Research studies

CBRN Terrorism: An assessment of the Islamic State

 

Prepared by the researcher : Nada Naji

  • PhD student, Laboratory of literature, linguistic, media and communication studies, Faculty of arts and humanities Sais, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University
  • Research visiting fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), The Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, CA. (Spring 2022)
  • Alumni of Lucerne Summer University Ethics in a Global context (LSUE), (Summer 2022)

This research was under the supervision of Dr. Sharad Joshi, associate professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and interim director of the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program as well as Dr. Philipp Bleek, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a former term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Fellow of the Truman National Security Project.

Democratic Arabic Center

Journal of extremism and armed groups : Thirteenth Issue – November 2023

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin

Nationales ISSN-Zentrum für Deutschland
ISSN 2628-8389
Journal of extremism and armed groups

:To download the pdf version of the research papers, please visit the following link

https://democraticac.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%E2%80%93-%D9%86%D9%88%D9%81%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1-2023.pdf

Abstract

With the many operations carried by the international coalition, many speculate that the Islamic State is no more a threat as it has already lost a lot of its previously conquered territories. Such claims make the Islamic State’s CBRN threat seem farfetched.  In this Article we will examine the strength of the Islamic State and re-bring the talk on its CBRN threat to surface, while keeping in mind all the previous and current data. We will first go through a quick timeline of the Islamic state in order to understand its nature, its evolution and have a deeper understanding of the Islamist movements’ ideology. Then we will look at its past use of CBRN weapons and analyze its rhetoric which will enable us later to assess what the future might hold for us.

Introduction:

With all the efforts done on an international level and all the various counter-terrorism strategies and security measures taken by different countries, Islamist movements/individuals terrorist attacks remain a threat, especially with the Islamic State (IS) and its unique operational system, that shifts between terrorism and insurgency, as well as its focus that shifts between IS central in Syria and Iraq, IS different branches (namely in Egypt, in Afghanistan (aka Khorasane), and in west Africa (aka Big Sahara)), and IS sleeping cells and lone actors. Such a mixed operational system, especially with IS being decentralized and given space to sleeping cells and lone actors around the world to act as they see suitable makes tracking IS individuals, their future operations and possible targets a real challenge.

In this research paper, the focus will be more on IS as a terrorist group. IS is particularly interesting because it is the most active Islamist group that has a global jihadist agenda by fighting both the near enemy (local regimes and Muslim states- that they consider not really Muslim) and the far enemy (the west and non Muslim states), it tries to conquer as many lands as possible in Syria and Iraq with the intention to expand its Caliphate even further, and still fights its war with the west, inside those regions that they consider as their territories (by fighting the international cooperation army) and in outer territories (by a set of terrorist attacks made by cells that pledged allegiance, in different western, Arab, and Islamic countries, with various means). It is also the most relevant for the topic of this research paper after Al Qaeda, because it has already used Chemical weapons in Syria[1], and an IS affiliated group in India has expressed its interest in using biological weapons by exploiting SARS-Cov-2 virus as a weapon and spreading it as most as possible, it states in their journal “The Voice Of India”: “The disease has shown the path to establish Allah’s rule on earth. It is an opportunity provided by Allah, the exalted; to help His believers spread His religion on earth. The days of misery and oppression are near their end and believers can wreak havoc on disbelievers by spreading the disease among them so that they are forced to bow down before Allah’s rule before they are wiped out from the earth.”[2]And because covering all territories of IS active cells – Since it had opened the door for all groups and individuals to pledge allegiance and act as they see it appropriate[3]-, and the impossibility to track lone actors affiliated to it, I’ll narrow the research geographically to make it specific to Syria and Iraq as a territory since it is the region where IS operates as a group and has most of their self-proclaimed Caliphate territories, and it is the land where Chemical Weapons were used.

Materials and methods:

IS’ use of WMD remains far from reach, but the use of less sophisticated CBRN weapons had occurred and is still indeed a danger that we should address, and make sure it does not repeat itself, for that conducting a threat assessment of ISIS interest in CBRN capabilities and terrorism may help preventing possible future CBRN attacks, and ameliorate security measures.

In order to assess IS’ CBRN terrorism threat it would be necessary to discuss two points, the first being the possibility of an attack on a CBRN facility, and the second being the threat of IS pursuing CBRN weapons, by investigating the Chemical, Biological, radiological, and nuclear threat separately.  What are the capabilities (i.e: materials in land, low security facilities, alliances, black markets, experts, etc…) that the group has? And what is/are its motivation/s (i.e: Identity, rivalry, destruction, deterrence etc…)? What messages does their rhetoric send us? And what implications would the acquisition of a WMD weapon mean for IS, for Syria and the neighboring countries, and for the West?

For all of this, the research paper in this case of study, relied on a historical approach in the first part along with speech analysis. This latter will be also used in the second part along with threat assessment.

Discussion:

  • IS history timeline :

The Islamic state of Iraq :

What is now known as the Islamic state was in the past part of Al Qaeda network. In 2004, one year after the American troops invaded Iraq “Abou Mossaab Azarqawi”, a former fighter in Afghanistan and the leader of what used to be known as “Atwahid wa al-Jihad group” pledged allegiance to Oussama Ben Laden, the group then changed its name to “Al Qaeda in the Mesopotamia” [4]

It is important to note that despite the fact that the two leaders were friends and fought together in the Afghan war, and it may seem as if they had the same reasoning and used the same speech in addressing different political and religious issues as well as common goal which is the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate; various letters[5] and strategic choices show that they had internal conflicts: while Oussama Ben Laden – along with Ayman Azawahiri- saw the U.S (the far enemy) as the first enemy, and found that the conflict with the Shiia Muslims in Iraq (the near enemy) must be delayed, Abou Moussab Azarqawi believed that dealing with the nearest enemy comes first, and in the Iraq case, dealing with both the U.S and Shiia at the same time was doable.  Two years later, Azarqawi got killed by a U.S strike. It is remarkable to note that in a recording grieving his death, Oussama Ben Laden defended the attacks carried out by Azarqawi against the Shiites, claiming that the latter had orders to fight and kill US troops and all their allies no matter who they are.[6]

In October 2006, only few months after his leadership of the group, after Azarqawi’s death, Abd Al Monaim Azzedine Ali known as  Abou Hamza Al Mohajir (also known as Abou Ayoub Al Misri) announced in a voice recording pledging  allegiance to “Abou Omar Al Baghdadi al Qoraishi” the Emir of the Islamic State in Iraq[7]; Ben Laden later on would call on Islamist groups to unite under one flag and would praise those who have already given up their leadership and have pledged allegiance to Omar Al Baghdadi  [8]

In the audio recording, Abou Hamza al-Mohajir confirmed that his speech was a declaration of the end of an era of jihad and the beginning of another. He called on all Muslims to retreat from their belief in the necessity of ideological consensus, and to directly support “Abu Omar al-Baghdadi”, given that Islam recommends Muslims unity and jihad as one team, and to avoid all causes of disperse between Muslim fighters and the first unity must be that of swords not of ideas. In the same audio recording, he then pledged allegiance to Abou Omar, and declared the dissolution of all organizations he established including the Mujahidines’ Shura Council  and that he’s putting under his new Emir’s command 12000 fighter all of whom are Al Qaeda’s army and have pledged allegiance to Al Baghdadi.

The allegiance has indeed made the group stronger logistically and militarily, which would show in their future attacks both in Syria and Iraq, especially when Abou Baker Al Baghdadi came to power after the death of Omar Al Baghdadi and his minister of war “Abou Hamza” in an Iraqi-American Strike in 2010[9].

Syria:

With the raise of the “democratic spring”, countries have known different changes. While Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have known the fall of the government, Morocco opted for a new constitution, Bachar Al Assad in Syria has chosen to rely on his military forces, on extremist prisoners to whom he gave freedom and on Russian military forces. And just like in Iraq, the situation escalated and soon turned out to a Shiia-Sunni conflict, which has led Al Qaeda in the Iraq to send troops there under the command of “Abou Mohamed Al Joulani” to Syria in order to fight with the Sunnis, and announced by January 2012 the establishment of a new Syrian group where different groups and movements united:  “Annusra Front” [10]

From The Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) to the Islamic State (IS):

After the establishment of AnnusraFront in Syria, Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi announced that the group has merged with the Islamic State in Iraq establishing by consequence what has become “The Islamic state in Syria and Iraq (ISIS)”[11], to which Al Joulani replied in recording stating firmly but respectfully that there has been no discussion on the topic and renewed his allegiance to Ayman Azawahiri (Al Qaeda) ending his speech by assuring to the Syrians: “We assure our people in the Levant that what you have seen from the front, in  defending your religion, your honor and your blood, and its good manners with you and with the fighting groups, will remain as such, and that the pledge of allegiance will not change anything in its policy.“[12]

Al Joulani response, has not only confirmed Annusra’s strategic choice in privileging the war against Bachar Al Assad, but has also launched a media-war between ISIS and Al Qaeda, and triggered division between different components of Annusra, that split into groups that pledged allegiance to Abou Baker Al Baghdadi, and those who renewed their Allegiance to Al Joulani and Azawahiri. In the middle of the conflict Ayman Al Zawahiri decided to address the matter once more in detail –in which he made many references to the letters U.S forces found in Ben Laden’s home, and published later –  and has noted that[13] :

-The Islamic state in Iraq is part of Al Qaeda’s network.

-The leadership of Abou Bakr Al Baghadi after the death of Omar Al Baghdadi has not been discussed with the Leaders of the network and had no information about the Abou Bakr.

-The reason why the Islamic state in Iraq (ISI) was approved and recognized by Al Qaeda and not the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq is due to a huge difference between the two organization including:

  • The Islamic State in Iraq’s establishment was not result of Fitna (disperse between Islamist fighters), which is the for ISIS
  • ISI was the result of Shuraa between the Mujahedeen while in ISIS case the discussion was limited to a small group of people and Annusra Front was excluded from such discussion.
  • ISIS went against Al Qaeda/Ben Laden’s order in not announcing any official existence of Al Qaeda’s network in Syria (for the simple reason that the network finds that they do not yet fulfill all the necessary requirements of an Islamic State there).
  • The announcement of ISIS has resulted in a political disaster for the groups there; in time the Syrian people were with Annusra’s Front, they have turned against the Mujahedeen there, after the announcement and the classification of Annusra Front as a terrorist group.
  • The announcement of ISIS resulted in an internal armed conflict between the Mujahedeen and Al Baghdadi has threatened Annusra’s Front.

Azarqawi has then shifted to a call to the Mujahedeen in Syria to stop their internal conflicts – on the ground and in the media- with each other and to focus more on fighting their common enemies. And invited Al Baghdadi to return to his Allegiance and focus more on the Iraq, assuring him that if he does so he would find all his “brothers” in his side.

