The strategic importance of Iran and its reflection on its relations with the countries of the Arab Mashreq (An analytical study)

 

Prepared by the researcher   :  Assistant Professor Dr. Ahmed Jassim Ibrahim / Babylon Center for Cultural and Historical Studies // University of Babylon

Democratic Arab Center

Journal of Iranian orbits : Sixteenth Issue – June 2022

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin.

https://democraticac.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%E2%80%93-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88-2022.pdf

Abstract

Perhaps one of the requirements of the study “for Iran’s strategic importance and its reflection on the Arab countries” requires looking at what that country includes in its relations and what it possesses of ingredients that have a clear impact on building interaction relations between Iran on the one hand and the Arab world on the other hand, as it has become a selective outlet for passing influence, formulating status and crystallizing Self and group attitude.

If the Arabs, in their relations with the neighboring countries, especially Iran, are interested in investing the elements of rapprochement to build proven patterns of dealing and interaction that reach the point of modeling. On the other hand, they are called upon to present their proposals that are clear to everyone with rules of conduct and rational demands that depend on their entitlement, their history, and the obligations that push them to coexist for a long time with their neighbors, especially since political arguments and strategic incentives alone are not suitable in building the ingredients for permanent interaction without economic and social supports, and even subjective ones related to the ruling elites’ thinking patterns and aspirations in the face of corresponding ruling elites who seemed to be waiting for opportunities to show their arbitrariness towards those demands, reaching the point of conflict and turbulent competition that carries with it a deviation It not only severely undermined the foundations of the relationship, but also distorted the premise of the trend towards reforming it in light of the tangible effects of the Arab regional system and Iran after the regional and international changes that imposed shifts in the visions, roles and aspirations of all parties, achieving divergence in ideologies and policies …. and even references and behaviors. As well as the decline in the ability to employ or invest the facts of the docking, the quiet friction in favor of building on New future prospects. In order to confirm this motive, to measure its effects, to encircle its repercussions, and to employ its results in favor of formulating its impact, and the interaction between the Arabs and Iran, we will proceed to trace that through our study.

The  introduction

Through this study, we sought to trace the paths of interaction that achieved Arab relations with Iran, the influences that disturb those paths, the possibilities of framing them, and the factors driving them in this direction. On the other hand, it is found in the reality of relations, and they have been planted in icebergs made by their parties, or by external parties that did not hesitate to direct forces and pressures, not to the will that adopts the ratification of the manifestations of this relationship, but to the forces that adopt the perpetuation of the momentum Total or partial to reach a meeting point in which reciprocal acts are freed from all restrictions and the outcome increases chances of rehabilitation and survival, and perhaps against any attempt to frustrate or obstruct and perhaps rob the results it brought.

Study Structure:

The researcher followed the conditions of the strategic importance of Iran as a “first topic” and the implications of these conditions on building the reality of its external action. While the researcher went in detail to the study of the factors affecting the nature of Arab-Iranian relations at the internal and external levels as a “second topic” and the views assessing its existence or attempts to frame it.

Study problem:

Decades ago, the Arab relations with Iran were locked in a soul. The signs of improvement did not start again. Along the line, the curve of those relations was confused according to the frequency of the elements of excitement between the clashing policies, self-deliberate, or in anticipation of a reciprocal rise, or the greed of a regional role that external parties do not hesitate to push or Its justification, and perhaps the first picture of that confusion appears in the continuous and dangerous deterioration in Iran’s relations with neighboring Arab countries in particular, until it reached the point of war, not to mention the continuation of the state of threat under various historical, geopolitical and ideological pretexts. It was threatened by threats and in various forms. Until this conflict began to expand to include the entire Arab dimension with the Iranian dimension. Therefore, there was a need for a new approach to remove the study of Arab relations with the Iranian neighbor, its chronic problem and its deterioration due to its reliance on methodologies that clearly showed shortcomings, even if it tried itself in The pursuit of the event without following the circumstances and causes of its emergence and the complications of its interactions. The study relied on the behavioral approach that departs from the traditional study based on a formula So….then “…in favor of that study that depends on what is and what it will be, and that methodology becomes more distant when the study of Arab relations with a neighboring country like Iran is linked to changing realities and spaces that multiply situations, so we used it as a method for our study without neglecting the assumptions of other curricula.” historical, descriptive.

First: the historical course of Iranian relations with neighboring Arab countries

Historical facts have proven specific characteristics of Iran’s relationship with the Arab neighboring countries, which, in their succession, expressed a true summary of visions, which various factors intervened in crystallizing them over time. It does not correspond to the nature of the Arabs only, but it was a sign of the horizon that distinguished the Arabs in their dealings with the neighboring countries, despite their possession of initiative and excellence in many times.^[1]

To the extent that this characteristic aroused indicative arguments for the peacefulness of the Arab approach towards their neighbors, as confirmed by their laws and laws, it aroused a lot of confusion among the neighboring countries, in addition to the sacrifices it required, and the complications it left, the least of which was the effect that it created outlets for the cautious neighboring forces to penetrate the self and the Arab state and influence it. And according to the magnitude and specificity of that relationship and the historical phases it went through, there were many approaches revealing that privacy, especially since the purpose of studying it in general is not an inventory of facts, but rather a conclusion with the results and documentation of facts that later become sensors for evaluation, consultation and construction.

One of the oldest academic approaches that those concerned with the study of Arab relations with geographical neighboring countries invoked is the historical approach that scholars of inter-state relations focused on, especially those concerned with studying foreign political behavior.^[2] This is because the actions of man, nations and civilizations cannot be identified, monitor their development, and seek the help of knowing their relationship and destiny without studying them within a historical, temporal and spatial framework.

In spite of the caveats,^[3] which are described for the importance of history and the distorted dangers that it carries as well as the multiplicity of theories of its study. However, it is very useful, especially when the goal of his study seems to follow the path of relationships and influences working in light of the movement of change taking place and its secretions, especially those related to value positions and ethical standards. researchers.^[4] The historical prelude prepares the researcher, in addition to providing the opportunity to reveal what has been hidden from the positions, but rather equips him with evidence and proofs that help him to build new positions. One of the forms of interaction as intentions and specific actions on the study of the corresponding personality. In addition to the fact that the researcher avoids the promising and sometimes invisible approach to many accidents that may be distorted or dominated by overlapping under intertwined circumstances. Just as the researcher avoids the absence of temporal arrangement and prepares it instead with a large sorting of accidents that helps him to Formation of a clear picture of the full mechanisms of dealing.^[5]

While another group relied on the inevitability of the historical study of the issue of Arab relations with the geographical neighboring countries.^[6] Not only because it is the correct entry, but also because it is a need coordinated with the specificity of Arab relations with the neighboring geographical countries, which are deep historical extensions that no researcher can ignore. Which presents itself to us through rapid variables and successive effects. In addition to its ability to diagnose weaknesses and capabilities that characterized the relations of the Arabs with their neighbors and extending over a long history, beginning its journey with the first human waves that migrated from the island towards these parties and ending with the new situation..and this is how the study is Historicity is not an indicator of the requirements of the element of time, which presents, with its continuation, the reality of the development of the place in its temporal dimension, but rather a function of measuring its existence in its entirety. Hence, the link between the historical dimension and the inevitability of its study and the need for a geostrategic understanding of the relationship between the Arabs and the countries of the geographical neighbourhood.^[7]

For the merit of this opinion, we found it appropriate to devote an independent study to examine the historical nature of the relations of those states whose fate and existence were intertwined with the Arabs, because they were fused with Islam, but fell under the influence of the mature geographical determinism consisting of comprehensive strategic and political dimensions, and based on that we will study that record according to many requirements. It was determined by the long historical process, which became common denominators that help us at least to take primary criteria for studying and evaluating the background of that relationship. Among those denominators:

• The realized legacy, which was created by the continuous interaction between the Arabs and those peoples, through the harmony and integration that Islam achieved for many decades, all the way to that state communication achieved in the current era.^[8]
• Geographical neighborhood, which provided Arabs and neighboring countries with facts that support the inevitability of communication and interaction, especially in light of historical freedom and the importance of global communication at the time.^[9]
• The common affiliation to one faith that made them, through deliberate processes of fusion and fusion, one force under one banner,^[10] which is Islam.
• The similar aspirations of the Arabs and the neighboring geographical countries to possess the role,^[11] weight and status. Our historical study of the facts of the interaction between them indicates the unity of aspiration in different periods of time, but it is repeated, yet the national self-aspiration remains the basis for determining movement and interest.
• The sensitivity of the Arabs and the neighboring countries to the realities of the balance of power.^[12] And its impact is not only on their highest aspirations, but on the reality of the roles supported by them, starting with the tripartite balance between the Persian state, the Byzantine Empire and the nascent Arab Islamic state, and ending with the balance between Arabs, Turks and Iranians under the dual polarity.

In parallel, let us examine the historical stages that Arab relations with neighboring countries have gone through, especially Iran, the subject of the study.

First: Iranian-Arab relations:

It is necessary for us to study the Iranian-Arab relations to dive into the depths of the bygone era,^[13] which puts the observer in front of the urgent question… What is the general nature of that relationship? The clear, and perhaps decisive, answer to this question tends to establish the fact that this relationship has gone through multiple stages that overcame its joints after a conflict in its various forms due to the contradiction of interests and the reality of neighborhood that represented, – and in contrast to the facts of the assumption -, a cause of tension due to the indecisiveness of its truth. Is it true? Neighborhood or the reality of a conflict of existence. History, a record of past events, reveals to us data for you in the distance.

