Prepared by the researche: Mahmoud Rasheed Mohmad bani Saeed, Doctoral researcher at Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco
Democratic Arabic Center
Journal of Political Science and Law : Forty-second Issue – December 2024
A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin
Nationales ISSN-Zentrum für Deutschland
Journal of Political Science and Law
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the nature of negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition, as well as the influence of international and regional powers on these talks. Despite ongoing international efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis, including United Nations mediations and Security Council resolutions, the conflict remains unresolved. Russia has focused on achieving ceasefire agreements in cooperation with Turkey and Iran, while the United States and its allies have supported a political transition based on international resolutions such as Security Council Resolution 2254. Although the Syrian opposition has faced significant challenges, including fragmentation and a lack of unified strategy, the gradual withdrawal of some of the regime’s allies has weakened its position. Amid these developments, the opposition’s prospects for achieving its goals are improving, making its eventual triumph over the current regime increasingly likely.
Introduction :
Despite the issuance of some Security Council resolutions confirming that the situation in Syria threatens international peace and security, such as Resolution 2118 issued on September 27, 2013 as a result of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, as it decided that the Syrian Republic or any party to it will not use, produce or store these weapons. In case of non-compliance with this resolution, the Security
Council will impose measures according to Chapter VII of the Charter, and Resolution 2191 issued on December 17, 2014, which indicated that the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, and Resolution 2209 of March 6, 2015, which affirmed Once again, failure to comply with the provisions of Resolution 2118 will impose measures by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. However, the Security Council did not take practical and joint steps within the framework of collective security measures, as mentioned in Chapter VII of the Charter. Toxic chemical weapons have been repeatedly used in Syria, and many civilians have been killed, as indicated by Security Council Resolution 2235 of August,7,2015, despite the same decision indicating that persons, entities, groups or governments responsible for using this type of weapon should be held accountable, no practical and effective measures have been taken in this matter.( Security Council Resolution 2018 of September, 27, 2013 ,S / RES / 2018) Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the civil-national opposition has preferred the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power, but it has lacked a detailed vision of a post-Assad Syria and a practical plan for achieving change. This was a huge deficiency that raised doubts about whether the opposition was really a viable alternative to the Syrian regime with a clear idea of the new regime it was seeking to create.
The participating countries met in the Vienna Conference on November 14, 2015 under the name of the International Syria Support Group. These countries declared her commitment to ensuring a political transition led by the Syrians based on the Geneva Declaration, and agreed to work to implement a ceasefire in Syria, and called for representatives of the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition to sit at the negotiating table under the auspices of the United Nations on January 1, 2016, and appointed Stephane de Mistura as a Epecial Envoy for the UN. The United States to determine the representatives of the opposition in the negotiations and assigned Jordan to identify terrorist groups and individuals who will not enter the negotiations. However, the dispute between the United States and Russia over the fate of Assad and his participation in future elections in Syria remained. The UN Security Council unanimously approved on December 18, 2015 a resolution confirming the decisions of the International Syria Support Group, calling for a new constitution to be drafted and fair elections in accordance with the new constitution before July 2017, and the UN Security Council approved the International Syria Support Group as a central international platform to facilitate the United Nations efforts to reach a political settlement. Permanent in Syria. (Sayigh, 2016).
Study Problem :
The study examines the issue of the nature of negotiations between the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition Working to resolve the conflict .The Syrian Crisis one of the most important international and regional crises. It has contributed to highlighting the weakness of the international system and its inability to exercise its role in maintaining international peace and security.
Study Questions:
The study mainly aims to answer the following main question: What are the positions of the actors in the Syrian negotiations towards the proposals for resolving the Syrian crisis? What is the level of the impact of the conflict between the international forces supporting the Syrian regime (China and Russia) and the forces opposing the Syrian regime (America, Britain, France) on the Syrian negotiations?
Study Hypothesis:
The main hypothesis that the study will answer states: “Is there an influential relationship to the nature of international political relations on the effectiveness of negotiations in ending the Syrian crisis?”