Al Baghdadi refused and continued to expand in Syria, and answered with an audio recording entitled: “Staying in Iraq and Syria” [14] and calling the fighters to kill and fight enemies while protecting Muslim women and children. A year later (July 2014), Al Baghdadi announced the demolishing of borders and the establishment of “the Islamic State” (IS) in his first appearance in Public in a Mosque in Mosel.[15] After which different groups from around the world started pledging allegiance to IS including:

  • Ansar Beit Al Maqdis/ Egypt.[16]
  • Yemen Mujahideen Group / Yemen.[17]
  • The Battle of Al Ansar – Group Abu Sayyaf Group / The Philippines.[18]
  • Mujahideen Network of Eastern Indonesia / Indonesia [19] .
  • Libya’s Mijahedeen/ Libya [20] .
  • The Mujahideen of Tunis, Kairouan / Tunis.[21]
  • Al Ghuraba Brigade in Constantine/Algeria.[22]
  • Jund Al Khilafa Group / Algeria.[23]
  • Ahl Al Sunnah Group for Preaching and Jihad (Boko Haram) / Nigeria.[24]

The succession of allegiances from various Islamic organizations with different experiences and capabilities from different parts of the world (the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, America, Europe, Russia, Asia) not only gives an expanded geographical presence to the Islamic State, and a possibility of geographical expansion and the acquisition of the human, natural and economic wealth of those regions, but also enables it to carry out massive terrorist operation  under  its name, and attracting therefore more fighters and groups, as the groups keeps asserting its power.

The growing threat posed by IS led to the establishment of an international coalition made of 84 countries, announced in September 2014. Among the most important countries that intervened militarily we find: the United States of America, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Russia, Britain, Iran, the African Union, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In this context, on October 26, 2019, the American forces managed to reach “Abou Baker Al Baghdadi” after arresting one of his messengers, who showed them his location. After trying to escape through a dead end tunnel, he eventually used his explosive belt. The former US President, Donald Trump announced the details of the operation in a speech on October 27, 2019[25].

IS announced the death of Abou Baker Al Baghdadi on the same day, and pledged allegiance to “Abou Ibrahim Al Qorashi“ as the second leader, few years later, he too will be captured and will kill himself and his minister and family members by detonating a bomb. US president Joe Biden gave details of the operation on the February 3, 2022.[26] And the group did not make a statement until March 11, 2022, in which “Abou Omar Al Mojahid” confirmed the death of their leader Abou Ibrahim Al Qorashi  and their spokesperson Abou Hamza Al Qorashi, and announced the new group leader “Abou Al Hassan Al Hashimi Al Qorashi”[27].

IS structure under the leadership of Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi:

In 2016, IS released a new propaganda video entitled “The Structure of the Caliphate”[28] revealing its structure. We have no other mean to verify the information given, no whether all of these institutions were made into place. What IS claims to have in terms of structures can be summarized as follows:

  • The Khalifa (with the help of the Shuraa Council): Defends the homeland, fortifies the fronts, prepares the armies, implements the Hudud (the religious sanctions), enforces people’s adherence to the rulings of Sharia.
  • The delegated committee: A committee that implements the orders given by the Khalifa, made of what IS describes as: Cognizant, administratively skilled, knowledgeable, upright individuals. They supervise: The Wilayat (States) , the Dawawin (courts), the offices and committees.
  • The Wilayat: There are 35 Wilayat in total, 19 inside Syria and Iraq and 16 outside of the areas.
  • The offices and committees: Specialized personnel working under the supervision of the delegated committee.
  • The Hijra (emigration) committee: receives those who emigrate to the IS and provides the committees and Dawawin with the required personnel.
  • The committee for the affairs of prisoners and Shuhada’ (martyres): looks up on the captives and seeks to rescue them, and looks after the families and children of the Shuhada’.
  • The office for research and studies: prepares research and makes investigation on Sharia issues.
  • The administration for the distant Wilayat: It’s responsible for overseeing and directing affairs of distant wilayat, outside of Iraq and Syria
  • The office of public and tribal relations: It serves as a link connecting between the IS and the tribal chiefs and dignitaries.
  • The Dawawin: Have offices in every Wilayat and assure the protection of rights, the maintenance of public interests, and the protection of the people’s religion and security. There are 14 diwans in total:
  • The diwan of Justice and grievance: It’s presided over by a number of judges who clarify shariaa rulings and enforce them in matters of blood, wealth, marriage and family issues etc…
  • The diwan of Hisbah: Commands virtue, forbids vice, and hold people accounts in accordance with the Shariaa.
  • Thediwan of Daawa (call for Islam) and Masjid (mosque): builds and prepares mosques, prepares Imams and preaches and appoints them, holds seminars and Shariaa courses.
  • The diwan of Zakah: collects the Zakah and then distributes it.
  • The diwan of the soldiery: It manages wars, guards the frontlines, provides the Khilafah Army with trained personnel, plans and prepares military raids, and dispatches divisions, brigades and battalions.
  • The diwan of public security: It’s responsible for safeguarding the internal security in the Islamic state and of waging war against any infiltration and spying networks.
  • The diwan of the treasury: Manages and protects the IS’ wealth.
  • The diwan of media: It is responsible for any content released (audio, visual, written as well as their translation) in the official Islamic State’s platforms.
  • The diwan of education: Regulates curriculums and courses and finds the necessary personnel.
  • The diwan of health: It provides medical needs, prevents and treats diseases and works on the development of the health sector.
  • The diwan of agriculture: It’s responsible for the agricultural and animal resources and maintaining food security.
  • The diwan of Rikaz (resources): It’s responsible for the exploitations of oil, gas and mineral resources.
  • The diwan of Fay’e and Ghana’im (Booty): Responsible for counting and safekeeping the wealth, and allocating shares on those who deserve them.
  • The diwan of services: Supplies water and electricity, paves and maintains roads, supervises and maintains the public utilities.

In this article we will be looking at IS past use of CBRN weapons and make a threat assessment of possible future CBRN use by the terrorist group.

When it comes to CBRN weapons Terrorism threat, researches divide into three major camps with different perspectives. According to the first one, CBRN terrorism threat is overrated. those researchers tend to focus more on the technical part of CBRN weapons, and usually consider the low damage that can be caused by CBRN that the terrorist groups can acquire as opposed to the WMDs that are mostly within states capabilities only, some of the researchers try to look at the security measures and define the interdiction measure, among them we can find John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart[29]. Alongside those researches we find also and Philipp Bleek who even though finds the risk  of CBRN attacks as very little, still thin the threat is worth taking seriously taking in consideration that the future might hide new developments on one hand, and all the damage an attack of less signification can cause and all the challenges it may present.[30]

The second focuses more on the terrorist groups’ motivation, and call for more security and to keep looking for red flags. For those researchers, terrorist groups are constantly trying to acquire such weapons and although they mostly fail, it takes only one successful attempt to get the weapon ready for use. Among researchers ringing the dangers bell we find Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann and Quan li[31], as well as Peter D. Zimmerman[32], and Wesley S. McCann[33]

The third group look at both the capabilities and the motivation of terrorist groups at the same time but also focus on the groups rhetoric and try to analyze it, they bridge between the technical part of CBRN, the motivation and ideology of terrorist groups as well as their decision-making logic, in order to get a more comprehensive and realistic assessment. Among those researchers we find Stephanie E. Meulenbelt and Maarten S. Nieuwenhuizen[34], Sharad Joshi[35], Elena Duno[36] and Mark Dechesne[37].

When attempting to assess the threat of terrorist groups pursue of CBRN weapons, it is very important to look at their motivations and actual capabilities. For that, many academics have tried to answer the question what might stop a terrorist group from pursuing CBRN weapons? One of the most comprehensive researches in this regards, would be James J.F. Forest article in which he makes the observation that not many terrorist groups have tried to get such unconventional weapons throughout history, he argues that in order to have a better understanding of the reasons behind that, it is best to look at the different “constraint theories” both practical (involving the technical difficulties alongside the financial capability and the will to risk a failed-test, as well as the environmental constraints (regarding all the controls on the CBRN materials, and the difficulty to steal already existing weapons)  and strategic constrain theories which question the benefits of CBRN weapons  compared to the conventional ones, and the fear of counterproductive results due to the use of CBRN weapons which can range from losing supporters, to generating more governmental and international reactions (in counter terrorism)[38]. Such constraints might be plausible for nationalist groups or groups with a political goal within limited geographical borders (either separatist groups, resistance, or others) but when applied to global jihadist group such as IS, that rely more on global support instead of local one, that have a religious ground instead of a nationalist one, that  have already generated an international reaction against them, and that have already proved to be one of the deadliest blood-shading groups and yet one of the main destinations of different supporters around the globe (other terrorist groups allegiances, foreign fighters, sleeping cells, lone-actors), most of the arguments given seem inapplicable (except for the financial costs -when it comes to some sophisticated facilities or technologies- compared to the added value of CBRN weapons instead of the conventional one).  According to Gary Ackerman, motives to acquire CBRN weapons, can range from the capacity to cause massive damage, to a psychological motive that might be related to the leadership decisions to an ideological motive in nature.[39]  When it comes to Islamist Jihadist movements the ideology as well as the political value of acquiring CBRN weapons become key in understanding the motivation of Islamist movements, their logic, and to determine their possible future targets and means to use CBRN weapons, researchers such as Jeffrey M. Bale[40] and Sharad Joshi[41]have focused on this and gave a more comprehensive analysis for the issue by going beyond generalization and the external view and looking instead at the situation from the terrorist groups perspective and looking and the extremists actually say, from both researchers it becomes clear that the Jihadist do not lack motivation and that they have a set of arguments prepared to justify their acquisition or attempt to acquire CBRN weapons.

  • IS and past CBRN weapons use/attempts :

Chemical, biological, radioactive as well as nuclear materials can be found in nature, and are used in different fields (agriculture, industry, energy, medicine, research etc) and although mostly not harmful, some of them can be used as weapons, it is only then that we can start talking about CBRN weapons. When such weapons are used by non-state actors for terrorist means we start talking about CBRN terrorism.

Although IS is surprisingly less vocal about its capabilities, intentions, and activities when it comes to CBRN weapons compared to other groups, it has nonetheless referred to them on some occasions .

In 2014, IS has published in the first issue of its journal “Dabiq” a call for all Muslim engineers, doctors, scholars and specialists for the Hijra and to join the battle field.[42] This call itself can prove the interest of IS in expanding its technologies used in the battle field and possibly building new weapons, but it does not say anything on its actual capabilities. On the same period of time, Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi made his first statement as the Caliphate of the Islamic State in what he called “A message to the Mujahidin and the Islamic Umma in Ramadan”. In his speech he called all Muslims for Hijra and to join the Islamic State, but he put more emphasize on Scientists, engineers, doctors, and so on to join, considering that their Hijra is an “individual obligation”* because “their Muslim brothers need them”[43] He also made sure to explain further –in a second speech- why it is considered an “individual obligation” but picturing the international coalition counter-terrorism (against IS) as the first war that brought “all unbelievers” together against “all Muslims”[44].

