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Research studies

QATAR’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ARAB SPRING

 

Prepared by the researcher   : Omar Khalid Ahmed –  Supervised By:  Dr. Mohamed Hussein –    Cairo University – Faculty of Economics and Political  Science – Political Science Department

Democratic Arab Center

Introduction

Foreign policy is based on the principle of achieving interests by recognizing the sources of power and clarifying the goals that the ruling elites seek to achieve through their political behaviour in the international environment, and therefore foreign policy is linked to the size of personal capabilities and the size of political ambition, in addition to the influence of external environment factors such as forces, positions, variables and interests, Foreign policy expresses the totality of the state’s orientations towards states and other actors, as we can touch the roles of any state in foreign policy through its positions and opinions in global politics[1], what is happening in terms of events and developments in the world, and how it looks at its present and future amid a number of conflicting events In the midst of regional and international interactions, it is difficult for any country to distance itself in front of it on many issues and positions.

Given that, the State of Qatar is one of the Gulf States that belongs to the newly independent third world countries, but it is considered one of the countries active in its regional and international environment. Addressing domestic issues, reflected in adopting the option of political openness and proceeding with economic achievements, has resulted in the consolidation of Qatar’s position in international forums, which qualified it to play an active role at the regional level.

The events of the spring that took place in the Arab region at the end of 2010, which started in Tunisia and with the expansion of its influence and repercussions, was necessary in the face of these developments and the influences that produced them – and which most of their interactions are still not over – for the foreign policy of this country to be thoroughly studied and researched. So that those who follow Arab policies in light of the great absence of central states from influencing the course of events can notice the increasing and influential role that Qatar has played and is still playing at the regional level in that Arab spring.

Research Problem

Given the dynamic that characterized Qatar’s foreign policy in many files in light of the Arab spring, and considering that Qatar is a prominent example of a small Arab country that plays an effective role at the regional level, the escalating Qatari role in the Arab region raises itself within the research community and raises many questions about its causes And its foundations, especially in light of Qatar’s lack of many elements that qualify it to play an influential role at the regional or international level, which necessitated subjecting this policy to study and research in an attempt to understand the nature of this role and thus know the most important variables controlling the determination of the Qatari foreign policy in light of the Arab spring.

Main Question

– What is the nature of the role that the Qatari foreign policy plays in the period of the Arab spring and the future of that role thereafter?

Sub questions

  1. What perceptions and foundations does Qatar have in determining its external role?
  2. What are the tools of the Qatar’s foreign policy towards the countries of the Arab Spring?
  3. How did the Qatar’s foreign policy interact with its external environment in light of the Arab spring?
  4. What are the tools of the Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Arab Spring countries?
  5. What are the attitudes of the Arab peoples in the Arab Spring countries towards the Qatari foreign policy?

Objectives

The topic covered by the study aims at the following:

  1. Standing on several aspects of the Qatari foreign policy related to its foundations, objectives, tools, and behaviour
  2. The study seeks to know the degree of Qatar’s interaction with its external surroundings in light of the spring in the Arab region, as the study tries mainly to highlight the nature and quality of this role, by examining the internal and external aspects that allow knowing the extent of Qatar’s interaction with the regional and international circles.
  3. Evaluates the role that the State of Qatar plays through its foreign policy in the context of the Arab spring and tries to foresee the future of this role.
  4. The scarcity of studies that dealt with the issue of the Arab Spring in terms of the foreign policy orientations of countries and the lack of resources due to the novelty of the topic and the lack of end repercussions, in addition to the dynamism that characterized Qatari diplomacy in many directions, in addition to the activity and effectiveness of the Qatari foreign policy and its ambiguity and sometimes contradiction, which encourages its study And research it.

 Significance

The importance of the topic lies in the context of a growing Qatari role in the light of the Arab spring, especially since Qatar, given its size, saw for itself a role that is not commensurate with its capabilities, size and strength. Hence, the importance of the study in that it reveals that small countries – including Qatar – have a distinctive pattern. Its foreign policy reflects its concerns and interests, and is characterized in large part by the absence of ideological influence and the predominance of pragmatism. Small countries have a different situation, whether at the level of perceptions or at the level of policies that they follow to achieve their interests. Dealing quickly and boldly with successive events, which give it a comparative advantage and the opportunity to refine this role, taking advantage of the absence of the role of traditional forces in the region that is preoccupied with its internal conditions or afraid to destabilize the fragile regional system, which makes this role worth research and study.

The scientific and theoretical importance of the study is represented in the orientation of the field of international relations towards more specialization and accuracy in describing and analyzing international interactions, as international research canters began to pay a remarkable interest in studies and research that focus on familiarity with the foreign policy of small-sized countries in terms of their population and geographical area for their distinguished role.

 As well as the importance of studies and research that are concerned with knowing the different aspects of interaction between countries of the world, i.e. what is known as regional/ Area studies, as we find many academic and scientific research canters in the United States of America and France, for example, spending huge budgets to study the internal conditions of countries and their position within the international system, in addition to The growing mobility of experts.

Scope

In response to the nature of the topic covered by the study and analysis, we have decided to address it within two temporal and spatial domains that have been identified as follows:

Time Frame: The study covers the period of time extending from 2010 to 2014, which is the period in which the Arab region witnessed a political spring that began in Tunisia and then extended to include many Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, and Syria.

Spatial framework: The geographical area of study can be determined in the State of Qatar precisely because it is the focus of the study with some Arab countries in North Africa and Asia.

Hypotheses

The importance of hypotheses in scientific research is evident in that they direct the researcher to a number of facts that he must search for in his study instead of fixing his efforts without specific hypotheses, and it also helps him to reveal the relationships that exist between the phenomena that he studies in his specialization, so a group of Assumptions that are consistent with the objectives of the study, as follows:

  1. The role of Qatar’s foreign policy in the light of the Arab spring is determined by the ambition of the ruling elite and its desire to achieve regional status.
  2. The increasing role of Qatari foreign policy towards the countries of the Arab spring is linked to a decline and absence in the roles of the pivotal Arab countries in the region.

Methodology

  1. Content analysis approach: in analyzing some important issues by analyzing speeches and statements and standing on them as an important matter.
  1. The comparative approach: Where a comparison will be made between one period of time and another and the actions of the Qatari foreign policy between one event and another and between one country and another in order to identify the extent to which Qatari policy has developed

Outline

Proposal

  • Research Question
  • Sub questions
  • Significance.
  • Hypotheses
  • Methodology

Chapter (1):

  • The foundations of Qatar’s foreign policies
  • Motives and Tools of the Qatar’s role

 

Chapter (2):

  • Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Arab spring in North Africa (Tunisia- Egypt- Libya)
  • Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Arab spring in Asia (Syria-Yemen)
  • Evaluating the Qatari role in the stage of the Arab spring

Chapter (3):

  • The implications of the Arab spring on the interactions of Qatar’s regional policy
  • Determining future paths for the Qatar’s role in light of the repercussions of the Arab spring

Conclusion and Recommendations

References

Chapter (1)

First Topic: The foundations of the Qatari foreign policy

To understand the Qatari foreign policy, it is necessary to know the foundations affecting this policy, by standing on its historical background, its constituents and objectives, and its most important tools in light of the emergence of the recently escalating Qatari role in a number of regional issues.

1-Historical Background:

Since 1995, the State of Qatar has emerged as one of the Gulf States seeking to play an influential regional role, and has been keen to find a place for it on the agenda of the relevant international and regional powers and interests in the Middle East region. The Qatari foreign policy in a different way at this stage to become more involved and active in the main issues in the region, as Qatar sought to be more independent from the countries of the region and sought to establish relations outside the Gulf region and in order to protect its security. The basis of this stage is to establish balanced relations with all regional and international powers, Consequently, Qatar moved away from the traditional dependence on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and established direct military relations with the United States, and from here, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shifted from a strategic depth to a parallel party. With the discovery of large gas reserves in the country, the Emir launched strong expansion projects and policies locally and regionally that covered a whole range of areas, all of which served the new foreign policy based on self-respect. A small country whose original population does not exceed 225 thousand people and Qatar soon managed to form an amazing network of relations.[2] On the one hand, it established good relations with the United States and on the other hand, it established strong relations with the Palestinian Hamas and Hezbollah springs. Allah the Lebanese and many other Islamic parties.

At the beginning of the spring that the Arab region built in late 2010, the Qatari leadership considered this spring the opportunity it was waiting for to confirm its regional role and position through the expansion of the use of the media tool, its diplomatic activity, its financial support, and even its military support (as in Libya and Syria) which it believed existed. A vacuum at the level of the region’s leadership, where it can intervene bypassing the barriers of deepening political activity on the size of the country, both geographically and demographically, and compensating for the lack of Arab influence in the region. The reasons that prompted Qatar to make a shift in its foreign policy from conservative to active:[3]

  • Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: any small country that is easy to control and occupy, and this made Qatar think that it does not secure neighbouring countries like what happened with Kuwait, and therefore Qatar tended to establish parallel relations with all countries
  • Qatar’s disagreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1992 over the “Al-Khfous” area coincided with Qatar’s belief that Saudi Arabia stands by Bahrain in its dispute with Qatar over the “Hawar” islands.
  • Qatar’s wealth has grown dramatically, making Qatar self-reliant through the export of oil and gas. In addition, some researchers attribute the beginning of the emergence of the regional and international role that Qatar created by hosting a number of events that accompanied the launch of Al Jazeera, especially the Asian-African conference in Doha in 1997.

2-Economic fundamentals:

Economic variables have an important role in guiding the external behaviour of the state, the more the state’s position in the economic field, the greater its position and power at the international level, which allows it to strengthen its political will and allows it to have a greater degree of independence and influence the behaviour of other countries. With regard to the economic situation of the State of Qatar, it was based on fishing and the pearl trade in the past, but the country witnessed an important quantum leap in its economy after its discovery of the first oil well in 1938, and the importance of the emirate in the international strategy increased after its discovery of huge quantities of natural gas in recent years, which made The state enjoys large financial reserves as a result of gas revenues that have enabled it to build a network of large international investments. The steady rise in oil and gas prices has had huge revenues for the Qatari state and enabled it to finance an active foreign policy.

The important economic capabilities that Qatar possesses have made it one of the richest Arab countries, and although it is like the rest of the other Gulf countries, its wealth is mainly based on oil and natural gas exports, it has taken steps to diversify its economic base and build a strong financial sector, as it represents the other important basis for the Qatari role.[4] The emerging Middle East in the successful process of diversifying its economy, as the decline in oil prices in the 1980s, and the ensuing pressure on the generous social welfare system, convinced the ruling families across the Arabian Peninsula that if they want to stay in power, they must diversify their economies away from oil through Supporting other sectors, as Qatar focuses on diversification in various fields such as air transport, real estate, telecommunications, tourism and others[5].

3-Political leadership

The external determinants produced by the international environment have an important role in the foreign policy of each country, and there is no doubt that reading the reasons behind the emergence of the Qatari role in recent years requires knowledge of all aspects that have qualified it for this. At the external level, several factors helped in the clear rise of the Qatari role, especially regionally. In the foreground:[6]

  • The retreat of the traditional roles of the pivotal Arab countries as a catalyst for the emergence of the Qatari role
  • The pivotal Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria) were absorbed in their internal crises, and these countries were living in a transitional phase in the context of rebuilding their political systems, which means that their stability and the unity of their societies prevailed over them from the main sources of power and turned to themselves, and created a vacuum
  • As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is the fourth pivotal state, its traditional policy towards dealing with the existing Arab order through the principle of preserving it has kept it from playing the pioneering and pivotal role, and the conservative policy towards the Arab spring that was in place in the Arab region kept it as well back row.

In light of these considerations, Qatar has taken upon itself to fill this void, consistent with an international influx and the acceptance of broad Arab popular groups with this role that contributed to the media coverage of “Al-Jazeera” and its financial tool, in addition to the presence of a strong international ally in charge of defending security and stability The state from external threats: represented by the United States of America, whose presence in Qatar is one of the largest size of the US military presence abroad, as Qatar hosts the largest American military base in the region[7]

Active membership of the State of Qatar in several international and regional organizations: In the framework of its endeavour to play pioneering roles in the international system, in addition to the awareness of Qatari decision-makers of the need to work through international organizations and activate membership in it or its work, and participate in various international forums and provide support to it, and at the level of The regional system through the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States. It has gained Qatar a strong base of diplomatic action and successful political work, and great experience in hosting and organizing important international conferences.

Second Topic: Motives and mechanisms of the Qatari role:

Firstly: Motives of the Qatari role:

The drivers of the Qatari role can be understood through two main determinants: the first is the “survival strategy”; As a large part of Qatar’s large natural gas fields are on the coasts within the disputed border areas with Bahrain, and extend to the maritime border with Iran, and this situation has convinced Qatar to adopt a non-confrontational approach with regard to Iran, in order to ensure the smooth flow of gas, even during times of tension Between Iran and its neighbours or between it and the United States. While the second determinant is Qatar’s desire and ambition to achieve regional and international status, by leaving the orbit of Saudi domination over the Arab Gulf states, and realizing its lack of capabilities and resources with which it can compete with Saudi Arabia, the largest power in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar has resorted to Several mechanisms to achieve an independent position, the most important of which are:

  • Establishing strong relations with the United States, the most important strategic partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, by hosting the largest American military base outside the United States, as well as pursuing a policy of rapprochement with Israel, Washington’s main ally in the region.
  • The launch of the Al-Jazeera satellite channel in 1996, which enabled Qatar to open the files that are silent about it, especially in its relations with Saudi Arabia, and then the relations between the two countries witnessed many political skirmishes and media splits that sometimes went out of fashion and reached the point of questioning the national positions of the two countries.[8]
  • Exiting the Saudi sphere of influence in OPEC, as Qatar began seeking to form an organization for the exporting countries of gas as an alternative to OPEC, so that Qatar, rich in gas, becomes a competitor to Saudi Arabia, which is rich in oil. Qatar has masterfully drawn its foreign policy in light of these two previous determinants by relying on a type of diplomacy, the first of which is mediation diplomacy, through which it aimed to consolidate its position in the region by drawing the image of a neutral mediator who can be relied upon and interested in peace and stability in the region … As for the second type, it is public diplomacy that is practiced through the media, and the complementarily of these two types of diplomacy with each other, and here highlights the role of Al-Jazeera in shedding light on Qatari mediation to highlight and amplify the Qatari role.

In terms of its foreign policy, Qatar aims to achieve a number of goals, the most important of which are:[9]

  • Ensuring the continuity of the hereditary rule in the emirate, by finding partners and allies on all levels, who will prevent the fall of the regime.
  • Strengthening its position at the level of its regional and global interactions through its playing roles, and its success in some cases when major regional powers failed, enhances its position as an honest broker, thus enhancing its position on the arena of regional and global interactions.
  • Ensuring the continuity of the Qatari economic growth and looking for the post-gas phase, which is reflected in Qatari investments, whether in its human capital or in all parts of the world.

Secondly: Qatar’s foreign policy tools:[10]

1- The diplomatic tool:

Mediation diplomacy: In the early last decade, Qatar demonstrated itself as the main mediator in regional and Arab conflicts (Western Sahara, Libya, Darfur, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc), and Qatar established working relations with Israel as well as with Iran. Hamas and Hezbollah, and this neutral position served many Qatari interests, as it helped build the mark of Qatar as a friend of all in the region, and thus as a potential investment destination, and perhaps even protected Qatar from the repercussions of the regional conflict by claiming that it is not an enemy of anyone. Building regional stability can only enhance the potential for regional economic development in which Qatar was hoping to play the role of the centre, and building good relations with everyone would increase the emirate’s position as a country with a role in the Middle East.[11] Until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in December 2010, Qatar confirmed its position as one of the countries that have good relations with everyone in the region, taking advantage of the absence of the role of traditional forces in the region preoccupied with its internal conditions[12]. Because of its small size and decision-making structure, Qatar was able to Dealing quickly and boldly with successive events, which gives it a comparative advantage for its foreign policy. Since 2011, the emirate has constructed a shift in its adopted approach to its foreign policy, moving from a policy of peaceful mediation and conflict resolution across the Arab world and Africa to direct intervention in some crises and stopping by the parties to the conflict, especially Libya and Tunisia.