Study methodology
The study is based on the systems analysis approach: The idea from which the systemic analysis approach is based on the concept of the system, which is an organizing framework in which a group of elements enter into an interaction process with each other and produce a set of results whose purpose is to accomplish certain functions, and this approach will be used. In analyzing the environment of the international system and international relations that affected negotiations to resolve the Syrian crisis during the period (2011-2018).
The Course of the Syrian Negotiations:
As a result of the difference in opinions and positions on the Syrian issue, there have become two political tracks in Syria:
The first track: led by Russia, which focuses on a ceasefire in accordance with a common vision that began in early 2017 in agreement with Turkey and Iran, and in May, 2017 it was able to reach a practical implementation of it by signing the memorandum of de-escalation in four regions in the country where the Syrian opposition is active, and the United States did not object The American and Western political track in Astana and felt that adherence to it by the parties, taking into account what was stated in international decisions, could achieve results and progress in the political solution, but on condition that the official negotiation moves to Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. Meaning that the West tried to contain the Russian-Turkish-Iranian track.
The second track: led by the United Nations, which receives support of the United States of America and its allies in the West and the Gulf. This path is based on international references, including UN Resolution 2254, while Russia has pushed through its military and political policy in Syria to implement the first track, which puts the allies of the Syrian opposition in front of narrow options.
International conflicts and their impact on regional and international initiatives to solve the Syrian crisis
International conflicts and their impact on regional and international initiatives to solve the Syrian crisis: Many Arab and international initiatives have been proposed to solve the Syrian crisis, and the following are the most important of these initiatives:
1: Initiatives before the Iran nuclear deal:
Many Western countries imposed some sanctions on the Syrian regime since the beginning of the Syrian crisis.
but they did not stop the violence in the Syrian territories, while efforts to settle the Western crisis did not come until after the Arab League Council sought the Security Council’s assistance as part of its second initiative. which was not implemented due to The veto issued by Russia and China, and the most important Western initiatives are as follows:
- Russian Foreign Minister “Sergey Lavrov” announced a roadmap prepared based on a Russian-Syrian consensus during his meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al- Assad on February 7, 2012, and this map is based on the first Arab initiative, The opposition focused its efforts on implementing the June 2012 Geneva Declaration, which was a metaphor for a six-point plan described by the UN Security Council as a framework for a political solution in Syria. However, the general objectives of the opposition remained vague, and this is partly due to the stated goals set by the statement. As the document called for “an interim governing body with full executive powers to be formed by mutual consent.” Members of the political opposition considered that this condition guarantees them the exercise of the right of veto over whether or not Assad is a party to the Transitional Authority 1, which reinforced their ultimate goal of changing the entire system.
- However, there was a negative dimension in taking this absolute position towards the Assad regime without developing other credible options. As this diminished the effects that the opposition could have exercised when it had signaled to the regime that it would reap nothing but the wind from the negotiations. Nicolas Van Dam, a former Dutch ambassador to the Middle East and author of a very important book on Syria, pointed to this shortcoming, saying: “There was no room for working with the regime in the opposition lexicon. 2 The opposition, with its focus on demands for leadership change and the implementation of sweeping reforms in The security and military institutions practically ask their interlocutors in the Syrian government to voluntarily surrender the state’s authority to it. On the other hand, the state’s refusal to legitimize the political opposition led to unresolved tensions that also undermined the negotiations. Because of her case and tangible political power, and she was unable to fully realize “that being right is one thing, and achieving this right is another completely different thing.” with the number of Arab observers increasing, and their complete security. On February 24, 2012, the United States of America mandated the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to search for a solution to the conflict in Syria based on the second Arab initiative. The opposition’s lack of clarity about achievable political goals was accompanied by another problem, also such as intentional self-harm. When choosing to operate from outside Syria, the groups constituting the civil-national opposition alienated themselves from the military actors within the country that rapidly dominated