rift in the wall of Turkish-American relations, in addition to the fact that Turkey’s new neighbor became the United States, and this necessarily resulted in Turkey losing the role of the agent and for the first time since the Cold War.[83]

The United States sought to repair its relations with Turkey, and its desire for Turkey to help it in Iraq, so General (John Abu Zeid) (the former commander of the American forces in the Middle East) visited Turkey, saying to the Turks since the Korean War and we are together, now let us not be like that, we have made mistakes In Iraq, and Turkey is an essential element in the region. We need Turkey, and we cannot succeed without it. We invite you to sit down and negotiate on Iraq. As a result, the Turkish government agreed to send troops to Iraq.[84]

Regarding taking this decision, (Turkish Foreign Minister) Abdullah Kul said: “Our forces are not occupying forces, and when we went to Kosovo and Afghanistan, we accomplished our mission, and we do not have a specific period. We want to provide humanitarian services in the field of water and electricity, not that We play the role of the gendarmerie in Iraq.. We will be an example for the neighborhood, and we hope that Britain and the United States will withdraw from Iraq..[85] Under pressure from the government: On October 7, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a resolution in favor of sending troops to Iraq, and Turkey had what allows it to negotiate with the United States regarding the deployment of forces, initially planned to be about 10,000 soldiers.[86]

The shift in the Turkish position is due to the following reasons:[87]

  1. The desire of the Turkish government to play an important role in Iraq, and through this role, Turkey seeks to make the Iraqi government loyal to Turkey, and that sending Turkish forces to Iraq will contribute to increasing Turkish influence in the Iraqi government.
  2. The Turks fear that Iran will become an active force in Iraq, or that it will participate in this role as an ally of the United States, and in either of these two cases, the Turkish influence will be excluded, and it seems now that Iran is in a better position in Iraq than the Turkish side, because of its strong ties With the Shiite majority in Iraq, and in order to balance this, Turkey must place its forces in Iraq.
  3. Turkey seeks to solve the Kurdish question. Although Turkey limits this goal officially to eliminating the guerrilla group (KADEK), which operates in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, its broader strategic goal goes further than that, as it seeks to weaken the forces The extremist Kurdish forces in Iraq, and inflicting a military defeat on it if necessary, and therefore its presence in Iraq will contribute to curbing Kurdish ambitions.
  4. Turkey aspires to have a share of the energy wealth discovered in northern Iraq and the contribution of Turkish companies, and that the presence of Turkish forces on Iraqi soil will help in this area, and although the Turkish forces will initially deploy outside Kirkuk and the northern oil fields, they are among the It could expand its influence under the pretext of escalating violence.
  5. Sending Turkish forces to Iraq will prompt the United States to provide loans to Turkey, and urged the International Monetary Fund to do so, in addition to obtaining military equipment, which contributes to strengthening Turkey economically and militarily to serve its geopolitical goals in Iraq.
  6. Restore the close alliance with the United States, which was broken after the Turkish Grand National Council refused to allow the American forces to deploy in Iraq and open a northern front against Iraq on March 1, 2003.

But Turkey did not succeed in sending troops to Iraq because of the opposition of the Transitional Governing Council, and because of the Kurdish groups’ threats to strike the Turkish forces. The change in the Turkish position came after the Turkish embassy in Iraq was attacked in mid-October 2003, and Turkey’s ambassador to the United States said The United Nations (Osman Farouk Logoglu) said that his country would not send troops to Iraq without obtaining a clear invitation from the Iraqi Governing Council appointed by the United States, some of whose members strongly opposed this idea. [88]

One of the results of the third Gulf War was the creation of a new security vacuum similar to the vacuum that occurred after the second Gulf War, and this was a problem for Turkey with which it threatened to intervene in Iraq, as the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok, announced (that Turkey has the right to defend itself and chase terrorists outside Its borders, stressing that the Turkish army will not hesitate to pursue terrorists in northern Iraq, if it deems it necessary, without the permission of the United States or any other country, since the UN Charter recognizes it with such a right.[89]

It appears that Turkey is preparing for a major military attack targeting PKK bases in northern Iraq. In May 2006, the US Secretary of State (Condoleezza Rice) called on Turkey to refrain from its unilateral moves against the Turkish Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq, and stressed the need for tripartite cooperation ( The Iraqi government, Turkey, and the Kurds) to confront this threat.[90]

During the visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to Turkey on November 26, 2006, several important files were raised, including the issue of the Kurdistan Workers Party, Iraqi federalism and the possibility of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and the repercussions of this on fueling separatism among Turkey’s Kurds, a day before al-Maliki’s visit Wahid, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Kul told the Turkish Grand National Assembly, “The division of Iraq into three separate states will plunge the entire region into chaos, and a new dark era will begin. Turkey and Iraq’s neighbors will not stand idly by in this case.”[91]

Turkey pressured the Iraqi government to take more effective steps to eliminate the elements of the PKK in Iraqi territory. Al-Maliki responded that the party’s offices had been closed, and that he would not allow the territory of Iraq to be the special corridor for terrorism against neighboring countries, and about Erdogan’s demand for consensus regarding Kirkuk In order to preserve Iraqi unity, al-Maliki’s answer was: The whole matter of Kirkuk is subject to the new constitutional framework in Iraq, which led to the growing Turkish fears.[92]

On the latter issue, tensions escalated between Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish government, when the President of the Kurdistan Region (Masoud Barzani) stated, “If Turkey intervenes in northern Iraq, which is inhabited by a Kurdish majority, as many have threatened to do, the Iraqi Kurds will enter the cities of southeast Turkey, which is inhabited by a Kurdish majority, And Turkish Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) replied to that by saying, “The Iraqi Kurds must be very careful in their choice of words, otherwise these words will deserve them.”[93]

These results had an impact on the Turkish-Iranian relations, as the war represented a turning point to some extent in the Turkish policy towards its Arab and Islamic regional surroundings, especially towards Iran and Syria. Perhaps the common point in the concerns of these countries is the possibility of the emergence of a federal and independent Kurdish entity in its early stages Its subsequent stages, and this factor was a driving force for the Justice and Development Party’s authority to find a coordination mechanism between most of the geographical neighboring countries, especially between Turkey and Syria, to take a unified position on the Iraqi issue.[94]

If this indicates an important stage in Turkish-Iranian relations, and Turkish-Iranian cooperation in an effort to coordinate their common positions, the third Gulf War, on the other hand, raised mutual doubts in their relations, especially in the context of Turkey’s fear of Iran’s growing role in Iraq, and that Iran becomes an active force in Iraq, and this Turkish concern escalated after the results of the Iraqi elections in January 2005, which resulted in the rise of political forces linked to friendly relations with Iran, as well as the repeated US accusations against Iran, and its role in arming the armed factions in Iraq regardless of their sectarian affiliations In an effort to obstruct the American project in Iraq, so that Iran will not be the target that follows Iraq in this field, and this role appears to be clear through the calls of the United States for dialogue with Iran, in order to calm the situation in Iraq and establish security in it, which indicates an American recognition of an Iranian role In the Iraqi arena, which it will not give up without gains, whether in terms of its nuclear program or the continuation of its political system.