Alliances diplomacy: Qatar considers one of its most important concerns to protect itself by concluding security and military agreements due to its inability to protect itself on its own, and Qatar saw after Saudi Arabia refrained from supporting the authoritarian coup in Doha in the mid-nineties, but that it would be safer with the presence of American military bases on its soil, according to According to political science theories, Qatar has to protect its security, either linking with a major country or balancing between several countries by adopting volatile policies towards these countries to create a margin for its own manoeuvre and alliance with the group of countries in international organizations. Qatar has adopted a new policy that combines the three options, but it is not limited to any One of them is where Doha has established clear security relations with Washington as a guarantor of its security.[13] As for potential threats, options for linking with a major country are in progress. Doha has also relied on the second principle, that is, a balance between several countries through good working relations with Israel and Iran, in other words Qatar brought together the contradictions of the regional order in the Middle East. In addition, it employed it to its advantage, by that it protected itself from falling under the domination of one regional power, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Qatar did not provide the third available alternative in theory. It is a small alliance with a group of international organizations. Qatar is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, from which a military force emerges to deter regional military threats.[14]

2- The media tool:

Qatar relies on the media tool as one of the basic tools in its foreign policy and in exercising its role in the region, as the launch of the Al-Jazeera satellite channel was among Qatar’s most influential projects in 1996, and the idea of ​​establishing the channel was consistent with the scope and steps of media reform and modernization of the media law. This editorial space proved remarkably beneficial to Al Jazeera, as it was able to broadcast critically acclaimed critical programming on Arab politics and controversial social, economic and cultural issues.[15]

In any case, the station presented a new case for understanding the role of modern cross-border media in supporting foreign policy, and this matter requires more reflection on classic approaches, as the term “geo-political” usually helps in describing the politics between nations, and the expressions of the expression “geo-economic.” Later in the nineties of the twentieth century to denote the processes of competition between political-economic forces emerging in the context of globalization, and by extension and deriving from the country case, a geo-informational term could be presented in an attempt to describe the dynamics of the use of intense, cross-border and global media in countries to compensate for the weak aspects or Absent in its “geo-political or geo-economic” strengths.[16] From a geographical-media perspective, we can explain in a more precise way the parallel emergence of the island’s influence and Qatar’s foreign policy. Qatar has been motivated to overcome the shortcomings that a geographical analysis can indicate – Political, so that Al-Jazeera station is widely viewed as one of the tools of the Qatari role in the region, especially as it is a competitor to the Al-Arabia Network, which it owns. For Saudi Arabia, and in this way, Al Jazeera’s coverage of any event can be considered a form of interference in that event.[17]

3- Cultural and religious tool:

The employments of these tools are shown by:[18]

  • Various cultural endeavours: Through Qatar’s participation in prominent cultural and scientific endeavours by hosting many conferences and scientific seminars, establishing universities and scientific research centres, and making many political experts who presented scientific research to contribute to decision-making, and in this context it has opened branches of some leading universities and research institutions In the United States and the United Kingdom in Qatar, just as Qatar hosted scientific and international conferences, seminars on energy, environment, climate, etc., and it has also undertaken a number of other projects such as a world-class Islamic Arts Museum, and a wide range of sporting events, the FIFA World Cup in 1995, the 2006 Asian Games in Doha. , Asian Football 2011, Arab Games 2011, through the request to host the 2022 World Cup, and to win it.
  • Qatar’s accession to the International Organization of la Francophone: Qatar sought to expand the margin of its spring at the global level, especially after it obtained approval to join the International Organization of la Francophone as an “associate member.”
  • Qatar’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood: The Arab spring opened the horizons for Qatar to expand its role through the alliance with the current of political Islam in the countries that witnessed the spring. It has begun to build relationships with Islamic leaders, especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is dominated by the Wahhabi doctrine. It hastened to show its interest in “Wahhabism” and according to its intentions. The Arab Gulf region disputed two approaches in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The first approach adopted by Qatar is based on open dealing with the group and embracing it and investing its influence in a number of Arab countries. The second approach Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the rest of the Gulf states lead it, and it is based on considering the Brotherhood movement who came to power in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as a threat to the security and stability of the countries of the region, as while Qatar hosts conferences and forums for the Muslim Brotherhood, the rest of the region’s countries announce periodic arrests of members The Islamic Group and accusing them of threatening security and stability and conspiring to overthrow the regimes. Qatar has come to play a functional role in crystallizing the new American trends based on engaging moderate Islamic currents in governance according to the scenarios provided by the Arab spring, and the United States has an interest in Qatar becoming the sponsor of Islamic movements in its lands.[19]

4- The Military tool:

Although Qatar possesses limited military power due to its limited population, Qatar maintains its security and defence status through defence agreements with the largest military powers, specifically the United States, as the relationship between the two parties led to the establishment of two large American bases in Qatar. Qatar also has defence agreements with other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar is currently one of the largest destinations in the world for arms manufacturers. [20]

Qatar recently tended to rely on military force, as in the cases of Bahrain and Libya, and this does not necessarily mean the small size of Qatar as a state compared to Saudi Arabia or Egypt excluding the military tool in implementing its foreign policy objectives, but at the same time, due to its size, the use of this military force in a collective setting is noted. Bahrain the Qatari forces were sent in a precedent of its kind within the framework of the Peninsula Shield forces that supported the ruling regime in Bahrain in March 2011, and participated in NATO operations to topple the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya.[21]

Chapter 2

First Topic: Qatar’s foreign policy towards Tunisia

 Tunisia is the cradle of the Arab Spring revolutions, and one of the models indicating the expansion of the Qatari sphere of influence, as it is no longer hidden on the Arab and Tunisian street the great role of the State of Qatar on the economic and political spring, and we can examine the behaviour of the Qatari foreign policy towards the Tunisian revolution through the following dimensions:

First: the political dimension:

The Qatari interest in the Tunisian issue began to emerge clearly when Qatar declared its support for the Tunisian revolution, as Qatar was the first country to announce its support for the revolution, according to what was confirmed by the Tunisian ambassador to Qatar, “Mohammed Al-Zarif,” who described Qatar (as being a pioneer in exchanging visits at the highest levels after the success of the revolution). The State of Qatar is responsible for the costs of treating hundreds of the wounded in the Tunisian revolution, and has transferred a number of them to Doha for treatment at its expense (AlArab, 2012). These distinguished political relations have been reflected in the bilateral cooperation between the two countries to include technical and investment cooperation, communications, trade exchange, cultural exchange and many agreements signed between the two countries[22].

Many believe that the political leadership in Qatar played a supportive role for the Tunisian revolution, as confirmed by what “Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of the Ennahda Movement” in Tunisia said: “Qatar played a pioneering role in the success of the Arab revolutions, including the Tunisian revolution, which it adopted and promoted in the media, and supported The speakers, and helped them express their views.” (Ghannouchi, 2011) Indeed, Ghannouchi went further when he considered Qatar a partner in the success of the Tunisian revolution.

The visits between officials in the two countries multiplied after the revolution, whether in Doha or Tunisia, and resulted in promises from Qatar to support development and investment in Tunisia within the framework of large Qatari investments in the Arab Spring countries, including Tunisia.

The Qatari role seemed important to Tunisians, and this was evident in the visits to Doha by whoever seized power in Tunisia after the revolution. “Caid Essebsi” went in July 2011 to Qatar under the title of introducing the principles and objectives of the revolution. Tunisian minister “Hamadi Jebali” goes to Doha before Paris, the largest economic partner of Tunisia, or influential neighbouring Algeria, or even the United States. Then the Qatari aid began to pour in on the state treasury in Tunisia. This was accompanied by a broad consensus between Tunisia’s foreign policy and Qatar’s foreign policy.

On January 13, 2012, the Emir of Qatar went to Tunisia, where he met the Tunisian president at the presidential palace in Carthage on a visit to congratulate Tunisia on the first anniversary of the revolution. saying “And we, our nature in Qatar, support the trend of cooperation between the State of Qatar and the Arab countries and Arab cooperation in general”, and the Emir added, “expressing his hope for the existence of an Arab entity similar to the European Union, saying that “we have a historical opportunity in the transformations taking place in a number of Arab countries to create an entity as happened. In the European entity”, “he added,” It is our duty to stand by Tunisia to support it to successfully cross this transitional stage, and the field has become open for integration between Arab economies”. (AlArab, 2012) He emphasized that Qatar considers the martyrs of Tunisia to be Qatar’s martyrs, and announced Qatar’s contribution to a fund to support the families of the martyrs and wounded of the revolution. (AlJazeera, 2012)

The Qatari-Tunisian relations and what the visit of the Emir of Qatar caused sparked controversy in the Tunisian street, as political forces considered it interference in internal affairs, and continued efforts by Qatar to extend its influence in the Arab world, and political parties threatened to boycott the opening session of the Constituent Assembly in the event that the Emir of Qatar was invited as a guest of honour, While others were surprised by this refusal to visit the Emir of Qatar, whose country supported the Arab revolutions, and they demanded that those who refused the visit reject the visit of the French President, whose country stood with Ben Ali.[23]

The torrent of criticism directed at the State of Qatar did not stop in the headlines of many Tunisian media, and the criticism was also directed at the movement of Ennahda, in what some described as the identification of Tunisian diplomacy with Qatari stances and submission to its financial and political influence, and the criticism extended to the visits of Tunisian officials to Qatar and the reception of Qatari officials in Tunisia. While some argue that Qatar bet on the Ennahda movement in order to secure its interests in Tunisia, whether by preserving part of the investment cake for Doha or by standing behind its positions on regional issues, in return for financial subsidies that help the Tunisian government to confront its crisis at home. Others felt that the delusion and fear of the independence of the Tunisian national decision from Qatar and other countries of the Gulf region should not be exaggerated, especially since the State of Qatar was the first to support the Tunisian revolution.[24]

By following the Qatari political role towards Tunisia, it becomes clear to us that Qatar supported the Tunisian revolution by abandoning one of the most important features of its foreign policy, which are the mediating roles in order to play new roles as it stood with the people in the face of dictatorial regimes. It can be said that Qatar supported the Tunisian revolution and still supports the Tunisian government politically, and there is convergence in the political positions of the two countries, due to the strength of the relations between the Qatari leadership and the El-nahda movement, and while the Tunisian leaders, including leaders from the El-nahda movement, express their gratitude for the State of Qatar’s support for the Tunisian revolution, they confirm On the independence of the Tunisian decision and not being dependent on any party.[25]

Second: The Economic dimension

Qatar signed a set of trade agreements with Tunisia a few days before the revolution during the visit of the Qatari prime minister to Tunisia, and after the revolution, Qatar announced, through several visits to official officials and Qatari businessmen, that it would help Tunisia rebuild the economy after the revolution, and Qatar considers these visits an appropriate opportunity to be informed. In addition, the study of the investment opportunities available in Tunisia, and after the revolution, the visits increased until Qatar Airways flies to Tunisia 5 times a week directly without stopping. (AlArab, 2012)

During his visit to Tunisia, the Emir of Qatar signed a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding between the two countries, the most prominent of which was an investment agreement in bonds on the Tunisian treasury, and a memorandum of understanding was signed for cooperation in the field of oil refining and the natural gas network program for Tunisian cities between Qatar Petroleum International and the government of the Republic. The Tunisian Ministry of Finance, the Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation between the Qatar Electricity and Water Company and the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company, the memorandum of understanding between the Qatar National Bank and the Tunisian Ministry of Finance, in addition to agreements between institutions from the two countries, such as the cooperation agreement between the Qatar Charity and the Tunis Charitable Society. It is worth noting that the Qatari projects came in light of a significant decline in foreign investment after the revolution, but they came within an optimistic vision for the future of the Tunisian economy. (AlArab, 2012)

Qatari investments in Tunisia came in light of the International Monetary Fund’s expectation that Tunisia would achieve an economic growth rate of 2.2% in 2012 and 3.5% in 2013, and in April 2012, the Central Bank of Tunisia announced that Qatar had loaned Tunisia 500 million dollars in April 2012 by subscribing to bonds. A loan to help the Hammadi Jebali government recover from the effects of the popular revolution that toppled the ousted president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Khaleej, 2012).

Third: The Media dimension

The main role of the Al-Jazeera meeting cannot be overlooked when talking about the media dimension of the Qatari foreign policy towards the Arab revolutions, and with regard to the Tunisian revolution in particular, the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel covered the Tunisian revolution in a way that made it play an important role in showing the popular revolution that toppled the Tunisian regime, The Al-Jazeera satellite channel, which has been highlighting many of the transgressions of the Arab regimes since its inception, did not miss this opportunity. Rather, the media that covered in Tunisia led the first popular revolution in an Arab country and despite the hostility of the regime of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to it, to keep abreast of the escalation of the Tunisian uprising.[26]

Perhaps the hostile stances of the Tunisian regime on the island made the channel more than a media party, rather it was an expression of the largely opposing voice, and perhaps the channel’s embrace of the popular uprising that emanated from “Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine and Tala” was without realizing that the issue was greater than an uprising, but it was a historical turning point. It is preceded by the fall of the Tunisian regime in a record time, before the fallout spread to other Arab countries

Moncef Al-Marzouki, the Tunisian president at the time, praised the role played by Al-Jazeera in the context of what was known as the spring of the Arab revolutions, pointing out that only historians will evaluate the role that Al-Jazeera played by its bias towards the will of the people against dictatorial regimes and that Al-Jazeera played an extraordinary role in preparing for the revolutions. The Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies played a major role in maturing democratic thought in the world[27]

Some analysts note that Al-Jazeera focused on the religious side of the Tunisian revolution, especially that Ben Ali was an ally of the United States in suppressing the so-called “Islamic extremism”, as he imprisoned political activists opposed to it and forced them to live in exile, although some accused Al-Jazeera of bias towards the Islamists In its coverage at the expense of other powers, there are those who confirm that it was balanced in its presentation of events, and this is what Hassanein Amin, professor of journalism and mass communication at the American University in Cairo, sees when commenting on that coverage, saying, “She did an excellent job, and its coverage was objective.” Various perspectives included

The revolution in Tunisia imposed on Al-Jazeera a special attention, so the latter allocated wide areas to the revolution of its broadcast times, and with the intensification of the revolution, the coverage increased and the channel hosted many Tunisian analysts and opponents, and the coverage remained expanded until the revolution succeeded in toppling the regime after the escape of former President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali From Tunisia, and after the success of the revolution, the channel opened an office in Tunis, and its correspondents and journalists began to appear on the screen from Tunisia. It became clear that the media role played by the Al-Jazeera satellite channel was the most prominent in the direction of the Qatari foreign policy towards the Tunisian revolution, and it had a clear impact on the course of events.[28]

Fourth: The Military dimension

After the revolution, the State of Qatar and the Republic of Tunisia signed two military protocol agreements and cooperation to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries in the military fields. The two agreements were signed by the State of Qatar, Major General Hamad bin Ali Al-Attiyah, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and by the Tunisian Republic, Abdul Karim Al-Zubaidi, Minister of National Defence.

Tunisia participated for the first time in the exercise of the prey falcon in the State of Qatar by sending a group of Tunisian soldiers to this exercise, in addition to delegations from Arab and foreign countries, numbering about 1,400 soldiers of various ranks and military ranks, and Tunisia received Qatari aid represented in armoured cars and other equipment Also of a security nature.