In the year 655 BC, he witnessed successive attempts by the Medes to expand at the expense of the Arab “Iraqi” lands, driven by the ambitions of jealousy and sensitivity towards what the Arabs had achieved in terms of civilization. After that,^[14] the successive attempts of the founding states in Persia continued, Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sasanian, which were horrified, like their predecessors, by the proportion of cultural development that the Arabs of Iraq had achieved or achieved in the search for a unique sultan tempted to eliminate the competing neighborhood or to subjugate it to it. Despite the Islamic sensitivity, which after a while took the form of excessive sensitivity, to the danger of relations with Persia, according to a careful extrapolation of the past with its previous basic manifestations, and the desire and wishes of the Islamic leadership not to get involved with the Persians, perhaps because of the general awareness of their intentions and the nature of their actions, that leadership distanced itself from heading to Persia and wished that it was Between the Muslims, the “Arabs” and the Persians, a mountain of fire.^[15] And since tyranny had spread in those countries, and in accordance with Islam’s responsibility to liberate peoples from the yoke of backwardness, ignorance and servitude to trivial things, in light of its human and global responsibility as a religion, and its dependence on what it possessed of faith and military power, the same leadership thought of transferring the light of Islam to Persia, achieving a real or serious healing between two nationalities under A spiritual roof, which is Islam. This relationship did not last until Iranian ambitions began to emerge, leaving dangerous tensions that severely affected the political and spiritual body of Islam. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Arabs, with their religious message, convinced the Persians to believe in Islam without being able to assimilate them culturally.^[16]

Despite the alternation of victory between the Arabs and the Persians, the spirit of competition remained in place until the beginning of the First World War in 1914, helped by the weakness that engulfed the Ottoman Empire. A new type of competition has dominated the course of Arab-Iranian relations until today,^[17] to varying degrees. Because of the dominance of colonial domination over the Arab world and Iran, those relations diminished, and the features of the eternal link between the Arab and Persian nationalities remained centered on fueling the feeling of independence for both of them. Hence, many broad opportunities were created for meeting and building a new course of relations, but the two sides could not forget the past and break free from it.^[18]

With the succession of the stages of international change and the increasing importance of the region as an arena of action for the international forces holding on the balance of strategic dealing, the two sides joined under one title to start a new page of aversion according to the two parties’ endeavor to maximize their interests by expanding to the colonizers. The direct and the Iranian Shahanism, the features of Islamic control seemed to recede or replace with a new formula in favor of Arab and Iranian liberation together with a big difference on both sides represented by the silence of the Arab side due to the multiplicity of the colonizers’ nationality and the agitation of Iranian ambition, which is no longer curbed even by colonial control over the region. And Iraq was destined to be the first country It was established in the region as an Arab kingdom adjacent to Iran, which was reluctant to recognize it and began to create problems in its face, especially the border ones, pushed by its ambitions and the grip of the ambitious strong man who overcame his thinking the inevitability of achieving a vital space for his stagnant empire that should return!!, despite the deterioration of relations and the possibility of its explosion. The two parties agreed. to settle their differences peacefully through the 1937 treaty^[19]. The assumptions of international change are returning to impose their efforts anew and to return the Arab-Iranian relations to a clear stage of stasis. The forties of the last century witnessed the division of Iran and the preoccupation of the Arabs, even those who were liberated from them, to arrange their internal affairs and divided their opinion and position towards the two sides of the Second World War, which, if it ended, the channels of relations returned to life. Arab-Iranian has a new opportunity, but it has not been exploited.^[20]

In the fifties of the last century, the Arabs made a great effort towards independence, which made them the task of formulating their unitary hopes in a national formula, to repeat the cycle of collision itself again according to the negative stance taken by the Shah of Iran in relation to it according to many factors, some of which represented opposition to the Arab justifications and began to fabricate excuses and justifications that made them harsher The Iranian link with the foreign powers colonizing the Arabs to enter the region in a phase of total imbalance in which Iran thought it was an outlet for it.^[21] While the liberated Arabs considered it a blatant challenge to them and their national aspirations. Within this framework, Iran began to raise issues that it was imperative not to go into them. After the fall of the Baghdad Pact paper, the Shah’s Iran raised the issue of Arab national aspiration and its role in shaping the entity of their state. Therefore, the Shah deliberately raised the security concern among the people. minorities because of the benefits it achieves. Thus, the Shah’s efforts to exploit the Kurds as a pressure card on Iraq and Syria continued.^[22]

This trend was accompanied by the Shah’s insistence on pursuing efforts to build the glory of his empire, which can only be achieved by elevating the Iranian act and seeking to split the Arab ranks by separating the Arab Gulf from his largest body, “the Arab world,” in order for the latter to renounce its economic and financial power and be unique in the Arab Gulf alone. Hence, the Shah dealt with his Gulf neighbors in a kind of Calm, hoping to establish free relations with everyone, and willing to start formulating political and security arrangements in which he would have the lion’s share.^[23] The intentions were suspicious and suspicious because they were associated, to one degree or another, with a threatening language that makes it difficult for everyone to find justifications for its interpretation other than the Iranian ambition to make the Gulf Persian and to activate once again the national animosity between the Arab radicals and the “Iranian” Persians armed with contradictory national ambitions. On the reality of bilateral relations to be marked by tension and conflict, as is the case with the Iraqi-Iranian relations, lacking in opportunities for cooperation between them and doubting their feasibility.

As soon as Britain completed its withdrawal from the Gulf, Iran took the Shah with all its ambitions to fill the void, not in the capacity of sovereignty, according to the sensitivity of the region and its international protection formula, but in the form of playing the role of the guardian of its affairs as an agent protecting the interests of others and weaving its own role by detailing his biggest dream, “the vital field.”^[24] With a terrible geopolitical extension, the international powers accepted it as a known price for its commissioned completion.^[25] And seized the three Arab islands.^[26] It threatened Bahrain’s ownership of it and deepened the dispute with Iraq as part of a scandalous international game at the time, so that Iran, with its expansionist effort, poses a challenge not to some Arab countries, but to the Arab national security as a whole, which subsequently suffered from major problems and vibrations due to the depth of the latent and declared border disputes, which were considered a major source of tension that Imprint those relationships between them.

If it is possible to monitor the nature of those relations, then we identify a clear fact that the Shah’s Iran spoiled the exploitation of the British withdrawal from the Gulf to establish clear friendly relations between it and the emerging Arab Gulf states. This was evident in the Muscat Conference in 1970^[27], when, by its actions, it imposed a state of tension and turmoil on the reality of security in the Gulf to open a new front of disagreement for Arab national security, which was preoccupied at the time with the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to sow the seeds of a schism that turned into an eternal bargaining element between the Gulf countries and Iraq, which it showed as its enemy and its strength. An element of their oppression. On the other hand, Iran has maintained its friendship with the distant Arab countries that are taken in by what is determined by its political and economic interests, despite it maintaining its relations with Israel at the highest level.

Thus, ijtihad, conflicting ambitions, and the diversity of Arab policies created an opportunity for Iran to extend its arms to undermine the unity of the Arab position or deepen the impossibility of receiving a unified Arab response that would make the Arabs able to impose a settlement regarding the outstanding problems with it.^[28] To receive this situation with its repercussions on the relations between the two parties and to question the feasibility of improving them, especially when the Iranian influence on the Arabs has diversified militarily, politically, socially and economically. The Arab-Israeli conflict, especially at the beginning of the seventies of the last century, when the outbreak of the October 1973 war and its security, political and economic benefits for Iran. In the face of this short period of time, which was characterized by a somewhat political relaxation, Iran, on the other hand, was determined to disturb him through a double action in terms of the following^[29]:

• Iran has been measuring its interests with the interests of the Arabs.

2 – Focused on the Arab countries’ occupations and weakening them.^[30]

After settling the problems contained in the Iraqi-Iranian relations and the calm that prevailed in the Arab Gulf region, the two sides enjoyed distinguished relations dominated by openness and foresight. One of their results was that the region entered a stage of prosperity and prosperity, compounded by the growing financial return as a result of high oil prices, to cover the region in a phase of stability that was shaken only by the turbulent conditions. that prevailed in Iran and whose revolution blew up not only the Iranian internal situation but the regional situation, relations, political, social and economic conditions, just as it blew up the concept of security that was in circulation to reflect the consequences of this on the relations of the countries of the region with international powers and to open the doors of Arab-Iranian relations to the international party that Tomorrow, since that period, affects its directions and knows its paths according to his visions.^[31]

The truth is that the revolution in Iran, which overthrew the secular claims of the Pahlavi Empire, came to the top of power with an extremely strict religious ideology based on the revival of Shiite discrimination in the face of the Sunni majority in the Arab world.^[32] There is no doubt that this ideology is extremism. It represents an element of threat from the point of view of most Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, whose awareness of the fear of Persian nationalism was imprinted in its awareness, which is based in its resurrection on the historical heritage and the hypothesis that incites to spoil the current situation in the region. Eight years between Iraq, which collected all its nationalistic vocabulary, and Iran, which gave the reins by its actions to overshadow its national and religious character. What is important in that war, which was suffused with many tranquilizers, is that its causes are still latent and are liable to erupt at the first uncalculated spark of a collision. Despite the heavy surgeries that the Arabs and Iranians left, who made a grave mistake by continuing to use the religious paper as a basis for their political behavior.^[33] This mistake could not be corrected after it was discovered early so that its religious prestige would fall after it made a big mistake when it hinted at its right to stir up unrest with a pretext described to lose the legitimate justification for its presence in the leadership position.

In the end, and after the certainty that struck the two sides, a fragile peace was achieved, despite the Arabs’ preservation of anticipation and confronting the described Iranian dangers, which the Iranian leadership has been insisting on achieving in the Arab countries, whose relations with Iran began to suffer from apathy and transformation. The Arab countries are spreading seeds of turmoil and deterioration according to their mission of exporting terrorism to Arab countries under various slogans, the most important of which is supporting Islamic waves and supporting their activities so that the Iranian threat to Arab countries turns into a package of goals distributed throughout the Arab world to obtain every part or detail in the relations (national security, internal security, economy social status, sectarian system, and national loyalty).^[34] Which made the cycle of conflict renewed, despite the risks and complications described to it, which came with the “Gulf Crisis” which emptied Iran of a unique task.^[35] . Nevertheless, Iran remained indifferent to the developments taking place in the world and the region, as long as it remained convinced that the principles of exporting the revolution still exist, and this is the wreaking havoc and the destruction of the entire Arab-Iranian relations.