The Turkish-Iranian relations are relations of historical dimensions, and with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 11, 1979 AD, the two parties are keen to coexist or cooperate in light of competition ,[95] Sometimes Turkey may be forced to accept American and Atlantic pressures against Iran, as it did by officially accepting on September 2, 2011 AD, the installation of the Atlantic missile shield on its borders with Iran, after a long hesitation for fear of Iran’s antagonism.[96] Turkey explicitly indicated that this shield is not directed at a specific enemy, but it can be said that the Turkish approval came in the context of the events of the “Arab Spring” and its positions clashed with some countries, such as the case with the Russian Federation and Iran.[97] In addition to confronting the threat of ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East (the Shahab 3), the Iranian missile has a range of (2000) km[98],In addition to the development of the Shahab 5 missile, which has a range of 2,500 km, it can reach parts of eastern Turkey and southeastern Europe, especially if Iran seeks to obtain nuclear weapons.[99] Which Iran began to be interested in developing such missiles since the mid-nineties of the last century[100] This prompted Iran to issue a threat on November 26, 2011, in the words of the commander of the Aerospace Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Amir Ali Hajizadeh) that if Iran sensed a dangerous attack, it would target the NATO missile shield in Turkey ,[101] Iran considers it an act of aggression directed against its national security, and a prelude to a military action orchestrated by the United States of America and “Israel”. Sometimes Turkey is forced, motivated by threats to its national security, to take military measures that Iran considers a direct aggression against it, such as installing Patriot missile batteries. On the Turkish border with Syria under the pretext of confronting any Syrian military aggression on Turkish territory ,[102] without this implying a dangerous escalation in the relations between the two parties, especially since Turkey had previously sided with Iran in the Western campaign against its
nuclear program ,[103] cooperating with Brazil within the Council Security in 2010 to prevent the imposition of sanctions against Iran .[104]

It seems that Turkey’s agreement to deploy the missile shield hides behind it several factors, perhaps the most prominent of which, as it seems from observing the sequence of events, is that Turkey wanted to achieve a regional alignment against Syria after the outbreak of the “Syrian revolution” in March 2011 AD, but it faced significant Russian and Iranian opposition, Which prompted it to accept the deployment of the missile shield and convey a message to both parties that Turkey is capable of providing options available to it, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vis-à-vis anyone who opposes its orientations in the region, in addition to Turkey playing an important and leading role in the Atlantic campaign against Libya in 2011. Then its realization of the opportunity to exploit the power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an additional force for it in support of its project to lead the Middle East. On the other hand, the presence of Iran as a real competitor for it to lead the region and with the escalation of its military, technological, economic and nuclear capabilities, it is necessary to work to weaken it by disengaging it from the Its allies in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, in cooperation with the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and then cooperation with the (5+1) group in the sanctions regime against Iran, and then accepting the presence of the United States and its allies. In order to deploy advanced military capabilities in Turkey in a way that upsets the military balance with Iran on the one hand, and to implicate Iran in an arms race that exceeds its actual economic and technological capabilities.[105]

Perhaps the presence of Turkey next to Iran and considered part of Europe was one of the reasons for Europe to open dialogue with Iran in cooperation with the United States of America regarding its nuclear program in 2004.[106]

As well as other economic and political reasons, which reflects the extent of Turkey’s importance and position to international and regional parties and in the structure of the global system as a whole. On May 17, 2010, regarding the exchange of highly-enriched nuclear fuel needed to operate the Iranian reactors in Turkey, despite the two sides’ secrecy over the progress of talks on the nuclear file[107]. This file,[108], However, at the same time, Turkey came under US and Western criticism for its role and for not completing the TRR sanctions deal on Iran, which negatively affected Turkish-Western relations.[109], Iran has sought to develop its nuclear capabilities since the rule of the Shah and has tried to obtain nuclear warheads from the Central Asian republics[110],In order to deter its enemies and to influence and dominate the surrounding region, in which its vital interests are multiple[111], and despite Turkey’s understanding of the civilian purposes of the Iranian nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear ambitions constitute a source of real inconvenience to Turkey from several sides[112], perhaps the most prominent of which is a change in the balance of power in favor of Iran and a security gap in Turkey [113], and the increase in Iran’s regional influence in the region at the expense of Turkey in the event that it possesses nuclear weapons, and to be a factor of attraction for the rest of the countries towards it and the breadth of its influence and position,[114] It is not excluded that it will work to redraw the map of the Middle East, support the revolutionary movements in the region and extend control[115], and in this context, both the former US President (Bill Clinton) and the former US President (George Walker Bush – Jr.) sought a nuclear initiative Secret, by the United States of America placing the moderate Arab countries under the nuclear umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Turkey is a member of the alliance – as a means of hedge against the growth of Iran’s power, and the formation of alliances and balances in the region that are in the interest and objectives of the United States of America and its allies [116], the United States of America It views Iran as the most important threat in the region, as it seeks to possess nuclear weapons and export its ideology in the Arab Gulf and the region, and it forms an axis of support for it and its influence in the region [117], because the United States of America deals with the Middle East as a function of its global program to achieve the goals of hegemony,[118] one might argue that “Israel” and the “Jewish lobby” did not have much influence on US policy toward Iran, because the United States of America has its own reasons for maintaining On a non-nuclear Iran, this is partially true, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not pose an existential threat to the United States of America, if it is able to live with the (former) nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear China, or even a nuclear North Korea, it can live with A nuclear Iran, and this is why the lobby must continue to maintain constant pressure on the policy of the United States of America to confront Iran as an existential threat to “Israel” [119].