IS is believed to have used chemical weapons in Syria[45], to have interest in radioactive materials, and called for the use of Covid-19 as biological weapon[46]-which had raise the concern of possible a new biological threat from possible research that IS maybe undertaking[47], and the rivalry with Al Qaeda may motivate different IS groups to either seek or attack nuclear facilities[48]. Below are some examples and attempts of IS to acquire CBRN weapons.

Chemical Weapons:  IS is believed to have used chemical weapons at least in 71 instances[49] – up till 2017- in which chlorine and sulfur mustard among other industrial materials were deployed.After30 Chemical attacks in Syria and 41 in Iraq, some with the use of drones, the group lost its territory in Iraq in 2017 and its Chemical attacks stopped[50]. This can mean that IS’ Chemical weapons were developed by the experts team of the terrorist group as a results of its territorial control over Mosul and having access to laboratory equipment as well as the precursor chemicals there.[51]This has led different scholars and researchers to conclude that IS has lost all its chemical weapons means. Yet, Iraqi officials say that IS have moved equipments and possibly chemicals from Iraq to Syria in 2016, and some of it might have been either buried or hidden.[52]

In 2020, After the death of Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi, the spokesman of IS –Abou Hamza Al Qorachi- made a recording vowing revenge and promising that IS has all eyes on Palestine. In his speech Abou Hamza alluded to the Chemical Weapons and missiles when talking to all IS fighters- especially those in the Egypt and Syria- to target the Jewish marketplaces and their territories, he said: “(…) O soldiers of the Caliphate everywhere, especially in dear Sinai and blessed Sham, below you are the settlements and the markets of the Jews, make them a testing ground for your Chemical weapons and missiles (…)”[53].

Biological weapons:  In 2016, a Kenyan affiliated group was arrested and was found to have plans to launch a bio-attack using Anthrax.[54] And in 2018, a Tunisian cell was planning for a biological attack using Ricin in Germany (Sief Allah H.)and Tunisia (two other men) simultaneously[55].Most recorded cases in which biological weapons were planned/being made were from affiliated cells in different countries, but due to the decentralized organization of the group, it is hard to tell whether those groups were following orders of IS central, of other better ranked individuals or if it was a pure initiative of the cell itself, but it certainly tell us that IS is indeed interested in biological weapons. Because there are no successful attacks that we know of we can only speculate that if a biological weapon falls in the hands of IS, they will most probably use it just like any other conventional weapon -which is exactly the way they dealt with their chemical weapons- and would try to make use of it in the country where the cell is located due to the difficulty of its transportation.

Nuclear and radioactive materials: According to reports, when ISIS seized  Mosul in 2014, and got hold of the Mosul’s University there were two Cobalt-60 teletherapy machines meant for research and cancer treatment. Although the machines were produced in the 70s or the 80s and the Cobalt-60 had decayed, it still had a strong radioactivity that could lead to considerable damage and can be lethal. According to the research conducted by the Institute for Science and International Security, “In terms of dose strength, the sources could produce a fatal dose to an individual at a meter from the source within 2-4 hours. For individuals within 0.1 meter distance, it could occur within 2-3 minutes”[56]After three years, when ISIS lost control of the area, the Iraqi forces found that the radioactive sources were still there and seem to be untouched. And while we couldn’t find any comment from IS about the matter, we can only look at some speculations given by the institute and then comment on them:

1-IS fighters didn’t know what they had in hands or the leadership didn’t have to think about it: IS had already sought and seized Natural Uranium -research estimates that IS has around 40 kilograms of Natural or depleted Uranium[57]– IS also has many scientists in its ranks. It’s highly unlikely that they didn’t know what they had in hands, as they seem to be interested in less radioactive materials such as Natural Uranium and were most probably either instructed to gather as much materials as possible and see what they would do with it later, or were communicating with their scientists and told what to do and what to look for.

2-Cobalt-60 was judged to be not destructive enough[58]: IS doesn’t seem to care that much about how destructive an attack would be, they consider any damage inflicted on the West and their allies as a success no matter of the range of destruction. They also are competing with Al Qaeda and the West in terms of power and proving their strength to their enemies (to be consider as an equal or a better state than the West) but also to their followers (As it would be perceived as a success from Allah).

3-The radiological disperse did not fit IS idea on how to attack the west[59]: In fact IS cells in different countries have been trying to get nuclear materials, to attack different nuclear facilities (Brussels attacks in 2016[60]). Such plots confirm that for IS, all kind of attacks are permitted especially against the West.

Other speculated that IS was afraid of being the first to be injured while trying to dismantle the machines[61]: IS’ ideology and strength -just like most Jihadists- lay on their will to die. According to interviews with ex-IS fighters, IS has a long list of fighters waiting for their turn for a suicide operation (most of them are carried in Iraq). IS had enough time to instruct some of their fighters with the help of their scientists and engineers on how to dismantle the machines, and if things go wrong it would still be considered a Jihadist operation.

And since we couldn’t get any materials in which IS addresses the matter, we can only speculate that IS actually knew exactly what it was, but that they had the city under control in a time where they were already accused of using chemical weapons in Syria, they could justify the use of chemical weapons by the fact that Bachar’s regime did the same, but they would find it hard to justify the use of radioactive materials. Also, the fact that they had the city in hand, meant that it was a city of Islam, and that they should protect Muslims. If they were to take the Cobalt-60, it would be hard to:

  • Measure the consequences if anything goes wrong and whether non-fighter Muslims can be injured.
  • Predict the reaction of the international community and the oppositions.
  • Also the spread of radioactive materials in a city of their control would mean that their movement inside the city will be limited and that Muslim population will be terrorized, including their followers.

IS’ interest in nuclear was pronounced In2015,. In its magazine “Dabiq”, we could read a hypothetical scenario where the group would get his nuclear from Pakistan[62]. (an imagined nuclear scenario –supposedly- written by John Cantlie- a British journalist that was captured by IS in November 2012 along with the American journalist James Foley and while Cantlie was kept alive, Foley was killed in 2014.)

The success of such a plot seem highly unlikely not only because they will need to either buy or steal nuclear from Pakistan, which is extremely hard to do, but because they will need a series of corrupted officials in all the countries, borders and roads they mentioned, and they will need special equipment to transport it which would be extremely hard and unsafe to do, with that being said they will then need to be able to use it, which is another challenge. But even though such a scenario is unlikely to happen, the possibility of a similar scenario remains a threat, and the fact that the group is considering nuclear power is a red flag that needs to be addressed.

Especially that IS does not have pressure from its followers, those who support IS while using conventional weapons are the same people who would be supporting it while using CBRN weapons – they do not perceive CBRN as a red line but rather as a prove of strength and a tool to teach the West a lesson. In fact they may get more supporters while using CBRN as other Islamist will start trusting the power of IS more-. And although IS has not talked openly about the CBRN weapons nor tried to justify it, we can claim that regardless of the difference between IS and Al Qaeda and the rivalry between them, they both have the same reasoning when it comes to CBRN weapons, and would have the same reasoning as all global Jihadist movements if not all Jihadist movements in general. Acquiring CBRN weapons according to Oussama Ben Laden “is not an accusation. It is the duty of Muslims to have it. And America knows today that Muslims have this weapon thanks to Allah (…)”[63]. In fact, One main common point that push Islamists forwards and bring them together is the psychological state of feeling that Muslims are being treated as inferior to other communities in the world, that they are “victims” of the “west” and that they are being “fought” because they hold the “true religion” (Islam) that the West “fears” and doesn’t want to be spread. Therefore any action that would show equality between Muslims/Islamists and the West will be cheered to, and any demonstration of power will be applauded (sometimes not only from extremists but from mainstream Muslims as well).

  • IS and future CBRN threat:

In terms of the capabilities of IS and current strength, assessments shift between those speculating a coming fall of IS judging from the territories the group lost in the recent years or based on the death of the leaders[64], and between those warning that the fight is still talking place and that IS is going nowhere for the time being[65]. The UN has seen it right when they predicted that IS pause- in 2019- may be temporary, as in August 2020 (From Moharam to Do Al Qui’da of 1441 Hijra), IS has counted a total of 358 operations in Syria, out of which 138 were with the use of explosive devices, 106 were assassination operations, 71 clashes and 43 other operations (not specified); resulting in 665 deaths and injuries.[66]  (That being said, some studies compare IS reports to those of the loyalists and speculate that IS does not report all of the operations and that this might be either because they want to hide them, or because the central IS did not know about them-omitting the third possibility which is that the loyalist might be exaggerating their reports)[67].

Although it’s true that IS has lost its control over certain territories, this could not be used as a proof of their fall. Indeed gaining control over territories had and will always be considered as an achievement for the group, yet, it has never been one of its main goals. Once Abu Baker made his famous speech in the Mosel, it had become clear that not only the group considers himself as a state in Syria and Iraq and that all borders have been destroyed but it also meant that the Islamic State has become universal and that groups all over the world were welcome to pledge allegiance to IS, and to perform operations on its behalf on their local positions. A following speech on 2018 on the occasion of Aid Al Adha was brought for the attention of lone wolves, where it incited all individuals to perform operation wherever they are, with whatever means they had. This clearly meant that IS’ first goal is to create as much damage as possible anywhere, anyhow, he said: [68]

“(…) And we congratulate the fierce lions in the countries of the cross; in Canada, Europe and elsewhere, their beautiful deeds in support of their brothers. May God bless your endeavors and accept your good deeds. So, O supporters of the Caliphate, march in their tracks, prepare from the affordable and rely on the Almighty, and carry a strike that strips hearts and blows minds. A  piercing shot, a deep stab in the guts, or an explosive detonation in your land is equivalent to a thousand operations for us, and do not neglect the run-over in the roads. So prepare for your war in order to its flames to reach the Crusaders and apostates. And I remind you, O soldiers and supporters of the Caliphate, in these few days, to redress what has passed, and to revive the Sunna of the murder of Al Jaa’dIbn Dirham*, and to sacrifice every secular, atheist and apostate who fights God and His Messenger”

Since then the group kept shifting between terrorist operations and insurgencies; the first aiming to spread terror, influence populations, destabilize governments; and the second to gain territory, tire their enemies and create as much casualties as possible (human, material and economic) in an attempt to push them back in Syria and Iraq, and to create interior conflicts between the governments and their populations (through many videos documenting the casualties and calling the people to reason their governments and to step back from a war that is not theirs).