Through the above, Qatar possessed important tools such as the island and the large financial resources that enabled it to make good use of the Tunisian revolution, and we can examine the features of the Qatari policy towards the Tunisian revolution, including the following:[29]

  • Relationships witnessed fluctuations and confusion with the Tunisian regime before the revolution.
  • Qatar is the first country to announce its support for the Tunisian revolution, despite its incompatibility with the US position.
  • Al-Jazeera played a supportive and biased role for the Tunisian people against the former Tunisian regime.
  • Qatar funded a fund to support the families of the martyrs and wounded of the Tunisian revolution.
  • The Emir of Qatar is the first leader to visit Tunisia after the revolution.
  • Qatar has supported the Tunisian economy through lending and investment projects.
  • Qatar maintained strong relations with the Tunisian political leadership during the transitional period and after you were elected
  • The Constituent Assembly also has good relations with the Ennahda Movement and with President Marzouki at the time.
  • Qatar agrees with Tunisia on a number of regional issues, the most prominent of which is the position on the Syrian issue.
  • Tunisian politicians and activists have criticized Qatar’s policy in Tunisia and the Ennahda movement.

The Tunisian revolution was a prominent stage in a remarkable shift in Qatari politics from the mediation diplomacy that characterized it during the years before the Tunisian revolution to the bias in favour of the Tunisian people in the face of the regime, and Qatar was keen on having distinguished relations with the regime after the revolution, and that Qatar benefited from the advantage of being ahead of the curve. Supporting the Tunisian revolution and one of the characteristics of the revolution itself, which was characterized by its suddenness, peace and popularity, and the slowing down of international attitudes towards it. By interfering in Tunisia’s affairs, but these criticisms can be interpreted as coming in the context of internal disputes in Tunisia between the Ennahda movement and the parties and opposition currents that accuse Qatar of supporting the Islamists, and this resentment and protest of some Tunisian factions against Qatar may be an incentive for Qatar to reduce and control what it calls this The groups to intervene, and the Qataris call it legitimate and meaningful relations to strengthen relations in the context of Qatar’s endeavour to expand its regional role in the region.

Second Topic: Qatar’s foreign policy towards Egypt

Many observers believe that the Qatari leadership considered the Egyptian revolution an extension of the opportunity it was waiting for to assert its regional influence and position after its support for the Tunisian revolution, and Qatar’s immediate response to the revolution in Egypt was the actual deployment of its media, diplomatic and financial tools.

 We can address the Qatari foreign policy towards the Egyptian revolution through the following tracks:

First: the political dimension

1- The first stage: From the outbreak of the revolution until the end of the term of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces:

 Qatar expressed its position since the first moments of the Egyptian revolution on January 25, 2011, expressing its respect for the Egyptian people’s desire for change, and its respect for their legitimate demands to achieve social justice and freedom in all areas of life. Neutrality, rather it was with the position of the people’s revolution, and its enthusiasm appeared after Mubarak stepped down to give relations between the two countries a high priority and to pave the way for activating the joint supreme committee headed by the ministers of the two countries[30].

Qatar pre-empted all Arab countries in its reaction to the resignation of the former Egyptian president and the transfer of power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, where the Amir Diwan in Qatar said that this is a “positive and important step.” In the brotherly Arab Republic of Egypt, while expressing its respect for the will of the Egyptian people and their options, it salutes the great and important role of the Egyptian armed forces in defending Egypt and the Arab nation and the interests of the Egyptian people. The Arab and Islamic nations, as it affirms its keenness to maintain distinguished relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and work to develop and develop them in a way that serves the interests of the two countries and their brotherly peoples.[31]

The Qatari support for the Egyptian revolution escalated in the stances and then in the exchange of visits, as former Prime Minister Dr. Essam Sharaf and a number of ministers in his government visited Qatar, and a very friendly discussion session was held, and the Qataris began to prepare for further development and interest in Egyptian relations and coordination in all fields (Al-Misfer, 2012), to be followed by the Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, visited Egypt, then Sheikh Tamim, the Crown Prince, accompanied by 45 Qatari officials, to start intensive consultations and an agreement to establish the Egyptian-Qatari Committee for the resumption of the joint committee headed by the two countries, during which it was announced that 10 billion dollars would be invested in Egypt. (Hilal, 2012)

In the context of strengthening relations between Qatar and Egypt after the revolution, the level of representation in the working group between the two countries was upgraded, and work was done to remove obstacles and sensitivities between Egypt and Qatar, and Marshal Tantawi, head of the Military Council, “confirmed his country’s keenness to support Qatari-Egyptian cooperation in many fields in light of relations the distinguished group that unites the two brotherly peoples” (Tantawi, 2011), and Tantawi also “praised the development of the Egyptian-Qatari relations, which are being pushed in many areas to strengthen the ties of cooperation between the two countries”. (Tantawi, 2011)

Qatar promised to pump money into the bank during this period, and provided $ 500 million to the treasury through the purchase of Egyptian treasury bills, but the political shift was reflected in some of these promises, in terms of instability, holding elections and anticipation of what will result in matters in Egypt in the next phase, which led to a postponement. Pumping these investments, as the Qataris follow the affairs in Egypt closely, and therefore they were waiting for the completion of the political transformation in Egypt. This meaning was confirmed by Professor Muhammad Hassanein Heikal by saying that “the Emir of Qatar had told him during the period of the country’s military council administration that he wanted to provide aid and aid to Egypt through projects and not fill a deficit of the state budget, but he did not know who he could talk to from Order to provide support, indicating the instability and the consequences of things during that period are not clear.” (Heikal, 2014)

It can be said that this stage has witnessed, in political terms, Qatari support in the political positions of the revolution and the Military Council, and frenzied Qatari contacts during the transitional phase with several political currents and forces in Egypt in order to consolidate relations, and promises from Qatari politicians to provide economic aid and implement economic projects, with anticipation And a close follow-up of the Egyptian political transformation process after the revolution, and it can also be said that this stage of Qatar’s relations with the Military Council is considered evidence of Qatar’s support for the revolutions in periods when Islamists were not in the leadership of the state at the time.[32]

2- The second stage: Presidency of Mohamed Morsi

After President Mohamed Morsi won the Egyptian presidential elections, Qatar continued to exchange visits with Egypt, as the Emir received the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Doha in July 2012, and about a month later, Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi received the Emir of Qatar in Cairo, and the Presidency said in a statement that the meeting included discussions On prospects for joint cooperation between the two countries and ways to develop it politically and economically in all fields, the meetings between the Emir of Qatar and the Egyptian President varied, where they met in September 2012 at the headquarters of the permanent delegation of the State of Qatar to the United Nations in New York, on the sidelines of the work of the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly

The meeting between the Emir of Qatar and Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was repeated on October 22, 2012, after the facilities provided by Egypt to the Emir of Qatar to complete his visit to Gaza, and the consultations between them focused on the situation in Syria and the situation in the Palestinian territories, and on November 17, 2012 President Muhammad Morsi received the Emir of Qatar, and dealt with Their discussions reflected the situation in Gaza and ways to stop “Israeli aggressions” against the Palestinian people. The talks reflected the congruence of the Egyptian and Qatari views on the need for a unified Arab position through the League of Arab States to support the Palestinian people and reject the aggression against them. (Morsi, 2012)

That period was marked by the increase in Qatari support for the Egyptian positions, the actual start of Qatari investment projects, and the injection of Qatari funds to the Egyptian government, but at the same time, many Egyptian media and politicians criticized the Qatari role in Egypt. There is a Qatari attempt on what he called “the Qatarization of Egypt” and, in his opinion, “Qatarization” focused on three main axes: the first is financing and support for specific political forces “to control the Egyptian state”, while the second axis is “controlling the Egyptian economy,” and the third axis is ” Focusing on financing and supporting the Egyptian factions that are able to conclude future deals to implement the American plan in the region.[33]

The Prime Minister of Qatar, in his response to accusations by Egyptian media, that Qatar seeks to dominate Egypt, said: “With regard to the Qatari domination of Egypt, this is a “ridiculous joke”, because a country the size of Egypt and its human and economic capabilities cannot be dominated before. Another country, “stressing that” a strong Egypt is important to the Arabs and to us in Qatar in particular, the Emir of Qatar recognizes Egypt’s pioneering role that Egypt is the largest Arab country, and we appreciate all its roles for Egypt. ” (Hamad, 2012)

On the other hand, and in the context of accusations that Qatar is working on implementing projects to “dominate the Suez Canal”, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi said: “Qatar is a sister country that has an excellent relationship with Egypt with it, as it stands in support of the Egyptians in their revolution, just as the Arab countries are,” noting That the Suez Canal is an Egyptian landmark, there is no room for any country to have an income, drink, or own property in it. “

On accusations that Qatar supports the Muslim Brotherhood without other groups and parties, Khaled Al-Attiyah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Qatar, stressed that his country has a good relationship with all political forces in Egypt, but it adheres to the etiquette of dealing, and thus it is committed to official dealing with governments, hence its dealings with The Muslim Brotherhood Group after they came to power in the elections, and he explained that the support provided by Qatar to Egypt is the fruit of the agreements concluded with the military before the elections that brought the Brotherhood to power

Egyptian researcher Hussam Moqled believes that he understands that Qatar’s support for the Egyptian revolution was not far from its political interests, and it was not all pure love for the Egyptian people, and this is natural and understandable, so it is not afraid of anyone the amount of estrangement and disharmony that existed between Qatar and the previous Mubarak regime, and that Politics does not know continuous alliances or permanent disputes, but he also does not believe that Qatar is mourning the recovery and resurgence of the Egyptian regime, calling for not to always think about the conspiracy theory to this extent.

A number of analysts tend to argue that in the world of politics there is nothing for nothing, and countries looking for a role and aspiring to create a place for themselves among the adults, always find in the political void its way to control the political and economic compass of other countries, and try to impose their method of arranging the papers of the political scene. .

In turn, Dr. Jawad Al-Hamad, head of the Centre for Middle East Studies, was not surprised by what Qatar is doing towards Egypt, as there is no country that is looking for a regional role for it, and Qatar wants to preserve its regional role and therefore it had to interact with the regional spring, and in the Egyptian issue Qatar is trying To be with Egypt in the new situation, and if it did so, it would gain a new role in addition to its current role. (Jawad, 2012)

Through its behaviour with the Tunisian revolution and the revolution in Egypt, Qatar has proven according to a number of observers that it is improving the investment of opportunities in order to achieve its strategic objectives in the region. Not only did it cover the revolutions using Al-Jazeera, but also it crawled into the field of practical action. Qatar was able to read the strategic dimensions in the region well in terms of the absence of the Egyptian and Saudi roles.

Professor Fahmy Howeidi believes that “the problem is not in the role played by Qatar, but the essence of the problem lies in the camping Arab vacuum that has turned the Arab world into a body without a head, and perhaps part of the problem is that the Qatari role is moving in a direction that sometimes appears independent and different from the path The Saudi role, so that I would argue that the degree of criticism and discontent could diminish if the Qatari role coincides with the Saudi, and Howeidi adds that Qatar is not the superpower that some people think is a driving the region’s events, and it should not be blamed if it tries to play a role in the current vacuum, which settles for us that We say that our blame should not be directed at those who work, but those who do not work are more worthy of blame and reproach”. (Howeidi, 2012)

Second: The Economic dimension

The Qatari-Egyptian relations witnessed a strong momentum after the revolution, driven by the path of economic cooperation between the two countries, towards strengthening their relations in various fields of work, and the visit of the Qatari Prime Minister strengthened the cooperation relations between the two countries, during which he conveyed a message that included frank and clear Qatari support to help Egypt exit From its current economic crisis, and the Emir’s directive that “there is no ceiling for cooperation or investment in Egypt.”

Qatar advanced the Arab and international community to stand with Egypt and support Egypt to stand on its feet in the wake of the revolution and the difficult economic conditions that Egypt is going through, and after President Mohamed Morsi assumed the presidency, Qatar provided Egypt with four billion dollars deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt and a billion dollars in donations, and Qatar was It announced its intention to invest 18 billion dollars in Egypt over the next five years.[34]

Investments were distributed by $ 10 billion in the northern coastal region in tourism investments, and $ 8 billion in the Gulf of Suez to provide logistical services to the cargo carriers that pass through them. The interest of Qatar’s investors in the Egyptian market comes, as it is full of investment opportunities that are more profitable than other foreign markets.[35]

Among the fruits of the Qatari support represented in pumping a large package of investments was the creation of optimism that prevailed among dealers in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and the dissipation of fears of investment in Egypt, as the banking expert Ahmed Adam confirmed that the Qatari deposit came at a time that reduced the continued collapse of Egypt’s monetary reserves. Of foreign currency largely, during August 2012 the reserves increased in an unprecedented manner since the revolution by $ 700 million, stressing that had it not been for the Qatari deposit, Egypt’s cash reserves would have decreased to $ 500 million.[36]

In that period, Qatar was ranked 18th among the countries investing in Egypt with a number of companies reaching 156 companies with a Qatari capital of about 568 million dollars. The volume of trade exchange between Egypt and Qatar in 2010 amounted to about 300 million dollars, but it jumped to 500 million dollars. In 2011, there are mutual partnerships between businessmen and investors from Egypt. The embassy helps them and arranges meetings for them with Qatari officials in many fields and works on exchanging visits between the two sides to increase trade exchange and to express the reality of relations between the two countries.[37]

Third: The Media dimension

For five years before the revolution, Egypt had the lion’s share in the news coverage of Al-Jazeera, and Al-Jazeera also received severe criticism on several occasions from talk shows on Egyptian channels, and dozens of hours of documentaries were broadcast on the island about Egypt, which increased from what was produced by all the Arab countries combined, All these hours of broadcasting carried criticism of the regime, but the role of Al Jazeera in moving the Egyptian buyer was really insignificant, but it left in the minds the idea that Egypt is living under a system outside history.