If Iran were able to produce nuclear weapons, through a secret deal with the United States of America and “Israel”, this would upset the strategic balance between Turkey and Iran, which might prompt Turkey, too, to reconsider its nuclear neutrality, especially since it is a non-oil country, and it has Increasing demand for energy, and this option was no longer excluded from the Turks, who began to think seriously about it hours after Iran announced its success in enriching uranium, when they announced the selection of the city (Sinop) on the Black Sea as a site for the establishment of the first Turkish nuclear reactors, among (8). ) Sites that have been proposed to establish a Turkish nuclear reactor out of three that Turkey seeks to establish, as a prelude to getting out of the framework of the US nuclear munitions depot state, and ending the state of energy dependency in the field of energy for neighboring oil countries, and on the other hand, Iran’s failure to conclude a deal with the United States of America and “Israel”, authorizing it to possess nuclear weapons, then “Israel” or the United States of America, or both together, to take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which will put Turkey in a position and a spiral of controversy over whether or not to allow it. The blood of allowing its airspace and air bases to be harnessed for this purpose in a way that carries with it the possibilities of additional tension in its relations with the United States of America and “Israel”, similar to what happened in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq, and on a third hand, Turkey will be forced to bear the huge security, political and economic consequences of such This military action against Iran, if it occurs[120], is that the Iranian nuclear program has put Turkey in great embarrassment. On the one hand, it opposes the American position on Iran, because of the resulting instability in the region, and on the other hand, its inability to tolerate The consequences of its policy difference with the United States of America in the event that the latter wages war on Iran, as it appeared before the war The United States on Iraq [121], and these are indications of a real Turkish desire to play a pivotal role in regional balances and in the region, taking advantage of its good relations with the United States of America [122].Turkey has publicly rejected the US administration’s demands that it join the besieging efforts – that is, participate in imposing sanctions or a siege on Iran – and perhaps launch a military strike against Iran, especially if we know that there is a proposal from the US Democratic Party on the Armenian file,[123] It is not far from the request of the US Congress what the French National Assembly and the Canadian Parliament did recently regarding the condemnation of the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide” during the days of the Ottoman Empire, which may burden Turkey if it occurs with financial compensation, as it is very difficult to bear the economy Moreover, in the event that Turkey does not respond to the American demands[124], it loses its most important supporter in its attempts to join the European Union.[125] , it did not prevent Turkey from defying US and international sanctions against Iran and continuing its trade relations with it, which amounted in 2012 to approximately (21.8) billion dollars, and was forced down in 2013 due to the strict restrictions imposed on Iran by the Security Council in boycotting Iran to (13). ,5) billion dollars, according to the statements of (Recep Tayyip Erdogan), the (former) Turkish Prime Minister – the current Turkish president – during his visit to Iran on January 28-29, 2014, who announced that the joint Turkish-Iranian goal is to raise the level of economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2015, the two countries amounted to no less than (30) billion dollars [126].

Turkey sees Iran as a strategic backer, especially in the field of energy – which was previously discussed in the second chapter, in the third topic -, and it has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Iran, because Iran is the main supplier of Turkish energy and natural gas in particular. Turkey and Iran also have large Kurdish minorities and a common interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, and with all these positive developments that occurred between the two countries, and were a factor of attraction between them [127], however, it witnessed a kind of transformation of these relations as a result of regional and international influences to the disadvantage of these relations, In the foreground were the events of the “Arab Spring” that triggered the historical rivalry between the two parties. Iran views the “Arab Spring” as an “Islamic awakening” inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of February 1979 [128], while Turkey sees the “Arab Spring” as an expression of The wide spread of the popular desire for more democracy and transparency and perhaps an opportunity to strengthen Turkey’s regional influence[129], especially the protests in Syria in March 2011, and statements by (Erdogan) about secular Islam in Tunisia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and Libya, as well as the dissemination of a regime for Radar in Turkey, as well as the issue of Bahrain, turned things upside down, and with regard to Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations entered another path, as a result of the position of the government of (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) on the protests in Syria, which was in favor of the protesters, which prompted ( Erdogan) to declare, “I expect the Syrian president to be overthrown sooner or later,” and express my readiness to impose sanctions on Damascus despite the Russian Federation and China’s use of their veto to block action at the United Nations against Syria, as well as the Turkish position on political developments. In Tunisia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and Libya, it was in favor of the protesters, as well as (Erdogan) promoting the term “secular Islam” during his visit to these countries, and his call for them to adopt democracy on the Turkish approach, and this is a clear Turkish desire for leadership and leadership in the Islamic world and influence. In the balances in the region, this tension also comes between the two countries, after Turkey agreed to deploy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an early warning radar system that relies on the American missile shield on its soil to monitor Iranian missiles [130].

Turkey basically has three options to confront the Iranian nuclear challenge, either expanding cooperation in the field of missile defense with the United States of America and “Israel”, or strengthening its conventional capabilities, especially medium-range missiles, or developing its own nuclear capabilities[131], but signs have begun to resolve The crisis came after the mediation of the Sultanate of Oman in July 2012, when Jake Swivan, a former US Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton) met with a representative of Iran, in addition to the arrival of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in Iran in 2013 [132], the agreement Between Iran and the P5+1 group in Geneva on November 23, 2013, about its nuclear program, during which the West managed to gain several months to prevent Iran from reaching the atomic bomb, while Iran won by breaking the sanctions and obtaining (8) billion dollars without giving up its lines. As long as Iran can trade with the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, it will continue to be able to survive [133], and regarding the impact of this agreement on the Syrian crisis, it ended the idea of ​​overthrowing the Syrian regime militarily, both with great efforts Then, the Syrian opposition and those who support it from the regional countries, including Turkey, are in a very critical position, and at the same time, Iran will not abandon the (Bashar al-Assad) regime in the foreseeable future and will continue to His support as an element of strength in any expected negotiations with the West regarding the Iranian regional role in the relatively long term[134], which reflects the extent of the link between the Iranian nuclear file and the Syrian file and the regional and international conflict taking place on Syrian soil as a result of international and regional accounts that primarily concern the file The Iranian nuclear program and the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the region and the world and the need for disarmament and any threat that would disturb international peace and security, and then the direct impact on Turkey’s regional and international position in a regressive manner, in return for the rise of Iranian influence in the region, despite Turkey’s awareness of the importance of stability and peace However, such Iranian-Western consensus regarding its nuclear file, which has multiple interconnections, including the Syrian crisis, will be at the expense of a tendency The regional balance is in its favour, at the expense of the Turkish hegemon and its leadership in the region, and as a result, its position, weight and regional and international importance in the global system.