This situation has not changed much, since we still can notice various terrorist operations in different countries (Israel[69] in March 2022….), as well as activities similar to those carried before in Syria (The operation in  Al-Sina’ah Ghuwayran prison in Al Hasakah[70] in January 2022…), reminding us of different operations carried out before (such as “Ataji” and “Abougharib” prisons operations carried out under Abu Baker Al Baghdadi’s leadership under the flag of Al Qaeda in the Iraq, in 2013, in what he called as “operation: breaking the walls”)[71]. In fact, they can easily religiously justify why they had to pull back from many territories and that they had to shift back to insurgency after they had the Tamkin and established the Islamic State by using the argument of “being tested by Allah” in order distinguish between the “Monafiqin/hypocrites” and the “Sadiqin/truthfull”. [72]

{أَحَسِبَ النَّاسُ أَن يُتْرَكُوا أَن يَقُولُوا آمَنَّا وَهُمْ لَا يُفْتَنُونَ (2) وَلَقَدْ فَتَنَّا الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِمْ ۖ فَلَيَعْلَمَنَّ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ صَدَقُوا وَلَيَعْلَمَنَّ الْكَاذِبِينَ (3)} (سورة العنكبوت، الآية 2-3)

{2. Have the people supposed that they will be left alone to say, “We believe,” without being put to the test?3. We have tested those before them. God will surely know the truthful, and He will surely know the liars[73]{ (Sura/Chapter The spider, verses 2-3)

From the rhetoric of IS and taking that the group has already used Chemical weapons and tried to acquire biological weapons it would be safe to say that the group is indeed motivated to acquire and use Chemical and biological weapons.  In this chapter we would skip the motivation part when it comes to the CB weapons and discuss it only when it comes to radiological and nuclear weapons, and we would, instead, focus more on their capabilities by looking at the materials in Syria in order to get a better idea of what is available for IS central, then by looking at what materials/facilities can be used by IS affiliates groups in different locations (including Iraq)[74], cells or lone actors judging from their accessibility/ vulnerability.

 Chemical weapons and IS:

After acknowledging its chemical stockpile on 2012, Syria declared in 2013 the destruction of its arsenal of almost 1300 metric tons of twenty different chemicals, twelve storage facilities and twenty-seven production facilities[75].  Yet, reports and investigations have found that the Assad regime has been responsible for most of the confirmed uses of chemical weapons in the civil war starting 2012, some count up till more than 300 attacks out of which more than 100 are confirmed[76], while others keep the count at 85 attacks[77].

From a comprehensive list made by the Global Public Policy Institute, we can clearly see that the Assad regime relies heavily on Chlorine – Chlorine has many legitimate uses for states and therefore even after Syria joined the Chemical weapons conventions there was no obligation for the Syrian government to destroy its Chlorine stockpiles or to declare them- , but tends to use also Sarin, and other unknown materials, while IS relies more on Sulfur Mustard alongside with some unknown materials[78] including chlorine. Sulfur Mustard and Sarin were available in a 70years old facility near Baghdad that IS seized control of in 2014[79], while Chlorine was seized in large quantities from an Iraqi water purification plants[80]. This leads us to speculate that either IS used whatever materials were still usable or that they had to make a decision and decided to use a less toxic weapon, by fear that thins may get out of control.

It is also notable that in Syria the number of the regimes attacks outnumbers IS attacks, in the previous list we can count 8 attacks in total in Syria, while in the START database we count only 2 confirmed attacks in Syria both in Marea near Aleppo, one in August 2015 and the second in August 2016, all by using Sulfured Mustard that the Assad regime did not use much. This may indicate that IS succeeded in transporting the chemical weapons from Iraq to Syria but in small amount only.

In Iraq the use of Chemical weapons by the terrorist group was more active, as we count from the Database 28 confirmed attacks, always relying on Sulfured Mustard. Although IS has been accused of testing its chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners[81], it is important to note that IS has used chemical weapons mainly as a strategy to either gain territory or protect and keep a territory under its control, and that the prison’s incident does not necessarily mean a chaotic use of chemical weapons.

Now that IS has lost most of its territory and therefore most of the laboratories that they used (especially in Iraq), and got back to its previous insurgency activities, use of sophisticated chemical weapons seem far from reach, but the possibility of future use of more common chemicals such as Chlorine can be easily achieved. The statement of IS’ spokesperson in 2020 was directed to IS followers everywhere and for the attention of fighters in Syria (Cham) and Egypt (Sinai) regarding the use of chemical weapons in fighting the Jewish people as part of what the group’s new leader at the time –Ibrahim Al Qurachi- regarded as a primary goal (to liberate Palestine by fighting Jewish people).The statement coincided with the deal of Israel pumping natural gas to Egypt, which pushed IS in Sinai to launch an attack on the gas pipelines[82],nonetheless it didn’t make IS networks in Syria nor in Egypt more active against Israel, and did not push IS central to any specific operation, and no chemical weapons were used. As Ramadan has been traditionally the month in which jihadists concentrate their attacks, the Ramadan of 2022 promised more chaos as it coincided with some meeting held between Arab/Muslim countries and Israel. Alongside with some attacks carried by the military wing of Hamas –Ezzedeen Al-Qassam brigades[83], IS cells launched a series of attacks on Israel and claimed them (22nd March in Beersheba[84] and 27th March[85] in Hadera). But those attacks were not very well financed nor sophisticated. With one involving one person with a knife and the other involving two armed men, IS – as opposed to Al Qaeda- doesn’t seem ready to invest in attacks outside of Syria and Iraq, and there seem to be no indication that its pattern and reliance on lone actors carrying low-budget attacks wherever they are.

As for the Chemical weapons, its use seem to be primarily in Syria and Iraq. Aside of the possibility of stealing chemical weapons in Syria, IS has also the knowledge, the know-how, and the experts who can and have built a chemical program, and might also have some equipments and materials that it could have moved from Iraq to Syria.

And although one might claim that IS has already lost many experts who were either killed or captured by the international coalition, and therefore might have lost all capacity to build chemical weapons, such scenario seem to forget that IS has a large experts network and has followers from all over the globe who have pledged allegiance to the group as well as cells that have pledged allegiance and are kept as sleeping-cells, some of whom had scientists among them. Such cells are hard to track or to predict and we only can get data on them once they are captured. In fact, IS chemical weapons were result of years of pursuits and research, starting from efforts of past leaders under the flag of Al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front who later formed or joined IS.[86]

IS still has financial resources as well as experts and fighters in its rank, it does rely on lone wolves’ and affiliated cells’ attempts in western countries, whether those attempts succeed or not it is still a win for IS; if succeeded then it is a victory, if not it is still a reminder that IS is still present, that the threat of future attack is still there, and a mean not only to spread terror, raise questions and gain media coverage, but it is also away to disrupt government, and use their personnel and financial resources.

As for the use of Chemical weapons, IS now have few territories under its control in Syria and has got back to insurgency, chemical weapons for the group seem to be considered as a mean to protect their territories, the use of the unconventional weapons in the current context wouldn’t help them much. IS as a terrorist group also knows that the use of Chemical weapons at all times will not only spread terror among the locals but would lose its meaning in the media and for the Islamic communities, thus it is left for important occasions, rather than daily use. Another reason that might be stopping IS from using chemical weapons would be the investigation that The Assad regime went through and the Syrian government being eventually obliged to stop using them. When the Assad Regime was using Chemical weapons, IS could justify using the same kind of weapons as self defense, but using unconventional weapons and putting locals in danger would be considered as offensive and might start a series of questions among the followers of the group.

IS might use poorly sophisticated Chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq in the future:

-If the Assad Regime or any other opposed entity uses Chemical weapons.

-As a last resort to re-/gain control over a territory either in Iraq or in Syria.

-To protect the territories that are under their control.

Even if IS central reaches a highly toxic chemical weapon, the group will most probably privilege the use of less harmful agents in the region in order to keep everything under control, the only case in which we can imagine the terrorist group disregarding this point, would be if they felt helpless and saw that they would leave the territory to what they judge as corrupted regimes and allies of the west. Although it is true that for IS there is no loyalty to a nation and that all loyalty must be for Allah (which is one of the reasons behind their conflicts with Taliban Afghanistan), IS still needs a land in which they can establish the Islamic State, before they would decide on either directing their efforts towards more Islamic/Arab countries or focusing more on the west and conducting their operations there. Starting from Iraq and then to Syria, IS finds in the area not only the history and the legacy its previous leaders and symbols, but also, the natural, agricultural and economical resources needed to establish a deformed but independent kind of state – the Islamic state. It’s geography and being close to the Turkish corrupted boarders–did- and would also benefit the group when it comes to trade, crossing borders, and possibly putting pressure on different institutions or countries.

As for when it comes to IS cells around the world, IS central has been encouraging its sleeping cells in Western Countries and Muslim/Arab countries (especially those normalizing their relations with Israel) and providing them with the know-how in an attempt to eventually succeed in conducting a chemical attack in foreign territories, but there has been no signs of important financing of cells. This might be due to the finances it had to take care of while it had many territories under its control, but even after the loss of most of them, there have been no particular signs of change when it comes to financing individuals or sleeping cells.

Biological weapons and IS:

Syria’s biological arsenal has been a subject for debate since 2011, and in 2014 the country declared the existence of production facilities as well as purified Ricin stockpiles. [87]

In fact, getting pathogens and biotoxins themselves won’t be  a problem for IS cells, as they might be found in nature, in different laboratories, and research centers.[88] And in order to weaponize them, all what the group needs would be the know-how and getting hold of laboratories (like what IS did in Iraq). [89] From data gathered we know already that IS has the technical and financial ability to do so[90]. With that being said, there are many other ways to use biological weapons such as: contaminating water supplies or food chains.

In the past years, there had been some allegations that IS central may have a biological program and may have succeeded building up a biological weapon. Although there is no certain information in this regards, such a scenario might be possible as they have many scientists with them and have been indeed able to get hold of many laboratories in Iraq. There are voices claiming that IS has no biological capabilities  and stating that if it was the case, IS would of used its weapons. Such a statement is not necessary convincing, even if IS has such capabilities, it is really a slim possibility that the group has the actual motivation to launch such kind of attacks.[91]

One main difficulty that faces IS in the use of biological weapons in Syria or Iraq, would be the ability to control its spread. Unlike Chemical weapons, it is hard to contain the spread of biological weapons and to control the targets of the attack. This would mean that IS risks contaminating not only its enemies, but also its own fighters, civilians and the region as a whole. unless, in an act of despair the group judges that they are losing everything, and that all locals are turning against them and labels them as apostates, the possibility of using biological weapons seem very slim.