With the outbreak of the revolution, the coverage was relatively modest at the beginning of the protests on the first day, however, on the second day of the revolution, Al-Jazeera TV stood up and up with it to the end, and harnessed all its media capabilities and its human and artistic energies, and thus gained great public confidence from the Egyptians, as many considered it the media arm For the revolutionaries, and the reliable mirror that reflects the most objective images and the closest to showing the truth of what is happening in Tahrir Square and other Egyptian fields in light of the state’s control over media outlets and the absence of truth. [38]

If the relationship between Al-Jazeera and Egypt was based on previous permanent tension, then this tension reached the point of an explosion during the January 25 revolution, when the channel’s coverage of the daily events of the revolution reached its maximum level, so Al-Jazeera suspended all its programs and opened its broadcasts continuously and continuously to cover the events of the revolution and its developments, and Al-Jazeera hosted Dozens of Egyptian dissidents, and at the same time, hosted the spokesmen of the Egyptian regime, albeit to a lesser extent, which aroused this in a group of the Egyptian regime, which felt the danger of the island to the regime as it participates and interacts with people in the revolution and urges them to do so, which constitutes a danger to the regime.[39]

As the demonstrations raged in Egypt, the Egyptian government cut off the broadcast of Al-Jazeera on the NileSat satellite, but the station was able to place its broadcast on several friendly stations, and the popular urgency to overthrow the regime in Egypt continued, and Al-Jazeera was greeted and thanked by the revolutionary public, and the Egyptian revolution emerged as the role of the thinker The Arab Azmi Bishara, who used to present profound political analyzes, had a tangible effect in arousing enthusiasm in the hearts of the revolution’s youth, in addition to the guiding dimension of the revolution in some analyzes. The reality of the difficulty of the Egyptian revolution on the island more than the revolution in Tunisia, due to the control enjoyed by the Egyptian media supporting the former regime in Egypt. (Bishara, 2011)

On the contribution of Al-Jazeera to making the Egyptian revolution, “political analyst Yasser Al-Zaatarah” believes that Al-Jazeera does not make revolutions, nor does the Internet in all its manifestations make revolutions, but the grievances and people’s sense of the possibility of change through peaceful protest and sacrifices, and the bulk of what Al-Jazeera does is that it reflects those sacrifices from Covered during (Al-Zaatarah, 2013). But the way Al-Jazeera presents the news, methods of formulating it and ways of dealing with it from analysis, discussion and debate, and the insistence on it in more than one way is the one who draws it with wider dimensions and places it in a size much larger than its normal size, so it sometimes exaggerates in monitoring the event, conveying the news and analyzing it, and sometimes inflating some negatives, One group triumphs over one group, and one group stirs up against another[40]

In a study on Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Egyptian revolution, “researcher Muhammad Aref Abdullah” concluded that Al-Jazeera played an important role in the revolutions through its coverage of them, confirming the island’s bias towards the revolutionaries in the face of regimes and governments, indicating that this is inconsistent with the professionalism and journalistic objectivity that it should enjoy. The media, but Al-Jazeera contributed, through its coverage of the Egyptian revolution during the revolution, in forming public opinion in favour of the revolution and opposed to the former Egyptian regime.[41]

Third Topic: Qatar’s foreign policy towards Libya

First: the political dimension:

Because of Qatar’s position in support of the Tunisian revolution, Gaddafi attacked Qatar’s role in the official Libyan television on 01/26/2011 largely, without knowing that the train of the Arab revolution would also pass through Libya, so it did not take several days for the revolution to rule in Libya.[42]

Some see in the outbreak of the Libyan revolution on the 17th of February 2011 as a decisive turning point in the course of regional and Arab politics, especially if the strategic location of Libya on the one hand, and its wealth on the other hand, are taken into account. “Al-Hadi Shalouf, a professor of international relations,” says that no Libyan can to deny that Qatari support for the Libyan revolution is unlimited, to go beyond what is logistical to providing heavy goods and training fighters, and to contribute to overcoming the financial deficit that burdened the Transitional Council.[43]

In the eyes of a number of analysts, Qatar was one of the first countries to see in the Libyan revolution an opportunity after it to play a role that contributes to establishing influence that suits the size of its enormous financial wealth and the great ambitions of its leaders, and Qatar was the first Arab country to announce that Gaddafi no longer represents legitimacy in Libya, The first Arab country to participate in imposing the air embargo on Libya with Qatari planes and pilots, and in an Arab development that is the first in the region, Qatar recognized the National Transitional Council as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people.[44]

Rather, the Qatari prime minister called on the international community not to stand by, but to make an effective contribution to the liberation of the Libyan people. On the issue of arming or not arming the revolutionaries in Libya, he said: “It is natural that we enable the Libyan people to defend themselves,” noting that ” A few weeks ago, no one talked about giving the Libyans a means of defending themselves, but now the process has become acceptable to make the Libyans defend themselves as we cannot defend them from the air only.” However, this call to defend the Libyan people was met with criticism that linked it to economic ambitions.[45] According to “Suleiman Al-Barasi, the spokesman for the Libyan Youth Assembly,” any country in the world has interests and Qatar has economic ambitions in the region in terms of gas and oil to be more influential on European countries. (Al-Barasi, 2011)

Mahmoud Shammam believes that “Qatar’s pursuit of its interests is a legitimate right for it, and a large part of it was to support the dignity of the Libyan people and to support the freedom of the Libyan people, and that its roles are mostly positive. We are grateful for this role and the entire Libyan people as well, but there are some reservations about Qatari motives.”

Regarding Qatar’s motives behind its great role towards the Libyan revolution, and in response to the above, Muhammad Al-Kuwari, Director of the Gulf Center, said that “Qatar is part of the Arab nation and an active member of the Arab League and has previously intervened in positive ways in Arab conflicts, and that Qatar has not lined up with a faction without Another” (Al-Kuwari, 2011). In addition to that Qatar is not looking to reap spoils in Libya or elsewhere, and the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister have affirmed that Qatar has no ambitions in Libya (Jassim, 2011), and Al-Kuwari emphasized that “this role is a Qatari conviction and a general position that there is no justification for any ruler to kill his people” (Al-Kuwari, 2011). Regarding Qatar receiving directives from the United States regarding the situation in Libya, Al-Kuwari said that the United States does not have the universe, and the revolutions have surprised it as well as others, and whoever realizes the right of people to change is the one who will remain in the leadership.[46]

For his part, “Abd al-Rahman Shalqam, the former Libyan foreign minister and its representative in the United Nations “accused Doha of trying to dominate Libya, and Shalgam said that Libya would not be an emirate belonging to Qatar, expressing his lack of understanding of the Qatar-led coalition saying: “I do not understand it, I do not accept it and it is unknown. Even for the Libyans, Qatar leads America and France, who is Qatar? What is the capacity of Qatar? ” (Shalqam, 2011)

From another point of view, “Ali Al-Sallabi, a senior leader of the Libyan Islamic Movement,” rejected what was said that the Islamists did not achieve what they achieved in post-Gaddafi Libya except because of their relationship with Qatar, which provided them with money and weapons, saying, “This is a big lie. (Alquds, 2011)” In addition, those who say this are people whom they have Gaddafi mentality, and that this criticism is unfounded. Al-Sallabi stressed that no one can deny the Qatari countries at the relief level, and Libyan cities attest to this, and support with weapons in confrontations for all the revolutionaries without discrimination, and the revolutionaries of Misrata and Zliten attest to this, and media support, and statements have been issued by the Emir and the Crown Prince that the Libyan people do not beg or beg, And that the Qatari drive is a humanitarian one based on Arab and Islamic values ​​and morals. (Al-Sallabi, 2011)

According to “Secretary of the Libyan National Transitional Council, Mustafa Al-Mani,” the role Qatar played during the revolution did not come alone, but rather within the framework of international legitimacy, stressing that Qatar is the active country in standing by the Libyan revolution, and denying that Qatar has any ambitions in Libya” (Al-Mani, 2011). Bashir Al-Kebti, General Auditor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, denied that his group was affiliated with or received any support from Qatar or the United States. (Alrai, 2012)

“The Qatari ambassador to Cairo, Saleh Al-Buainain,” said in his response to a protest stand by people who supported Gaddafi who criticized Qatar’s role in the Libyan crisis. This pause represents the democratic tax that must be accepted, and as you know what the Arab countries are witnessing of successive events, and there is a new element in the Arab arena. It is the Arab public opinion, and I believe that every country can take from the sovereign decisions that it deems appropriate for it and that is in line with its policy and with the changes occurring in the world, and we must accept the reactions. (Al-Buainain, 2011)

Second: The Economic dimension

Before the collapse of the Libyan regime under the leadership of Gaddafi, several Libyan-Qatari agreements began on joint investments – exceeding $ 10 billion in value, and after the arrival of the transitional council to power in Libya, the Qatari government began to anticipate developments like the rest of the countries that supported the transitional council in addition to following up on its projects And its investments in Libya, and steps were taken to revive these projects, hoping for more Qatari investments in Libya.[47]

It was expected that the political role Qatar played in supporting the revolutionaries would have more positive effects, but the fear of some future unrest or differences between the revolutionaries, is what may harm Qatar’s interests as the first Arab country that participated in striking the previous regime, and therefore any Progress in Qatari investments is completely dependent on the political role played by the transitional council, which may be completely shaken in the event of international interference in Libya. Qatar provided a number of economic and financial assistance to Libya, as the Qatari Prime Minister indicated that Qatar had provided aid to Libya until May 2011 from 400 to 500 million dollars, and promised to provide the same for humanitarian, not military, affairs. (Jassim, 2011)

After the freezing of Libyan assets and legal difficulties in selling Libyan oil, the transitional council did not have enough money to pay the salaries of the Libyans nor to cover the subsidized goods such as bread, gas and others. Then Qatar proposed to market one million barrels of oil for the account of the transitional council and achieve 100 million dollars in the proceeds from this The Road.[48]

Third: The Media dimension

Al-Jazeera’s coverage in Libya continued along the lines of its coverage of the two revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, benefiting from the success it achieved in them, and started from the first day of the Libyan revolution to cover its events, and was accused by the Libyan regime of being a “channel of sedition”, and that it “implements Qatar’s agenda that was originally affiliated with the Western agenda in fragmenting the nation.” Al-Arabiya “, and Al-Jazeera took its position by being with the revolution and against the Gaddafi regime, and it broadcast many news and pictures about the massacres of the Gaddafi Brigades and their bombing of civilians in Benghazi and other Libyan cities, and it continued to be covered with the same heat until the fall of the Gaddafi regime with the fall of the capital, Tripoli, and later with his death.

During the participation of the Qatari forces in the military operations led by NATO in Libya, there was an unprecedented media focus from the Al-Jazeera channel on the Libyan revolution that left no detail except and was highlighted in a manner that some see that greatly exceeded the principles of independent and impartial journalistic work. Al-Jazeera channel not only presents the events and developments in Libya, but was also establishing the next Qatari role and paving the way for it, by making Al-Jazeera and behind it Qatar appear not only as supporters of the revolution, but also as active players in making it successful.

One of the manifestations of Al-Jazeera’s establishment of this role is that it cancelled its usual programs, and it became a time-round workshop for covering and broadcasting live photos, in addition to managing discussions and interviews, so that the channel’s slogan changed from “opinion and other opinion” to “The coverage continues”, just as Al Jazeera started a week later From the outbreak of protests against the Gaddafi regime in using the old Libyan flag that the revolutionaries chose as an alternative to the green Libyan flag, which is a clear departure from the neutral coverage, then this media mobilization increased with Qatar’s participation in NATO operations in Libya, and the channel’s coverage became more biased, even in terms of The vocabulary used, such as the use of the term “Gaddafi Brigades” for that part of the Libyan army that was fighting alongside Gaddafi.[49]

Mahmoud Shammam added that Al-Jazeera gives an impression that tends to a lot for the Islamic currents, and this does not concern Libya only, and is not a new position. He added: “Several times I told the Emir that he stands at the same distance from all groups and currents, and that he supports democracy and we really want to see that. From friendly Qatar that stood with us during the days of distress, to stand with us in the days of transformation, for the days of the democratic political game in which there are tensions and inclination for a party without a party, if the matter is in line with what a party proposes, then this is normal, but if there is financial, media and political support, then we reject it, and the Qatari leadership You realize that the Libyan people who defied the dictatorship do not accept the tutelage of any state over it. ” (Shammam, 2011)

It seems that Qatar equates its support to the revolutionary parties as much as its popular support, and through its vision that the future is for the Islamic movements in general, so it is natural for Qatar to strengthen its relationship with the party expected to win the elections, and it is also natural for it to face criticism from other parties.

Fourth: The Military dimension

Covering the Al-Jazeera satellite channel, fighting the Libyan rebels in more detail and depth than it did with the revolutionary movements in other Arab countries, seemed compatible with the current behaviour of Qatar. By sending six Mirage aircraft to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in air operations, and this step represented a qualitative leap in the Qatari foreign policy, and Qatar has interfered over the years in a set of international disputes through mediation, but it has not happened before Qatar announced publicly support for one side or direct intervention.[50]

Bin Jassim, Chairman of the Qatari Council of Ministers, justified the call for military intervention in a press conference on 5/5/2011 by saying: “But when we see people die every minute after a minute, history will never forgive us and we believe in dialogue, but Gaddafi did not believe in it.” (Jassim, 2011)

In April 2011, Qatari planes were taking off regularly from Doha to supply the rebels with weapons. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim stated that Qatar was sending defensive weapons to the rebels, but reports from Tripoli indicate that the support went further, as these reports confirmed that Qatar is training Libyan fighters in the Nafusa Mountains in western Tripoli and eastern Libya, and the Qatari army has also brought Libyan fighters to Doha to conduct special training, and in the last attack on Bab al-Aziziyah on August 24, Qatari special forces were seen on the front lines of the fighting.[51]

With the participation of the Qatari forces in the military operations led by NATO in Libya, Qatar topped the list of countries that provided supplies and ammunition to the Libyan fighters, as it transferred supplies, forces and logistical equipment to them through its fleet, and some believe that some of the armament operations were carried out without studying what created a number of militias other than Punctual. (BBC, 2011)

In addition to the above, Lieutenant-General Joseph Charles Bouchard, commander of the “United Protector” operation in NATO in Libya, affirmed that the Qatari armed forces were the main pillar in achieving the most successful operation in the history of NATO, which took place on Libyan soil against the Gaddafi regime, as the Qatari forces demonstrated superior capabilities. In field and combat operations, the difficulties in dealing with the Libyan culture were eased and the gates of understanding were opened with the Libyan citizens, pointing to the distinguished efforts made by the strategic transport aircraft.[52]

Fourth Topic: Qatar’s foreign policy towards Yemen

Qatar found in the Yemeni revolution that began in February 2011 a golden opportunity that cannot be compensated. Qatar sought to mediate at the beginning of the revolution in Yemen, and the former president, but this mediation was not accepted, so it entered with all its material, media and political weight to support Yemeni cooperation, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is an international party. The former president called for power, and demonstrations took place among the Yemeni community in Doha, demanding Saleh to relinquish power despite the momentum of protests against him in Yemen.

With the Yemeni revolution, Qatar seemed to continue its behaviour in support of the Arab revolutions, as it sought to confirm the independence of parts and its position from the neighbouring region, for it is the second exceptional for the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council states on April 10, 2012 to answer the Gulf questions to solve the Yemeni crisis, stressing that the president will accept and will not accept any Agreement leads to power. After announcing the Gulf initiative, the former president declared his welcome to it and refused Qatari interference in the internal affairs of his country, and Saleh said, on April 8, 2011, in front of large crowds of his supporters in Al-Sabeen Square, “Our legitimacy is derived from the strength of our great Yemeni people and not from Qatar, and the Qatari initiative. Rejected, “in reference to the Qatari Foreign Minister’s speech about an initiative to step down from power.”

After that, the State of Qatar announced its withdrawal from the initiative of the countries of cooperation to resolve the crisis in the Republic of Yemen, explaining that it had made this decision compelled, due to the delay and delay, to sign the proposed agreement in the initiative with the continuation of the escalation, the unity of confrontations and the loss of wisdom, which contradicts the spirit of the initiative aimed at resolving the crisis in Yemen is in my captivity time.