After Geneva, the two sides returned to Vienna on November 18-24, 2014, in part thanks to the successful test of diplomatic intentions in the Geneva Accord, and with the emergence of the threat of the threat of the Islamic State in the region[135], and Iran’s pledge to confront this threat, in The time when the United States of America needs reliable allies in the region, in light of the tense relations with Turkey[136], but the negotiations resumed and were postponed for a period of (7) months due to the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency still has doubts about the facility The military in Parchin, as stated in its report issued on November 1, 2014, within a timetable that specifies three things: First, a period of four months to reach a political agreement on what Iran will obtain and what it will provide, and secondly, regarding the technology that must be resolved before The agency to allay the fears of Western countries, third, the formulation of the final agreement that the parties will pledge to abide by from March-June 2015, according to which Iran will receive (2.5 billion dollars) in oil revenues frozen in American banks, and forge a diplomatic success to both sides [137], this clearly indicates The Iranian moves and its international interactions have a clear impact on the international and regional status of Turkey as a strong competitor on the one hand and a potential strategic partner on the other hand, and this has a significant impact, according to the formula of that relationship with Iran, on Turkey’s position and strategic extent, and on the other hand, if a nuclear Iran could Leading to a nuclear race in the region, seriously undermining regional stability, Turkey is particularly aware of the country’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, and rightly so, that it plans to practice by developing its first nuclear power plant with Russian partnership.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

The Ottoman-Iranian relations witnessed several wars that began with the announcement of the establishment of the Safavid state at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and continued until the end of the nineteenth century, and despite the peace and peace treaties that were concluded during that era, conflict and wars are the distinguishing feature of that era.

The changes that took place in the twenties of the last century, especially the military coup in February of the year 1921, which brought (Reza Khan) to Persia, and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on October 29 of the year 1923, and the election of (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) as President of the Turkish Republic at the beginning of an era contributed New history of relations between the two countries based on cooperation between them, which was embodied through bilateral cooperation agreements in various political, economic, and security fields. The Islamic Revolution with Iran in February of the year 1979.

This revolution represented political and security concerns for Turkey, as the presence of an Islamic state on its borders might undermine secular principles in Turkey and contribute to the establishment of a similar revolution in it. The authority and other opposition currents, as well as the long war on its western border with Iraq.

These events contributed to strengthening Turkish-Iranian relations in their various fields in order to stand up to the dangers that might threaten the national security of either of them. The two countries exchanged high-level official visits, especially in the mid-nineties and the beginning of this century, and signed economic agreements, most notably the (gas) agreement. Necmettin Erbakan signed with Iran in 1996, which was rejected by the United States, and this era witnessed the signing of mutual security agreements aimed at stopping the activities of the opposition movements of the two countries, especially the activity of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on the border between them.

However, this does not negate the existence of competition between them in many arenas, especially in the Central Asian republics, which are considered a region of strategic importance due to their geopolitical location. This Turkish approach receives Western support, especially from the United States, which sees it as a competitor to the Iranian model in these republics. On the other hand, Iran rushed Towards these republics to achieve their political and economic goals, especially in the field of laying oil and gas transmission lines across their territories and getting rid of the international isolation imposed by the United States on them, as well as benefiting from the expertise and materials that help them build their nuclear program, which can be obtained from these republics.

The internal developments in Turkey and Iran, especially with regard to strengthening civilian rule and weakening the role of the military institution in controlling the political decision in Turkey on the one hand, and Iran’s adoption of a policy based on giving priority to its own interests over ideological considerations on the other hand, will contribute to strengthening and developing Turkish-Iranian relations. The economic factor plays an important role in the development of Turkish-Iranian relations, especially since the two countries have the capabilities and capabilities that qualify them to enhance cooperation between them and increase the level of trade exchange. Therefore, the two countries coordinated in the industrial, agricultural and commercial fields, and many agreements were signed in these fields, and to strengthen So the two countries joined the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

The US occupation of Iraq in 2003 contributed to strengthening Turkish-Iranian relations based on the two countries’ awareness of the nature of the dangers that emerged from the motives of the US occupation of Iraq, whether with regard to Turkish fear of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, or Iranian concern about an American attack on Iran because of its program Nuclear or for other reasons. The assumption of power by the conservative movement and its commitments in Iran may contribute to the deterioration of Turkish-Iranian relations due to its hard-line approach, ideological commitment and its refusal to dialogue with the United States. Turkey is a nuclear neighbor, as well as the use of Iranian nuclear weapons to strengthen Iran’s position in the competitive arenas with Turkey, especially in the Central Asian republics. American pressure is an important factor in impeding the development of Turkish-Iranian relations, especially since Turkey is an ally of the United States while Iran is An enemy of it, and the effect of this factor increases with the intensification of the US-Iranian confrontation, whether with regard to its nuclear program or because of what the Iranians claim. The United States of Iranian interference in the Iraqi affairs.

However, the common threats faced by the two countries were manifested in particular after the US occupation of Iraq in March of 2003, which prompted more coordination and joint cooperation. The recent months have launched operations on the Iranian border, and on the other hand, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been active in launching military operations inside Turkish territory, and these operations have received a mutual understanding, expressed by the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister (Ali Babacan) to Iran in October of 2007 And the visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister (Manouchehr Mottaki) to Iraq and the invitation of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. (Nuri al-Maliki) Iran to play an important and effective role, in the peaceful settlement of the Iraqi-Turkish crisis, as this process found Syrian support expressed through the visit of President (Bashar al-Assad) in October The first of 2007, which affirmed Turkey’s right to defend itself.