Second: The strategic importance of Iran:

It is no longer possible to define the conditions of Iran’s strategic importance according to the traditional context that fragments these conditions as if they were discordant pieces that could be combined to be a measurable and evaluable condition or function, because Iran, as its modern history indicates:

• It is seriously linked to Western politics, which made it an advanced center for its movement.^[36] With Britain’s announcement of its decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in 1968 and the concomitant flow of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean and the increase in the economic and oil value of the Arabian Gulf after the emergence of the global energy crisis, the United States of America began to look at Iran in particular, according to its strategic importance in its global policy, which has taken on a uniqueness. The Arab Gulf region is of great importance for its position in the conflict equation between it and the former Soviet Union, which cost the United States of America a lot at the beginning of the seventies of the last century^[37], which in turn witnessed the start of America importing oil from the Arab Gulf. Military commitments and expenditures and to ensure security and stability in the Arabian Gulf, which is understood in the form of full US control over that region. Among those parties is Iran, which the United States began to strengthen by facilitating the process of obtaining weapons and military equipment, whether in the form of foreign aid or sales^[38]. It also delegated the Shah of Iran to play the role of the Gulf policeman to protect its interests in the region, especially oil, especially since Iran occupies an important position in light of its weight As the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said, “in his memoirs,” the construction of Iran’s military power was in line with his aspirations and fulfilled his security concerns. The Shah himself acknowledged this role, “In fact, we do not assume only national and regional responsibilities, but we play a global role as guardians and protectors of 60% of the world’s oil reserves.”^[39] Within this framework, bilateral relations between Israel and Iran have developed since the fifties of the last century, according to a set of variables. Especially the security ones, as both Israel and Iran represented two regional powers that aspire through expansion and extension towards Arab lands, starting with the policy of gradual nibbling. And the end of the policy of encirclement. At a time when Iran found in Israel a helper to keep Arab countries away from their historical goals of regional expansion, while Israel found in Iran an obstacle that prevents the Arabs from mobilizing their capabilities on the front lines with it, such as the geopolitical location of Iran and what it possesses of vocabulary Objective power, an added importance to Israeli strategic thought.^[40] David Kimhi expresses this importance by saying, “Iran is our natural ally and its location is vital to the West, and we cannot dispense with it and do not want it to fall into the hands of the Kremlin, and if Khomeini is able to issue his revolution and sow disorder in the Arab countries, he will perform a clear service to Israel.”^[41]

This perception did not change much after the 1979 revolution,^[42] despite the severing of Iranian-Israeli relations. Israel continued to openly support Iran in its war with Iraq, realizing that Iraq’s victory would create an effective force in the region and change the balance of power in its favour^[43]. And after a while, the support was understood as an Israeli policy aimed at preventing one of the parties from winning as a hedge for the future. If “Iraq wins, the result will be for us to confront an enemy with extensive military experience, and if Iran wins, this will lead to the spread of Islamic extremism movements in the region… Thus the interest was represented. The Israeli war will continue between the two sides indefinitely, without either side achieving a real resolution.”^[44]

The American strategy toward Iran was subjected to a violent shakeup after the 1979 revolution and the overthrow of the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the fall of Iran under the control of a regime that does not owe America, which represents a blow to its political and security interests. Iran, especially after America announced its intentions to protect the Arab Gulf and its interests through the “Carter Doctrine,” which opened the door to rearranging the situation in the Arab Gulf region and linking it to Western security interests again. And Ali deliberately controlled her actions in return for her courtship in a clear manner, especially since Iran did not act only in its region^[45], but also with the former Soviet Union, which increased its fears of the intense US military presence in the Gulf.

On this basis, the United States of America took from time to time to communicate with Iran through adventures, in order to activate its presence and influence in Iran. The adventure of Iran Gate was “Irangate”.^[46] Through which the Americans paid a price for the absence of specialized policies based on existing objectivity (Shocism) about their behavior The external influence on that value and its impact on the American strategic thought, which did not abandon the belief that Iran still maintains its position, which does not accept change, not because it sits at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf and overlooks the Arabian Sea, but also because of its oil capacity, which made it the most sensitive region in the world, as it is the China of the nineties of the century past “chin of go s”.^[47]

Accordingly, Iran’s strategic importance until the end of the last decade was greater for the West, as it had a long border with the Soviet Union, and its containment was more important and denied it access to the Gulf waters through Iran. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the containment of Iran jumped from the Western point of view in the ladder of priorities. In the hope of preserving the safety of the world’s oil reservoir and its supplies. That is why the signs of a US commercial boycott of Iran appeared.^[48]

• Being exposed to many tremors, including many political and doctrinal ones, that affected the ability of its ruling elites to describe a well-known framework for its strategic ability.^[49] As much as this perception weighed Iranian strategic thinking and embarrassed it on many occasions, it was a reason for building radical solutions to its security dilemma, which was never understood in its narrow form.^[50] Despite Iran’s exposure to the problem of chronic political instability, which greatly affected its external orientation, Iran, despite its different political beliefs, remained insistent on establishing its strategic effort on two basic facts that carried with it the conditions for its validity at all times.^[51] The first is instrumentalism, as it is preoccupied with the nationalist proposition and the independence of its strategic action, which is followed by another task that has burdened and deepened its dilemma, which is defined by the ambition from which it took a boat to pass calculated strategic actions. It was distinguished, and this is another weight, by the fact of blending in the view between regional action, especially towards the Arabs, and the international one, which is mainly associated with the intense desire to form or build a known system that would achieve absolute security for it, and that view did not change despite the collapse of the expansionist rule of the Shah.^[52]

As for the second fact, it is motivation. Despite the differences in the Iranian leadership’s description according to the necessities of the stage and the nature of those leaders’ understanding of their conditions, the motivation represented, over time, an ambition and action in increasing the effectiveness of the strategic capacity in order to achieve a fixed identity and moving laws over time that help Iran to present itself as a power Able to absorb challenges and build new superiority power conditions capable of achieving its “absolute” security, with which all potential challenges vanish. At that time,^[53] through this perception, Iran achieved its ambitions and succeeded a lot in the formation of its social identity, especially during the time of the Shah and the Islamic regime. However, it was subjected to a clear curtailment that made its security-strategic view limited to one dimension after the various international forces robbed them of their principles and emptied their ideological action.^[54]

Despite the severity of this restriction, Iran, especially during the Islamic era, remained insistent, despite the chosen course of violence, on building a comprehensive security vision based on a set of conditions as starting points whose action would be socially objective and with one outcome, which is to increase the strategic ability to do so. Among those conditions:

• Working on detailing the security dilemma without compromising its comprehensive nature or formula. So we noticed new concepts of national security – regional security, international security instead of the comprehensive security formula, which is understood in the form of the Pax Islamica thesis.^[55]
• B – Diversifying the avenues of the goal after Iran abandoned the confinement of its interests to the Arab Gulf region, which has become a graveyard for its comprehensive strategic ambitions due to the huge foreign presence there, especially after 1990, and we are witnessing Iranian openness, through various means, towards regions that are calmer, more beneficial and free to move.^[56]
• c- Investing in its various strategic capabilities in favor of building an action and movement strategy that nurtures its comprehensive geostrategic ability.^[57] Here, whoever says that Iran has replaced its old view, which relied on creating its strategic capacity, in favor of its new view, which requires moving towards the quiet formation of these conditions, after it justified, diagnosed and monitored effective solutions to accomplish its difficult task in light of the ambiguity of the environment surrounding it and the large number of security pressures generated on it. …. In addition to the realization of the current Iranian leadership that what it aspires to is “greatness and superiority” in a place where even a magician’s wand is not suitable.^[58] Which required them to work hard in order to capture the justifications and stimuli for formation. Among those stimuli is the investment of the conditions of strategic ability in terms of:
• Location:

Iran occupies a vast land area estimated at 1,640,000 million km2, including three-quarters of a barren desert or arid desert with red sands and fossilized salt patches. The heart of that area is represented by the Iranian plateau, which rises above sea level at different heights ranging between 1000 and 1500 m. It is surrounded by a group of high mountains, the most important of which is the Zagros Mountains, from which a group of rivers, valleys and plains descend.^[59] This area consists of a region that developed in its individual importance and formulated by merging with some of the components a single whole state that took its increasing strategic importance according to historical factors determined by the passage of time and the influence of the Persian element, which throughout history remained the main group of the population of Iran and who worked on observing all the regions surrounding the plateau that It contains various other elements. Over the course of this site,^[60] the historical events that together formed the basis of the identity of Persia and the political entity of Iran competed throughout history, starting with the ancient Persian Empire, which was not satisfied with Iran, but also seized the Babylonian Empire and reached Egypt in 525 BC, passing through the Sassanid Empire, which was conquered by Islam in 637 AD….. And the Safavid Empire, which was founded by Ismail al-Safavi in ​​1254 AD, and ended with the new Iran, which took its current status since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Just as Iran has borne the weight of its sprawling geographical location, it has at the same time gained from it a tremendous strategic depth, provided it with security and capacity, and established for it a significant predominance due to its volumetric extension, the completion of its external shape and proportional to its dimensions so that it does not narrow in an area and cannot be divided or penetrated. If the stomachs of history reveal to us the clarity of these features through connected regional spaces surrounded by natural insulators. These features became evident and gained geo-strategic importance with the end of World War II and the intensification of the Cold War^[61], which forced Iran to adopt the option of international responsibility that decided its manifestations in favor of linking interests Western relations with its allies. Perhaps the most important thing that was established by the geographical location of Iran is that which lies in achieving twinning between:

• The political action, economic capabilities, and population empowerment that has become an inevitable impact on its movement.
• The sea view and its reflection on the direct and intense interaction with its neighbors, especially the Arabs among them, and the possibility of inflicting political influence on the behavior of the invading country.