Some believe that Qatar did well by withdrawing from the Gulf mediation, because with this step Doha absolves itself of the possible failure that the Gulf initiative will meet, even with Saleh’s signature on it, and Qatar has viewed what happened in Yemen as a popular revolution, while the view of the Gulf Cooperation Council states appears. Closer to it is a political crisis between the former president and the opposition. While others saw that Qatar withdrew because the terms of the initiative did not live up to what Qatar wanted to empower Yemeni parties with whom it enjoys strong relations as far as the ruling party was able,[53]

With regard to Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Yemeni revolution, several studies and research have dealt with Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Arab revolutions, including the Yemeni revolution. In this context, the results of a questionnaire prepared by Yemeni researcher Ibrahim bin Qafla about the neutrality of Al-Jazeera in its coverage of the Yemeni revolution are as follows, as 47% of the youth confirmed Al-Yemeni stated that Al-Jazeera was neutral, while 36% assured that it was biased towards the revolution, the revolutionaries and the opposition, while the rest said that it was sometimes biased.[54]

 According to the previous questionnaire, Yemeni youths believe that the owners of Al-Jazeera channel had a clear opinion of advocating the oppressed peoples against the oppressive rulers. As for the connection of the general policy of Al-Jazeera channel with the Qatari policy, the Yemeni youth do not see a problem in the connection, but the problem lies in the objectives of foreign policy. Qatar, and does it have a positive role in advocating the causes of vulnerable peoples, or is it an interest-based role, but they see that what is clear is the positive role of the Qatari foreign policy.[55]

After his departure from power, former President Ali Saleh held Doha responsible for the sabotage and chaos that occurred in his country, and held it responsible for the future repercussions of the situation due to its interference, which he described as blatant in the Yemeni affairs. However, with the arrival of Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi to power, the Qatari-Yemeni relations returned to the official level again, and the Yemeni Prime Minister headed to Doha in April 2012, and then the mutual coordination in August 2012 culminated in the visit of the new Yemeni president to Doha, accompanied by Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar to discuss some files. (Al-Lisswas, 2012)

After the Yemeni president’s visit to Doha, the “political opponent Abdullah Salam Al-Hakimi” accused President Hadi of turning against the partners of the revolution, and of cooperating with Qatar, the Brotherhood. He describing the matter “as a silent coup they carried out against all the partners of the transitional political process. In this context, criticism of Qatar has not stopped” (Al-Hakimi, 2012). On its support for the Islamists, as the “deputy in the Yemeni parliament, Ahmed Hashid revealed that the State of Qatar has pumped financial support to the Islah Party (Hashid, 2012), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, and the largest party of the joint bloc. Ahmed Hashed, who is one of the leaders of the protests against Saleh, accused Qatar of planting the revolution against Saleh on behalf of The Brotherhood movement in Yemen, who is currently Qatar’s allies in the region, is leading their movements in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Palestine.[56]

There is no disagreement among observers that Qatar became the strongest supporter of what he called the revolution of change in Yemen through the great financial and media support to overthrow the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but the disagreement is about the motives of this support, there are those who say that this was not out of love for change and revolution, but rather comes Driven by a Qatari desire to reduce Saudi influence by overthrowing Yemen as an ally or subordinate to Saudi Arabia. It is evident from the above that the Qatari foreign policy towards the Yemeni revolution differed from it towards the revolutions that preceded it in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as Qatar in previous revolutions took the initiative, precedence and continuous active participation in supporting the revolutions. [57]

However, in the Yemeni revolution shortly after this role it withdrew from the Gulf initiative This is due to the sensitivity of its position and the nature of its relationship with the Saleh regime, in addition to the entry of Saudi Arabia as a major player in the issue, and this shows that there are difficulties facing the individual political behaviour of Qatar in the Gulf region, including the presence of the Cooperation Council as a collective umbrella, and the failure of Saudi Arabia to concede its regional roles in the Gulf, and after the coming New Yemeni President Qatar has returned to Yemen, and it appears that it is seeking to play a bigger role.

Fifth Topic: Qatar’s foreign policy towards Syria

The Syrian revolution differs from the rest of the other revolutions in the international dimension in which things rolled, in addition to the survival of the regime and the continuation of the revolution, and at the beginning of the revolution the Qatari position was not satisfactory to the Syrian people, as the situation was foggy, but after a period of silence, Doha chose to stand by the people against the regime Al-Assad, and the Qatari move began through the Arab League by issuing a statement on 10/16/2011.

Among its most important items were: the immediate cessation of violence, the formation of an Arab ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister of Qatar, and contact with the conflict parties to hold a national dialogue, and through Qatar’s presidency of the ministerial committee The Arab League in charge of dealing with the crisis, the Arab initiative came to reflect the Qatari vision.

Doha gradually escalated its stances towards the Syrian regime, as Doha worked to create an Arab consensus to exert a lot of pressure on the Syrian regime, and the Qatari official political rhetoric against the Assad regime escalated, for example by saying, “Damascus’s refusal to cooperate with the Arab peace plan is what will lead To the internationalization of the crisis.”

Qatar’s position on the Syrian revolution is represented by three specific phases of time that have witnessed a qualitative shift in relations between Qatar and the Syrian regime due to the escalation of events and the way Bashar al-Assad confronted the crisis, ranging according to the stages it went through from the far right to the far left, and these stages are:

The first phase: From the outbreak of the protests in March 2011 to August 2011:

With the ambiguity of the position regarding the nature of events in Syria, two contradictory positions emerged, while Al-Jazeera, in addition to the Qatari newspapers, stood firmly by the Syrian popular protests, and opened its screens and pages wide to the leaders of the Syrian opposition. During the first five months, Qatar committed itself to caution. Advice and advice to Syria, and the Emir of Qatar exchanged contact with President Al-Assad on March 30, 2011, while the Qatari Foreign Minister visited Syria on April 2, 2011.[58]

The Qatari position escalated in the attack on the Qatari embassy in July 2011, in protest against Al-Jazeera’s stance on the events in Syria, which prompted the Qatari government on July 18, 2011 to suspend its work, then withdraw its ambassador from Damascus, and close its embassy. (Al-Assad supporters attack the embassies of Qatar, America and France, 2011)

The second phase: from August 2011 until January 2012:

This stage represented a defining turning point in Qatar’s position, as it shifted from an individual position to a collective position with the countries of the Cooperation Council, but this collective position was preceded by many positions that pushed in its direction, including summoning Qatar and a number of Gulf countries their ambassadors from Damascus, where Qatar was the first An Arab country withdraws its ambassador from Damascus, and closed its embassy there.[59]

On August 25, 2011, the Emir of Qatar expressed his opposition to the way the Syrian authorities deal with the protests, which was confirmed by his Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim the next day when he called on the Syrian leadership to initiate rapid reforms in order to contain the critical situation, as Sheikh Hamad bin emphasized Jassim, on October 26, 2011, the Arabs were keen to solve the Syrian crisis without foreign intervention, pointing out that Assad did not agree to everything that the Arabs presented. (Jassim, 2011)

Qatar initially sought to provide solutions that lead to a peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis within the framework of the Arab League. Since August 27, 2011, the Arab League adopted an initiative aimed at stopping violence and conducting a comprehensive national dialogue with the opposition, and in October 2011, and in accordance with the decision of the Arab League, an Arab committee was formed A ministerial headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, whose mission is to contact the Syrian leadership to stop all acts of violence to implement political reforms. (BBC, The Arab League suspends Syria’s membership and imposes political and economic sanctions, 2011)

The Syrian government did not abide by its pledges, which prompted the League’s Council to decide to adopt a set of measures, including stopping economic and political sanctions against the Syrian government, and inviting all spectrums of the Syrian opposition to socialize at the headquarters of the Arab League during the period to agree on a unified vision for the next transitional phase in Syria, and at that meeting, after the idea of sending an Arab observer mission to Syria was crystallized. [60] [61]

The third phase: from January 2012 until the beginning of 2013

The Qatari position against the Syrian regime has escalated at this stage. In addition to its efforts within the framework of the Arab League, Qatar has proposed two measures to deal with the crisis in Syria: [62]

  1. The proposal to send Arab forces instead of international intervention, as happened in Libya, a proposal presented by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, on January 14, 2012 in a television interview with CBS, by introducing aid, finding safe areas and monitoring the ceasefire
  2. Supporting the opposition with weapons, as Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim called on the international community on February 27, 2012 to accelerate the idea of ​​arming the Syrian opposition and providing it with a safe haven, especially after the failure to endorse the Arab initiative in the Security Council

Qatar affirmed its readiness to contribute to the salvation of the Syrian people, and called on the international community to exert efforts to find a solution outside the Security Council. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani said, “We want a safe exit for the Syrian leadership and leave the Syrian people without burning the land,” noting that “change is coming, but we want it.” With the least losses.” (Jassim, 2011)

After that, Qatar vehemently sought to obtain full recognition of the new Syrian coalition to be the only legitimate representative of all Syrians, and called upon “all the present Syrian opposition, headed by George Sabra, head of the National Council, and Moaz al-Khatib, head of the new coalition, until they agree and not be separated by differences, calling on the Syrian opposition to trust With the Qatari endeavour, she said: “Trust us, because we will from now endeavour to fully recognize this new body, and we will endeavour in the Arab League, in the Cooperation Council, with European friends, and also with the Americans, so that this body is the only and legitimate representative of all Syrians.” (al-Khatib, 2012)

It can be said that the Qatari foreign policy progressed towards the Syrian revolution, as it was monitored and closer to neutrality in the first phase, then it became clear during the second and third stages. In the second phase, Qatar and Saudi Arabia led the Arab system in dealing with the crisis, and its position shifted from neutrality to an attempt to stop the massacres against the Syrian people. By proposing diplomatic solutions to the crisis within the framework of joint Arab action, which was embodied in the first Arab initiative, then Qatar came to lead the third phase by virtue of its chairmanship of the Arab Ministerial Committee concerned with Syrian affairs, and the situation developed radically from Assad’s demand for reform and change, to his demand to step down to his deputy, This was embodied in the second Arab initiative, after which the situation evolved towards internationalization and the demand for the entry of an Arab and international force to protect the Syrian people and arm the opposition, and to reject dialogue with Bashar al-Assad, options that Qatar and Saudi Arabia supported.[63]

Some opponents of Qatar’s policy considered that its intervention in Syria “did not stem from its desire to see a real democratic project in the region, and that it does not have a vision outside the framework of Western priorities. Others said: It cannot be understood no matter what justifications are proposed, while others considered it a license. For the Assad regime to commit its crimes, considering it a crisis complication, and it missed the opportunity to reform the system, and many went even further by saying: The Arab League has become a vehicle used for the purposes of the Gulf States and their agendas.

Sixth Topic: Evaluating the Qatari role in the stage of the Arab spring

Qatar is a model for a small country aspiring to play a distinct regional role in a highly intertwined and complex regional environment, and despite the escalation of the regional role of Qatar since the start of the spring in the Arab region, this role in the wake of the Arab spring received a number of observations, so we try to evaluate This role by focusing on the following two points:

  • In terms of the clarity of vision for the perceptions of the country decision-maker
  • In terms of the level of leadership in balancing the objectives and Resources

  1. In terms of the clarity of vision for the perceptions of the country decision-maker

Most foreign policy researchers argue that there is a correlation between perception and behaviour. In this regard, “Kenneth Pollack, an expert in national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf” says that those who make decisions that determine the policies and behaviour of nations do not act on the objective facts of the situation. Regardless of what this means, but based on their perceptions of the situation, “individuals act or behave according to a position they perceive about the world around them. This perception does not necessarily coincide with the actual or real reality, and therefore we must distinguish between the environments as we perceive it or perceive it and the environment as it exists.” Actually, the lack of congruence between them creates what is called a cognitive error, and accordingly, if the decision-makers’ perceptions of the world are wrong or incorrect, their policies will be different and perhaps failed, in other words that the psychological environment factors determine the validity of the foreign policy decisions to a large extent and that the more congruent perceptions and perceptions The leader with the scientific environment or whenever the difference between perception and reality decreases, that is, the decision is made based on the perception and understanding of the political leader of the same variables. [64]

Regarding the Qatari role, he did not devote himself to merely the decision-maker’s perception of this role, which is based on ensuring survival to overcome the obsession with size, but rather ensuring the continuation of economic growth and huge investments and the desire for regional expansion using smart power, so that Sheikh Hamad, with his pragmatic personality, worked on translating this role from the foundations The Qatari system has qualified it to play a role that is difficult for other Arab countries to play, and if we consider the perceptual map of the perception of the Qatari decision maker, we will notice there are two implications for this role:

The first indication: Qatari decision-makers were distinguished by the personal and public involvement of the Emir and the Prime Minister, and a small circle of decision makers, in addition to allocating large financial resources to influence the outcome of mediation, and the structure of the small and central decision-making circle has greatly facilitated Qatari officials to put at their disposal Together, the political and economic resources are through the ministries and institutions owned by the state, and this helped them to project their influence in the areas in which they intervene, all these factors intersected in order to achieve a growing reputation for Qatar as a player capable of achievement in international and regional affairs, but what can be noticed is that there is a wide distance between the discourse The official expressing the Qatari vision of its external role and the scientific practice of this vision, which created a gap between the attitudes and perceptions on the one hand and between actions and roles on the other hand, as there was a mismatch or an inappropriate marriage between the intentions of the Qatari leadership and Qatar’s diplomatic and bureaucratic capabilities, as Qatar lacked Administrative and field resources to use its role in order to achieve tangible results.[65]

The second indication: an overlap in the relative importance of the ladder of priorities by giving priority to the regional role at the expense of the internal role, as the huge resource wealth along with the small size of the indigenous population gave Qatari officials a wide room for freedom to manoeuvre, and freed the emirate from the socio-economic pressures it suffers from. The largest neighbours in the region, and over time this translated itself into an important source of soft power and strengthened Qatar’s regional position.

However, this distance between perceiving and performing the role led to the deviation of the role from its path, especially with the beginning of the Arab spring by adopting the policy of double standards and moving away from the strategy of zeroing problems with its regional surroundings to interfering in the region’s affairs in a way that did not make it a single role, but rather a set of roles at the same time, I worked to give priority to interests over principles.[66]

In the period prior to the Arab spring, Qatar played a prominent role in strengthening and supporting its relations with the countries of the Arab region and had a leadership role in resolving many crises, while the period during which the Arab spring took place reflected a stark contrast between the maximum levels of support it provided to the opposition in exchange for the utmost deterioration. The retreat of collapsing regimes and the fall of previous regimes, as sharp criticisms of Qatari policy began to crystallize. Qatar’s failure to use its role to achieve tangible results after the spring reflected the extent of the lack of depth in its professional diplomatic capabilities and also the extent of the challenges / institutional outcomes that the personal decision-making processes have created to the extent The Qatari foreign policy is characterized by the diversity of its behaviour in several different paths and may be contradictory in many times, and this may be due to the weak institutionalization of the mechanism for making foreign policy, and its direct link with the Emirati power, either personally or under guidance through the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Makes Qatari foreign policy dependent on personal relationships and moods dominating the princely establishment in the state.

  1. In terms of the level of leadership in balancing the objectives and Resources

Guidance in creating a balance between goals and resources means that the established objectives be within the limits of the available resources, with the best use of serving those goals in a manner that the return is greater than the cost, as each country has its own strategy that guarantees its goals and protects its national interests and national security within the framework of the resources and capabilities it has available. And material and moral elements, Harold Lasswell, one of the prominent political science professors in analyzing this point, indicated that the criteria for rationalization in decision-making extend to include several important matters and considerations: the extent of clarity of the idea of ​​the purpose of the decision and the degree of accuracy in measuring and evaluating the possibilities resulting from taking a particular decision among several decisions Alternative, and finally, the ability to adapt the available means of knowledge in the service of the ultimate goal sought by the decision, or in other words, the rational decision is the result of a balanced assessment, as far as possible, of all controlling values, available facts and expectations related to future conditions, so the decision maker evaluates an important part of his assumptions and expectations Basically on his perceptions of future situations, taking into account that he has the ability to change things in a way that makes the future more stretchy and keep his desires and goals.[67] [68]

Foreign policies are based on the principle of achieving interests by realizing the sources of power and clarifying the goals that the ruling elites seek to achieve through their political behaviour in the international environment, and therefore foreign policy is related to the size of the sources of power and the size of political ambition, as Qatar has large financial resources that are able to employ them internationally in politics. Active external, but it does not constitute the only factors of power in contemporary countries, especially in the case of countries with very small areas, or with an extreme geographical location, or in terms of major goals regionally and internationally, and all of these huge financial factors were reflected with the limitations of other factors on political behaviour. Qatari divergent or even contradictory in many files related to the Qatari foreign policy and in its interactions with other countries.[69] The main motive for Qatar is its political ambition; Qatar wants to appear as a prominent political mediator, if not the most prominent in the Middle East, and this ambition motivates Qatar is seeking to intervene in any conflict that occurs in the region, in addition to trying to influence political processes and the players in them, especially now in countries facing transformations.

