Prepared by the researcher : Ramez El-Shishy – Writer and Political Researcher
Democratic Arab Center
As developments in the Ukrainian warfare escalate, as a result of the recent Russian military sharp attacks, concerns are mounting in the Middle East in particular, and in various other regions of the world in general. The followers of these developments will find that they came after the Russian recognition of the cities of Lugansk and Donetsk in the Donbass region, as areas completely independent of Ukrainian sovereignty. As a result, these sharp developments have led to the escalation and growth of security threats, which will adversely affect Ukrainian wheat exports to various regions of the world in general, most notably the Middle East. The Ukrainian warfare is the “most serious threat to global food security,” and Ukraine is the “world’s food basket,”[1] because the Ukrainian regions producing food grains and vegetable oils are located on the country’s eastern border, which is the most dangerous and targeted aspect of Russia on the one hand. On the other hand, this crisis represents an excellent opportunity for eastern Mediterranean countries, particularly Egypt, as well as many other countries such as Qatar and Algeria. Furthermore, some of the unresolved and pressing crises in the Middle East, most notably the Iranian nuclear issue and other thorny crises, can be said to have been alleviated by the Ukrainian warfare.
In this context, we will try to clarify the most significant potential implications for the Middle East…
- Severe food crisis
At a time when food prices are rising significantly due to the disruption of supply chains related to the Covid-19 pandemic, global inflation,[2] the Ukrainian warfare is reinforcing the risk of food insecurity. Rising bread prices, coupled with sharp rises in energy prices, pose a real destabilizing threat to the Middle East, and the region is already experiencing very high levels of food insecurity even before the warfare.
According to the World Bank, more than 55 million of the region’s 456.7 million people are undernourished.[3] Pandemics, protracted conflicts in the region and other factors make famine more common. In 2020, the Middle East and North Africa region accounted for 20% of the world’s severe food insecurity population, which is expected to increase if the Ukrainian warfare continues in parallel with other global crises.
The number of countries dangerously hovering close to famine, namely Yemen and Lebanon (both major buyers of Ukrainian wheat), will face the worst consequences. Rising prices will also pose a threat to countries such as Libya and Egypt, which import basic supplies from Ukraine, as well as Tunisia and Algeria, and rising food costs have often sparked popular outrage in those countries.[4] Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country, imports 80 percent of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. Lebanon, which is already suffering from a debt crisis and suffocating inflation, imports 60% of its wheat from the two warring countries, which supply 80% of Tunisian grain.
- Boosting oil exports
With the closure of Nord Stream 2 as part of German sanctions against Russia,[5] Europe is largely dependent on Russia for natural gas, which accounts for 40 percent of its needs. This is a great opportunity for eastern Mediterranean countries, particularly Egypt, which has huge natural gas reserves, especially with two gas liquefaction units in the Egyptian cities of Damietta and Edco.[6] Greece and Egypt also agreed to expand their cooperation in LNG supplies and study the possibility of building an under-Mediterranean gas pipeline between the two countries.[7]
Also, Egypt and Cyprus signed an agreement in May 2018 to build a pipeline from cyprus’s Aphrodite field, with reserves estimated at 3.6 trillion to 6 trillion cubic feet, for liquefaction in Egypt and re-export to Europe.[8] Construction of the pipeline is expected to be completed in fiscal year 2024-2025, when it is developed to complete the development plan. In this regard, Europeans will look forward to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, in which Cairo plays a pivotal role, especially as it valiantly adopts large projects and exports its vast stockpile of newly discovered gas fields. The EU, as well as NATO, can rely on Qatar, Algeria together, but Qatar provides only about 5% of Europe’s total natural gas imports, as well as its geographical dimension, high shipping costs, and Qatar’s lack of capacity to supply Europe with alternative gas supplies to Russia because of its long-term contracts with Asian suppliers.[9] Moreover, Egypt is a strong strategic and trade partner for the West in general.
- Marginalization of the Iranian nuclear file
The escalation in the Ukraine warfare will encourage Russia to pursue its strategic objectives of expelling the United States from the Middle East and becoming the region’s dominant regional power, goals it shares with Iran, particularly in light of the failure of the Vienna negotiations,[10] and the west’s general failure to reach a settlement with the Iranian side.[11] The Iranian government will therefore not be prepared to make any concessions, but will strengthen its determination to expel the United States from Iraq, Syria, and the region.