the evolving dynamics of the conflict. Moreover, because it was considered far from the suffering of Syrians at home, the opposition gradually encountered a major problem in the field of legitimacy. All this gave the upper hand to the forces on the ground in determining the approach towards the Syrian regime, as well as with regard to receiving foreign aid. – Consequently, representatives of the civil-national opposition (whether their headquarters are in Istanbul as well as the Syrian National Council, and later the Syrian National Coalition, or in Riyadh, as is the case with the Supreme Committee for Negotiation, or in Geneva, Geneva and Vienna, as with some opposition offices), were unable to introduce amendments Weigh the course of the dispute or the settlement. In fact, the negative aspects of the exile affected negatively those who initially opposed the Assad regime from within Syria, and who were later followed by the civil-national opposition outside the country. The political opposition often absorbed activists from inside Syria, employed them to work in its institutions and kept them away from the context in which they were active. As a result, and within a few months, the opposition lost all internal contacts on the ground, making its presence largely superfluous. Therefore, Annan presented a six-point plan that contributes to solving the Syrian crisis represented by: – Cooperation with an envoy The United Nations in the events of a political process that includes the opposition, a commitment to stop the fighting between the conflicting parties in Syria under the supervision of the United Nations, and the creation of effective mechanisms to ensure the arrival of humanitarian aid, the gradual release of political detainees, and the guarantee of freedom of movement of journalists, freedom of assembly and demonstration.
as held by the “Friends of the Group” Syria “in Tunisia its first meeting in 2012, with 70 countries attending, in order to find a solution to the Syrian crisis away from the Security Council, which is restricted by the right of veto, and among the matters discussed in this meeting is the call for other countries to impose new sanctions that contribute to the removal of President Bashar al-Assad. and the recognition of the National Council The Syrian is the legitimate representative of the Syrian people . (Muhammad, 2015).
On March 6, 2012, China presented an initiative to solve and settle the Syrian crisis that included a number of points, most notably; The importance of quickly stopping violence and military attacks from all parties to the conflict, launching a political dialogue under the auspices of the joint special envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States (Abdel Halim, 2013)
The ” Geneva 1″ conference was held on June 30, 2012, and resulted in the issuance of the Geneva Declaration, which indicated the need to establish a transitional government with full executive powers, and to prepare for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections with the consent of the Syrian people. What was worse is that all of this happened at a time when the armed factions and the temporary local councils inside Syria began to take over the security and civil administrations in the areas beyond the authority’s control. These agencies have formed separate funding channels with international donors, thereby reducing the dominance of the civilnational opposition over developments on the ground. Such a cycle soon became selffeeding: the funding obtained by the opposition inside Syria, which was already questioning the credibility of the exile opposition as a coordination body, led to the diversion of resources away from the exiles, which further marginalized the influence of the political opposition and with it its coordination capabilities.
The “Friends of Syria III” conference was held in Paris on July 6, 2012, which called for the departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, tightening sanctions against his regime, and support for the Syrian opposition. (Muhammad, 2015).
On November 1, 2012, China presented a new proposal on finding a peaceful solution to settle the conflict in Syria, and the proposal included the need to stop all acts of violence, establish a transitional governing body, cooperate to implement the Geneva Declaration, and settle refugees in Syria in more appropriate places. In November 2012, China submitted new proposals to Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy and the Arab League, and the plan includes a phased ceasefire and the formation of a transitional government.
The “Friends of Syria Fourth” conference was held on December 12, 2012 in Marrakesh. This conference announced its recognition of the Syrian National Coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian people.
In February 2013, the “Fifth Friends of Syria” conference was held in Rome, which indicated the necessity for the countries participating in this conference to provide their political and military support to the Syrian opposition. (Abdel Halim, 2013) The Sixth “Friends of Syria” conference was held in the Jordanian capital Amman on May 22, 2013, which included the importance of forming a transitional government from the Syrian opposition, provided that this pressure would take place at the Second Geneva conference, in addition to the need for the withdrawal of armed militias of Hezbollah. (Muhammad, 2015).
