Prepared by the researcher: Eman Abo Zeid
Democratic Arab Center
Introduction:
The future of the British EU membership has become one of the most pressing concerns for the EU.
Although member states will try – within limits – to accommodate British demands, Prime Minister Cameron’s ambivalent strategy leaves many open questions.
The EU-British relationship has always been one of special character but a number of recent developments have led to a ‘Brexit’ gaining momentum. The UK’s veto on the Fiscal Compact, Cameron’s promise to hold a referendum on EU membership and the success of the eurosceptic UKIP party in the European elections, have further accrued tensions.
With growing euroscepticism in the UK but also elsewhere in Europe, the political reality requires a targeted and joint European action.
Some of the British demands are legitimate calls for an EU reform. There is broad agreement on the necessity of an EU agenda for growth, competitiveness and fairness. Completing the Single Market and opening the EU to global competition are British priorities which overlap with the European roadmap anyway.
Common ground among member states also exists on the necessity of cutting “EU red tape” and of reassessing EU competences.
Yet a broader tug-of-war will emerge around those British reform demands which target the EU’s basic principles at its core. There will be little room for manoeuvre in policy areas which destabilise the institutional interplay and fundamental principles such as the free movement of people.
Only the UK itself will be able to rationalise the domestic debate on EU membership. Although EU member states are favourable to some reform demands, possible concessions will not suffice to appease British eurosceptic hardliners.
In this paper we will learn about different aspects Despite Britain being a difficult partner, they share common values.(1)
2- Question of the study:
UK’s exit from the European Union would undoubtedly change the future of European integration by confirming true political disunion from a regional experiment that is unprece What does the British government want? Is the reform sought after by London acceptable? What are its demands? How far are its partners prepared to go to keep the UK in the EU? Is a compromise possible and acceptable by all of those involved? If so what might keep the UK in the EU? Is a compromise possible and acceptable by all of those involved? If so what might the main approaches of this be?
dented in the world. In this paper we will learn about different aspects of We will highlight the multiple reasons for negotiation of England out of the Union and the results of that Almtertbah.
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1- A future in the EU? Reconciling the ‘Brexit’ debate with a more modern EU Page , www.dbresearch.com – 3 –
3-Main concepts:
The concept of negotiation .
Negotiation is a kind of dialogueIs the exchange of proposals between two or more parties in order to reach an agreement leading To resolve the contentious issue among them and at the same time maintainingthe common interests among themselves, that is, To negotiate two main pillars of a common interest or more, and there is the issue of contentious or more.
Negotiation is the process through which interacts two or more parties have a belief in the existence of common interests and concerns And overlapping and to achieve their goals and access to desirable outcomes that require contact with each other means more adequate.
space to narrow differences and expand the area to participate, including through discussion and argument and sacrifice And persuasion and objection to reach an agreement acceptable to the parties to negotiate on topics or issues.(2
1-Chapter One.
1-1 .
THE DEBATE ABOUT ‘BREXIT’ IN THE UK
Pauline SCHNAPPER The UK is the only country to have ever contemplated leaving the European Union since it was created.
In view of the numerous challenges the EU faces, its growing unpopularity among large swathes of its population and the consequences of a British withdrawal, the British referendum will be closely watched throughout the continent.
Understanding the terms of this debate is key to assessing the prospect of Brexit, as it would have dramatic consequences on of Brexit, as it would have dramatic consequences on the process of European integration in general, raising the possibility of a disintegration of the EU (as well as of the UK, although that is a different matter).
The return of a debate in the UK about whether to stay in the EU is in many ways puzzling.
1-2.roots of British attitude for re-negotiations it membership in eu
The issue, which dominated the political scene in the 1960s and early 1970s, had been apparently apparently settled by 1975.
The return of a debate in the UK about whether to stay in the EU is in many ways puzzling.
The issue, which dominated the political scene in the 1960s and early 1970s, had been apparently apparently settled by 1975.
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2-‘Ed Miliband’s speech on Europe: full text’, Spectator, 12 March 2014, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/03/ed-milibands-speech-on-europe-full-text/, accessed 30 Oct. 2014. – 4 –
In 1974 Harold Wilson, then leader of the Labour party in opposition, had rejected the terms of entry negotiated by Prime Minister Ted Heath before 1973 and promised, if he came back to power, to renegotiate these terms and then organise a referendum about whether to stay in the European Community.
The ballot did take place in May 1975 and a resounding “yes” vote of over 65% showed the clear wish of the British electorate to stay in.
Even Margaret Thatcher, who became increasingly hostile to many aspects of European integration in the course of her premiership (1979-1990), never contemplated leaving the EC.4
As for Tony Blair (1997-2007), he championed a positive role for UK and the EU, talking about engagement and leadership.