It seems that these Turkish positions are part of an important shift in Turkish policy pursued by the Justice and Development Party, through which it sought to improve its relations with Arab and Islamic countries, especially Iran and Syria. This is why Turkey looked positively at Hamas in Palestine, and welcomed (Khaled Mashaal) And it made reciprocal visits to Syria and Iran, which provoked American resentment in Turkey, expressed by indifference towards the activity of the (PKK) in northern Iraq, or the US Senate’s support for the decision to condemn the Armenian massacres as genocide. All these factors and variables may push towards further development of Turkish relations. – Iranian.

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  39. Khaled Yunus, Turkey’s Secular Kemalism and the Problematic of Its Cultural Identity: http://www.rezgars.com\
  40. Magdy Kamel, Nuclear Secrets: From the Discovery of the Atom to the Exit of the Genie from the Bottle and the Disaster for the Arabs to Stay Out of the Nuclear Club!!, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, Damascus – Cairo, 2008 AD.
  41. Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iranian Nuclear Program Negotiations: What next?”, Series: Case Analysis, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, 2014.
  42. Malik Mufti, Audacity and Caution in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi – United Arab Emirates, first edition,
  43. Mark Landler, “How Obama’s Undercover Statecraft Secured Three Major Accords”, The New York Times, DEC. 18, 2014.
  44. Mona Hussein Obeid, The Iranian-Turkish position on the Arab revolutions, Al-Marsad International Journal, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 18, September 2011.
  45. Mona Hussein Obeid, The Iranian-Turkish Position on the Arab Revolutions, p. 85.
  46. Monem Sahi Al-Ammar, Iraqi Relations with Neighboring Countries (Turkey-Iran), a study in the problem of simultaneous imbalance, Journal of Political Issues, Issues Nine and Ten, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University, Fall 2005.
  47. Muhammad Abdul Qader, “Turkey’s Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Bet on Non-Escalation,” Iranian Anthology, Issue (71), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006.
  48. Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A New Round of Wolves’ Conflict.
  49. Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A New Round of the Wolves’ Struggle”, Iranian Anthology, Issue (162), Year (14), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014.
  50. Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A new round of wolves’ struggle.
  51. Muhammad Noureddin, Consequences and Implications Turkey.
  52. Muhammad Noureddin, Consequences and Implications Turkey.
  53. Muhammad Noureddine, Consequences and Implications Turkey.
  54. Muhammad Nur al-Din, Consequences and Implications Turkey, in Ahmed Youssef et al., The Occupation of Iraq and Its Repercussions at the Arab, Regional and International levels, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2004.
  55. Muhammad Nur al-Din, Consequences and Implications Turkey.
  56. Muhammad Sayed Rasas, is it in the interest of the Arabs for Iran to become a nuclear state? Al-Hayat Newspaper, January 15, 2006, Internet.
  57. Mustafa Jassim Hussein, The Regional Role of Turkey for the period 2002-2010,..
  58. Nabil Muhammad Salim, In the Light of the Turkish Elections, Reality and Dimensions.
  59. Nabil Muhammad Salim, In the Light of the Turkish Elections,.
  60. Natalie Tosi, The Dimensions of the Turkish Role in the Middle East, International Politics Magazine, Issue 182, Al-Ahram Center, Cairo, Vol. 45, October 2010.
  61. ORSAM Report on Reyhanli “May 11”, ORSAM Report, No. 156, Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştrmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, May 2013.
  62. Ragheed al-Solh, the Arabism of Iraq rejected by the Sharm el-Sheikh conference http://www.almoharer.net/
  63. Rawa Zaki Younis Al-Taweel, The Future of Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish Relations (1923-2007), (Mosul University: Center for Regional Studies, Scientific Symposium ((25)) on Iraq’s economic relations with neighboring countries and the possibility of developing them, 2007.
  64. Saad Haqqi Tawfiq, American Choices in Iraq, Journal of Political Science, Issue 29, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, October 2004.
  65. Saad Razih Abram, Turkish-European Relations 1979-2006,..
  66. Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted conflict and proliferation, Routledge, London-New York, 2010.
  67. Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab world: Patterns and prospects for the new relationship, Zed Books, London-New York, 2005.
  68. Sean Kay,”NATO’s Missile Defense-Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century”, PERCEPTIONS Journal of International Affairs, Vol.17, Number.1, The Center for Strategic Research(SAM), Ankara, Turkey, Spring 2012.
  69. Shafi’ Abu Mneijel, Backgrounds for “Iranian Attitudes Towards Occupied Iraq, An Attempt to Understand the Motives”, Arab Future Magazine, Issue 316, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, June 2005.
  70. Stephen Flanagan, Wrong Priorities, Turkish Assessments of American Power,..
  71. Stephen Flanagan, Wrong Priorities: Turkish Assessments of American Power, Translated Studies Series, ‘Center for International Strategic Studies, No. 69, Beirut, June 2011.
  72. Stratfor Foundation (Control by Participation: The Price of the Turkish Army’s Going to Iraq), The Arab Future Magazine, Issue (297), Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2003.
  73. Talal Atrissi, (Iran.. Where to?), The Arab Future Magazine, No. 282, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2003.
  74. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Arap Baharı ve Değişen Bölgesel Dinamikler”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Sayi.30, Citt.3, Ortadoğu Stratejk Araştirmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, Haziran 2011.
  75. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Arap Baharı ve Yansımaları”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Sayi.36, Citt.3, Ortadoğu Stratejk Araştirmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, Aralık 2011.
  76. The Mardini System Regional Coordination to Face a Kurdish Headache, Al-Hayat Newspaper, 25/8/2004, http://WWW.DARALHAYAT.COM/
  77. Thierry Covel, Iran: The Hidden Revolution, Arabization: Khalil Ahmad Khalil, Edition 1, Dar Al-Farabi, Beirut, Lebanon, 2008.
  78. Will Hassan Rouhani Succeed in Settling the Iranian Nuclear Crisis?”, The State of the Region, No. (3), Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2013.

[1] Rawa Zaki Younis Al-Taweel, The Future of Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish Relations (1923-2007), (Mosul University: Center for Regional Studies, Scientific Symposium ((25)) on Iraq’s economic relations with neighboring countries and the possibility of developing them, 2007) p. 43.

[2] Malik Mufti, Audacity and Caution in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi – United Arab Emirates, first edition, p. 17.

[3] Saad Razih Abram, Turkish-European Relations 1979-2006, p. 316.