2: Initiatives after the Iran nuclear deal:
The Republic of Iran indicated the need to conclude a nuclear agreement with the “5 +1” group, believing that this would contribute to finding a peaceful political solution to all the crises in the Arab World, and a number of initiatives were proposed, the most important of which are::
- The initiative of the UN envoy “de Mistura”, which was presented to the Security Council on July 29, 2015, called for the formation of four working groups for the purpose of implementing the Geneva Declaration, establishing a body for transitional governance and elections, and finding a solution to military and security issues. Iran’s initiative on August 4, 2015 included the process of forming a government of national unity and introducing amendments to the constitution to guarantee the rights of religious and ethnic minorities.
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s initiative on the Syrian crisis, issued on August 8, 2015, stipulated that parliamentary and presidential elections be held under the supervision of the United Nations.
On August 19, 2015, Moscow announced its readiness to hold the “Geneva 3” conference.
On September 30, 2015, China called for a political solution to the Syrian crisis, excluding the military tool, while working on combating terrorism on the other hand. – From October 30 to November 13, 2015, the Vienna Meetings were held with the participation of about 17 countries and three international organizations. These meetings ended with the decision to hold elections within 18 months with the necessity of a ceasefire.
On November 19, 2015, it was announced by Iranian Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs “Hussein Amir” that Iran would not allow talks in the upcoming meetings about the fate of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and that this decision is up to the Syrian people.
On November 26, 2015, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the existence of contacts and efforts being made between Saudi Arabia and opposition groups with the aim of holding a meeting aimed at unifying opposition forces in Syria.
In early 2016, three rounds of indirect negotiations between the regime and the opposition were held in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations Special Envoy to Syria de Mistura, which clashed with the methods of the transitional period and violations of the armistice. From March to July 2017, there were four more rounds of indirect negotiations that yielded nothing. On December 14, the UN envoy accused Damascus – following another round of negotiations – of undermining the negotiations by refusing to negotiate with the opposition, considering it a “missed golden opportunity.” On January 26, 2018, the Ninth International Round ended in disappointment in Vienna, which hosted it for logistical reasons, noting that it is usually held in Geneva. (Muhammad, 2015) in January 2017, Russia and Iran, allies of the regime and Turkey, organized support for the Syrian opposition in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. Negotiations included, for the first time, representatives of the Syrian regime and others of the opposition factions, and these three “sponsoring” countries announced in late December 2016 a ceasefire between the Syrian forces and the opposition factions. Russia was able to change the data on the ground following its military intervention in late September 2015 in Syria in support of the regime
Seven rounds of negotiations took place, leading to an agreement on establishing four “de-escalation zones” that would allow the fighting to recede, but not completely.
On January 30, 2018, representatives of the Syrian civil and political society met in Sochi at the invitation of Moscow to draft a new constitution for the country. But the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces – which represents the main opposition groups – and Kurdish organizations loyal to the United States, refused to participate in this meeting, and the delegation of the Syrian opposition factions, consisting of about 80 people, returned to Ankara after refusing to participate in the conference, and said in a statement that they were surprised that he “None of the promises that were made have been fulfilled; neither the brutal bombing of civilians has stopped, nor the regime’s flags on the conference banners and slogans removed, in addition to the lack of the assets of diplomatic decency from the host country.” It was agreed at the meeting to establish a committee for constitutional reform that would include representatives elected at the conference and representatives of groups that did not attend.
The Russian-American agreement of September 9, 2016
In light of the developments in Syria, the conflict between political forces, the spread of extremist groups and the war on terror, America and Russia sought to stop the battles between the regime and the opposition, as former US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached an agreement to impose a truce between the conflicting parties, especially in The city of Aleppo, and actually the cessation of the war began on September 12, 2016, and the United Nations sought to pass an international resolution obliging the conflicting parties in Syria to stop the battles in the disputed areas, but Russia and China suspended the decision through their use of their veto power against the draft resolution. In mid-November 2016, the Syrian regime launched a violent attack on the city of Aleppo to regain neighborhoods controlled by the opposition, and on January 22, 2016, the Syrian regime announced its complete control of the city of Aleppo. (www.aljazera.net)
The Russian-Turkish plan for peace in Syria:
the parties to the Syrian crisis announced their commitment to the decision of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which he issued on December 29, 2016, regarding a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed three documents between the opposition and the regime. The first document relates to a comprehensive ceasefire, the second deals with its oversight, and the third relates to the preparation for peace negotiations. The “Astana” conference, which was held on January 23 and 24, 2017, represented an important shift in the interactions of the crisis after the ceasefire was confirmed. (Ahmed, Ahmed Syed,2017).