In the face of this,^[62] some suggested the necessity of taking into consideration the impact of the site in the interpretation of Iranian foreign policy in the modern era. Just as the “Hormuz” that is in need of penetration and supremacy in the Gulf, its other border sides created a site contact with a positive impact on Iranian behavior. The close approach created a kind of guarantee for national security without compromising the extension of political arms to support it by creating possibilities of influence for it in the most remote regions such as Africa and Central Asia.

d- Its conviction that it plays the role of the state – the key, and the building of a model for its movement, after it spent a full third of a century serving the American strategy as a wall against a possible Soviet threat.^[63]

On the other hand, the geographical location of Iran had a clear influence in shaping the pattern of other policies towards it, especially the Arabs, because of geographical determinism and historical partnership.

2-Population importance:

No one disputes the importance of the population to build the strategic importance of the state that includes it on its foundation, as it is a basic source of power in all its forms. And Iran, which possessed this element, which is a phenomenon in favor of Iran on the widest possible scale, in order to gain security and prepare for supremacy and through many social, economic and religious fields. The importance of the influence that the population played in qualitatively and in terms of age in shaping Iran’s strategic capacity with the modern history of Iran, which sought help from it, appeared after it was spotted. of laws integrating it, to be freed from the constraints of its existence. Therefore, it is not surprising that some say that the huge population size is one of the major bets on which the Pahlavi and Islamic rule in Iran bet in order to achieve its action, especially since the Iranian foreign policy and its goals were originally linked to the amount of opportunities and paths that those created The structural nature of Iran’s population, as well as the combination of that nature with qualities that are more ready for political and religious salvation. It also adapted it to build its military capacity and economic strength, such as the human element as a labor force for about 21.6% of the population. Accordingly, the demographic factor gave a sure and tangible motive for the Iranian political leaders to spread their action, as it affected its formulation towards its Arab neighbors.^[64]

3-The importance of economic capacity:

It is not strange for Iran to enhance its strategic capacity with an economic act, as it is capable of it.^[65] Especially after the comprehensive change that affected the Iranian economic system by cutting the organic links of the Iranian economy’s dependence on the Western economic system, canceling the existing banking system, liberating the Iranian currency from its link with the US dollar, and reintegrating oil, in production, into the Iranian economy through changing the structure of exports and redistributing economic activities^[66]. If this change has a political and legal basis, then real life has proven the efficacy and usefulness of this change, not only for the success of the process of transforming the lifestyle, but also for increasing Iran’s strategic effectiveness.

Despite the obstruction that affected this endeavor as a result of the Iraqi-Iranian war, which distorted its data and results. However, the Iranian leadership remained insistent on implementing its foundations, even with new measures,^[67] which at first glance seem completely different from what was published in 1979, which brought many benefits to the Iranian economy, its freedom, and its ability to absorb internal and external changes.^[68] Especially after Iran supported the International Monetary Fund, whose experts intervened in the process of change and reform and developed the necessary plan for the success of this process. In-depth studies indicated clear indications of the improvement that took place in the body of the Iranian economy, as the gross domestic product rose to 25.1 billion dollars in 1994 compared to 21.6 billion dollars Dollars in 1993 and growth rates returned to their normal positive status after they were subjected to a violent shock in 1993. Inflation rates declined after adopting strict policies in imports, which would have achieved a marginal surplus in its current account in 1994 after relatively large deficits from the previous two years to 1994 . Iran has worked to reduce its external debt rate, which amounted to $23.5 billion, or about 92.5% of its total production in 1994. However, as a result of its dependence on oil and its imports, Iran continued to be subjected to violent economic shocks at times, accompanied by political and social repercussions that in turn affect the development of the economic situation in its entirety.

Nevertheless, the economic capacity has had a great impact, not only in formulating the economic capacity, but in activating it, especially after the link achieved with it with the rest of the elements of Iran’s comprehensive capacity, especially the military one, according to Iran’s huge economic potential.^[69] In the field of agriculture, despite the limited land In proportion to its vast area, Iran owns 51 million hectares of agricultural land, 28.5% of which are cultivated permanently. Its water is obtained by irrigation,^[70] by 17.2%, and by 37.7% by means of oases and groundwater. While the proportion of lands that constitute forests is 6.4%, and the lands that are cultivated with seasonal crops 31.4% The share of this sector of employment is about 28% of the total population. The share of agricultural production in investment production represents a large proportion, reaching 23.6%, and its production of wheat reached 10.3 million tons in 1992, rice 2.5 million tons, and beets 4.45 million tons. Despite that, production remained Agricultural as a whole does not cover the national needs of foodstuffs. In the field of industry and minerals^[71], Iran has witnessed a tangible industrial leap, especially after the government relied on free market mechanisms and helped hundreds of industrial enterprises For the government to the private sector to devote itself to managing the balances of large production of minerals, which totaled (60) million tons per year, most of which went abroad as products or raw source. 26% of the workforce works in this sector and contributes 17% of the investment production group. However, production Oil remained the decisive factor in the nature of the Iranian economy, which was greatly affected by the fluctuations in its prices. Iran was able to increase its oil production capacity after it was able to repair all oil facilities that were destroyed as a result of its war with Iraq. Its daily production rate reached 4 million barrels per day, especially after The discovery of several oil reservoirs that add reserves of oil, estimated at 8.4 billion tons, and gas reserves, estimated at 14 billion tons^[72]. Therefore, it is not surprising and such an ability for Iran to ride the economic cart to promote its strategic action according to the financial liquidity provided by that ability to build its development experience and its ability to open up to the outside world economically. In the field of foreign trade, the Iranian government, through a policy of export support, has entered into multiple export sectors for the purpose of financing its need of hard currencies. Exports of non-oil products increased in 1990/1991 by 100%, which was accompanied by a significant increase in the value of imports until it reached in 1991 more than (28) billion dollars.

This policy helped Iran to be an important place for attracting capital and investing in it, especially after the government abolished many laws and proceeded to liberalize the internal economy and set a new policy for currency rates. This has provided great opportunities for foreign companies to work in Iran and trade with it. Thus, the economic management of Iran’s latent components has established an important support for the Iranian leadership in strengthening its strategic direction, as economic capacity has become necessary and its use is inevitable for the following matters:^[73]

• Dismantling the counter-regional isolation around it, with what it intends to do in terms of harnessing and using resources.
• Economic temptation, which was considered a fundamental component of the goal of exporting the revolution.
• Weaving new conditions of openness towards areas of overcrowding and competition, and equipping them with multiplying factors of influence.

The importance of military capacity:

To the extent that Iran was supplementing its strategic capacity, it was based on the aforementioned elements. The military capability and the implications it imposes on the necessity of possessing it and updating its beliefs was an unparalleled component of another component in the formation of Iran’s strategic capability,^[74] which expresses its importance very clearly in light of a distinguished military success. The military strength of any country in the world is one of the most important factors that determine its strength or weakness in the face of external challenges that affect its interests. The visual and anticipatory experiences of the Iranian external action have established the fact that Iran’s military ability goes beyond being a mere phenomenon that requires verification and formation and is linked to “high politics” It is intentionally isolated from the social influences that hinder it.^[75] And if the military institution has played a limited role in Iran’s general policy, everyone agreed that its action establishes a variable that has an unparalleled impact on the development of Iran’s strategic capacity, especially since the latter wanted to make it a package of action, as it is an ability, effectiveness, and a link between national security and the presence of the ability to maintain it. Thus, the Iranian military force became the pivotal link in the Iranian political project and the mirror of its connotations and implications.^[76]

In view of these reasons, Iran sought to take a number of urgent measures to increase its ability to influence and develop its armed forces, in order to dictate what it had suffered as a result of the war with Iraq, or to take advantage of the strategic vacuum left by the Thirtieth Aggression against Iraq in the Arabian Gulf, and the collapse of the Soviet Union from a vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and a willingness toto impose its position as the dominant regional power.^[77]

Thus, Iran began to adopt a strict deterrence strategy for itself to achieve the superiority that comes in light of building a conventional and nuclear arsenal, modernizing its military doctrine, and building a new administrative and organizational method for it that enumerates its uses, not as an input that determines the required response in the procedural environment or as a determinant that achieves greater effectiveness in its function to establish its strategic ability in Its territorial sanctuary or affected due to its connection with other components is Zbel as a way out through which it aims to increase its comprehensive ability “superiority.” The Iranian leadership envisaged this goal from the beginning, as it considered itself concerned with spreading God’s law in all the earth, in addition to its mission to ensure the freedom and safety of its vital space and to achieve additional sources of strength for it. It aided it in its mission as the center and center of the Islamic world. This goal came with its greatness and grandeur to justify the size and sheerness of Iran’s military spending, which represented about 26% of the total public spending as long as the need for military force remained as a distinct way to support its effort in creating or establishing a regional balance.^[78]

• Ideological importance:

Appealing to ideology as a tool for activating the comprehensive strategy was not new to Iran, which inhabited its various leaders and the historical legacy that it had in all its cooperative, bargaining, and conflict forms.^[79] The Iranian political history, in its various stages, clearly reveals the extent of the influence that ideology leaves on the general Iranian political action, which has gone beyond its mission as an administration to neutralize the danger of the national mosaic. It defined and characterized this ideology, whether it was the Iranian (nationalist or religious majority)^[80], its characteristic, and activated its components, and provided the impetus for the need to increase its influence in its sanctuaries or in remote places. The same history is also distinguished by Iran’s ability to blend the images of that ideology in the hope of having a great impact. Iran, especially after the revolution, deliberately merged the national and religious image, “which I understood in its sectarian aspect” together, not because of its compatibility with the Iranian personality, but because the Iranian revolution was calculated as a historical necessity, not for Iran. Not only, but to the Islamic world, and for this reason, if this revolution was undermined and failed, Iranian popular beliefs emerged, but they remained containing their strategic and political components capable of preserving the essence of those images. The goal of exporting the revolution remained vital and crucial because this matter is linked to the general strategic goal of “comprehensive security”.^[81] That dualistic ideology was abstract and justified, as it seemed to weigh heavily on the Iranian strategic ability, which declined in response to its assumptions after finding that the choice between developing and spreading that ideology and covering up with the ability and its components is very difficult. Relying on it in favor of a realistic approach that depends on exploiting the elements of politics and economics for the purpose of influence and And for a while.^[82] With a simple look at the experience of total reliance on ideology to reveal the comprehensive strategic ability. We find that Iran has thus achieved two gains:

The first – the legitimacy of its counteracting action, as it considered exporting the revolution a divine duty at the same time, an inevitable and fateful act to ward off any security harm to its national security vocabulary.^[83]

The second – the legitimacy of a coordinated and purposeful attack, since exporting the revolution is a divine mandate to establish a new paradigm.^[84]

However, the defeat with Iraq and the international situation that brought about the so-called new world order and what the situation arranged after the Thirtieth aggression against Iraq in 1990, Iran organized an opposite option, which some considered an invitation to retreat after Rafsanjani froze the act of exporting the revolution in favor of realistic dealing with the international community. The type rectifier lost its performance over a decade ago.