[4] Same source, p.316

[5] Mustafa Jassim Hussein, The Regional Role of Turkey for the period 2002-2010, p. 173.

[6] Graham Fuller, p. 156.

[7] Foley Ozerkan, an Israeli minister says that the energy agreement between Turkey and Iran is the worst, translated by Nasser Mutlaq Abd, Regional Translations Magazine, Year 2, Issue 5, p. 5.

[8] Same source, p.5

[9] Hakki Ugur, previous source, p. 234

[10] Azam Shalabi, The Turkish Economy, Its Transparency and Its Ability to Absorb Shocks (Expectations of a Positive Future for the Turkish Economy) Afaq Al-Mustaqbal Magazine, Issue 4, First Year, Abu Dhabi – United Arab Emirates, 2010, p. 82.

[11] Hakki Ugur, previous source, p. 235.

[12] Stephen Flanagan, Wrong Priorities: Turkish Assessments of American Power, Translated Studies Series, ‘Center for International Strategic Studies, No. 69, Beirut, June 2011, p. 16’

[13] Stephen Flanagan, Wrong Priorities, Turkish Assessments of American Power, p. 17.

[14] Natalie Tosi, The Dimensions of the Turkish Role in the Middle East, International Politics Magazine, Issue 182, Al-Ahram Center, Cairo, Vol. 45, October 2010, p. 102.

[15] Hakki Ugur, previous source, p. 236.

[16] Same source, p.237.

[17] Natalie Tosi, previous source, p. 102.

[18] Azam Shalaby, previous source, p. 101

[19] Mona Hussein Obeid, The Iranian-Turkish position on the Arab revolutions, Al-Marsad International Journal, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 18, September 2011. p. 85.

[20] Ali Hekmat Taher, The Turkish-Iranian Role in the Middle East, on the website, t.abdlcelil @kahire turk.org

[21] same source.

[22] Mona Hussein Obeid, The Iranian-Turkish Position on the Arab Revolutions, p. 85.

[23] Same source, p.86.

[24] Ali Hekmat Taher, the previous source.

[25] Iranian-Turkish relations in light of the Arab revolutions. Studies of the Cairo Center for Turkish Studies, on the website, t.abdlcelil@kahire turk.org

[26] same source.

[27] Gokhan Bacik-Havva Karakas Keles, the Iraqi Question in the International Context and it’s Domestic Reflections, the Turkish Year Book of International Relations, No. XXX11, Ankara, 2001, p. 86.

[28] Saad Haqqi Tawfiq, American Choices in Iraq, Journal of Political Science, Issue 29, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, October 2004, pp. 1-4.

[29] Muhammad Nur al-Din, Consequences and Implications Turkey, in Ahmed Youssef et al., The Occupation of Iraq and Its Repercussions at the Arab, Regional and International levels, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2004, pp. 405-408.

[30] Although the Turkmen issue is an important issue, and Turkey is one of the active players in northern Iraq after the second Gulf War, the Turkmens were excluded from the American efforts that worked to protect the Kurds, and Massoud Barzani publicly rejected the Turkmen demands for their equality with the Kurds, and from the Turkmen point of view. Masoud Barzani considered them a minority, and treated them in a similar way to the treatment of the previous Iraqi government with them. For more details see: Gokhan Bacik-havva karakas keles, OP. CIT, P. 19

[31] Heinz Kramer, Ibid., pp. 218-219.

[32] Nabil Muhammad Salim, In the Light of the Turkish Elections, pp. 13-14.

[33] Bashir Abdel-Fattah, “US-Turkish Relations”, International Policy Journal, Issue 150, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, October 2002, p. 137.

[34] same source, p.140

[35] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, “Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and the Future,” Journal of Political Science, No. 29, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, October 2004, p. 28.

[36] Same source, p.28

[37]   Same source, p.29

[38] Muhammad Nur al-Din, Consequences and Implications Turkey, p. 409.

[39] The same source, pp. 410-411.

[40](http://www.albayan.com.net\albayan10/1/2003

[41] Khaled Yunus, Turkey’s Secular Kemalism and the Problematic of Its Cultural Identity: http://www.rezgars.com\

[42] Nabil Muhammad Salim, In the Light of the Turkish Elections, Reality and Dimensions, p. 14.

[43] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and Future, p. 31.

[44] Muhammad Noureddin, Consequences and Implications Turkey, p. 412.

[45] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and the Future, p. 36.

[46] Muhammad Nour al-Din, previous source, p. 413.

[47] Same source, pp. 413-414.

[48] Same source, p.414.

[49] The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted with 264 votes in favor of the memorandum, 251 against and 19 abstentions, and then the government was unable to pass its decision, which needed an absolute majority. For more details, see: Ahmed Nuri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and the Future, p. 37

[50] Henri, J. Barkey, Op.Cit, p. 2.

[51]  Natalie Tocci, Op.Cit, p. 3.

[52] Muhammad Noureddin, Consequences and Implications Turkey, pp. 415-416.

[53] Abdel Halim Ghazali, The Wolfowitz Bomb and the Crisis of US-Turkish Relations, previous source.

[54] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and Future, p.39

[55] Same source, p.39

[56] Dhafer Nazim Salman, previous source, p. 25.

[57]The wedding of Thaer Jassem, previous source, p. 117.

[58] The same source, pp. 117-118.

[59] Talal Atrissi, (Iran.. Where to?), The Arab Future Magazine, No. 282, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2003, p. 33.

[60] Same source, p.32

[61] Same source, p.32

[62] Muhammad Sayed Rasas, is it in the interest of the Arabs for Iran to become a nuclear state? Al-Hayat Newspaper, January 15, 2006, Internet.

[63] Arab Strategic Report 2005-2006, p. 252.

[64] George Friedman, The Future of Iraq, The Search for Balance towards Iran, in Adam Roberts and others, The American Occupation of Iraq, Its Image and Fate, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2005, p. 168.

[65] Shafi’ Abu Mneijel, Backgrounds for “Iranian Attitudes Towards Occupied Iraq, An Attempt to Understand the Motives”, Arab Future Magazine, Issue 316, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, June 2005, p. 66.

[66] Ahmed Ramadan, Reframing the East… A Reading of the American Plan http://www.islamonline.net\

[67] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations, Reality and the Future, pp. 28-29.