Through the above, it is clear that the Syrian revolution that began since March 2011 was an extension of the so-called “Arab Spring” and as a result of the political, social and economic conditions in which the Syrian people live. The demands of the revolutionaries were focused on demanding change and reform. The protests soon expanded and spread to Homs, Hama and Deir Ezzor. And Idlib. The Syrian crisis was characterized by globalism in terms of the presence of forces, and it recorded a shift and turn in the nature of the ongoing conflict between the active forces in the crisis. The Free Syrian Army was formed and followed by the formation of many armed militias that confronted government forces in most cities, whose main goal became to bring down the regime, as well as the entry of a number A large number of militants from several countries, especially Islamic and takfiri groups, part of which belongs to the Al-Qaeda organization, which is known as the State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), and the Al-Nusra Front, which is the largest and most powerful front fighting on Syrian soil, and the armed opposition began to receive financial and political support and support from several countries On the regional and international levels, the opposition was active on the political level by forming the Syrian National Council, the Syrian coalition, and then forming a government in exile, but it did not have an effective influence on the Syrian arena.
Astana negotiations to solve the Syrian crisis:
Astana negotiations began in January 2017 and reached their eighth stage by calling them to be held on December 22, 2017, and among the most important results of the previous meetings was the call for indirect negotiations, the release of detainees, and the identification of areas for reducing tension, with the continued aggression of the Assad regime and the failure of its guarantor allies, Russia and Iran. With the ceasefire decisions.
The most prominent stations of the Astana negotiations since its inception can be summarized as follows:
Astana 1: On January 23, 2017, the most important thing in that meeting took place, the emphasis on a political solution in Syria, and the delegations of Russia, Turkey and Iran reached an agreement to establish a tripartite mechanism to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire in Syria, as the countries sponsoring the negotiations
(Turkey) agreed And Russia and Iran) provided that the negotiations between the two delegations of the Assad regime and the opposition are indirect, and the opposition delegation called on Russia to declare a ceasefire on Syrian territory. The Astana meeting statement confirmed that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis, and stressed the need to adhere to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria. The statement also mentioned that the “participating delegations” insist on fighting the Islamic State and the Fatah al-Sham Front (formerly Al-Nusra), and that they be separated from groups Armed opposition.( Gilsinan,2015)
Astana 2: It began its work on February 15, 2017: The most prominent thing in this round is the talk about forming a tripartite working group (Russian, Turkish and Iranian) to monitor the cessation of hostilities, and the formation of a mechanism for the exchange of detainees between the Assad regime forces and the armed opposition
Astana 3: Launched on March 14, 2017: The most prominent thing is that Russia submitted proposals to draw up a constitution for the country, and the third round of negotiations ended in light of the boycott of the armed opposition. The final statement of this round confirmed that the next round meeting was held in early May 2017, and that it was agreed to hold a meeting at the level of experts in Tehran during June 2017, and the statement confirmed the guarantor countries’ agreement to form committees to monitor the truce and violations, and committees to follow up the aid file. And committees for the file of prisoners and detainees.
Astana 4: It began its work on May 4, 2017, and the most prominent result of which is the agreement on areas of de-escalation, which includes the entire Idlib Governorate, Latakia Governorate, Aleppo Governorate, parts of Hama, Homs, Daraa and Quneitra governorates, and the Eastern Ghouta region in Rural Damascus.
The representatives of the countries sponsoring the Astana talks (Russia, Turkey and Iran) signed the memorandum proposed by Russia to establish areas to reduce tension in Syria, and Russia confirmed that it would be implemented for a period of six months, which could be extended, while the opposition delegation announced that they are not part of the agreement. ( Holliday, 2013, p.9 ).