As for the use of biological weapons in Western Countries, there seem to be real motivation to conduct such an attack; yet, the challenge would be to actual capability. Unlike in Syria and Iraq where the group has a good armed power and was able to gain control over different areas, the cells in Western countries will have to do with their low number, small budget and the lack of facilities. Two main scenarios in which IS cells may succeed or get close to making a biological weapon would be if one of the cell members has access to a research center or a laboratory – such as the case of Sief Allah H-[92], or if technology and its wide spread allows it in the future, namely the Crisper Kits that have become popular and easy to access to.

Nuclear weapons and radioactive materials:

Because of the complexity of building a nuclear facility and making fissile material, and the need for a safe location and high financial and technical capability, all of which are not in within the reach of IS currently nor in the near future, we will omit tackling that point in this chapter and look rather at the threat of theft as well as of sabotage.

As mentioned before IS has allured to the possibility of getting nuclear devices from Pakistan. The scenario it has imagined is indeed hard to achieve due to the necessity of not only an insider in Pakistani facilities which can still happen) but the obligation to have a series of corrupted officials in different countries, borders and roads, as well as the need for a sophisticated adequate mean of transportation and a specialized team on board. All of this must be added to the capability of escaping from all radars and satellite imaging and international security groups. And even if all of this is done, IS will need to hope that the Pakistani Nuke do not have a security measure that would enable Pakistan from rendering the stolen weapons useless; and although talking about such a scenario does not necessarily mean that IS is actively seeking nuclear, it does mean that it is still in the group’s imagination and might be one of its long term goals.

When it comes to Nuclear weapons, it is safe to say that Syria has none, although there were allegations about its attempt to build a reactor in Dir Azzour, an allegation that Syria kept denying even after the Israel had attacked and destroyed the facility in 2018. Syria still has one research reactor containing less than one kilogram of HEU and put under the IAEA safeguards, before this later lost all updates about the reactor due to the civil war.[93]

In Iraq the situation is not that different; According to resources there are no nuclear facilities in Iraq (at least up till 2011) as they have been either destroyed or rendered useless by the United Nations’ Special Commission as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency after the airstrike in 1991 and the Persian Gulf War [94]

With that being said, the threat of theft or sabotage in other locations (by IS affiliated cells) or the making of a dirty bomb is still a remaining possibility that does not defer much from any other terrorist organization.

And while there are speculations that some IS cells may have had some nuclear facilities in Western countries as a target but were arrested beforehand[95],  there has been no actual record of IS’ attacks or plots involving nuclear weapons or facilities, in contrast to Al Qaeda who has plotted an attack in Australia in 2000 and 2003, and in Belgium in 2001[96]. Whether that means that IS is not interested/yet, or that it has not been successful yet or that it has indeed succeeded but just was not identified (see the records of unknown perpetrator of the attacks) is still not clear.

As mentioned before IS did get hold of 40 kilograms of Natural or depleted Uranium[97] which is less radioactive than enriched Uranium (EU) and highly enriched Uranium (HEU) and although it is still unknown what IS plans were concerning the material, it could be an indicator of their interest in a dirty bomb  . But even with such a weak weapon, IS will lose control of any caused hazards, this leads us to speculate that even if the making of such device happen it will most probably not be used in their territories of interest, but rather in other countries figuring on IS’ black list such as the USA and Israel. The fear of causing uncontrolled hazard might be the cause why IS is avoiding all radioactive materials in the area including the Cobalt-60 of Mosul.

Conclusion:

While the paper studies what has already happened and how it happened in order to understand IS use of CBRN weapon and make an assessment of the threats, it is also important to speculate what might happen in the future based on the previous data.

When it comes to chemical weapons, IS might use poorly sophisticated Chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq in the future:

-If the Assad Regime or any other opposed entity uses Chemical weapons.

-As a last resort to re-/gain control over a territory either in Iraq or in Syria.

-To protect the territories that are under their control.

As for when it comes to IS cells around the world, IS central has been encouraging its sleeper cells in Western Countries and Muslim/Arab countries (especially those normalizing their relations with Israel) and providing them with the know-how in an attempt to eventually succeed in conducting a chemical attack  in foreign territories, but there has been no signs of important financing of cells.

As for biological weapons the threat is really low due to the fact that biological weapons being hard to contain, and the high possibility of losing control. The biological weapons remain nonetheless a slim possibility as they could be used as an act of despair.

 As for lone wolves and sleeper cells, especially in the West, the use of biological weapons needs someone who has access to sophisticated laboratories and who has the knowledge (ex: Sief Allah H’s Ricin in Germany/2018). The chances of such a scenario happening under the radar is slim but the continuous development of technology might allow it in the future.

And when it comes to nuclear weapons and radioactive materials, there are no nuclear facilities that could be used, stolen from, or sabotaged in Iraq, while Syria has one research reactor. the use of such weapons in both Syria and Iraq is really low, and IS will be unable to control the results.

With that being said, the threat if theft or sabotage in other locations especially Western Countries as well as Turkey and Israel, or the making of a dirty bomb by IS affiliated cells is still a remaining possibility that does not defer much from any other terrorist organization as there seem to be no particular financing from IS central to the cells in this regards.

In order to face those threat it is essential to:

-Have more security: especially when it comes to laboratories, and export control.

-Stay Vigilant: Mosques, Khotab and media are the main sources to spread extremist ideas and plan attacks. In Islamist countries, government have more control of the religious spheres, as they have more understanding of religion and have the legitimacy to act as everyone involved is from the same religion. In the West, governments seem to find it harder to interfere or control what’s being said and done ad they are faced with the ‘Islamophobia”, ‘Racism’, and ‘Hate against a belief or a minority group’ accusations.

-See Something, Say Something: this goes hand in hand with the second recommendation. As in some non-Muslim countries it has become almost a crime to question Muslims behaviors. There is no such thing as Islamophobia, just like there is no Christianophobia. Islam is a religion, an ideology and not a race, actions can be questioned, the ideology can be criticized, and if any understanding is against human rights, it must be stopped. In this regards, we might say that the Moroccan ‘Rehabilitation of the religious field’ model is one of the most comprehensive strategies to maintain the religious freedom and respect all the religious and cultural characteristics of Islam, all while preserving the population from extremism and hate speech and keeping everything under control, better yet, encouraging tolerance, diversity, and moderation.

Acknowledgment:

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people.

Many thanks to all the academic and administrative team of MIIS for their generosity and willingness to help.

Jean du Preez the director of the program offered me the great opportunity to be part of the program and has been of great support along the journey.

Dr. Philpp Bleek, has made time to read my paper and his suggestions helped a lot, he also was very generous to allow me to attend his Seminar series (CBRN terrorism).

Dr. Jason M. Blazakis, the director of the Center on terrorism, extremism and counterterrorism” was of great support and his suggestions kept me motivated.

Masako Toki’s lectures were very interesting, and the discussions with her reminded me why I chose my field, and of the human part of it allowing me to stay motivated and focused.

Many thanks to my parents, my brother and June for their patience and support.

Declaration of interest statement:

No conflict of interest to declare

References :

In English :

Articles :

  • A knife-wielding man killed 4 Israelis in Beersheba: police say, npr, 22 March 2022

https://www.npr.org/2022/03/22/1088126698/beersheba-israelis-stabbed-attack

  • Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat.” PRISM, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532.

  • Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, biological weapons, Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Biological

  • Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, Chemical weapons, Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Chemical

  • Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, Past nuclear weapon program , Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Past

  • Bale, Jeffrey M., Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of WMD, Jihadists and weapons of mass destruction, edit. Gary Ackerman, Jeremy Tamsett, CRC Press-Taylor & Swift group, 2009

النقر للوصول إلى Jihadists__WMD1.pdf

  • Bleek, Philipp, 9/11 Al Qaeda and the nuclear terror threat, August 2021
  • Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann and Quan li, Atoms for terror? Nuclear Programs and Non-Catastrophic Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism, British Journal of Political Science,Vol. 43, No. 4, 2013

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23526263?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A379771a5233c8e246210d5b0ac578dad&seq=5

  • Bunn Matthiew, ISIS seizes Nuclear material but that’s not the reason to worry ,the National Interest, July 2014

النقر للوصول إلى isis_seizes_nuclear_material-but_thats_not_the_reason_to_worry.pdf

·         Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future, July 2017

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/cobalt-60-sources-in-mosul-recovery-and-lessons-for-the-future/

  • Dechesne Mark, Obedience to Divinity? The Psychology of Jihadist WMD Terrorism, Jihadists and weapons of mass destruction, edit. Gary Ackerman, Jeremy Tamsett, CRC Press-Taylor & Swift group, 2009

النقر للوصول إلى Jihadists__WMD1.pdf

  • Diseased World, Lockdown special : Believers stand tall it’s time for kuffar to fall, The Voice Of Hind, Shawwal 1441

https://archive.org/details/the-voice-of-hind-lockdown-special/page/5/mode/2up?q=voice+of+hind

  • Duno, Elena, Reassessing CBRN Threats in a Changing Global Environment, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019 https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24499.9
  • Forest, James J.F. “Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012): 51-68. Accessed June 21, 2021

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973

  • GREGORY WATERS & CHARLIE WINTER, ISLAMIC STATE UNDER-REPORTING IN CENTRAL SYRIA: MISDIRECTION, MISINFORMATION, OR MISCOMMUNICATION?, 2021

النقر للوصول إلى Islamic%20State%20Under-Reporting%20in%20Central%20Syria-%20Misdirection%2C%20Misinformation%2C%20or%20Miscommunication%3F.pdf

  • HardingThomas, Coronavirus: global alert over rising ISIS bioterrorism threat, Jul 10, 2020

https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/coronavirus-global-alert-over-rising-isis-bioterrorism-threat-1.1046646

  • Iraq Nuclear facilities, NTI, 2011

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iraq-nuclear-facilities/

·         Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says, HIS Markit, June 2017

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170613005676/en/

·         Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says, June 13, 2017

https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/aerospace-defense-security-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-capability-degraded-ihs-mar

  • Joshi, Sharad, How terrorist actors in Pakistan use nuclear weapons for political influence, Taylor & Swift group, Asian Security, Vol 16, NO 2, 2020
  • Levy, Ido, How Big Is the Islamic State Threat in Israel?, Washington Institute, April 2022

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-big-islamic-state-threat-israel

  • Louis Charbonneau, Suspend Syria’s Rights Under Chemical Weapons Convention: Governments Should Bolster Respect for Landmark Arms Ban, 2021

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/suspend-syrias-rights-under-chemical-weapons-convention#:~:text=Human%20Rights%20Watch%20found%20that,veto%20to%20end%20that%20probe.