Whatever the two aspects of Iran’s strategic importance, it cannot be measured according to the action of one of the above components, but rather combines according to the interrelationship between all these components and what the Iranian movement provides of intrusive force that justifies the inevitability of its orientation towards comprehensive security, which remains as a calculated goal, waiting for opportunities to reveal the identity of what it requires ofAn act that the Iranian leadership bears the task of justifying and monitoring the ingredients for its achievement, and from here we can explain the Iranian orientation towards the Arab world, especially after the 1979 revolution, and this is what we will stand on in the coming pages.

The second topic: the factors affecting the Arab relations with the neighboring countries (Iran) as a model

It is no longer possible to ignore the determinants of the difficult equation that marked the course of Arab relations with the neighboring countries, namely Iran and Turkey, that equation which,^[85] despite the ease of describing the elements of interaction in it, but it continued to carry a calculated and perhaps intentional complexity because of the influences that took its way into penetrating the infrastructure of that equation And the elements of interaction in it until they have become basic elements whose vitality is measured by the outcome and essence of that equation. The body and structure of Arab relations with neighboring countries, which are characterized by their historical extensions and the intensity of their interventions, which have become synergistic with their surrounding influences, have caused the formulation of the complexities that they apply in an international structure in which the dimensions and dimensions of dealing have been disrupted^[86]. Despite the large number of studies that dealt with this topic, analyzing the reality, nature and perhaps the future of Arab relations with neighboring countries in an oriental manner, these studies, despite their insistence on the necessity of adopting a study model (as is the case in the attempt of Abdel Moneim Saeed 1987)^[87], which could not provide us with a survey Inclusive of the factors affecting the formulation of those relationships and to show their realistic impact, and it did not provide us with a full assessment of the outcome of these factors as a prelude to understanding the essence of the influence that affects the nature of those relationships despite the present consensus on the fate that these factors reach. Hence, and in view of the foregoing, it can be said that the origin of the dispute revolves around:

First: the causes of impact:

Experts and researchers began to tackle the topic (Arab relations with the neighboring countries) adopting the basis for revealing its different data. Some see the necessity of research starting with the pattern of security actions,^[88] since the Arab relations with neighboring countries actually represent the outcome of different perceptions that mutually support and repel each other according to different visions of a group of threatsAnd the temptations, risks and opportunities that lie within the regional or international framework, and therefore their study needs to know the factors affecting the formulation or formula of security for all parties, especially if we take into account the societal formulation of the concept of security that includes all fields.

Hence, the study of relations with neighboring countries cannot be studied with unified criteria according to the specificity of each of them and according to the specificity of the patterns of the existing relationship. At the time when studying Arab-Turkish relations, which are dominated by the nature of relative friendliness, they are faced with dilemmas of dissonance and great conflict when we study the Arab-Iranian relations thatIts behavioral folds include many problems and data. The thing that must be built here is a case of a common understanding based on ideal foundations, the nature of the phase, the mutual actions, the value of the transaction, the factors affecting the determination of this value … then the expected outcome.^[89]

Second: – Evaluation of the outcome.

While others consider that the study of Arab relations with neighboring countries,^[90] and that it is determined by studying the influences as reasons for the connection of those relations, it is sometimes studied as reasons for confusing the outcome as well. The relationship is for the better or disrupted. Here, the return of relations to the zero degree appears to be the subject of new research, and that the premises are equal,^[91] but they often differ in the outputs of that relationship to weave turbulent inputs. It must be discussed again as the necessary basis for the essence of those relations as a whole.

We, for our part, will merge these two theories because we believe that the causes of the launch and the exits of the definition of the relationship, although they differ in the formulation of the relationship, but they are united in a special vision about the essence of the relationship, especially as we adopt a behavioral approach and a comprehensive view. Combined units “alliances” to a common perception.^[92] And vice versa for neighboring countries as well. In addition to that, the effect of the emerging links between those parties and the international or regional powers or their position. Thus, the foundations of the crisis became, which refers to the influence of latent or apparent factors to the merging of two types of internal and external influences, which carried with it the characteristic of the Arab relationship with countries Geographical neighborhood, especially Iran, gave it a certain shape.

Third: Internal Factors “Internal Influences”

The observer of Arab relations with the neighboring countries, “Iran and Turkey,” notes the magnitude of the state of crisis and the intensity of turmoil in the structure of these relations. Their position towards Iran and Turkey has been torn apart, and their view of it as a source of threat or as peaceful neighbors has been torn apart. The Iranians have also become discolored, and their actions seem to indicate a lot of conflict in goals, behavior and intentions as well. It is not hidden from everyone the interests that they intend to acquire. Thus, the state of disagreement and evasion arranged a conflict in the means as well.^[93] The matter that contributed greatly to disrupting the dialogue and its mechanisms and replacing them with new mechanisms based on conflict and the desire to dismantle opposite positions may predict that all parties were unable to absorb the lessons of the past and were unable to The events of a major turning point, especially since there is a convergence in some common issues, as well as a divergence of the common collective goals that distorted or disrupted It may be undermined by an external action.^[94]

In general, we can observe the most important factors that cause the situation above:

• The different perceptions of the ruling political elites of the nature of relations, their course, and the mechanisms of their disposition:

The divergent perception of the Arab and Iranian elites, despite the presence of the common collective goals and the justifications for achieving them by relying on the common heritage, common hopes and common challenges, is an important and influential factor in reading Arab relations with Iran. On the lack of agreement between these elites on the method of benefiting from mutual awareness and the models of structural transformation witnessed by the three societies, and the lack of conviction and perhaps confidence among the active institutions in those societies that formulating a specific detail of that awareness did not bring great results and mutual benefits for all.^[95] And if the seventies witnessed a remarkable rapprochement between these parties due to the rise of the Arab nationalist feeling. And the activity of the enlightened national movement in Iran before 1979, but finding a common solution to come out with it to build clear value gains in foreign policy became difficult to achieve, especially after the 1979 revolution and Iran’s distancing On the Western orientation and the growing sense of self, which made the expansionist act through the slogan of exporting the revolution a political logic for its action, in addition to the poor course of Arab perception about it, which resulted from the greater evil that characterized the Arab conditions.^[96]

Thus, the political discourse of the Arab and Iranian ruling elites provided us with clear evidence of the extent of the imbalance that would not have resulted primarily if it had not been built by all parties on ideological perceptions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the intellectual crisis seemed to deepen at the level of the region. At the time, this helped Iran to weaken the leftist currents. Spreading and strengthening the traditional right-wing path, the Arab world began to be embarrassed as it faced the clear contradiction between the secularists and the Islamic trend, and between self-reliance and Western interaction.^[97]

• The magnitude of the inherent differences between the parties and the complexities witnessed in the course of interaction between the Arab and Iranian parties. At a time when the Arabs and Iranians are associated with many differences, the degree of conflict has reached the point of armed conflict, as history tells us: “Iraq and Iran, ancient and modern” and “Iran and the Gulf states.” “Arab” such as border disputes, territorial ambitions with ideological reasons… The reasons for these differences are still clear, whether because they have not been put to an end or settled, as is the case with the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, despite the existence of a framework for it through UN Security Council Resolution No. 598 / at 20 / 7/1987, or the Shatt al-Arab problem, which witnessed multiple solutions, the parties took turns promoting it for a period and then violating it again and accepting it a third time, and all the problem of the three Arab islands, for which Iran basically adopted a framework of protection under the agreement concluded by Iran with the United Arab Emirates in 1970 for a period 25 years ended in 1995. However, Iran, which aims to go beyond protection on the islands, has re-imposed the method of protection without any awareness of the sensitivity of the situation in the region crowded with the presence and influence of many international actors.^[98]

The problematic relationship with Iran did not stop at this point, but witnessed the tension of many problems between the two sides, whether in the renewed allegations of naming the Arab Gulf the Persian Gulf, and the regional role of Iran in the Gulf, religious guardianship….etc.. And what followed by building a great degree of suspicion among the official Arab elitesAnd the educated are aware of the feasibility of peaceful dealings with Iran, or on issues related to fighting national options under the pretext of helping minorities or opposing Arab regimes, as is the case in their direct interventions in the situation in Iraq.^[99]

• Multiple subjective visions:

The Arab-Iranian relations were affected by the multiplicity of self-visions of each party, especially the conduct of those relations based on different strategies. At a time when the Arab regime lost a comprehensive and organized strategy to deal with Iran, its parties began to manage their relations with it according to personal and individual visions that oscillated between agreement, confusion and estrangement. Thus, Iran secured its position vis-à-vis Iran. this case.