Astana 5: It was launched on July 4, 2017, and the three guarantor countries – Russia, Turkey, and Iran – disagreed over the delineation of the borders of the de-escalation zones in Syria, and after two days of negotiations, two subsequent meetings were scheduled on the first and second of August 2017 in Iran, in order to agree on maps for the two regions. The second and third, with questions regarding the first region in Idlib governorate, and some reservations regarding the southern region.
Astana 6: Its work began on September 14, 2017, after the opposition submitted several complaints that the Assad regime did not adhere to the de-escalation agreement in many regions, and the opposition delegation included 24 members headed by Brigadier General Ahmed Berri, and Bashar al-Jaafari headed the Assad delegation. The previously announced de-escalation zones, especially the Idlib region, which was the focus of disputes.
Astana 8: Its work ended on December 21, and the final statement approved a document on forming a special working group to discuss the file of missing and detained persons and exchanging bodies, despite the opposition of the Assad regime’s delegation until the last moment. The document on mine clearance in Syria was also approved, including on cultural heritage sites listed on the UNESCO list, according to the final statement read by the Kazakh Foreign Minister, Khairat Abdurrahmanov. In Astana-8, it was decided to hold the “Syrian Dialogue” conference in Sochi, Russia, between January 29-30, 2017, as a “tributary” to the international efforts for a political solution. It was decided to hold a technical meeting by the “guarantor” countries, prior to the “dialogue conference”, in Sochi, in preparation for it.
Astana 9: The Syrian Dialogue Conference will come, in the Russian city of Sochi, on January 30th. And “Astana 9” is the first in 2018.
The Hamburg Agreement and its Results: In a new chapter in the scene of the events taking place in Syria, Moscow and Washington announced that they had reached a ceasefire agreement in southern Syria, coinciding with the meeting between US Presidents Donald Trump and Russian Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 summit, which was held in Hamburg, Germany. On the sidelines of the G20 summit, Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump reached a ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria, which includes combat zones in the Daraa and Quneitra governorates, and its implementation will start on July 9, 2017. The agreement came as a result. A negotiating path far from the spotlight that took place between Russian, American and Jordanian experts in the Jordanian capital, Amman, from which Israel was not far, to establish security arrangements that would include southwestern Syria, secure the borders of Jordan and Israel, and prevent Iran from approaching them. This is the main goal of the agreement for the two countries. This agreement is the latest in a series of Russian-American agreements aimed at imposing a ceasefire in Syria, or in parts of it, and allowing humanitarian aid to enter the fighting areas or besieged areas. ( Mchugh, 2016)
The withdrawal of the Assad regime forces and the militants loyal to them, the withdrawal of the fighting and Islamic factions from the lines of contact in all axes, and the spread of the internal security forces of the Assad regime in these lines.
Deploying Russian military police forces in the ceasefire areas in the three governorates in the agreement (Quneitra, Daraa, and As-Suwayda) to supervise the ceasefire and implement the truce. The armed revolution factions included in the agreement are responsible for the protection of public and private facilities, and the exit of all who do not wish to agree to the agreement.
The withdrawal of all armed militias loyal to the Assad regime of non-Syrian nationalities.
Preparing the infrastructure for the successive return of Syrian refugees from Jordan, holding local council elections that have broad powers, and delivering humanitarian aid to these areas that abide by the ceasefire, and the agreement includes managing the region between Moscow and Washington in an alliance between them, reflecting their political and military compatibility in Syria. One of his early products was the agreement outside Astana and Geneva.
The Vietnam Agreement and its data: Iranian apprehension against Russia appeared coinciding with the joint statement announced by Moscow and Washington, and caused a sensation in Tehran, after the meeting between US Presidents Trump and Russian Putin on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Forum in Danang, Vietnam on 11/11/2017. Embodying a series of US-Russian meetings approved by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Sergey Lavrov, the two sides emphasized that “the final political settlement of the conflict must be found within the framework of the Geneva process and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.” Which was known as the “Trump-Putin” document.