  • McCann S. Wesley, CBRN Terrorism Interdictions (1990–2016) and Areas for Future Inquiry, Terrorism Research Initiative, Perspectives on Terrorism , Vol. 15, No. 6, December 2021

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27090915?seq=

  • Meulenbelt E. Stephani, Nieuwenhuizen S. Maarten, Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences, International Review of the Red Cross, The human cost of nuclear weapons, 2015

النقر للوصول إلى irc97_17.pdf

  • Mueller John, Stewart G. Mark, Misoverestimating ISIS: Comparisons with Al-Qaeda, Perspectives on Terrorism, Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol. 10, No. 4, August 2016

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297616

  • Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2019

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3814176?ln=en

·         Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD), START website

https://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad

  • Schneider Tobias, Lütkefend Theresa, Nowhere to hide: the logic of chemical weapons use in Syria, Global Public Policy Institute, 2019

النقر للوصول إلى GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf

·         Smith Alexander, Kenya Police Say They Foiled ISIS-Linked Plot to Unleash Anthrax Attack, May 04, 2016

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kenya-police-say-they-foiled-isis-linked-plot-unleash-anthrax-n567721

  • Strack,Columb, The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts, Combating terrorism center in West Point, CTCSENTINEL,Vol 10, Issue 9, October 2017
  • Syria: A Year On, Chemical Weapons Attacks Persist-International Action for Deterrence, Justice Ineffective, Human Rights watch website, 2018.
  • They Plot and Allah’s plots, Dabiq issue 9, Sha’ban 1436 (May 2015
  • Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 2019

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

  • Vick Karl, ISIS Attackers May Have Targeted Nuclear Power Station, Time website, 25 March 2016

https://time.com/4271854/belgium-isis-nuclear-power-station-brussels/

  • Warrick Joby & Loveday Morris, How ISIS nearly stumbled on the ingredients for a dirty bomb, July 2017

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-isis-nearly-stumbled-on-the-ingredients-for-a-dirty-bomb/2017/07/22/6a966746-6e31-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html

  • Warrick Joby, Exclusive: Iraqi scientist says he helped ISIS make chemical weapons, Washington post, Jan 2019

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/exclusive-iraqi-scientist-says-he-helped-isis-make-chemical-weapons/2019/01/21/617cb8f0-0d35-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html

  • Warrick, Joby, ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners: U.N. investigators find, The Washington post, May 13, 2021

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/isis-chemical-weapons-experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebfb0-b42e-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html

  • Winter Chase, German prosecutors: Tunisian planed ricin terror bombing against ‘unbelievers’, Aug. 03, 2018

https://www.dw.com/en/german-prosecutors-tunisian-planned-ricin-terror-bombing-against-unbelievers/a-44949132

  • Zimmerman D. Peter, Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2009

النقر للوصول إلى 01-Do_We_Really_Need_to_Worry_Some_Reflections_on_the_Threat_of_Nuclear_Terrorism.pdf

Documents :

  • Dabiq: The return of Khilafah, issue 1, Ramadan 1435

https://archive.org/details/DABIQ_01_2014_/page/n5/mode/2up

  • “Diseased World”, Lockdown special : Believers stand tall it’s time for kuffar to fall, The Voice Of Hind, Shawwal 1441

https://archive.org/details/the-voice-of-hind-lockdown-special/page/5/mode/2up?q=voice+of+hind

  • Letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, 09 July 2005

https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf

Videos :

  • President Biden speaks after announcing US raid in Syria killed ISIS leader, 13 civilians”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIF8ktiKLgM

  • President Trump’s full announcement on the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Washington post, October 27th, 2019

Websites/databases:

  • Quran in English

https://www.clearquran.com/029.html

In Arabic :

Books :

  • “الأرشيف الجامع لكلمات وخطابات أمير الاستشهاديين الشيخ المجاهد أبي مصعب الزرقاوي رحمه الله”، “الخطاب السابع عشر: بيان: البيعة لتنظيم القاعدة بقيادة الشيخ أسمة بن لادن “، ورشة عمل شبكة البراق الإسلامية، ط1، 2006م

https://archive.org/details/El_Zarqawy_PDF

  • لقاء مع جمال إسماعيل لقناة الجزيرة – ديسمبر 1998م، مجموع رسائل وتوجيهات الشيخ المجاهد أسامة بن لادن –رحمه الله-، نخبة الإعلام الجهادي، 2015م

https://ia801304.us.archive.org/6/items/al_nokbah9_o_20151212 مجموعرسائلوتوجيهاتالشيخأسامةبنلادن /.pdf

Articles:

  • {قَاتِلُوهُمْ يُعَذِّبْهُمُ اللّهُ بِأَيْدِيكُمْ وَيُخْزِهِمْ وَيَنصُرْكُمْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَيَشْفِ صُدُورَ قَوْمٍ مُّؤْمِنِينَ} بيان عسكري صادر عن كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام : عملية سلفيت البطولية حلقةٌ في سلسلة ردودنا على العدوان على الأقصى،01-05-2022

https://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/عملية-سلفيت-البطولية-حلقة-في-سلسلة-ردودنا-على-العدوان-على-الأقصى/5690/بيانات-بلاغات-القسام

  • بيان بخصوص استشهاد الأميرين: البغدادي والمهاجر، تنظيم القاعدة ببلاد المغرب الإسلامي، مؤسسة الأندلس للإنتاج الإعلامي، 27 أبريل 2010م

https://archive.org/stream/isi-abo-omar-al-mohager-324/maghreb#page/n1/mode/2up

  • تفريغ شريط ملحمة الاستنزاف-4″ لولاية شام الخير

https://pastethis.to/QMMWJWncmB

  • داعش تسيطر على مصنع سابق للأسلحة الكيماوية، أخبار DW

https://learngerman.dw.com/ar/ داعش-تسيطر-على-مصنع-سابق-للأسلحة-الكيماوية-في-العراق/a-17723737

  • وكالة أعماق: مقتل عنصرين من القوات اليهودية وإصابة 10 آخرين بهجوم انغماسي نفّذه اثنان من مقاتلي الدولة الإسلامية في فلسطين، 28 مارس 2022م

https://archive.org/details/photo_2022-03-28_02-39-33_202203

Audios and videos :

  • الإعلان عن جبهة النصرة”، مؤسسة المنارة البيضاء للإنتاج الإعلامي، صفر 1433هـ

https://archive.org/details/jabhastart

  • “السبيل لإحباط المؤامرات”، مؤسسة السحاب، شتنبر 2007م

https://archive.org/details/78967678637

  • “إن الحكم لله” أبو حمزة المهاجر

https://archive.org/details/Archive-Of-Abo-Hamzah-Talks/2n-al7okm-2la-lilAllah.mp3

  • باقية في العراق والشام”، مؤسسة الفرقان للإنتاج الإعلامي، يونيو 2013م

https://archive.org/details/baqiah1

  • “دمر الله عليهم وللكافرين أمثالها”، يناير 2020

https://archive.org/details/0601441

  • “رسالة إلى المجاهدين والأمة الإسلامية في شهر رمضان”، مؤسسة الفرقان يونيو 2014.
  • “ساحة الشام”، مؤسسة المنارة البيضاء للإنتاج الإعلامي

https://archive.org/details/lightkitpro

  • “شهادة لحقن دماء المجاهدين في الشام”، مؤسسة السحاب للإنتاج الإعلامي

https://archive.org/details/sheham-history

  • “فتربصوا إنا معكم متربصون”، مؤسسة الفرقان، 2015
  • فمنهم من قضى نحبه
  • “والرائد لا يكذب أهله”، أبو محمد العدناني المتحدث الرسمي للدولة الإسلامية ووزير حرب أبي بكر الحسني القرشي، 2014
  • “وبشر الصابرين”، أبو بكر الحسني القرشي البغدادي، مؤسسة الفرقان، غشت 2018م

https://archive.org/details/20200621_20200621_0444/وبشر+الصابرين.mp3

  • “وبشر المؤمنين”

https://archive.org/details/muhd_462

  • “ويأبى الله إلا أن يتم نوره”، إنتاج مؤسسة الفرقان للإنتاج الإعلامي، أبو بكر الحسيني القرشي، يوليوز 2012م

https://archive.org/details/tanzim-qaeidat-aljihad-fi-bilad-alrafidaynأرشيف+تنظيم+قاعدة+الجهاد+في+بلاد+الرافدين/

B5%جريمة+التاجيD.واقتحام+مقر+للحرس+الوثني+والقضاء+على+من+فيه+-+سرية+الغضب+الإسلامي+mp4

خطبة الموصل أبو بكر البغدادي

https://archive.org/details/20200814_20200814_1704

  • رثاء أسامة بن لادن لأبو مصعب الزرقاوي

https://archive.org/details/retha2-Abo-mosaab-high

  • صرح الخلافة، مؤسسة الفرقان، 2015

 

groups pledging allegiance to Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi:

  • بيان من مجاهدي ليبيا:

https://archive.org/details/By3tLybia

·         البيعة الفيليبينية:

https://archive.org/details/20150520_201505

  • بيعة أنصار بيت المقدس:

https://archive.org/details/ansar.bait.al.maqdes.baayat.khalifa.al.bagdadi.original.quality.mp3

  • بيعة جند الخلافة في الجزائر:

https://archive.org/details/by3at-jzaer

·         بيعة مجاهدي اليمن:

https://archive.org/details/YmnBy3a

  • بيعة مجاهدي تونس:

https://archive.org/details/tounis.bayaa

  • المجاهدين في أندونيسيا:

https://archive.org/details/BaiatMIT

  • ولاية الجزائر:

https://archive.org/details/sawxxsaw22_moakt_20150725_1742

  • ولاية السودان الغربي (نيجيريا):

https://archive.org/details/Baiat.Gamat.To.Islamic.State/Baiat.Gamat.To.Islamic.State.A.1080p.mp4

[1]Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says, June 13, 2017

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170613005676/en/

[2] “Diseased World”, Lockdown special : Believers stand tall it’s time for kuffar to fall, The Voice Of Hind, Shawwal 1441, PP : 6-7

https://archive.org/details/the-voice-of-hind-lockdown-special/page/5/mode/2up?q=voice+of+hind

[3] See audio recording in Arabic:

وبشر الصابرين، أبو بكر الحسني القرشي البغدادي،  مؤسسة الفرقان، غشت 2018م.

https://archive.org/details/20200621_20200621_0444/وبشر+الصابرين.mp3

[4]See Arabic text of Abou Mossaab Azarqawi pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda and to Oussama Ben Laden