The rise of euroscepticism The reasons for questioning EU membership.
In order to understand why a withdrawal is now contemplated, we need to go back to one longterm political evolution and one more immediate development in the UK and the EU.
The long-term evolution is the rise of euroscepticism, especially within the Conservative Party and its off-shoot, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).
This started in the early 1990s at the time of the Maastricht treaty, which a minority of Conservative backbenchers considered as marking a turning-point towards a federal Europe which the UK could not accept, even though London had secured an opt-out from the single.
What was European currency and the Social Chapter?
then a minority view in the party gradually gained ground in the late 1990s and during the 2000s, to the point where by 2010 it was almost impossible to be selected
as a Conservative parliamentary candidate without holding strongly eurosceptic views.
Meanwhile UKIP had been created (in 1993) with the specific aim of campaigning for withdrawal from the EU.
It made increasingly significant gains in the following secondorder elections (held on proportional representation), especially in the European Parliament, where it came first in the May 2014 elections.
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3-Dr. Ahmed Sakr Ashour, a book of human behavior in the organization Page No. 6
Alexandria, the library, the university in 1989.
4 – Kai Oppermann argues See House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, 12th Report of Session 2009–10, HL Paper 9 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p.53. – 5 –
In the May 2015 general election it won only one seat in the House of Commons because of the first-past-the-post electoral system but attracted 12% of the popular votes, which was unprecedented.
The second, more immediate reason why membership of the EU is again questioned has to do with the financial and economic crisis since 2008, which reinforced the British public’s scepticism towards the euro in particular and the European project as a whole.
The fate of Greece in particular has fuelled opposition to the EU.
There has been a widespread feeling, even among supposedly pro- European politicians and journalists in the UK that the euro had been badly conceived and that Europe is in possible terminal economic decline.
By 2012, as we will see below, polls showed that more British people were in favour of withdrawing from the EU than staying in.
As for the Conservative party, it is now divided into different shades of euroscepticism, those who follow the Cameron line that the EU needs important reforms and the more radical ones, between 50 and100 backbenchers, for whom British withdrawal from the EU has become inevitable.
1-3.Arguments.
There are three main arguments used by supporters of withdrawal on the right: sovereignty globalisation and immigration.
• A lmost entirely at regional or local level—the only other UK-wide referendum
being held over electoral reform in 2011.
• The idea of an increasing role for direct democracy in UK-wide politics has often been discussed.
• It is therefore worth recalling what referendums can and cannot do.
shallower level of debate characteristic of a general election campaign which necessarily addresses a wide range of issues.
The pros and cons of referendums have been analysed extensively elsewhere,
so it will suffice here to provide a short overview.(5)
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5 – http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ ldconst/99/99.pdf, accessed 30 Oct. 2014. – 6 –
On the positive side they can confront an issue, prompting thorough debate and the provision of in-depth information, in contrast to the As a result, decision-makers are prevented from exploiting public ignorance and space is provided for neglected arguments.
By promoting direct involvement in decisionmaking a referendum can enhance the democratic process and entrench the decision as the direct will of the citizenry.
• As a result, referendums can settle issues.
• As sir John Major stated in declaring his support for a UK in/out referendum: ‘It can be cathartic.
• It can end 40 years of political squabbles.’6
But referendums also have negative aspects.
T heir use in Britain currently depends on political decision-makers, and as such can be used as a tactical device by governing parties and leaders.
Political elites and well-funded interests are by governing parties and leaders.
Political elites and well-funded interests are better placed to exploit them, especially at a national level.
Minority groups can be isolated, and indeed their isolation can be exacerbated, if a referendum highlights the weakness of their position.
The debates can lead to oversimplification of complex issues, with few referendums offering more options than ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Even when a referendum asks a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question the answer given can be about something other than the question asked, with referendums turning into opportunities for voters to make clear their feelings about other issues, or about the incumbent government.
Despite often vocal support among voters for the calling of a referendum, actual turnout rates can be low.
When they do vote, voters tend to come out in support of the status quo rather than change.
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6 – See Matt Qvortrup, A comparative study of referendums: government by the people (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Stephen Tierney, Constitutional referendums: the theory and practice of republican deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom. – 7 –
1 – 4. theoretical perspective”european disintegration”
Taking the decision away from a representative institution such as a parliament does not change the fact that the political elite will still need to implement the result.7
This can be difficult, given that divisions among decision-makers will persist whatever the result of the e vote, and indeed may even be deeper as a result of individuals having publicly campaigned on opposing sides. The UK is not the only state where referendums have been held or promised on issues relating to the EU.