The de-escalation zones agreement:
The safe sites established by the United Nations have been called in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Security Council Resolution 819 (1993) for the first time touched upon the concept of a safe zone and demanded that Srebrenica and its surrounding areas be treated as a safe zone that must be free from any armed attacks or other acts of aggression. . Subsequently, the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina were expanded to other cities in need of security through Resolution 824 (1993), to include Sarajevo, Tuzla, eba, Gorazdi and Bihac. The aim of these decisions, which allowed the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, was to prohibit armed attacks or any hostile action in and around these areas, and to increase the number of the United Nations Protection Force in order to monitor the humanitarian situation in safe areas. In addition, the Security Council, in its Resolution No. 836 (1993), which was adopted on the basis of Chapter Seven as well, authorized the United Nations Protection Force to use force to respond to any party bombing safe areas, or to counter any armed incursion into them, or in the event of any deliberate obstruction. For the freedom of movement of the force or the protected humanitarian convoys. It also authorized member states, within the authority of the Security Council and in coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force, to support the latter through the use of air power in and around safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia.
The positions of the Syrian opposition from the negotiations
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the civil-national opposition (that is, those activists and politicians who have jointly gained international recognition as an alternative to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad) have faced insurmountable obstacles to the possibility of it becoming a balanced party inside Syria. It was unable to exert significant influence over the complex and opaque network of civilian governance institutions that emerged with the succession of the conflict in sequence, and was effectively separated from the armed factions that took hold of security in Syrian areas outside of government control.
While a variety of political and military groups made known the sword of the opposition against the Assad regime, elements of the civil-national wing of the opposition shared a more distinct history. This opposition has its roots in the Damascus Declaration for National Democratic Change in October 2005, which was signed by activists from across the political spectrum under the slogan of political reform. After the uprising erupted in 2011, many signatories joined the Muslim Brotherhood and other exiled political figures to form the Syrian National Council. This council, and other groups, later transformed itself into the National Coalition for the Forces of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition, which was based in Istanbul and was also known as the Syrian National Coalition, and was the tool of governance in it the Syrian Interim Government. The Syrian opposition also included the Negotiating Committee for the Forces of the Syrian Revolution and the Opposition, an organizational umbrella that was formed at the urging of Saudi Arabia to unite Syrian political groups in preparation for the peace negotiations sponsored by the United Nations. ( Salacanin, , 2016)
For several years, both the Syrian and international actors have referred to the nationalcivilian wing as the “Syrian opposition,” underscoring its presumed importance. And because this opposition participated in a peace plan for Syria supervised by the United Nations, and was returning its origins to the long civil campaign against the Assad regime and in favor of reform, it enjoyed legitimacy and did not face serious doubts about it at the beginning of the uprising. However, the escalation of the military conflict in the country, the accompanying humanitarian crises, and the exacerbation of sectarian features, created dynamics that increasingly marginalized the civilian and national dimensions, which ultimately led to the complete marginalization of the Syrian opposition.
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the civil-national opposition has preferred the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power, but it has lacked a detailed vision of a post-Assad Syria and a practical plan for achieving change. This was a huge deficiency that raised doubts about whether the opposition was really a viable alternative to the Syrian regime with a clear idea of the new regime it was seeking to create.
Initially, the opposition focused its efforts on implementing the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012, which was a metaphor for a six-point plan described by the UN Security Council as a framework for a political solution in Syria. However, the general objectives of the opposition remained vague, and this is partly due to the stated goals set by the statement. As the document called for “an interim governing body with full executive powers to be formed by mutual consent.” Members of the political opposition considered that this condition guarantees them the exercise of the right of veto over whether or not Assad is a party to the Transitional Authority 1, which reinforced their ultimate goal of changing the entire system.