Iran, for its part, has raised serious questions about its regional policy goals and objectives after declaring its intention to find a kind of Iranian peace in the region, taking advantage of the full circumstances that the Arab regional system has gone through with motives for Iranian actions because Iran represents an element of attraction from the Arab alliance system.^[100] On this basis, Iran sought to enter into a complex network of political, economic and social interactions, aided by its own self-dynamism and fixed kinetic rules that help it in its escalating action in light of the multiple areas of regional action. Iran has tried to categorize itself with its regional movement in the Arabian Gulf.^[101] Therefore, the basis of Iranian responsibility lies in its tendency to defend the security of the Gulf until it began to look at security in it as “we” and Iran realized the requirements of this role, especially after the Thirtieth Aggression on Iraq in 1991 and what the circumstances required of freezing its previous export action and replacing it with a series of diplomatic, political and media steps and measures It helps to open a new page of Iranian-Arab relations, especially the Gulf ones. The western parties resolved their issue in Iran’s favor, stressing that “without the strong and influential presence of Iran in the region, there can be no security for the Gulf states,”^[102] especially after pledging to contribute to Gulf security, respecting regional borders and settling disputes with any Gulf state^[103]. Iran presented itself as the only power that the world could Relying on it to maintain security and peace in the Gulf, as it establishes that the road remains open to the flow of oil. However, the Damascus Declaration postponed the legitimacy of the Iranian proposal and hinted at the growing need to build components of joint security in which security programs are formulated far from bargaining and counter containment in favor of building mutual interests.^[104] However, the anxious conditions and changes made the regional hegemony of Iran in light of the great destruction of Iraq’s capabilities, the dangerous strategic and security exposure of the Gulf states, and the decline in the regional power of Egypt and Syria in light of the internal crises and tension in relations with the Gulf countries. A large regional group of external powers in light of Middle Eastern arrangements.

Fourth: – External factors “External influences”:

Everyone agrees that the second aspect of the imbalance in Arab relations with Iran lies in the influence of external factors on them because the environment of these relations has been deliberately linked to external determinants that were shaped by the actions of the parties themselves through the multiplicity of their links with external forces that did not hesitate to interfere in confusing the forms of interaction between the concerned parties and undermining Their efforts towards conciliation and disrupting any sign of reforming the defect that is rooted in the body of these relations.^[105] In addition to their interference in provoking problems as part of its endeavor to generate crises to tighten its control over the course of those relations and their environment, which remained the heart of the world according to its geographical location and its strategic resources that must be tightly controlled. Those who follow the course of the external influence easily notice how this view has changed in the wake of the international changes brought about by the successive collapses of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and then the collapse of its center in the Soviet Union^[106]. . These variables raised a basic fact: that international and regional powers have deliberately marginalized and fragmented the Arab regional system and built it on regional rather than national foundations, and that the security mission of the West has become towards the Arab region the new center of gravity instead of the former Soviet Union. In addition, these forces are working to marginalize and confuse the Arab relationship with Iran as part of its mission to contain the latter, according to the theory of dual containment. Which prevents Iran from exploiting any opportunity to form or giving it any role in the security interaction taking place in the region and encircling its military effort. At the same time,^[107] it prevents it from building bridges of relationship with the Arab regional system to strengthen its position.

On the other hand, these forces were keen to undermine the Iranian effort in the Middle East, especially when it began to view it as an enemy betting on the sovereignty of fundamentalism represented by Iran. It has a role in the Arab Gulf, after circumstances created opportunities to build security visions that would have no place for Iran, which did not establish climates of trust between it and the Arabs^[108], especially the Arab Gulf states. Based on that, we can summarize the influences of the external environment as follows^[109]:

A – Escalation of the impact of the effects of the change.

B – The increasing degree of association with the West.

C – the increasing influence of the American role.

D- The increasing influence of the Israeli role.

C – The disruption of inter-relationships between Iran and Turkey.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

In summary, the researcher must conclude his study with some conclusions that he deems appropriate to reform the state of Arab relations with Iran, or investigate rapid models for this task that are superior to cases of crisis and complexity, total or partial, that bring the relations under study to a point of no return, even if the researcher has arrangedThere are a number of options that are required of all parties, but he sees the necessity of:

 1-Neutralizing the scope of the next movement in order to connect the paths of mutual interaction and to agree on the starting point for building the model calling for promoting the option of disciplined competition and the long-term division of labour.

2- Building organizational matrices for an association that takes upon itself the fulfillment of the aspirations of calming down or solving the pressing problems experienced by the concerned parties or preventing their complications.

3- Agreeing on specific means to conduct the course of the relationship, including agreeing on a unified security formula with clarity that defines each party’s tasks in deviation from what the third party achieves, even if it is an effort.

4-Working to lay down conditions that achieve a common response to the demands being circulated as such4- Working on paving conditions that achieve a common response to the circulating demands as an outcome of what should be achieved, whether through a bilateral or collective effort according to an approximate scheme that the ruling elites strive to formulate in the hope of creating a joint ownership, whether in deepening the state of trust between all parties or in creating stable interests that workTo be a case of convergence and mutual benefit.

5- Working to create the conditions to create opportunities that enable the Arabs to choose the intentions of the regional parties and enable the latter to prove their efficiency and credibility, and thus everyone achieve reasonable degrees of equality that guarantee opportunities to restore Arab national security to its components, including reforming the state of Arab-Iranian relations.

6-Seeking to dispel the regional state of anxiety, especially Iran, from the Arabs, who must reassure Iran, in a way that establishes a state of psychological and political rapprochement, whether through non-governmental institutions or on generating convictions among the official elites of the necessity of adopting positions with common options that are tempting to the opposite parties and to make them ableTo seize the threads of deliberate harm and consolidate the conviction of the necessity of mutual rapprochement, not to ensure peace and stability in the region, but to prevent the circulating lightning bolts.