In this context, the timing of the Ukrainian warefare for Tehran, just as the nuclear talks were to reach a critical point or a watershed, could not have been more appropriate. At the very least, the Ukrainian warfare has diverted attention from Iran and the nuclear issue, making the United States less capable of taking strong positions and giving Iran more time to withdraw negotiations and further develop the nuclear program. As a result of recent U.S. economic sanctions against Russia, if U.S. talks with Iran return, Russia will be in a hostile position with the West and less inclined to pressure Iran to compromise, which will have far-reaching implications for Israel’s security in particular, and Arab national security in general.[12] Russia’s motivations can be explained by the fact that the nuclear issue is related to US-Iranian relations rather than Iranian-Russian relations. Over the last two decades, Russia has used Iran as a trump card in its dealings with the United States. Russia has frozen or strengthened cooperation with Tehran during times of closeness and tension with the United States. To put it another way, cooperation could be described as a mask for the pattern of conflict between Russia and the United States of America. Russia’s stance on Iran’s nuclear issue is governed by the strength of its relationship with Tehran and the fragility of its relationship with the US, particularly after successive economic sanctions imposed as a result of the current Ukrainian warfare.
In conclusion, we can confirm that the traditional crises in the Middle East region have been in a state of inactivity in the midst of the interactions of the Ukrainian warfare, and other crises that have been relatively calm have been developed. As Ukraine intensifies, those crises begin to deepen and expand, and the region will experience instability at all levels unless the Ukrainian warfare is calmed down and a peaceful compromise is reached among all the conflicting parties.
[1] Flangan, J & Vohra, A. (2022). “War in Ukraine: food price spike will hit world’s poor hardest”. THE TIMES. Available at:- https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-crisis-spike-in-food-prices-will-hit-world-s-poor-hardest-2hb6x3327 Accessed on: 25/2/2022.
[2] Mohieldin, M. (2022). “Interest rates and greenflation”. Ahramonline. Available at:- https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1204/460741/AlAhram-Weekly/Opinion/Interest-rates-and-greenflation.aspx Accessed on: 15/2/2022
[3] Belhaj, F & Soliman, A. (2021). “MENA Has a Food Security Problem, But There Are Ways to Address It”. THE WORLD BANK. Available at:- https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2021/09/24/mena-has-a-food-security-problem-but-there-are-ways-to-address-it Accessed on:22/2/2022
[4] ECFR. (2022). “Unsettled: The impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on the Middle East and North Africa”. Available at:- https://ecfr.eu/article/unsettled-the-impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-on-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ Accessed on: 22/2/2022
[5] Weise, Z. (2022). “Germany shelves Nord Stream 2 pipeline”. POLITICO. Available at:- https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-stop-nord-stream-2/ Accessed on: 22/2/2022.
[6] Al-Monitor. (2022). “Egypt breaks LNG export records with eye on Europe”. Available at:- https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-breaks-lng-export-records-eye-europe Accessed on: 20/2/2022
[7] كلتشرز بوست، (2022). The Ukranian Crisis and the Europe Energy Paradox: Finding Alternatives to Russian Gas. Available at: https://culturespost.blogspot.com/2022/09/the-ukrainian-crisis-and-europe-energy.html?m=1
[8] IEMed. (2018). “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation”. Available at:- https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-eastern-mediterranean-new-dynamics-and-potential-for-cooperation/ Accessed on: 20/2/2022
[9] England, A. & Sheppard, A. (2021). “UK asks Qatar to become gas ‘supplier of last resort’”. FINANCIAL TIMES. Available at:- https://www.ft.com/content/06049722-2f62-4b29-b8e0-8f77fb29f08b Accessed on: 20/2/2022.
[10] Ahramonline. (2022). “Iran says Vienna talks ‘far from balance in commitments”. Available at:- https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/460586.aspx Accessed on: 15/2/2022.
[11] England, A. & Sheppard, A. (2021). “UK asks Qatar to become gas ‘supplier of last resort’”. FINANCIAL TIMES. Available at:- https://www.ft.com/content/06049722-2f62-4b29-b8e0-8f77fb29f08b Accessed on: 20/2/2022.
[12] Grierson, J. (2022). “Russia-Ukraine crisis a ‘dangerous moment for the world’, warns Truss”. THE GUARDIAN. Available at:- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/15/russia-ukraine-crisis-dangerous-moment-world-warns-liz-truss Accessed on: 16/2/2022.