However, there was a negative dimension in taking this absolute stance towards the Assad regime without developing other credible options. As this diminished the effects that the opposition could have exercised when it had signaled to the regime that it would reap nothing but the wind from the negotiations. Nicolas Van Dam, a former Dutch ambassador to the Middle East and author of a very important book on Syria, pointed to this shortcoming, saying: “There was no room for working with the regime in the opposition lexicon. 2 The opposition, with its focus on demands for leadership change and the implementation of sweeping reforms in The security and military institutions practically ask their interlocutors in the Syrian government to voluntarily surrender the state’s authority to it. On the other hand, the state’s refusal to legitimize the political opposition led to unresolved tensions that also undermined the negotiations. Because of her case and tangible political power, and she was unable to fully realize “that being right is one thing, and achieving this right is another completely different thing.”
The civil-national opposition was able to list three major failures that prevented it from imposing itself as a capable and effective player:
The first failure is its organizational fragmentation. The opposition’s inability to make clear, unified, and enforceable demands limited its ability to exert influence. Even when its bodies issued statements emphasizing the importance of unity, these initiatives rarely materialized in concrete efforts to integrate the opposition components administratively. This shortcoming reflected and deepened the unclear goals, and indeed the conflicting reality, of Syria’s post-war future.
second failure is that the civil-national opposition has overestimated its capabilities, assuming that the gestures of verbal or symbolic support by external actors are equal to the influence inside Syria, and of course it was never like this. Although regional and international calls to support the opposition came mostly in the early years of the conflict, the armed factions that control the territories inside Syria have not paid any attention to either the opposition’s international situation or its attempts to have a say in the developments inside the country. And when the armed opposition’s fortunes began to crumble in 2016, the bodies nominally recognized as having sovereignty over all anti-government forces did not have any practical tools other than rhetoric to counter the advances of government forces.( Cunningham 2013, p. 26).
third failure is that since the start of the conflict, both the civilian-national opposition and its external backers have failed to publicly acknowledge the widespread influence of Islamist armed factions. The high organizational capabilities of these factions allowed them to seize Syrian lands, but the almost complete unwillingness of the civilnational opposition to recognize the true influence of these groups left them lacking the means or structures to effectively confront the Islamist forces as soon as the latter became part of the conflict. Such a deficit had far-reaching repercussions, because the opposition’s inability to confront these groups, apart from exercising any influence over them, made it itself lose the support of external forces that were resentful of the Islamists ’behavior.
Conclusion
Russia is still imposing its vision to find a solution to the conflict in Syria, in light of the West’s efforts to contain it, with the absence of a clear executive mechanism to implement the international political track in Geneva. It can be believed that the West will constantly seek to obstruct reaching a comprehensive political agreement led by Russia, unless the latter submits to the US-European demands to transfer the weight of the political process from Astana to Geneva. Consequently, the de-escalation zones will not lead to a comprehensive ceasefire if Russia tries to circumvent them to restore the Syrian regime’s presence.
Here, it is necessary to present the position of the Syrian opposition regarding this international-regional dispute over the political track, and in fact it is not possible to rely on a strong and unified role for it, for various reasons, most notably:
- Russia’s success in isolating the military factions from each other within unconnected geographic enclaves, and each of them took a different stance to the other on the course of the political process, whether in Astana or Geneva.
- The inability of the Syrian opposition to solve the problem of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, which weakened its military influence on the ground in northern Syria.
- The dispersion of the power of the factions and their failure to form a single military bloc to represent them.
- The wide discrepancy between the vision of the military factions and the political opposition.
Opinions and positions varied among the members of the Security Council on the Syrian crisis, which contributed to the exacerbation of the crisis, and thus reflected on the continuation of the crisis and the failure to reach solutions to the crisis, which led to an increase in the deaths and injuries, the displacement of millions of Syrian refugees in various countries of the world, and the almost complete destruction of the infrastructure in some countries. The governorates, and this is what made the council’s effectiveness almost non-existent as a result of one member (Russia) using the right of veto, contrary to the trends and desires of the majority in the council as well as the majority in the United Nations General Assembly, which creates a conviction that it is impossible for the Council to address the issues currently and in the future.
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