“الأرشيف الجامع لكلمات وخطابات أمير الاستشهاديين الشيخ المجاهد أبي مصعب الزرقاوي رحمه الله”،  “الخطاب السابع عشر: بيان: البيعة لتنظيم القاعدة بقيادة الشيخ أسمة بن لادن “، ورشة عمل شبكة البراق الإسلامية، ط1، 2006م، ص:173

https://archive.org/details/El_Zarqawy_PDF

[5]See Letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, 09 July 2005,

النقر للوصول إلى Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf

[6] See Arabic recording of Oussama Ben Laden’s speech: (min 28:20s)

https://archive.org/details/retha2-Abo-mosaab-high

[7] See Arabic recording of Abou Hamza AL Mohajir “إن الحكم لله”:

https://archive.org/details/Archive-Of-Abo-Hamzah-Talks/2n-al7okm-2la-lilAllah.mp3

[8] See Arabic recording of Oussama Ben Laden’s speech: “السبيل لإحباط المؤامرات”، مؤسسة السحاب، شتنبر 2007م.

https://archive.org/details/78967678637

[9] See the Arabic text announcing of Abou Omar and Abou Hamza’s death:

“بيان بخصوص استشهاد الأميرين: البغدادي والمهاجر”، تنظيم القاعدة ببلاد المغرب الإسلامي، مؤسسة الأندلس للإنتاج الإعلامي، 27 أبريل 2010م:

https://archive.org/stream/isi-abo-omar-al-mohager-324/maghreb#page/n1/mode/2up

As well as Abou Baker Al Baghdadi’s first speech (in Arabic): “ويأبى الله إلا أن يتم نوره”، إنتاج مؤسسة الفرقان للإنتاج الإعلامي، يوليوز 2012م

[10]See video in Arabic announcing the establishment of “Annusra group” : الإعلان عن جبهة النصرة”، مؤسسة المنارة البيضاء للإنتاج الإعلامي، صفر 1433هـ

https://archive.org/details/jabhastart

[11] See the video in Arabic :”وبشر المؤمنين”

https://archive.org/details/muhd_462

[12]Arabic audio recording :”ساحة الشام”، مؤسسة المنارة البيضاء للإنتاج الإعلامي

https://archive.org/details/lightkitpro

[13] See Arabic voice recording of Ayman Azawahiri explaining the conflict in Syria  :”شهادة لحقن دماء المجاهدين في الشام”، مؤسسة السحاب للإنتاج الإعلامي:

https://archive.org/details/sheham-history

[14]See Al Baghdadi’s Arabic audio: باقية في العراق والشام”، مؤسسة الفرقان للإنتاج الإعلامي، يونيو 2013م.

https://archive.org/details/baqiah1

[15] See the Arabic speech of Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi:

https://archive.org/details/20200814_20200814_1704

[16] See audio :

https://archive.org/details/ansar.bait.al.maqdes.baayat.khalifa.al.bagdadi.original.quality.mp3

[17] See audio:

https://archive.org/details/YmnBy3a

[18] See video :

https://archive.org/details/20150520_201505

[19]See audio:

https://archive.org/details/BaiatMIT

[20] See audio :

https://archive.org/details/By3tLybia

[21]See audio :

https://archive.org/details/tounis.bayaa

[22] See audio :

https://archive.org/details/sawxxsaw22_moakt_20150725_1742

[23]See audio :

https://archive.org/details/by3at-jzaer

[24] See audio :

https://archive.org/details/Baiat.Gamat.To.Islamic.State/Baiat.Gamat.To.Islamic.State.A.1080p.mp4

[25] See: President Trump’s full announcement on the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Washington post, October 27th, 2019.

[26] See video :  “President Biden speaks after announcing US raid in Syria killed ISIS leader, 13 civilians”,

[27] See Arabic audio :

[28] See video :https://archive.org/details/STRUCTURE258/SRKH01-EN.mp4

[29]See: Mueller John, Stewart G. Mark, Misoverestimating ISIS: Comparisons with Al-Qaeda, Perspectives on Terrorism, Terrorism Research Initiative, Vol. 10, No. 4, August 2016, pp. 30-39

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297616

[30] See: Bleek,Philipp, 9/11 Al Qaeda and the nuclear terror threat, August 2021.

[31]See: Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann and Quan li, Atoms for terror? Nuclear Programs and Non-Catastrophic Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism, British Journal of Political Science,Vol. 43, No. 4, 2013, pp: 915-936

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23526263?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A379771a5233c8e246210d5b0ac578dad&seq=5

[32]See: Zimmerman D. Peter, Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2009, pp: 1-14

النقر للوصول إلى 01-Do_We_Really_Need_to_Worry_Some_Reflections_on_the_Threat_of_Nuclear_Terrorism.pdf

[33]See: McCann S. Wesley, CBRN Terrorism Interdictions (1990–2016) and Areas for Future Inquiry, Terrorism Research Initiative, Perspectives on Terrorism , Vol. 15, No. 6,  December 2021, pp. 41- 60

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27090915?seq=1

[34]See:Meulenbelt E. Stephani, Nieuwenhuizen S. Maarten, Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences, International Review of the Red Cross, The human cost of nuclear weapons, 2015, pp: 831-858

النقر للوصول إلى irc97_17.pdf

[35]See: Joshi, Sharad, How terrorist actors in Pakistan use nuclear weapons for political influence, Taylor & Swift group, Asian Security, Vol 16, NO 2, 2020, pp: 221-242

[36]See: Duno, Elena, Reassessing CBRN Threats in a Changing Global Environment, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, pp: 8-13

https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24499.9

[37]See: Dechesne Mark, Obedience to Divinity? The Psychology of Jihadist WMD Terrorism, Jihadists and weapons of mass destruction, edit. Gary Ackerman, Jeremy Tamsett, CRC Press-Taylor & Swift group, 2009, pp:  61-82

النقر للوصول إلى Jihadists__WMD1.pdf

[38]See: Forest, James J.F. “Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012): 51-68. Accessed June 21, 2021.

 https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973

[39] See: Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat.” PRISM, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), p: 24

 https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532.

[40]See: Bale, Jeffrey M., Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of WMD, Jihadists and weapons of mass destruction, edit. Gary Ackerman, Jeremy Tamsett, CRC Press-Taylor & Swift group, 2009, pp: 3-60

النقر للوصول إلى Jihadists__WMD1.pdf

[41]See: Joshi, Sharad, How terrorist actors in Pakistan use nuclear weapons for political influence, Taylor & Swift group, Asian Security, Vol 16, NO 2, 2020, pp: 221-242

[42]See: Dabiq: The return of Khilafah, issue 1, Ramadan 1435, p: 11

https://archive.org/details/DABIQ_01_2014_/page/n5/mode/2up

*In Islamic literature there are two different kinds of obligations/duties (AKA Fard/plur. Forod)  :  FardKifaya  and Fard Ayn. Fard Ayn referds to all the individual duties of Muslims towards Allah, once they reach puberty, for example: Siyam (fasting Ramadan) and 5 Salat (the 5 prayers a day), the Haj (pelgrimage) and the Zakat…etc…Each Individual gets Tawab (blessing) or Ithm (sins) for either doing or leaving the Fard, taking in consideration that the goal is to get closer to Allah, and repetition of those duties.
Fard Kifaya refers to all the group duties of Muslims towards Allah, and that means that it is enough if a group of Muslims do them in the name of all other Muslims. If a group does the Fard Kifaya all Muslims get Tawab if no one does the Fard Kifaya all Muslims get Ithm, taking in consideration that the goal is the general good of Muslims either for religious reasons such as: learning the Islamic teachings, Salat of Janaza (A special prayer held when a person passes away) or for other “Earth-related” reasons (social, economic, political etc…) such as: engineering, medicine, trade, handcrafts etc…. The Fard Kifaya is not necessarily repetitive.
In the case of Jihad, it is considered Fard Kifaya if it is to conquer territories and spread Islam in non Muslim states, but it is considered Fard Ayn if it is to defend Muslim territories from outsiders or to defend and protect Muslims.

[43]See audio recording:

رسالة إلى المجاهدين والأمة الإسلامية في شهر رمضان، مؤسسة الفرقان يونيو 2014.

[44]See audio recording :

فتربصوا إنا معكم متربصون، مؤسسة الفرقان، 2015.

[45]Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says, June 13, 2017

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170613005676/en/

[46]See: “Diseased World”, Lockdown special : Believers stand tall it’s time for kuffar to fall, The Voice Of Hind, Shawwal 1441, PP : 6-7

https://archive.org/details/the-voice-of-hind-lockdown-special/page/5/mode/2up?q=voice+of+hind

[47]See: HardingThomas,  Coronavirus: global alert over rising ISIS bioterrorism threat, Jul 10, 2020

https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/coronavirus-global-alert-over-rising-isis-bioterrorism-threat-1.1046646

[48] See: Karl, ISIS Attackers May Have Targeted Nuclear Power Station, March 25, 2016

https://time.com/4271854/belgium-isis-nuclear-power-station-brussels/

[49] Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says, June 13, 2017

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170613005676/en/

[50]“Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Capability Degraded, IHS Markit Says”, HIS Markit, June 2017.

https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/aerospace-defense-security-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-capability-degraded-ihs-mar

[51]For more details see :

Strack Columb, The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts, Combating terrorism center in West Point, CTCSENTINEL, Vol 10, Issue 9,  October 2017,  pp: 19-20

النقر للوصول إلى CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss9-21.pdf

[52] Warrick Joby, Exclusive: Iraqi scientist says he helped ISIS make chemical weapons, Washington post, Jan 2019,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/exclusive-iraqi-scientist-says-he-helped-isis-make-chemical-weapons/2019/01/21/617cb8f0-0d35-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html

[53] Audio recording in Arabic “ دمر الله عليهم وللكافرين أمثالها “, Jan. 2020 :

https://archive.org/details/0601441

Translated from Arabic:

” (…) فيا أجناد الخلافة في كل مكان، ونخص منهم ولاية سيناء الحبيبة والشام المباركة؛دونكم مستوطنات وأسواق اليهود، اجعلوها أرضًا لتجربة أسلحتكم وصواريخكم الكيماوية (…)”.ْ

[54]Smith Alexander,  Kenya Police Say They Foiled ISIS-Linked Plot to Unleash Anthrax Attack, May 04, 2016

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kenya-police-say-they-foiled-isis-linked-plot-unleash-anthrax-n567721

[55]Winter Chase, German prosecutors: Tunisian planed ricin terror bombing against ‘unbelievers’, Aug. 03, 2018

https://www.dw.com/en/german-prosecutors-tunisian-planned-ricin-terror-bombing-against-unbelievers/a-44949132

[56]Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future, July 2017

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/cobalt-60-sources-in-mosul-recovery-and-lessons-for-the-future/

[57]Bunn Matthiew, ISIS seizes Nuclear material but that’s not the reason to worry ,the National Interest, July 2014

النقر للوصول إلى isis_seizes_nuclear_material-but_thats_not_the_reason_to_worry.pdf