[68] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[69]Same source, p.34

[70] Ragheed al-Solh, the Arabism of Iraq rejected by the Sharm el-Sheikh conference http://www.almoharer.net/

[71] same source.

[72] Abdel Azim Mahmoud Hanafi, the previous source, p. 135.

[73] Gokhan Bacik-Huvva Karakas Keles, Op.Cit, pp78-79.

[74] Adel Sadiq, the previous source.

[75] Haitham Al-Kilani, Commentary on Muhammad Nour Al-Din’s Paper, in Ahmed Yusuf and others, previous source, p.

[76] The Mardini System Regional Coordination to Face a Kurdish Headache, Al-Hayat Newspaper, 25/8/2004, http://WWW.DARALHAYAT.COM/

[77] http://www.middle east on line-online.com/5/5/2006.

[78]http://mehrnews.com/27/5/2007

[79] Monem Sahi Al-Ammar, Iraqi Relations with Neighboring Countries (Turkey-Iran), a study in the problem of simultaneous imbalance, Journal of Political Issues, Issues Nine and Ten, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University, Fall 2005, pp. 34-35.

[80] Same source, p.40

[81] Muhammad Noureddine, Consequences and Implications Turkey, p. 422.

[82] Previous Source, pp. 417-418.

[83] Al-Bainah newspaper, US-Turkish relations, motives and benefits http://www.mehrnews.com

[84] Ahmed Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iraqi-Turkish Relations – Reality and the Future, p. 42.

[85] Same source, p.42

[86] Stratfor Foundation (Control by Participation: The Price of the Turkish Army’s Going to Iraq), The Arab Future Magazine, Issue (297), Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 2003, p. 106.

[87] Ibid., pp. 108-109.

[88] http://www.arabic.cnn.com/

[89] Al-Mashreq Iraqi newspaper, 26/4/2006.

[90] Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, issue 10021, 6/5/2006. http://www.asharaqlawast.com\

[91] http://www.aharam.org.eg\

[92] same source.

[93] Al-Arabiya Satellite Channel 9/4/2007.

[94] Mahmoud Noureddin, Consequences and Implications Turkey, pp. 421-422.

[95] Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A New Round of the Wolves’ Struggle”, Iranian Anthology, Issue (162), Year (14), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014, p. 4.

[96] Sean Kay,”NATO’s Missile Defense-Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century”, PERCEPTIONS Journal of International Affairs, Vol.17, Number.1, The Center for Strategic Research(SAM), Ankara, Turkey, Spring 2012, P.45.

[97] Gallia Lindenstrauss, Op.24

[98] Jeff Kueter, “Missile Defense and Arms Control”, in: Henry D. Sokolski(Editor), The Next Arms Race, Op. Cit., P.440.

[99] Sean Kay,Op. Cit., P.39.

[100] Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted conflict and proliferation, Routledge, London-New York, 2010, P.95.

[101] Gareth H. Jenkins, Op. Cit., P.39.

[102]Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A new round of wolves’ struggle,” pg. 4-5

[103]   Three main reasons can be identified for the gap in attitudes between Iran and the countries of the (5+1) group. The first reason is the level of enrichment, which has turned into a negotiating paper between Iran and the group’s countries (USA-Russian Federation, People’s China, France, Britain, Germany Federalism) dominated the talks since 2003 AD until now, for example, the meeting held in April 2013 did not contribute to reaching a final solution to the level of enrichment, as the countries of the group presented to Iran a proposal centered on Iran stopping all uranium enrichment activities at the level of ( 20%) and taking measures to shut down the “Fordo” reactor, and transfer Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium by (20%) outside Iran, in exchange for suspending some sanctions imposed on gold and petrochemical industries, as the Iranian position remained committed to suspending enrichment, not stopping it. On October 31, 2013, the Iranian Foreign Minister announced that his country would continue enriching uranium to 20% according to its needs in the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor. The second reason is due to nuclear capabilities, as Iran adheres to its right to possess nuclear capability, but, as In his speech to the United Nations in September 2013, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani emphasized that it does not want nuclear weapons. The third reason concerns the issue of the talks, as Iran has been seeking, indirectly, to turn its talks with the group into a forum for discussing controversial issues. between them and Western countries. For more information, see: Reham Mokbel, “The Gap Challenge: Will Hassan Rouhani Succeed in Settling the Iranian Nuclear Crisis?”, The State of the Region, No. (3), Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2013, p. 1.

[104] Henri J. Barkey, Op. Cit., P.7. ; Talha Köse, Op. Cit., P.185.

[105] Thierry Covel, Iran: The Hidden Revolution, Arabization: Khalil Ahmad Khalil, Edition 1, Dar Al-Farabi, Beirut, Lebanon, 2008, p. 435.

[106] Ahmad Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iranian Foreign Policy 1979-2011, p. 491.

[107] Andrea Ellner, “Iran-Challenge or Opportunity for Regiona Security?”, PERCEPTIONS Journal of International Affairs, Vol.16, Number.2, The Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Ankara, Turkey, Summer 2011, p.16

[108]  Henri J. Barkey, Op. Cit., P.8. ; Gareth H. Jenkins, Op. Cit., P.36.

[109] Muhammad Nabil Fouad Taha, Nuclear Weapons and National Security Priorities in the Light of the Possibilities of Building an Arab Nuclear Power, in a book, Muhammad Ibrahim Mansour (Editor), The Nuclear Choice in the Middle East, Volume 1, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, Lebanon, 2001, p. 362. For more information regarding evidence of Iran’s intention to acquire a nuclear weapon, see: Emily B. Landau, “Facing Iran’s Military Nuclear Ambitions: The International Challenge and Israel’s Concerns”, Strategy papers, N.15, Center for International Studies and Research(CERI/CNRS),Sciences Po,Paris, France,17décembre2012,PP.3-6.

[110] Magdy Kamel, Nuclear Secrets: From the Discovery of the Atom to the Exit of the Genie from the Bottle and the Disaster for the Arabs to Stay Out of the Nuclear Club!!, 1st Edition, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, Damascus – Cairo, 2008 AD, p. 381.