However, there are those who consider that a defect has affected the relationship between the goals and the resources available to the State of Qatar in the period following the Arab spring, as the Qatari leadership envisaged broad and broad goals for the Qatari external role, the achievement of which requires a large amount of resources that are not necessarily material and which were not available to Qatar, such as the interests of reputation and status, for example. The material resources were greater than their status, which tempted them to adopt expansionary policies in the region. Rather, the leadership sought to maximize these resources by converting them into capabilities, meaning that Qatar’s capabilities became greater than the actual size of the available material and moral resources and the investment of those capabilities became in the interest of Arab causes characterized by lack of Certainty, what may be risky investing in it, such as the billions that have been spent on the Arab spring without guarantees, and the decision to hand over power to Sheikh Tamim may be part of the image correction, the reduction of impulsivity and the restoration of the State of Qatar as a neutral mediator.

It seemed to the Qatari decision-maker at the beginning of the spring that the benefits of Qatari Arab policy were very large in exchange for a lower cost (the return and cost could not be calculated on purely financial grounds), but the developments of the situation in the region proved the opposite, as this cost was not behind a tangible return, especially after the fall of The Morsi regime in Egypt and the change of leaders of the Syrian opposition loyal to Qatar with ones close to the Saudi circles, the political crisis in Tunisia, the deteriorating security situation and the congestion of the internal security situation in Libya.

Chapter (3)

First Topic: The implications of the Arab spring on the interactions of Qatar’s regional policy

The Qatari leadership tried to take advantage of the developments and changes taking place in the Arab world in its favor in order to consecrate itself as an effective regional power in the region, but the changes that took place after the Emir of the State of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, took over the reins of the country’s rule, redrawing the geopolitical landscape and regional balances. The isolation of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the escalation of tensions and conflicts in Libya, the expansion of the Islamic State in the region and its seizure of large geographical areas in both Syria and Iraq, and the recent Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, all these events gathered the Qatari leadership controlling its foreign policy regarding the way Its dealings with the current developments in the region, and the dynamism of dealing with developments at the regional level.

The events taking place in the Arab region in light of the Arab spring have changed the balance of power in the region, which has pushed the foreign policy of the State of Qatar to bring about transformations in its dealings with its geopolitical environment, After the state’s foreign policy was characterized by mediation and neutrality during the first decade of the third millennium, its course was transformed after the start of the Arab spring to enter the phase of influence, after the Qatari decision-maker adopted a position in support of the spring in the Arab region, and given the nature of the regional role that Doha seeks to play, on which it is built The entirety of its foreign policies, in order to exercise pioneering roles in the regional system at the Gulf and Arab levels, especially in light of the Arab spring, which necessitates discussion of Qatari-Arab relations in light of the repercussions of the Arab spring.[70]

First: Qatar-Gulf relations

The growing role of the Gulf Cooperation Council is considered the most important regional developments revealed by the Arab spring, for while the Council was mainly concerned with developments in its inter-relations and developments in its countries’ relations with Iraq and Iran, it has become active and more effective in light of the events and developments that the Arab region has been building since the start of the spring. The Qatari approach, which involves under the collective leadership of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, was completely different from the unilateralism that characterized Qatar’s policies elsewhere, in large part because the spring in North Africa did not represent a material or ideological threat to Qatari interests as the spring did. Against a neighboring Gulf ruling family that is only twenty-five miles off the western coast of the State of Qatar (meaning Bahrain), as it would have made any deep concessions on political reform on the part of the ruling Bahraini elite, which can be said to be the weakest link in the chain of Gulf monarchies that threatens to encourage opposition springs in other Gulf Cooperation Council states, and disturb the delicate sectarian balance between the group of Sunni-Shiite interests. Iran maintains regional sovereignty, and Saudi Arabia had exerted great political and economic influence over the neighborhood from small countries long before the start of the Arab spring.[71]

Almost identical indicators can be observed in Yemen. Like Bahrain, Yemen represented a geostrategic and political interest, especially for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And the perpetuation of Saudi influence, and during the tenure of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud as Minister of Defense for five decades, he exerted a dominant influence on Saudi-Yemeni relations, which were characterized by informal and personal contacts as much as they were characterized by official activities between the two countries, and Saudi financial flows were The main political elites in Yemen are fleeting and unpredictable at best, as they were closely identified through the sources of Prince Sultan’s personal information and were never properly institutionalized.

It can be said that in Yemen and Bahrain, the already existing levels of Saudi influence have limited Qatar’s ability to formulate and implement policies that differ greatly from the Saudi approach. With the launch of mass demonstrations against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power thirty-three years ago in the capital, Sana’a, it quickly spread. To the rest of the cities and towns across Yemen, hundreds of thousands of protesters called on President Saleh to step down immediately. It would remove President Saleh from power in an orderly process from the hierarchy of power to the bottom and led by the elite, but the Gulf Cooperation Council plan devoid of any place for the popular pro-democracy spring that unexpectedly appeared to challenge the current situation in Yemen and completely change it. Instead, the plan remained They are wedded to the support of established and familiar political actors, as the leaders of the GCC countries sought to control the crowd and guide the transition to the post-President Saleh era[72]. Nevertheless, the general context of the Qatari policy in Yemen was directed by the collective effort of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, consistent with the Qatari policy towards Bahrain during the same period, and in the Gulf Cooperation Council Qatar remained active, but maintaining good relations with Iran worried Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, The two sides have been experiencing tensions for a long time with this country. However, in an event that is the first of its kind – since the establishment of the Compassionate Council for the Arab States of the Gulf more than thirty years ago – three Gulf states, namely: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, withdrew their ambassadors from Doha on the fifth of March 2014, and took this decision in a joint statement issued by them, interfering Qatar in the internal affairs of the Gulf states, which leads to a threat to the security and political stability of those countries.[73]

This unusual diplomatic crisis in the Gulf region, especially among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council system, comes in the context of regional developments in the region, the most important of which are the events taking place in the Arab Republic of Egypt after Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in 2013 after the overthrow of one of the movements The Islamic trend, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the first reading of this escalation by the governments of the three Gulf states, and at this time reveals the efforts of these countries to limit the Qatari influence and clear features in some of the central files in the Middle East region, especially the Egyptian file, and the desire of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the degree The first, and then the United Arab Emirates, is to work seriously to pass the stage of the Arab spring. This crisis almost profoundly affected the performance of the Gulf Cooperation Council system, after it undermined confidence among its members, since the establishment of this regional and Saudi system it has sought to dominate it even though regional and international interactions have led to a change in balances and concepts alike, and from this standpoint comes [74]The refusal of the small states in the Gulf system to be dictated by the policies of the major countries, and this can be seen in this context. As the State of Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman did not follow the example of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain in withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar, and it is evident that the position of these two countries is an indication of a refusal to follow the Saudi position, and there is a kind of division within the Gulf system that leads to the inability to take a unified Gulf decision[75]

We conclude from this that Qatar will remain of great importance as a player, actor and mediator in everything related to “political Islam”, given that it enjoys good relations with the components of this current in the Arab spring countries. Likewise, Saudi Arabia’s desire to absorb Qatar and annex it under its influence is paralleled by its will to form a united front to confront the eastern neighbor “Iran”, and in this regard both the Sultanate of Oman and the State of Qatar stand against this approach, as the two countries remained keen to establish good neighborly relations with Iran, Despite the tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In the Gulf agreement that was reached during an extraordinary summit held in Riyadh, November 17, 2014, in light of the escalation of regional crises, fears of extremists and the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the decision to return the three ambassadors came after eight months of absence from Doha, as a result Due to mediation efforts led by the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, this decision indicates that it is difficult for the division between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to continue, and because of considerations related to political legitimacy it is difficult for the new regime in Qatar to continue this approach, as there was a Qatari effort for reconciliation and the state followed [76]The context for this was in order for the ambassadors to return quickly, whether through Kuwaiti mediation or through the unsuccessful attempt of US President Barak Obama or through the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco, or during the meeting between Sheikh Tamim and the US Secretary of State in Algeria. As the decision to withdraw ambassadors posed fears for Qatar, the most prominent of which was its threat to be confined and isolated from its Gulf surroundings, with at least three important and main countries, and it carried indications of the formation of Gulf relations of a special kind with Egypt, and what looks like a regional axis facing the axis of Qatar – Turkey – Iran, Doha’s pursuit of its hostile policies meant the intensification and deepening of this axis, with its impact on the US’s relations in the region.[77] Consequently, the Qatari endeavor for reconciliation and the return of ambassadors came from this basis.

Second: With the rest of the Middle East countries

The Middle East region used to be friendly to Qatar and was open to its role, but it is now looking at the Gulf emirate with suspicion and suspicion, and Syria remains the greatest challenge facing Qatar in the future in the Middle East, after the emirate was confident in the demise of the Assad regime due to international pressures and the weapons provided by the opposition The balance of power has become in favor of the Syrian regime, and the results may be reflected in Qatar, which supported the opposition militarily and materially

Michael Stevens, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in Qatar, points out that “Syria is the biggest challenge for the Qataris, as they believed that Bashar al-Assad’s regime was about to collapse in the face of international pressure and supply arms to the opposition forces, but the situation is moving in the interest of the Assad regime”. (Stevens, 2015)

Third: with the countries of North Africa

Public opinion has turned against Qatar despite the billions of dollars it pumped into the Arab spring that led to the overthrow of the regimes in some of these countries, and Qatar’s continued support for the Islamic regimes that held power in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt before the overthrow of President Morsi in 2013, which angered many, and Qatar became the place Criticism of its interference in the internal affairs of the uprising countries, hence Qatar lost the support of these countries for their orientations. (Al-Dostor, 2013)

Algeria also feared Qatar’s regional ambitions in its support for Islamic movements in North Africa and its hosting of Abbasi Madani, the former leader of the banned Islamic Salvation Front who tried to rapprochement with the Libyan Transitional Council, and its funding of jihadist movements in Mali that were holding Algerian hostages, and its rapprochement with the Moroccan monarchy after the visit of the Emir Sheikh Tamim to Morocco on December 27, 2013, with the provision of Qatari aid to Morocco worth half a billion dollars, which is part of the strategic agreement that brings together the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Morocco and Jordan.[78]

Second Topic: Determining future paths for the Qatari role in light of the repercussions of the Arab spring:

The future of the escalating Qatari role raises a lot of controversy in official and unofficial circles about the reality of the interests that Qatar seeks to achieve and its ability to continue its ambitions, which some consider to be beyond its actual and available size, but developments in light of the spring that the Arab region is going through makes determining the future Qatar in the region is linked to multiple paths that are governed by internal and external variables, especially since it is unclear the extent to which Qatar is able to continue its active role in the region in light of the tense relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries and the increasing state of “dissatisfaction” on the part of the Arab and Western circles in a manner. This emirate might be “repositioned” within the regional environment by rearranging its roles, especially after the inauguration of Sheikh “Tamim bin Hamad” to succeed his father. The escalation of the roles of other countries, or the gradual expansion of the Qatari external role, or the return of this role to a place it had in the period prior to the Arab spring.

  • Scenario of decline in the Qatari role

This trend focuses on the assumption that the future of the Qatari role in the Arab region during the next phase is linked to the path of decline and decline, as regional data and indicators show that there is a marked decline in this role, and this trend considers that the decline and decline of the Qatari political role will be in favour of the escalation of the roles of other countries. It seems that Qatar’s role in support of the Muslim Brotherhood has begun to retreat in the regional arena in favour of Saudi Arabia, which has taken the lead in major files such as Egypt and Syria, especially after Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced that they would provide $ 8 billion in aid to Egypt, and the Egyptian army’s decision to dismiss President Mohamed Morsi The election of Ahmed Assi al-Jariya, who is close to Saudi Arabia, as the head of the Syrian opposition, in addition to the resignation of the head of the Syrian interim government, Ghassan Hitto, who is affiliated with Qatar, to “limit Doha’s ambitions.” Kuwaiti analyst Ayed Al-Manaa considers that “Qatar tried to assume a leadership role in the region, but it overstepped its borders by publicly adopting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and other Arab Spring countries.”[79]

This view is supported by Jonathan Eyal, head of international relations at the Royal United Services Foundation in Britain, who said: “Qatar’s Middle Eastern diplomacy has receded today, and it will not succeed in Libya as it failed in Syria and is witnessing a collapse in Egypt.”[80]

The political researcher in international relations affairs, Bakr Muhammad Bakr Al-Banhawi added that the Qataris, after realizing the damage caused by their policy, “worked to reduce the level of their impulsivity” which brought about the change in government with the sudden abdication of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani from power in favour of his son Sheikh Tamim and expelled Qatar’s diplomatic engineer, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, “added:” Saudi Arabia, the historic ally of the United States in the region, has regained its previous role. (Al-Banhawi, 2015)

It has also become clear that the Qatari-Saudi differences are not heading towards stability, in light of the disagreement over the details of the Syrian file and Qatar’s use of the “Houthis” as a card to threaten Saudi Arabia with a “Shiite” extension, which happened at the beginning of 2013 from Qatari attempts to communicate with a number of leaders in the former South Yemen Residing abroad in order to keep her away from any alliance he led between the Southerners and Saudi Arabia.

In addition, the Qatari role witnessed a Gulf recession due to the loss of confidence that was followed by Bahrain and the UAE to it and its political alliances, and the UAE’s dissatisfaction in particular with the growing relationship of Qatar with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and it began to work to undermine the Qatari influence in all fields, but after he assumed power he sought Prince Tamim to work towards correcting Qatar’s relations with neighbouring Gulf states and returning the country to the fold of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the coming years.[81]

There is also a retreat of the Qatari role in the Arab region. The Qatari intervention in the ongoing conflict in Syria since 2013 has not overthrown the Assad regime and this regime has become difficult to fall, so that this trend is expected to prolong this conflict for a period of time, and Algeria is also objecting to the role of Qatar in Libya, especially with the decline of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood there, and in addition to that, this trend sees that the decline of the spring in the region will necessarily lead to a decline in the Qatari role, specifically its role in supporting the spring, as well as a decline in the political weight of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, which is one of the tools for Qatar’s movement in the region. [82]The region and thus reducing the impulse to support the Brotherhood, despite the Qatari ambitious pursuit of a regional leadership in a stage after the Arab spring, and its ability to reduce the gap between the elements of power that it possesses and the role it plays through smart power policies, there are great challenges facing Qatar. It will not enable it to avoid the negative aspects of that gap and to continue to exercise its regional influence in the near future, which limits the volume of internal and external givens.

First: The internal level

  1. Political dysfunction[83]

The political imbalance is represented in the absence of democracy and the lack of effective political participation that ensures determining political options and making public decisions, despite the stipulations of the permanent constitution of 2004 that the people are the source of powers and the principle of separation of powers affirmed by the reality of the Qatari political system confirms the continuation of absolute governance. Despite the appointment of Sheikh “Tamim bin Hamad” to succeed his father on July 25, 2013, the authority remained confined to the hands of Emir Sheikh Tamim and his father, Prince Hamad bin Khalifa, in addition to the role of members of the Emir families. Political analyst Olivier Da Lage believes that in the first stage, major changes cannot be expected in Qatar’s orientations, and he attributed this to Qatar’s policy, which came as a result of a long-term strategy that was developed more than 15 years ago, and that the new emir will take his first steps as a ruler under the gaze of his father. However, with time, the personality of Sheikh Tamim will emerge more and there will be a change in style, not in content, and Qatar is one of the most unreformed Gulf countries over the past decade. What it has built of reforms does not rise to the level of structural reforms. In an effort to support peoples’ demands for change, and thus the contradiction in the Qatari behaviour remains around its support for democracy externally, at a time when an internal autocratic system is practiced in the absence of elected councils, which keeps the council’s powers formal and strengthens in the future the narrow leadership circle. It is noticeable that the national vision set forth by Qatar for the year 2030 does not refer to political reform and political development, but rather confines the issue to human, social, economic and environmental development without mentioning political development, as it is a major pillar of the vision.