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• For more details on these prohibitions, see: Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviours of states, London, 1973, p.11-14
• Arnold J.Toynbee,Astudy of History, London,1961,p.71-75.
• This fact appears in times of crisis, for more details see: Robert J. Art, Military power, Washington, 1978, p.11.
• This is what has been confirmed by most studies specialized in this subject. For more information, see: Saad Eddin Ibrahim and others, Research Project foreseeing the Future of the Arab World, General Framework, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1984
• . On this need, many studies have emerged to confirm it. See: Abdel Moneim Saeed, The Arabs and Geographical Neighboring Countries, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1978.
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• . This is what characterized regional politics in the Middle East in general. For more information, see: George Lenczowski, The Middle East in world affairs.3rd, Newyork, 1962, p.71-92
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• Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Hamdanin, the previous source, pg. 17.
• Leuis Bernard,Rethinking in the New Middle East,Foreign affairs ,Fall,1992    For more information on this perception, see: The report that I prepared on June 9, 1992, the Arabic Bulletin, the Lemond Diplomatic   C-Paul Bradley ,Recend state policy in the (Persian)Gulf,London,1982,p.50.
• Zibigniew Brezezinski, Power and principle,Newyork,1983,p.81
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• Aharon Barev, “Israeli Fears of the Iraqi Victory”, Strategic Bulletin, No. 22, 1980.
• K.Ramazni,ed,Iran s Revolution, The search for consensus,Washington,1990,p.20.
• Hooshang, Amirahmadi and M.parvin,eds,-Revolutionary Iran, Boulder,1988,p.120.
• Oliver, T.,ed, The Iran-Contra Arms Scandal Aforeign policy Dis.zster.N.Y.,1988,P.61-78.
• Khader Al-Dahrawi, “The Dimensions of the Oil Tanker War in the Gulf Region”, International Policy Journal, Issue 78, 1984, p. 190.
• Newyrk Times, 23-1-1992. Its denial is a detailed report on the positions of the above parties on the Iranian nuclear armament, as well as see: Monem Al-Ammar and Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud, The Program, the Iranian Nuclear Choice, Dirasat, Arab House for Studies and Publishing, Cairo, 1996.
• Mshen Milani, The making of Iran s Islamic Revolution, From monarchy to Islamic Repuplic, BOULDER,1988,P.120.
• Marvin Zonis, Majestic Faiur,The full of the shad Chicago, 1991,p.181.
• This idea was argued by the Iranians in their government after 1988, for more details see: Ervand Abrahamian, Iranian Majahedin, New Haven, 1989, p.12.
• Efraim, Kask,The Iran-Iraq war,Amilitary Analysis,Adelphr pupers,No-220.1987,p.180.
• The foreign presence in the Arabian Gulf, looking at you: Talaat Muslim, The foreign military presence in the Arab world, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1993.
• Barry M.Rosen,Iran Since the Revolution, Internaal Dynamic,Regional conftict and the super-power,Newyork,1985,p.84-102.
• Lanczowaski, Oil and state in the middle east, Newyork, 1989,p.271-282
• . The Middle East and North Africa,1982-1983,p.386.
• Sayed Zahra, Iran’s Revolution, Social and Political Dimensions, Nalahram Center for Strategic Studies, 1985, p. 174.
• 2.Hoskins,The middle East.problem area in the world politice,Newyork,1980,p.211-233.
• Lela Meo,Us strategy in the Gulf ,interventaion against Liberation.London,1989,p.82.
• Lenczowski,u.s interests in the Middle, East, Washington,1992,p.28—99.
• United Nations,Global Estimates and projections of population by sex and Age,The 1988 Revision.Newyork,1989,p.212-213.
• The Military Balance,1990-1991.155,p.109
• For more information, see the minutes of the sessions of the Republic Center 1992, p. 5.
• Sipir,year Book,1989,Oxford University Press.297.
• About those studies, we look at you, Muhammad Al-Saeed Abdul-Momin, Iran from the inside – an Egyptian vision of the Arab Strategic Report, Cairo, 1994, p. 51 and beyond.
• The European year Book ,1989,Aworld survey,vol.1,Lo  ndon,1988,p.1412.
• For a comparison with these figures and their counterparts before the revolution, see: Khazal Nassoavi Iran, The Economy and the Revolution, Middle East international, No.7,1988, p.122.
• See Table No. 5 in the Appendix
• . For more details, see: Monem Al-Ammar, “Iran and the Islamic Republics”, Journal of Political Science, research promised to be published, p. 28.
• For more on the effect of military power on general strategic attainment, see: Thouas C. Shaling Arms and influence Yale university press, London, 1966, p.70-102.
• Willim H.Sullivan,Date line Iran,The road not taken,foreign affairs,No.40,1980,p.175-186.
• For more details, see: Hamdi Ali Attia, “The Military Effectiveness of the Arab Gulf States and the Iranian Threats”, International Politics Journal, No. 85, 1989, p. 83.
• Newyork Times, 10.12.1992.
• Monem Al-Ammar and Nizar Al-Hayali, previous source, p. 20 and beyond
• . Mohammed AyooB,Security in Theird world the about turn,Intrnational affairs,N1,1984,p.538.
• Anthony Cordesman ,The Gulf and the search for strategic stability,London,1984,p.73.
• Jad Taha, Iran and the inevitability of history, National House of Printing and Publishing, B.T., p. 9 and beyond.
• Shaoul Bakhash The rigen of Ayatollah s,London,1985,p.12.
• Shereen Hunter, “Arab-Iranian Relations and Stability in the Persian Gulf”, The Washington Quarterly, translated by MBC, 1984, p. 113.
• James A.Bill,Iran and the Crisis,of 78foreign affairs,No.57,1979.p.338.
• John V.Whitebeck, Con federation Now, Aframe work for Middle East peace, Middle East policy,No,1,p.1993,p.63-68.
• Dan Cherji, America and Peace in the Middle East, translated by Muhammad Mustafa Ghoneim, revised by Raafat Abdel Hamid, Beirut, Dar Al-Shorouk, 1993, p. 118.
• Abdel Moneim Saeed, The Arabs and the Geographical Neighboring Countries, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1987.
• Philip Robinson, Turkey and the Middle East, translated by Michael Najm Khoury in Cyprus, Cordoba House, 1993, p. 63.
• Davyd E.Long, prospects for Armed conflict in Gulf in 1990 s,The impact of the Gulf war,middle East policy,No.1.1993,p.113-125.
• Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, Arabs and Turks in a Changing World, Volume 1, The Arab Perspective, Beirut, 1993, pp. 18-21.
• Patrick seal (eds)A Gun for Hire,New York,1992,p.271.
• Louis J.Cantari,Regional Solutions to Regional security problems,Middle East policy, No.3,1994,p.28.
• Dale F. Eickelman ,The re-imagination of the middle East ,politic at and Academic frontiers, middle East studies Assoiation Bulletion,No.1,1992,p.3-12.
• Suleiman Bashir, The Arab Mashreq in Communist Theory and Practice 1918-1938, Al Sharq Cooperative Press, Beirut, 1977, p. 321.
• Bruce Riedal, The middle East,what is our long-term vision?middle east policy,No.3,1994,p.16.
• Jalal Amin, the Arab East and West, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 1983, pp. 102-119; Share Issawi, Reflections on Arab History, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1991, p. 198.
• Compare that with the procedures that prevailed in Arab-Iranian-Turkish relations before the establishment of the year 1979, see: Hamid Rabie, The Arab Gulf War and International Interactions, Journal of National Security, Issue, Baghdad, 1986.
• For more details, see: Saad Naji and Monem Al-Ammar, “The Arab Gulf in a Changing World”, International Policy Journal, No. 125, Cairo, 1996, p. 61 and beyond.
• Muhammad Saad Abu Amoud, The Iranian position on Abu Musa, how does the world respond today, Al-Alam Al-Youm newspaper on February 26, 1992; Shamlan Al-Issa, Arab-Iranian Differences, The Three Islands, a paper presented to the Arab-Iranian Relations Symposium held by the Center for Arab Unity Studies, Doha, 1995, p. 10 and beyond.
• Monem Al-Ammar, The Future of Iranian Foreign Political Action: Challenge and Response, Research Presented to the Symposium of the Center for Arab Gulf Studies, Basra, 1993, p. 18.
• Anthony Gorst,Strategy and the Diplomatic process,Journal of strategic studies,No.4,1988,p.391-436.
• Ramzi musaliam,The middle East problems in the 1990 s,Gulf report,No.2,1972,p.3-18.
• Monem Al-Ammar, The Future of Political Action, previous source, p. 18.
• Monem Al-Amar, Abdul Rahman Al-Daoud, The Iranian Nuclear Program, Dirasat, Dar Al-Arabiya for Studies and Publishing, 1996, p. 40 and beyond.
• Robert Keohane and J.Nye,Power and inderdependence,World polities in Transion,New York,1992,p.108
• Turgut Ozal,Turkish stand on the Gulf Crisis forgein policy,no.5,1993,p.86
• . Authoung lake,Cofronting Backlash states,foreign Affairs,no.2,1994,p.49
• Henry Kissinger’s Secret Lecture in the Middle East, Kazma Publishing, Translation and Distribution Company, Kuwait, 1977, p. 185

^[1] Hamed Rabie, Islam and International Powers, Nadar Al Mawqif Al Arabeen, Cairo, 1981, p. 78.

^[2] Hamed Rabie, the previous source, p.79.

^[3] For more details on these prohibitions, see: Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviours of states, London, 1973, p.11-14.

^[4]  Arnold J.Toynbee,Astudy of History, London,1961,p.71-75.

^[5] This fact appears in times of crisis, for more details see: Robert J. Art, Military power, Washington, 1978, p.11.

^[6] This is what has been confirmed by most studies specialized in this subject. For more information, see: Saad Eddin Ibrahim and others, Research Project foreseeing the Future of the Arab World, General Framework, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1984.

^[7] On this need, many studies have emerged to confirm it. See: Abdel Moneim Saeed, The Arabs and Geographical Neighboring Countries, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1978.

^[8] On the reality of the state as a working unit related to its counterparts. See: Kaneth, N. Waltz, Man. The state and war, Newyork, 1959, p. 82-102.

^[9] same source.

^[10] Hamed Rabie, the previous source, p. 82.

^[11]   On the nature of the impact that aspirations have on the status and international weight of the state in general, see: Morgen thau, politics among Nations, The struggle for power and peace, Newyork, 1967, part1, p.21-32.

^[12] This is what characterized regional politics in the Middle East in general. For more information, see: George Lenczowski, The Middle East in world affairs.3rd, Newyork, 1962, p.71-92.

^[13] For more information on those attempts, see: Group of Specialized Professors, Iraq in History, Freedom House for Printing, Baghdad, 1983.

^[14] Christense, Iran in the Era of the Sassanids, translated by: Yahya Shehab, Cairo, 1975.

^[15] Hassan Al-Sudani, Blood on the Karfa River, Forty Centuries of the Arab-Persian Conflict, Al-Hadara Press, Beirut, 1980.

^[16] Saeed Abdel Fattah Ashour, Arab-Persian Relations from the Islamic Conquest until the Fall of the Abbasid State, in a group of researchers, Arab-Iranian Relations, Center for Arab Research and Studies, Cairo, 1993, pp. 18-19 and beyond

^[17] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Arab public opinion trends towards the issue of unity, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1980.

^[18] Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud Al-Hamdani, Arab Relations with Neighboring Countries Turkey and Iran, unpublished doctoral thesis, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 1997, p. 12.

^[19] For more details on the Iraqi-Iranian treaty, see: Group of Researchers, The Arab-Persian Conflict, Freedom House for Printing, Baghdad, 1983, p. 260 and beyond.

^[20]   Chalottesivlle,1972,p.21. Gulf” Iran s R.K.Ramazni,The “Persian

^[21]   AdaIphi Paper,NO 219,1987,p.26.

^[22]   News week,20 April,1983.

^[23]   Chubin,Shahram, Security politice to world Iran and Gulf,Adelphi Paper,No157,1980,p.18-22.

^[24] For more information on this subject and its connection to nationalism in Iran, see: Richard Cottam, N ATIONALISM IN Iran, 1976, p.265.

^[25]   Chubin, Sharam,op.cit.

^[26]On the issue of the three Arab islands, see: An Arab point of view in Ahmed Jalal Al-Tadami – The Three Arab Islands, Abu Dhabi, 1995; and on the Iranian point of view, see: Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, London, 1995,

^[27] For more details about the conference, see: Monem Al-Ammar and Saad Naji Jawad, “The Arab Gulf in a Changing World”, International Policy Journal, No. 125, Cairo 1996, p. 58.

^[28] Monem Al-Ammar, “The Egyptian Position on the Iranian Transformation in the Region”, Journal of International Studies, Al-Jumhuriya Center, No. 1, 1992, p. 29 and beyond.

^[29]   Richard Cottam,op.cit.p.267.

^[30]   R.K.Ramazan,op.cit.p.24.

^[31]   R.K.Ramazani,Revolutinary Iran,London,1986,p.108.

^[32] This was the case of the late reaction to the revolution in Iran. For more see: Osama Al-Ghazali Harb, “The Historical Development of the Reality of the Iraqi-Iranian War”, International Politics Journal, No. 63, Cairo, 1981, pp. 66-67..

^[33] Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Hamdanin, the previous source, pg. 17.

^[34]   Leuis Bernard,Rethinking in the New Middle East,Foreign affairs ,Fall,1992,

^[35]   For more information on this perception, see: The report that I prepared on June 9, 1992, the Arabic Bulletin, the Lemond Diplomatic

^[36]   C-Paul Bradley ,Recend state policy in the (Persian)Gulf,London,1982,p.50.

^[37]   Zibigniew Brezezinski, Power and principle,Newyork,1983,p.81.

^[38]   A.H.Cordesman, The gulf and search forstrategic stability,colorodo,1984,p.160.

^[39]   Times,12-6-1976.

^[40] Oded Anion, Israel’s Strategy in the Eighties, translated by: Research and Information Center, Baghdad, 1983, p. 14.

^[41] Sami Abdul-Hafiz Al-Qaisi, “The Zionist entity and the Iraqi-Iranian War”, Al-Khaleej Al-Arabi Magazine, Issue One, 1986, p. 16.