[111]  F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. security partner, Op. Cit., P.11

[112] ( ) H. Sönmez Ateşoğlu, “Security of Turkey with Respect to the Middle East”, PERCEPTIONS Journal of International Affairs, Vol.16, Number.2, The Center for Strategic Research(SAM), Ankara, Turkey, Summer 2011, P.100.

[113] The Iranian nuclear program is linked to regional politics, due to its nature related to economic, security and political issues in the region, and as a result it is linked to relations with regional and trans-regional actors, and from this perspective, the Iranian nuclear program has led to the desire of regional countries to exploit peaceful nuclear energy for development purposes. At the same time, this program is directly related to slowing down or accelerating the arms race and maintaining the traditional regional balance imposed by foreign powers. The other issue at the regional level is the regionalization of the program, as the current Iranian policy aims to link its security with the security of the Middle East. And the world in general, through the nuclear issue, and it seeks to do so by establishing a “strategic political parity” in nuclear talks with the West, as well as legitimizing peaceful nuclear activities at the regional level by supporting the expansion of nuclear activities of other regional states, and proposing collective security measures and comprehensive in regional matters. For more information see: Kayhan Barzegar, Iran’s Nuclear Program, “The Nuclear Question in the Middle East,” the Working Group’s Brief Report, aforementioned source, pp. 20-21. And also: Arif Keskin, “İran Nükleer Krizi Nereye?”, Dış Politika Analizi, Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştirmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, 11 EKİM 2013.

[114]  Tarık Oğuzlu, “Arap Baharı ve Değişen Bölgesel Dinamikler”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Sayi.30, Citt.3, Ortadoğu Stratejk Araştirmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, Haziran 2011, P.35.

[115] Bruno Tertree, previous source, p. 132.

[116] Patrick Tyler, Op. Cit., P.12.

[117]  Tarık Oğuzlu, “Arap Baharı ve Yansımaları”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Sayi.36, Citt.3, Ortadoğu Stratejk Araştirmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, Aralık 2011, P.11.

[118]  Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab world: Patterns and prospects for the new relationship, Zed Books, London-New York, 2005, P.50.

[119] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Op. Cit., P.38.

[120] Bashir Abdel Fattah, “Dimensions of Transformation in Turkey’s Regional Relations”, International Politics Journal, Issue (179), Volume (45), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2010, pg. 136.

[121] The former US President (George Walker Bush – Jr. -) claimed that the main reason for the United States of America to invade Iraq (a reason that had a role when other reasons turned out not to be credible) was to provide people with democracy, when the truth was to work on creating an entity A weak, fragile, fractured politician belonging to the United States of America, and the United States of America established a government of people it chose on the basis of its belief that they would bid for it, but the United States of America installed some of its leaders on this government for not following the signs, or it was widely disrespected, and the states dissolved The United States of America has in the administration an American official, in fact, with the role of the president in Iraq. For more information see: Dr. Khaled Abdel Azim, Major Transformations in Global Strategy: The Gulf and Afghanistan, Strategic Landscape Analysis, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Hadith, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2011, p. Also: Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., PP.75-76.

[122] Muhammad Abdul Qader, “Turkey’s Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Bet on Non-Escalation,” Iranian Anthology, Issue (71), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006, p. 126.

[123]  Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley, Steven A. Cook, Op. Cit., P.7.

[124] The United States of America obstructed the Iranian nuclear program, which had begun to take off during the nineties of the last century, by applying political pressure, and making economic deals, with the People’s China and the Russian Federation, while continuing to track Iranian nuclear activities, and questioning Iran’s nuclear intentions. For more information, see: Dr. Mohamed Abdel Salam, The Labyrinth: Problems of Establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006, p. 111.

[125] Muhammad Abdul Qadir, the previous source, pp. 126-127.

[126] Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, “Erdogan in Tehran: A New Round of Wolves’ Conflict”, p. 5.

[127]  F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. security partner, Op. Cit., P.17.

[128] Henry Kissinger, The World Order: Reflections on the Vanguard of Nations and the Course of History, p.149. Also: Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yilmaz, Op. Cit., p.145.

[129]  F. Stephen Larrabee, Alireza Nader, Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East,Op. Cit., P.7.

[130] Ahmad Nouri Al-Nuaimi, Iranian Foreign Policy 1979-2011, p. 493.

[131]  F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. security partner, Op. Cit., P.13.

[132] Mark Landler, “How Obama’s Undercover Statecraft Secured Three Major Accords”, The New York Times, DEC. 18, 2014.

[133]  Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iranian Nuclear Program Negotiations: What next?”, Series: Case Analysis, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, 2014, P.5.

[134] Leslie Gelb, previous source, p.77

[135] Transnational armed groups (i.e., non-state international actors) are non-state actors who are fully intertwined with governments, societies and individuals all over the world and operate on a global scale. Their influence is difficult to measure, but they are in a niche and can usually speak their mind on The least with regard to major issues and she has her voice when using her experiences, and the expansion of global communications and the Internet is the impact of her opinions as well. For more information see: Leslie Gelb, aforementioned source, pp. 80-81.

[136] (**) Turkey fears that large-scale participation in the activities of the coalition could lead to revenge against the (Islamic State) organization, and sleeper cells inside Turkey could commit attacks on Turkish territory, such as the Reyhanli bombing, which killed more than (50) ) person in May 2012 AD, and despite the critical importance of Turkey’s security considerations, it is not the main reason for Turkey’s reluctance to embrace the full measures of the alliance in the Middle East, as Turkey’s allies were shocked by the lack of solidarity from their ally in the war against (the state) Islamic), as Turkey has always been reluctant to support foreign military intervention in the region, as it believes that the intervention of the United States of America in Iraq in 1991 AD and more clearly in 2003 AD, resulted in negative consequences for the region and for Turkey itself, the Turkish economy suffered And regionalism versus the growing Kurdish issue at Turkey’s expense, and recent opinion polls in Turkey showed that public opinion is against any Turkish military intervention in Syria and Iraq, as it was always against any Turkish military intervention in the Middle East, but Turkey’s most important hesitation The Kurdish issue plays such a central role in Turkish politics in the Middle East. For more information see: ORSAM Report on Reyhanli “May 11”, ORSAM Report, No. 156, Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştrmalar Merkezi(ORSAM), Ankara, Türkiye, May 2013, P.7.

[137]  Mahjoob Zweiri, Op. Cit., PP.6-7.

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