  1. Economic-productive imbalance

It is based on the almost absolute and increasing dependence on the proceeds of exports of oil wealth threatened with depletion, which is a defect that is reflected in the gross domestic product and all other national accounts, because the source of the income of the State of Qatar is the rent of depleted natural wealth and not a wealth based on the productivity of individuals and institutions, as is the case in productive economies, Oil rents became the source of the general budget revenues, public investments and other national accounts, a defect that limits the expansion and continuity of the Qatari role.

  1. Military-security imbalance[84]

An effective foreign policy requires a large amount of financial resources, which are available to Qatar, but at the same time it needs to build a military force capable of playing an interventionist leadership role in cases of necessity, which Qatar can only do within the framework of regional or international powers. Through limited participation, as happened during its participation in the international campaign against the Gaddafi regime, or within the Gulf Force, the “Peninsula Shield” at sea.

In addition to Qatar’s inability to defend itself on its own due to its limited military power, its compulsion to ally with foreign powers, and its association with treaties that allow the establishment of military bases and the presence of foreign forces on its territory, this imbalance prevents it from unilaterally entering the military. Qatar still lacks military strength; This hinders its ability to unilaterally intervene in international and regional issues; Because the absence of hard power – specifically the military – prevents it from undertaking military adventures, and forces it to rely on non-military methods of intervention, in addition to this, the narrow geographical area and the limited human mass prevent Qatar’s ability to arm itself and build a military deterrent force even if the huge capabilities are available.

Second: At the external level

  1. The absence of a Qatari vision for the post-Arab spring

Qatar worked on a basic goal, which is change and support for the spring, but it did not have a vision for the Arab region after the spring, and in that it did not differ much from the forces of the Arab spring, which knew exactly what it wanted at the very moment, but it did not take into account the following. The spring, and beyond its desire to bring down regimes and replace regimes with Brotherhood or Islamic orientations, we do not see a Qatari vision for the transition phase or for democratic transformation in the Arab world, and there is no country vision for the directions of change in the post-spring phase, as Qatar played a role in leading the spring’s processes, but after The Arab spring, Qatar did not have a vision or political, economic or cultural initiatives.

  1. Failure of the financial support policy

 Qatar’s external political role has increased since the end of the last century, disproportionate to the size of the country and its population, as mechanisms to strengthen its Arab and international interactions and develop its alliances, as it has used its huge financial revenues to serve that policy. It seemed that this country, which waited for the reward for its role from the spring countries, must spend on this role and bear the responsibility for change, and that part of the deterioration of the internal situation bears its responsibility for Qatar, and they are demanding that it contribute financially to the extent of its contribution to political change, and then the waiting of Qatar for the reward has shifted[85]. In fact, it seems that Qatar has a plan or a vision, even with regard to financial support. Despite the announcement of providing support to specific countries, doubts have arisen regarding the amount of scrutiny provided, and the announcement of support for what promised to implement it and the slowdown in its implementation.

  1. The imbalance in Qatar’s relations with the Brotherhood with its relationship with the liberal and Salafi trend

Qatar’s relationship with the spring’s countries remained limited in their support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place, and it did not open up to the liberal or Salafist forces in those countries. The Brotherhood’s rule in the Arab countries further distanced it from civil, liberal and Salafi currents. Its support for the Brotherhood in Egypt in light of the demands of the civil forces to overthrow the president and the condemnation of what they call “the rule of the guide” led to more anger against Qatar. In fact, this point will represent a political dilemma. Qatari because it is expected that Qatar’s relations with the spring’s countries will be subjected to tension and various problems, if Qatar’s unilateral tendency to support the Brotherhood continues, especially with the fall of the Brotherhood’s rule experience, and in light of the various possibilities for Arab power transfers after the spring and in addition to the civil and liberal current, hostility to Qatar will remain in some sectors. The old parties and forces excluded by the spring.[86]

  1. Not having the legitimacy at the level of the Arab street to play a leadership role

 Especially since the leadership roles are entrusted with historical dimensions that were confined to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, and the Qatari activity came because of the absence of those roles, or their self-reliance.

  1. The decline of the media influence of Al-Jazeera

 The spring in the Arab region resulted in a completely new Arab media scene in which the private media prevailed, and in the face of that the Arab citizen’s hesitation to Al-Jazeera became selective, seasonal, and according to the occasion. In it except by renewing the tool and the goal, as it lost nearly five million viewers, and is being criticized for its bias and lack of editorial accuracy after it became a tool for the Qatari government instead of being an independent media organization, it is in the Arab world accused of being biased towards the United States and Israel in what the Western world considers a mouthpiece”Islamists Voice.”[87].  In addition, after it played a major role in covering the events of the Arab spring, its offices in Arab capitals became closed, its correspondents were subjected to harassment and imprisonment, and the channel continued to work with all its assets to cover all Arab and international events except Qatari events.[88]

  • Scenario of gradual expansion in the Qatari role

This path presupposes the escalation of the Qatari role during the post-Arab spring. Although the Qatari impulse in managing Arab files is reduced, this does not mean Qatar’s inability to play future roles to influence regional interactions in the region, and this trend sees that the Qatari role will be within the framework of Acting as the actor and supporter of any new Arab arrangements in the region that would enhance the Qatari role.

Despite the relative decline of the Qatari role, it still possesses many other elements of power that can be employed by the necessary employment that enables it to play an important and influential role in its region, and the new regional variables, although they carry some risks, provide some opportunities for them that can be taken advantage of. Including them to maximize their capabilities and enhance their position.

This temporary decline in the Qatari role does not mean its end, as Qatar continues to enjoy huge wealth and huge investments in Western countries, which will keep it in place in these countries, as the political analyst specializing in Gulf affairs, Neil Patrick, indicated that this country “still enjoys economic weight locally and internationally.” (Patrick, 2014) In addition, although its wealth is based mainly on oil and natural gas exports, it has taken other steps to diversify its economic base and build a strong financial sector that manages huge investments, and its strong economic role emerged through Qatari aid to Egypt after the January 25 revolution in addition to its role in the war on Libya.[89]

Qatar has recently moved towards a new type of investment in human capital, by bringing in experts to develop its economy and train its staff. The Qatar Foundation has also brought in the best Ten American Universities and other English and European universities to form branches in Qatar, and Qatar invests in its infrastructure. Broadly, what qualified it to be a global centre for world summits and conferences, its hosting of the 2022 World Cup, and the accompanying completion of infrastructure projects.[90] Qatar is also among the Arab countries that started a process of political reform, as it moved in recent years towards adopting some democratic mechanisms; especially it was the second Gulf country to grant women the right to vote and vote, after Oman.

Conclusion

It is evident through our study of this topic that the escalating role of the State of Qatar in light of the Arab spring is a continuation of its growing foreign policy over the past two decades. Although small countries usually encounter difficulties in achieving their foreign policy objectives because they are often modest in military capabilities, so they resort In addition to other non-military means to achieve its objectives, Qatar is a small country with a limited geographical area and military capabilities in addition to its location in a region of constant security turmoil, but it was able to practice an active foreign policy and imposed itself as a major player in Arab politics since the beginning of the spring, and several factors contributed to this. It has been linked to internal variables related to the ambition of the ruling elite in Qatar and external ones related to the decline of the roles of pivotal Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example.

In light of the above research and analysis of the topic, the following results were reached

  • What has been monitored about the Qatari role in the Arab spring shows that the foundations of the Qatari foreign policy did not change during its interaction with the Arab spring, and that Qatar intended to expand the use of the media tool and the financial and even military tool it used in a collective setting, which reflects its endeavour to protect its interests from behind This role and the achievement of its foreign policy objectives.
  • There is complementarily in the Qatari roles at several political, economic and media levels towards the countries of the Arab spring, and this has been linked to Qatar’s endeavour to compensate for the geographical, demographic and military imbalance that it suffers from.
  • The high level of Qatar’s involvement in Arab and regional affairs in light of the Arab spring. Given the dynamism that characterized this policy in many files in light of the Arab spring, and as a mechanism to enhance its involvement in Arab and international affairs and develop its alliances, Qatar’s immediate involvement in the spring was the actual dissemination of its media arsenal and diplomatic activity. And its financial and even military support was requested by some parties, such as (in Libya and Syria)
  • The ability to employ the financial tool to achieve political gains, as Qatar used its huge financial revenues to serve its foreign policy, as it generously contributed to the provision of financial aid and assistance to many countries of the Arab spring, and Qatar became one of the countries most employing political money in the form of loans, grants and grants to target countries to achieve And protect their interests.
  • The boldness and ambition of the Qatari leadership, as the Qatari foreign policy was influenced by the perceptions and personal motives of the ruling elites – especially Prince Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani – who considered the Arab spring the opportunity that was waiting for it to confirm its regional position and role at all levels.
  • The broad employment of the media tool in achieving its foreign policy goals, as it can be seen the role of Al-Jazeera, which has been fully involved in covering the events of the countries of the Arab spring, and has focused in its coverage on mobilization in favour of the spring, and pushed the limits of information to new heights by providing direct coverage of the major developments in the region. Arabia and Al Jazeera worked to host political and religious opposition groups in Arab countries.
  • Exploiting opportunities and manoeuvrability in its foreign policy due to its pragmatic nature that expresses political realism as a driving force for Qatari external behaviour, which appears through the combination of contradictions and the preservation of a network of alliances extremely complex and contradictory at the same time without damaging its relations with each of them, which allowed Qatar High manoeuvring capabilities in its foreign policy and enabling it to practice an active foreign policy in the crisis-stricken Arab arena in light of the spring in the region. Qatar has also succeeded in exploiting the opportunities that were provided to it in light of the retreat of major countries in the Arab region in order to strengthen its regional position and maximize its political role And economical.
  • The nature of the relationship with regional and international powers: The small states that lack the factors of power and influence and that want to play a role greater than their size, whether at the regional or international level, cannot do it if they do not have the support of regional or international powers, which is what applies to the State of Qatar. The framework It is possible to talk about the strategy of international investments that are followed by small countries, including Qatar, which accepts the employment of international powers for it and in return it employs its relations with major countries in order to achieve its interests, as Qatar confirmed the continuation of its alliance with the United States of America and its employment for this relationship in light of the Arab spring, in order to Protecting its security in light of security and regional threats, if American protection provides it with the ability to play a role in the region.
  • Qatar’s policies reflected a careful evaluation of its interests in the various countries of the Arab spring, and it sought to intervene directly and indirectly in Libya and Syria under the pretext of searching for solutions within an Arab framework for Arab problems, and it provided economic aid in Tunisia and Egypt, but Doha was limited to cautious coordination with the countries of the Cooperation Council. Gulf countries to re-establish the political system in Bahrain and Yemen, recognizing the greater influence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in these countries, and the potential threat that the successful spring in the Gulf may pose to stability near its borders, and therefore when it comes to the security of the Gulf states, Qatar cannot separate from Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf countries. .
  • It is also evident through an analysis of the Qatari role that after an initial period of caution and caution at the beginning of the Arab spring in late 2010, the Qatari leadership realized the emerging features of the escalating political spring in the region, in order for the foreign policy to be modified in a pragmatic manner. (Before the spring) and then by the intervention (during the spring) that enabled it to play an exceptionally overt and intervening role during the early stages of events in the region.

The Arab spring represented the highest summit of the rise of the influential Qatari role in the region, and Qatar was seen as the biggest beneficiary of the spring politically, economically and in the media, but its first success was not destined to continue after it lost many of its allies, starting with the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, and the leaders The Muslim Brotherhood, where the new emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, faced growing pressure from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to counter the support of his predecessors to the Muslim Brotherhood and its local branches in countries undergoing a transitional period. It is also possible to notice the decline of Qatar’s power as the first supporter. For the Syrian opposition, and thus its role in the Syrian spring declined in favour of Saudi Arabia, which replaced Qatar as the main financier and supporter of the opposition against the Syrian regime, which made the opposition groups distance from it, which means that they are no longer in a position of leadership politically.

In addition to the pressures facing Leah Qatar from regional and international powers, she directed sharp criticisms of its policy because of its involvement in many issues, not with the old mediator approach, but rather with the actor approach, including the Libyan issue, where he accused her of supporting armed factions with an Islamic background after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and even the Libyan situation. The current deteriorating situation, as well as the situation in Syria, support for armed factions there, and support for certain political rhetoric against the Bashar al-Assad regime; In addition to the constant pressure from the Gulf neighbours to try to limit the Qatari role, which is Qatar’s permanent problem that it cannot currently back down under pressure so as not to lose the independence card of its political decision.

Recommendations

  • If the State of Qatar wants to preserve its regional role, it needs to diversify its relations with all currents without being biased towards some parties against others, while avoiding establishing relations with political forces and groups within the Arab countries without the approval of the systems of those countries in order to avoid being accused of interfering in the internal affairs of the countries of the region.
  • Work to address the gap between domestic policy and foreign policy, to avoid any contradiction, especially with regard to internal political reform, which suffers from stagnation and the activity of its foreign policies in support of political spring in other Arab countries, which requires them to pay more attention to political reforms internally.
  • The Qatari foreign policy for reform needs to return to the policy of active and positive neutrality and to move away from the interventionist policy as much as possible, especially since Qatar has made significant efforts in this field during the previous period that have brought it to a great position, in addition to its economic capabilities that help it in the success of its efforts in a number of mediation files.
  • Working to reset its approach to using financial incentives in order to focus on long-term investments rather than short-term results, and thus focus on humanitarian aid, economic development and peace building projects.