^[42] Aharon Barev, “Israeli Fears of the Iraqi Victory”, Strategic Bulletin, No. 22, 1980.

^[43]   R.K.Ramazni,ed,Iran s Revolution, The search for consensus,Washington,1990,p.20.

^[44] Abdul Rahman Ahmad Al-Hamdani, the previous source, p. 45.

^[45]   Hooshang, Amirahmadi and M.parvin,eds,-Revolutionary Iran, Boulder,1988,p.120.

^[46]   Oliver, T.,ed, The Iran-Contra Arms Scandal Aforeign policy Dis.zster.N.Y.,1988,P.61-78.

^[47] Khader Al-Dahrawi, “The Dimensions of the Oil Tanker War in the Gulf Region”, International Policy Journal, Issue 78, 1984, p. 190.

^[48] Although there is a fundamental difference between America, Western European countries and Japan, the difference is not in the general principles of orientation, but in its method, as it was agreed to accelerate the deterioration of economic indicators to constitute a major pressure factor on the central authority, either for a fundamental change in its attitudes towards its atomic programs and its position on the Arab peace process. Israel, and accusing it of supporting terrorism or changing the regime as a result of those pressures. For more details see: Newyrk Times, 23-1-1992. Its denial is a detailed report on the positions of the above parties on the Iranian nuclear armament, as well as see: Monem Al-Ammar and Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud, The Program, the Iranian Nuclear Choice, Dirasat, Arab House for Studies and Publishing, Cairo, 1996.

^[49] Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud, the previous source, pg. 47.

^[50]   Mshen Milani, The making of Iran s Islamic Revolution, From monarchy to Islamic Repuplic, BOULDER,1988,P.120.

^[51] Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud, the previous source, pg. 47.

^[52] Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al-Daoud, the previous source, pg. 47.

^[53]   Marvin Zonis, Majestic Faiur,The full of the shad Chicago, 1991,p.181.

^[54] This idea was argued by the Iranians in their government after 1988, for more details see: Ervand Abrahamian, Iranian Majahedin, New Haven, 1989, p.12.

^[55]   Efraim, Kask,The Iran-Iraq war,Amilitary Analysis,Adelphr pupers,No-220.1987,p.180.

^[56] The foreign presence in the Arabian Gulf, looking at you: Talaat Muslim, The foreign military presence in the Arab world, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1993.

^[57]   Barry M.Rosen,Iran Since the Revolution, Internaal Dynamic,Regional conftict and the super-power,Newyork,1985,p.84-102.

^[58]   G.Lanczowaski, Oil and state in the middle east, Newyork, 1989,p.271-282.

^[59]   The Middle East and North Africa,1982-1983,p.386.

^[60]   Sayed Zahra, Iran’s Revolution, Social and Political Dimensions, Nalahram Center for Strategic Studies, 1985, p. 174.

^[61]   H.2.Hoskins,The middle East.problem area in the world politice,Newyork,1980,p.211-233.

^[62]   Lela Meo,Us strategy in the Gulf ,interventaion against Liberation.London,1989,p.82.

^[63]   G.Lenczowski,u.s interests in the Middle, East, Washington,1992,p.28—99.

^[64]   United Nations,Global Estimates and projections of population by sex and Age,The 1988 Revision.Newyork,1989,p.212-213.

^[65]   The Military Balance,1990-1991.155,p.109

^[66] For more information, see the minutes of the sessions of the Republic Center 1992, p. 5.

^[67]   Sipir,year Book,1989,Oxford University Press.297.

^[68] About those studies, we look at you, Muhammad Al-Saeed Abdul-Momin, Iran from the inside – an Egyptian vision of the Arab Strategic Report, Cairo, 1994, p. 51 and beyond.

^[69]       The European year Book ,1989,Aworld survey,vol.1,Lo  ndon,1988,p.1412.

^[70] Ahmed Al-Momen, the previous source, p. 29 and beyond.

^[71] For a comparison with these figures and their counterparts before the revolution, see: Khazal Nassoavi Iran, The Economy and the Revolution, Middle East international, No.7,1988, p.122.

^[72] See Table No. 5 in the Appendix.

^[73] For more details, see: Monem Al-Ammar, “Iran and the Islamic Republics”, Journal of Political Science, research promised to be published, p. 28.

^[74] For more on the effect of military power on general strategic attainment, see: Thouas C. Shaling Arms and influence Yale university press, London, 1966, p.70-102.

^[75]   Willim H.Sullivan,Date line Iran,The road not taken,foreign affairs,No.40,1980,p.175-186.

^[76] For more details, see: Hamdi Ali Attia, “The Military Effectiveness of the Arab Gulf States and the Iranian Threats”, International Politics Journal, No. 85, 1989, p. 83.

^[77] Robert Timms, Director of the US Intelligence Agency, confirmed that Iran has started great efforts to develop its military and defense industries, and these efforts also include weapons of mass destruction programs, not only in preparation for the possible release of Iraqi weapons, but also to strengthen Iran’s prominent position in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. For more details, seeNewyork Times, 10.12.1992.

^[78] Monem Al-Ammar and Nizar Al-Hayali, previous source, p. 20 and beyond.

^[79]   Mohammed AyooB,Security in Theird world the about turn,Intrnational affairs,N1,1984,p.538.

^[80]   Anthony Cordesman ,The Gulf and the search for strategic stability,London,1984,p.73.

^[81] Jad Taha, Iran and the inevitability of history, National House of Printing and Publishing, B.T., p. 9 and beyond.

^[82]   Shaoul Bakhash The rigen of Ayatollah s,London,1985,p.12.

^[83] Shereen Hunter, “Arab-Iranian Relations and Stability in the Persian Gulf”, The Washington Quarterly, translated by MBC, 1984, p. 113.

^[84]   James A.Bill,Iran and the Crisis,of 78foreign affairs,No.57,1979.p.338.

^[85]   John V.Whitebeck, Con federation Now, Aframe work for Middle East peace, Middle East policy,No,1,p.1993,p.63-68.

^[86] Dan Cherji, America and Peace in the Middle East, translated by Muhammad Mustafa Ghoneim, revised by Raafat Abdel Hamid, Beirut, Dar Al-Shorouk, 1993, p. 118.

^[87] See: Abdel Moneim Saeed, The Arabs and the Geographical Neighboring Countries, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1987.

^[88]Philip Robinson, Turkey and the Middle East, translated by Michael Najm Khoury in Cyprus, Cordoba House, 1993, p. 63.

^[89]   Davyd E.Long, prospects for Armed conflict in Gulf in 1990 s,The impact of the Gulf war,middle East policy,No.1.1993,p.113-125.

^[90] Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, Arabs and Turks in a Changing World, Volume 1, The Arab Perspective, Beirut, 1993, pp. 18-21.

^[91]   Patrick seal (eds)A Gun for Hire,New York,1992,p.271.

^[92]   Louis J.Cantari,Regional Solutions to Regional security problems,Middle East policy, No.3,1994,p.28.

^[93] On this perception and its origin, see: Dale F. Eickelman ,The re-imagination of the middle East ,politic at and Academic frontiers, middle East studies Assoiation Bulletion,No.1,1992,p.3-12.

^[94] On the antiquity of this trend and the elements of undermining it in the past, see: Suleiman Bashir, The Arab Mashreq in Communist Theory and Practice 1918-1938, Al Sharq Cooperative Press, Beirut, 1977, p. 321.

^[95]   Bruce Riedal, The middle East,what is our long-term vision?middle east policy,No.3,1994,p.16.

^[96] Compare this difference with the West’s difference to Islam as well: Jalal Amin, the Arab East and West, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 1983, pp. 102-119; Share Issawi, Reflections on Arab History, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1991, p. 198.

^[97] Compare that with the procedures that prevailed in Arab-Iranian-Turkish relations before the establishment of the year 1979, see: Hamid Rabie, The Arab Gulf War and International Interactions, Journal of National Security, Issue, Baghdad, 1986.

^[98] For more details, see: Saad Naji and Monem Al-Ammar, “The Arab Gulf in a Changing World”, International Policy Journal, No. 125, Cairo, 1996, p. 61 and beyond.

^[99] On these differences, see: Muhammad Saad Abu Amoud, The Iranian position on Abu Musa, how does the world respond today, Al-Alam Al-Youm newspaper on February 26, 1992; Shamlan Al-Issa, Arab-Iranian Differences, The Three Islands, a paper presented to the Arab-Iranian Relations Symposium held by the Center for Arab Unity Studies, Doha, 1995, p. 10 and beyond.

^[100] Monem Al-Ammar, The Future of Iranian Foreign Political Action: Challenge and Response, Research Presented to the Symposium of the Center for Arab Gulf Studies, Basra, 1993, p. 18.

^[101]   Anthony Gorst,Strategy and the Diplomatic process,Journal of strategic studies,No.4,1988,p.391-436.

^[102]   Ramzi musaliam,The middle East problems in the 1990 s,Gulf report,No.2,1972,p.3-18.

^[103] Monem Al-Ammar, The Future of Political Action, previous source, p. 18.

^[104] Monem Al-Amar, Abdul Rahman Al-Daoud, The Iranian Nuclear Program, Dirasat, Dar Al-Arabiya for Studies and Publishing, 1996, p. 40 and beyond.

^[105]   Robert Keohane and J.Nye,Power and inderdependence,World polities in Transion,New York,1992,p.108

^[106]   Turgut Ozal,Turkish stand on the Gulf Crisis forgein policy,no.5,1993,p.86.

^[107]   Authoung lake,Cofronting Backlash states,foreign Affairs,no.2,1994,p.49.

^[108] About the introduction of this perception, see: Henry Kissinger’s Secret Lecture in the Middle East, Kazma Publishing, Translation and Distribution Company, Kuwait, 1977, p. 185.

^[109] For more details on these influences, see: Abd al-Rahman Ahmad al-Daoud, the previous source, pg. 84-97.