[58] Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future, July 2017

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/cobalt-60-sources-in-mosul-recovery-and-lessons-for-the-future/

[59] Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future, July 2017

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/cobalt-60-sources-in-mosul-recovery-and-lessons-for-the-future/

[60]Karl Vick, ISIS Attackers May Have Targeted Nuclear Power Station, Time, March 2016.

https://time.com/4271854/belgium-isis-nuclear-power-station-brussels/

[61]Joby Warrick & Loveday Morris, How ISIS nearly stumbled on the ingredients for a dirty bomb, July 2017.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-isis-nearly-stumbled-on-the-ingredients-for-a-dirty-bomb/2017/07/22/6a966746-6e31-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html

[62] “They Plot and Allah’s plots”, Dabiq issue 9, Sha’ban 1436 (May 2015), p: 77

النقر للوصول إلى dabiq-magazine-9.pdf

[63]لقاء مع جمال إسماعيل لقناة الجزيرة – ديسمبر 1998م، مجموع رسائل وتوجيهات الشيخ المجاهد أسامة بن لادن –رحمه الله-، نخبة الإعلام الجهادي، 2015م، ص: 301

https://ia801304.us.archive.org/6/items/al_nokbah9_o_20151212 مجموعرسائلوتوجيهاتالشيخأسامةبنلادن /.pdf

[64]See: Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 2019

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

[65]See: Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2019

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3814176?ln=en

[66]انظر تفريغ شريط ملحمة الاستنزاف-4″ لولاية شام الخير

https://pastethis.to/QMMWJWncmB

[67] See: GREGORY WATERS & CHARLIE WINTER, ISLAMIC STATE UNDER-REPORTING IN CENTRAL SYRIA: MISDIRECTION, MISINFORMATION, OR MISCOMMUNICATION?, 2021, pp:12-13

النقر للوصول إلى Islamic%20State%20Under-Reporting%20in%20Central%20Syria-%20Misdirection%2C%20Misinformation%2C%20or%20Miscommunication%3F.pdf

[68] See audio recording in Arabic:

وبشر الصابرين، أبو بكر الحسني القرشي البغدادي،  مؤسسة الفرقان، غشت 2018م.

https://archive.org/details/20200621_20200621_0444/وبشر+الصابرين.mp3

Transcripted and translated from the original Arabic audio :

“ونبارك للأُسد الضارية في بلدان الصليب في كندا وأوروبا وغيرها جميل صنيعهم نصرة لإخوانهم. ألا بارك الله مسعاكم وتقبل حسن بلائكم، فسيروا يا أنصار الخلافة في إثرهم، أعدوا من الميسور وتوكلوا على العلي القدير، واضربوا ضربا يخلع القلوب ويُطِير بالألباب، فطلقة خارقة أو طعنة في الأحشاء غائرة، أو تفجير ناسفة في أرضكم تعدل ألف عملية عندنا، ولا تهملوا الدهس في الطرقات. فخذوا لحربكم أهبتها ليصلا الصليبيين والمرتدين لهيبها. وأذكركم يا جنود الخلافة وأنصارها في هذه الأيام المعدودات، أن تدركوا ما فات، وأن تحيوا سنة قتل الجعد بن درهم وأن تضحوا بكل علماني وملحد ومرتد محارب لله ورسوله”

*According to Islamic literature, Jaa’d Ibn Dirham was a teacher (of religion) who used to discuss openly some of Allah’s qualities namely: speaking and friendship, and stated that those cannot be qualities of Allah; this implied that he was stating that Allah did not speak to Moussa (Moses) nor made Ibrahim (Abraham) his best friend (two thins Muslims believe in). On Aid Al Adha, during the prayer time, the governor of Al Bassra in Iraq named Khalid Ibn Abdallah Al Qasri slaughtered Jaa’d as a sacrifice for Allah (instead of a sheep).

[69] See video:  https://archive.org/details/2-5334768737943820090

[70] See IS document video :  https://archive.org/details/480_20220220

[71] See video in Arabic:

(جريمة التاجي ) وإقتحام مقر للحرس الوثني والقضاء على من فيه – سرية الغضب الإسلامي، تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في بلاد الرافدين Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn،

https://archive.org/details/tanzim-qaeidat-aljihad-fi-bilad-alrafidaynأرشيف+تنظيم+قاعدة+الجهاد+في+بلاد+الرافدين/

B5%جريمة+التاجيD.واقتحام+مقر+للحرس+الوثني+والقضاء+على+من+فيه+-+سرية+الغضب+الإسلامي+mp4

[72] See audio recording ofAbou Bakr Al Baghdadi in Arabic:

“ويأبي الله إلا أن يتم نوره”، ابو بكر الحسيني القرشي،

https://archive.org/details/ ويأبى+الله+إلا أن+يتم+نوره+1433+ه.mp3

See also audio recording of Abou Mohamed Al Adnani, spokesperson of the Islamic State and military minister of Abou Bakr Al Baghdadi :

“والرائد لا يكذب أهله”، أبو محمد العدناني المتحدث الرسمي للدولة الإسلامية ووزير حرب أبي بكر الحسني القرشي، 2014

[73] Quran in English :

https://www.clearquran.com/029.html

[74] Iraq is left with the rest of the regions because IS has lost control of it and do not have any controlled areas there.

[75]Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, Chemical weapons, Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Chemical

[76]Schneider Tobias, Lütkefend Theresa, Nowhere to hide: the logic of chemical weapons use in Syria, Global Public Policy Institute, 2019, pp: 5-6

النقر للوصول إلى GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf

[77]Louis Charbonneau, Suspend Syria’s Rights Under Chemical Weapons Convention: Governments Should Bolster Respect for Landmark Arms Ban, 2021.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/suspend-syrias-rights-under-chemical-weapons-convention#:~:text=Human%20Rights%20Watch%20found%20that,veto%20to%20end%20that%20probe.

[78]Schneider Tobias, Lütkefend Theresa, Nowhere to hide: the logic of chemical weapons use in Syria, Global Public Policy Institute, 2019, pp: 39-47

النقر للوصول إلى GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf

[79]داعش تسيطر على مصنع سابق للأسلحة الكيماوية، أخبار DW

https://learngerman.dw.com/ar/داعش-تسيطر-على-مصنع-سابق-للأسلحة-الكيماوية-في-العراق/a-17723737

[80]Warrick, Joby, ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners: U.N. investigators find, The Washington post, May 13, 2021.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/isis-chemical-weapons-experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebfb0-b42e-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html

[81]Warrick, Joby, ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners: U.N. investigators find, The Washington post, May 13, 2021.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/isis-chemical-weapons-experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebfb0-b42e-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html

[82] Levy, Ido, How Big Is the Islamic State Threat in Israel?, Washington Institute, April 2022.

 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-big-islamic-state-threat-israel

[83]}قَاتِلُوهُمْ يُعَذِّبْهُمُ اللّهُ بِأَيْدِيكُمْ وَيُخْزِهِمْ وَيَنصُرْكُمْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَيَشْفِ صُدُورَ قَوْمٍ مُّؤْمِنِينَ}بيان عسكري صادر عنكتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام : عملية سلفيت البطولية حلقةٌ في سلسلة ردودنا على العدوان على الأقصى،01-05-2022.

https://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/عملية-سلفيت-البطولية-حلقة-في-سلسلة-ردودنا-على-العدوان-على-الأقصى/5690/بيانات-بلاغات-القسام

[84] A knife-wielding man killed 4 Israelis in Beersheba: police say, npr, 22 March 2022

https://www.npr.org/2022/03/22/1088126698/beersheba-israelis-stabbed-attack

[85]وكالة أعماق: مقتل عنصرين من القوات اليهودية وإصابة 10 آخرين بهجوم انغماسي نفّذه اثنان من مقاتلي الدولة الإسلامية في فلسطين، 28 مارس 2022م.

https://archive.org/details/photo_2022-03-28_02-39-33_202203

[86]StrackColumb, The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts, Combating terrorism center in West Point, CTCSENTINEL, Vol 10, Issue 9,  October 2017,  pp: 19-20

النقر للوصول إلى CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss9-21.pdf

[87]Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, biological weapons, Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Biological

[88] Biological Attack Fact Sheet: Human Pathogens, Biotoxins, and Agricultural Threat, Homeland security, updated: Mai 19, 2022

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/biological-attack-fact-sheet

[89]CHARLET, KATHERINE The New Killer Pathogens: Countering the Coming Bioweapons Threat, Carnegie endowment April 17, 2018

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/17/new-killer-pathogens-countering-coming-bioweapons-threat-pub-76009

[90]See :Smith Alexander,  Kenya Police Say They Foiled ISIS-Linked Plot to Unleash Anthrax Attack, May 04, 2016

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kenya-police-say-they-foiled-isis-linked-plot-unleash-anthrax-n567721

and: Winter Chase, German prosecutors: Tunisian planed ricin terror bombing against ‘unbelievers’, Aug. 03, 2018

https://www.dw.com/en/german-prosecutors-tunisian-planned-ricin-terror-bombing-against-unbelievers/a-44949132

[91]Khaniejo Natallia,Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Daesh / ISIS, 2016

https://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/use-chemical-and-biological-weapons-by-daesh-isis

[92]Winter Chase, German prosecutors: Tunisian planed ricin terror bombing against ‘unbelievers’, Aug. 03, 2018

https://www.dw.com/en/german-prosecutors-tunisian-planned-ricin-terror-bombing-against-unbelievers/a-44949132

[93] Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, Past nuclear weapon program , Arms control association website, 2022

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile#Past

[94] Iraq Nuclear facilities, NTI, 2011.

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iraq-nuclear-facilities/

[95]Vick Karl, ISIS Attackers May Have Targeted Nuclear Power Station, Time website, 25 March 2016

https://time.com/4271854/belgium-isis-nuclear-power-station-brussels/

[96]Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD), START website

https://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad

[97]Bunn Matthiew, ISIS seizes Nuclear material but that’s not the reason to worry ,the National Interest, July 2014

النقر للوصول إلى isis_seizes_nuclear_material-but_thats_not_the_reason_to_worry.pdf

5/5 - (2 صوتين)

المركز الديمقراطى العربى

المركز الديمقراطي العربي مؤسسة مستقلة تعمل فى اطار البحث العلمى والتحليلى فى القضايا الاستراتيجية والسياسية والاقتصادية، ويهدف بشكل اساسى الى دراسة القضايا العربية وانماط التفاعل بين الدول العربية حكومات وشعوبا ومنظمات غير حكومية.

مقالات ذات صلة

اترك تعليقاً

لن يتم نشر عنوان بريدك الإلكتروني. الحقول الإلزامية مشار إليها بـ *

زر الذهاب إلى الأعلى