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  53. Muhammad Mansour, “The Qatari Military Role in the Libyan Conflict (2011-2020),” Al-Marsaad Al-Arabi, (August 18, 2020)
  54. Muhammad Saeed Abu Amer, “The Gulf Role in Political Transition in Yemen: Al-Jazeera as a Case Study”, International Politics, Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation, Issue 192, (April 2012). p. 92
  55. Muhammad Shamdeen, “The Policies of the Gulf Countries in Syria”, Harmoon center for contemporary studies, Doha, Qatar, (23 November 2015). p. 4-7
  56. Mohammed Al-Bazzaz, “The New Directions of Qatari Foreign Policy in a Transforming World”. Meknes, Morocco: Faculty of Law. (April 27, 2013). p. 47
  57. Mohamed El-Sayed Selim, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Constants and Variables”, Egyptian Renaissance Library, 1989. p.18-25
  58. Muhammad al-Sayed Salim, “The Scientific Analysis of Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework, Adapted, Arab Strategic Thought,” No. 40, April 1992, pp. 140-142
  59. Moataz Salameh, “The Regional Expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council”, International Politics, Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation, No. 185, Volume 46, (July 2011). p. 80
  60. Muhammad Bakr Al-Banhawi, “The Saudi role is advancing while the Qatari is retreating after the developments in Egypt and Syria.” Arab solaa newspaper, 2014
  61. Moataz Salameh, “After the Ambassadors Crisis … The Big Scenarios for Political Transformation in Qatar”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. (April 2014). P.20
  62. Marie Sophie, “Al Jazeera, the little Qatari in the big media court”, Jolpress, (4, January 2014).
  63. Mona Hussein Obaid, “The Reflection of Change in the Arab Region on the Arab Gulf Countries,” from the works of the Forum: Change in the Arab Countries and its Impact on Iraq and the Arab Gulf Region, Baghdad: Center for International Studies, (March 13, 2013). p.5
  64. Nader Kazim, “Save Hope: The Long Road to the Arab Spring”, Manama, Bahrain: Masaa publishing and distribution, (2013). P.9
  65. Nawaf Al-Tamimi, “Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the National Character: Theory and Application to the Qatar Model”, Beirut, Arab Science House, (2012). P. 31-42
  66. Pierre de Sennar Clenz, “The Realistic Model and International Conflicts”, translated by: Salama Mahmoud al-Babli, The International Journal of Social Sciences, UNESCO Publications, Issue 127, (February 1991, pp. 5-10
  67. Paul Salem, Huib de Zeeuw , “Qatari Foreign Policy Article: The Changing Dynamics of an Outsize Role “. Carnegie Middle East Center, (DECEMBER 31, 2012).
  68. “Qatar Poverty and wealth, Information about Poverty and wealth in Qatar”. Retrieved 3 March 2015
  69. “Qatari firms top list of investors in Arab countries”. The Peninsula. 29 December 2015. Retrieved 29 December 2015.
  70. Rasha Al-Sayed Ashry, “The Gulf Crisis and the Dimensions of the Libyan Role”, European Center for the Study of Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, (5 July 2019)
  71. Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smitt. “How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution”. Financial Times. Retrieved (26 June 2013)
  72. . P. Barston, “Modern Diplomacy”, 3rd edition. London: Pearson Education, (2006), p. 239.
  73. Rasoul Sorkhabi, PhD “The Qatar Oil Discoveries”, in GEO ExPro Magazine, Vol. 7, No. 1 – 2010. P. 6
  74. RTine Ustad Figenschou.” Al Jazeera and the Global Media Landscape: The South is Talking Back”. New York. Routledge ;( October 24, 2013). P.44-53
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[1] Bojang, Alieu S, “The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations”. Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs, Vol. 06, Issue 4 (January 2018), P.1

[2] Paul Salem, Huib de Zeeuw , “Qatari Foreign Policy Article: The Changing Dynamics of an Outsize Role “. Carnegie Middle East Center, (DECEMBER 31, 2012).

[3] Muhammad Adnan Murad, “The Power Struggle in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf, Its Historical Roots and Dimensions”. Damascus House for Printing and Publishing, Damascus, (1984), p. 317

[4] Rasoul Sorkhabi, PhD “The Qatar Oi l Discoveries”, in GEO ExPro Magazine, Vol. 7, No. 1 – 2010. P. 6

[5] “Qatar Poverty and wealth, Information about Poverty and wealth in Qatar”. Retrieved 3 March 2015

[6] Ahmed Zakaria Al-Shalaq, “Chapters from Qatar’s Political History”, Doha Modern Press Ltd., Doha, (1999). P.75

[7] Barakat, S, “The Qatari Spring: Qatar’s emerging role in peacemaking”. LSE Kuwait Program on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, Paper no. 24. (2012). P.43

[8] BloombergView, “Al-Jazeera Gets Rap as Qatar Mouthpiece”,( July 2014)

[9] Cafiero, G.” Is Qatar’s foreign policy sustainable?”,  Foreign Policy in Focus, (18 July 2014)

[10] Majed Khudair, “The Elements of Qatar’s Foreign Policy.” Journal of International Studies. Issue 29, Center for International Studies: Baghdad. p. 195-240

[11] Saadia Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), p. 92

[12] Worth, R. F,“Qatar, playing all sides, is a non-stop mediator”, The New York Times, (9 July 2014)

[13] Mehran Kamrava, “Qatar: Small State, Big Politics”: Cornell University Press. (July 23, 2013). P. 64

[14] R. P. Barston, “Modern Diplomacy”, 3rd edition. London: Pearson Education, (2006), p. 239.

[15] Hugh Miles,” Al-Jazeera: The inside Story of the Arab News Channel That is Challenging the West” Paperback, Grove Press (January 11, 2006). P.22-24

[16] Tine Ustad Figenschou.” Al Jazeera and the Global Media Landscape: The South is Talking Back”. New York. Routledge ;( October 24, 2013). P.44-53

[17] Moufid Al-Zaidi, “Al-Jazeera Channel: Breaking Taboos in the Arab Media Space”, Tale’a Publishing House, Beirut, 2003

[18] Khaled Al-Ayadi, “The Growth of the Qatari Role in the Region: Foundations and Foundations”, the Arab American news. (26 December 2012).

[19] Nawaf Al-Tamimi, “Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the National Character: Theory and Application to the Qatar Model”, Beirut, Arab Science House, (2012). P. 31-42

[20] Brahim Saidy, “Qatar’s defense policy: smart choices of a small state”, Conference: Small States and the New Security Environment (SSANSE) At: Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland. (June 2018). p.4-5

[21] Krauss, C., “For Qatar, Libyan intervention may be a turning point”, The New York Times, (23 July 2014)

[22] Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Fledgling Gulf Relations”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 8 September 2017.

[23]   Monia Fadel, “Fingers of the Gulf in Tunisia”, Gulf house for studies and publishing,( 18 October 2015)

[24] Karim Ben Mansour, “After the mutual accusations of loyalty to the foreigner: Tunisia between Qatari and French influence”, Babnet Tunisian journal, (30 Decembre 2011).

[25] Arafat on Jarghoun, the Qatari position on the Arab Spring revolutions and its impact on Qatari foreign policy changes, Al Mustansirba Journal for Arab and International Studies, Baghdad: Al-Mustansirba Center for Arab and International Studies, Issue 48, (2014). P.38

[26] Atheer Nazem Abdul-Wahid, “The Role of Qatari Foreign Policy in Light of Arab and Regional Crises,” Dirasat Journal, Center for International Studies, Issue 43, Baghdad

[27] Ahmed Abdul Malik, “Qatari Media: The March and Challenges”, a working paper prepared in the context of the Monday (5) meeting and presented for discussion in Dr. Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari’s council, Doha, June 29, 2011.

[28] Muhammad Abu al-Rub, “Al-Jazeera and Qatar: Politics discourses and the politics of rhetoric”, Abu Ghosh for publication and distribution, Jerusalem, 2012.

[29] Salman Sheikh, Shadi Hamid, “Between Intervention and Assistance: The Policy of International Support in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya”, Joint Study of the Program on American Relations with the Islamic World and the Brookings Doha Center, (November 2012). P.5-10

[30] Nader Kazim, “Save Hope: The Long Road to the Arab Spring”, Manama, Bahrain: Masaa publishing and distribution, (2013). P.9

[31] Giorgio Cafiero, “Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Spring”, Al-Ahram weekly, (October 2012)

[32] James Dorsey, “The Struggle for Egypt: Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role”, available at: Huffington post.com, (16 JULY 2013)

[33] Chris Zambelis, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar: royal rivalry in the Levant (part 2/2)”, fair observer, (24 august 2013)

[34]Asmaa El-Khouly, “The Role of Gulf Aid in Supporting the Egyptian Economy since the January 2011 Revolution and Its Impact on Foreign Exchange Reserves”. Middle East Online. (2012)

[35] Mustafa Dalla, “$ 10 million financial aid to save Egypt from drowning: President Morsi benefited from Qatari, Saudi, and Turkish support to confront the collapse.”. Gulf Media. (2012)

[36] Maryam Abdel-Ghani, “Foreign Aid to Egypt between January 25 and June 30: Economy in Politics.”, Aswatmasriya, (23 January 2014)

[37] “Qatari firms top list of investors in Arab countries”. The Peninsula. 29 December 2015. Retrieved 29 December 2015.

[38] kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications” Carnegie endowment for international peace, Research paper. ( 24 September 2014)

[39] Walid Saeed, “The role of the media in moving or putting down revolutions.”Al-Waie Magazine. (6 September 2016)

[40] Aref Hijjawi, “The Role of Al-Jazeera (Arabic) in the Arab Revolts of 2011” Heinrich Boll Foundation, (2012). P. 68-72

[41] Amir Jameel Yehia, “The Framing Of The Egyptian Revolution Portrayed Through The Aljazeera And Cnn Media Outlets And How They Compare And Contrast” , A Thesis Presented To The Faculty Of The Graduate School University Of Missouri, (December 2011). P. 47 – 60

[42] Barker, Anne. “Time Running Out for Cornered Gaddafi”. ABC News. Retrieved 12 September 2011.

[43] Al-Hadi Shalouf, “Qatari-Libyan Relations Two Years after the Revolution”, Al-Arab Magazine, Issue No. 9011 (February 12, 2013).

[44]Abdel Basset Ghobara, “Libya: Qatar’s Role in Overthrowing Colonel Gaddafi’s Regime” Article, Africa News Portal, (3 June 2016)

[45]Tayseer Ibrahim Kodeih, “International Humanitarian Intervention: A Case Study of Libya 2011”, Master’s Memorandum in Political Science, Faculty of Economy and Science Know-how, University of Gaza, (2013). P. 146

[46]Karim Maslouh, “The American-European Administration of the Libyan Crisis During the Revolution,” Middle Eastern Studies, Issue 58, (15 December 2012). P. 48

[47]Abdul Zahir Muhammad, “Qatari Investments in Libya Approximately $ 10 Billion”, The Middle East, Zawya Platform for Study and Analysis, (2011)

[48] Emad Mortada, “On the Qatari Role in Libya since 2011: The Economic and Security”, Arabi Press ,(12 October 2019)

[49] Rasha Al-Sayed Ashry, “The Gulf Crisis and the Dimensions of the Libyan Role”, European Center for the Study of Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, (5 July 2019)

[50] Muhammad Mansour, “The Qatari Military Role in the Libyan Conflict (2011-2020),” Al-Marsaad Al-Arabi, (August 18, 2020)

[51] Ibid

[52] Karim Maslouh, “The American-European Administration of the Libyan Crisis During the Revolution,” Middle Eastern Studies, Issue 58, (15 December 2012). P. 75 – 77

[53] Mona Hussein Obaid, “The Reflection of Change in the Arab Region on the Arab Gulf Countries,” from the works of the Forum: Change in the Arab Countries and its Impact on Iraq and the Arab Gulf Region, Baghdad: Center for International Studies, (March 13, 2013). p.5

[54] brahim Saleh Abdullah Bin Qafla, “Covering Al-Jazeera from the Viewpoint of the Right Young People,” Qatar: Al-Arabi Research Center, (2012). p. 9-12

[55] Muhammad Saeed Abu Amer, “The Gulf Role in Political Transition in Yemen: Al-Jazeera as a Case Study”, International Politics, Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation, Issue 192, (April 2012). p. 92

[56] Bassam Radwan, “The Qatar Protectorate: The Role and Objective … The Qatari Role in the Yemeni Crisis During the Revolution”, tishreen newspaper, Damascus, (December 24, 2012)

[57] It is evident from the above that the Qatari foreign policy towards the Yemeni revolution differed from it towards the revolutions that preceded it in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as Qatar in previous revolutions took the initiative, precedence and continuous active participation in supporting the revolutions. p. 17

[58] Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smitt. “How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution”. Financial Times. Retrieved (26 June 2013)

[59] Muhammad Shamdeen, “The Policies of the Gulf Countries in Syria”, Harmoon center for contemporary studies, Doha, Qatar, (23 November 2015). p. 4-7

[60] Black, Ian, “Arab League mission in Syria ‘has only just started'”. The Guardian. London, ((7, January, 2012)

[61] Solomon, Erika and Lyon, Alistair. Arab League suspends Syria mission as violence rages. Reuters, (28, January 2012).

[62] Mohammed Al-Bazzaz, “The New Directions of Qatari Foreign Policy in a Transforming World”. Meknes, Morocco: Faculty of Law. (April 27, 2013). p. 47

[63]Jawad Bakhshi, “Qatar’s Role in Syrian Developments – A Tripartite Study: Money, Media and Military Intervention”, Iranian Journal, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Issue 143, (2012). p .76

[64] Mohamed El-Sayed Selim, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Constants and Variables”, Egyptian Renaissance Library, 1989. p.18-25

[65] Muhammad al-Sayed Salim, “The Scientific Analysis of Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework, Adapted, Arab Strategic Thought,” No. 40, April 1992, pp. 140-142

[66] Ismail Sabry Moqalled, International Political Relations – A Study in Origins and Theories, Kuwait: Kuwait University Publications, College of Commerce, Economics and Political Science, 1971, pp. 101-105.

[67] George A. Lipsky, “The Theory of International Relations of Harold D. Lasswell”, The Journal of Politics Volume 17, Number 1 (February., 1955)

[68] Pierre de Sennar Clenz, “The Realistic Model and International Conflicts”, translated by: Salama Mahmoud al-Babli, The International Journal of Social Sciences, UNESCO Publications, Issue 127, (February 1991, pp. 5-10

[69]Kenneth Waltz:, “Theory of International Politics”, New York: Random House, 1979, p. 88 – 99

[70] Jamal Abdullah, “Qatari Foreign Policy: Redirecting or Restraint”, Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, (1 October 2014)

[71] Tariq Othman, “Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions: In Transformations of the Arab Regional System”, Doha: Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, (August 2014)

[72] Moataz Salameh, “The Regional Expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council”, International Politics, Cairo: Al-Ahram Foundation, No. 185, Volume 46, (July 2011). p. 80

[73] Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, “Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, 9 May 2011.

[74] Anders Holmen Gulbrandsen, “Bridging the Gulf: Qatari Business Diplomacy and Conflict Mediation”, (MA Thesis,) Georgetown University, (2011). P.40

[75] Jamal Abdullah, “The Crisis of Withdrawing Ambassadors from Doha: Motivations and Implications”, Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, (14 March 2014). P.2

[76] Islam Khaled Hassan, “The Gulf Cooperation Process: Gulf-Gulf Creations: Reasons, Issues, and Mechanisms of Resolution”, Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, (April 2014). P. 53-54

[77] Moataz Salameh, “After the Ambassadors Crisis … The Big Scenarios for Political Transformation in Qatar”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. (April 2014). P.13

[78] Christian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Political Drivers and Regional Implications”, Carnegie center for the Middle East,( 24 September, 2014)

[79] Iman Rajab, “Doha Directions: The Future of Qatar’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” Cairo: The Regional Center for Strategic Studies, (August 21, 2014). p.6

[80] Muhammad Bakr Al-Banhawi, “The Saudi role is advancing while the Qatari is retreating after the developments in Egypt and Syria.” Arab solaa newspaper, 2014

[81] Abdel Qader Naana, “Contradictions in Qatari Foreign Policy: The Relationship with Iran as a Model”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, (March 27, 2015). p.10-14

[82] Abdullah Abdul-Khaleq, “The implications of the Arab Spring on the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Arab Center for Studies and Research, Doha. 2014

[83] Jenan Amin, “Qatar aspirations and realities”, Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung, (4 Nov 2012). P 14 -15.

[84] Hatem Khater, “Military Power: The Biggest Challenge to Qatar’s Role in Its International Relationship”. 2014

[85] Abdel Qader Naana, “Contradictions in Qatari Foreign Policy: The Relationship with Iran as a Model”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, (March 27, 2015). p.10-14

[86] Moataz Salameh, “After the Ambassadors Crisis … The Big Scenarios for Political Transformation in Qatar”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. (April 2014). P.20

[87] Moataz Salameh, “Has the countdown started … the end of the Qatari era in Arab politics”, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. Issue 1 (15 October 2014). P.10-12

[88] Marie Sophie, “Al Jazeera, the little Qatari in the big media court”, Jolpress, (4, January 2014).

[89] Hatem Khater, “Military Power: The Biggest Challenge to Qatar’s Role in Its International Relationship”, Arab Media Forum Authority, (24 June 2013).

[90] Jane Kinninmont, “From football to military might: how Qatar wields global power?” The Guardian, Middle East.( 3 February 2013)

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