While some member states are constitutionally required to hold a referendum on certain EU matters, such as a new treaty, the UK is one of a number of states that have held discretionary referendums.
There have been28 such referendums promised or held over the course of European integration.
Chapter II.
1-1.The attitude United Kingdom and the European Union;
What Fair Deal between UK and EU Member States?
• A referendum does not necessarily lead to a growth in support.
As Simon Usherwood has pointed out: ‘Although referendums have historically been viewed as a means of bringing EU citizens closer to the EU, the stark reality is that they have served to further embed Euroscepticism in terms of the perception of EU citizens.’8
For all the improved understanding and regular campaigns in Ireland and Denmark, those two states—Denmark especially—have Eurosceptic movements that have been especially evident during referendum campaigns, and their publics have either rejected or come close to rejecting several EU treaties.
Britain’s 1975 referendum reportedly saw a rise in understanding about the EU;16 even so,
by March 1980 opinion polling showed 71 per cent of the public supporting withdrawal.15
Voting to remain in the EU now will not stop the British saying no in any later referendums on EU matters.
UK’s relationship with the European Union has never been a bed of roses.
In 1975, barely two years after joining, Harold Wilson’s Labour government consulted the British population by referendum asking them whether they wanted to remain in the European Community. At that time 67% answered “yes”.
For the 42 years of membership, taking part in Europe has, for most British governments, comprised preventing Europe’s institutions from having too much power and negotiating exemptions and derogations to protect national sovereignty.
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7 – Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’, p .15.
8 – Evidence from Unlock Democracy to House of Lords, in House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, p. 18. –
Negotiating exemptions and derogations to protect national sovereignty.
In 2015 this has led to a UK that has managed to escape both from the single currency and the Schengen Agreements on the free movement of people.
There are three areas in which the UK has made a strong contribution to the European Union without playing a wild-card: the creation of the internal market, enlargement and defence.
There are three areas in which the UK has made a strong contribution to the European Union without playing a wild-card: the creation of the internal market, enlargement and defence.
The British have always felt comfortable with a European Union defined as a vast market, but much less so with one of political union.
Since a market can never exist without regulation the governments in London have accepted however, whether they have liked it or not, for the European Union to regulate trade, financial services and capital.
Hence enlargements have often been viewed as positive extensions to the market.
Since UK, along with France, are the only ones to have an army that can project itself outside of the European Union, it has been able to make a significant contribution to european Defence without committing strongly to the institutionalisation of a European Defence Policy, which might have competed against NATO In 2015 British
political life is marked by a wave of euroscepticism which is not specific to the country.
most were driven by the strategic political considerations of governments
who used referendum pledges for domestic, defensive reasons.9
This is especially true of states with active Eurosceptic movements, where the aim has often been to depoliticize the European issue.
It is not just the UK, then, that has wrestled with domestic tensions over Europe, and other EU states are likely to use referendums in the future to manage such tensions.
Will it secure fresh public consent?
Supporters of an in/out referendum argue that it offers the chance for a muchneeded debate to refresh the British people’s understanding of European integration so that they can then either renew Britain’s commitment to the Union or bring it to an end. – 9 –
Either outcome would allow the British government to focus on the relationship sanctioned by the vote
The experiences of Denmark and Ireland have been held up as examples of two states where use of referendums each time there is a new treaty have helped create a more settled relationship with the EU.9
This may be so, but we should not overlook the wider and less polarized political debates about the EU in those countries; or that to come close to replicating their experiences Britain would need to hold more than one referendum.
Without the possibility of further referendums the pressures of domestic politics and low voter appetite for hearing about Europe could lead Britain’s political class to fall back into a habit of avoiding the topic.
Sir John Major himself backed a referendum so that attention could thereafter be turned to more pressing domestic concerns.10
For all the improved understanding and regular campaigns in Ireland and Denmark, those two states—Denmark especially—have Eurosceptic movements that have been especially evident during referendum campaigns, and their publics have either rejected or come close to rejecting several EU treaties.
Britain’s 1975 referendum reportedly saw a rise in understanding about the EU;11.
even so, by March 1980 opinion polling showed 71 per cent of the public supporting withdrawal.12
Voting to remain in the EU now will not stop the British saying no in any later referendums on EU matters.
2-2. The government’s current approach.
A-Exceptional demands:
Renegotiating UK membership That the question of whether to adhere to the very project of European integration is central to the proposed referendum is further confirmed by Cameron’s insistence on seeking renegotiated terms of EU membership.
In his January 2013 speech, the British Prime Minister set out his plan to ‘ask for a mandate In fact, by this stage the British government had already launched a Review of the Balance of Competences exercise to audit the costs and benefits of UK membership. Although not designed to generate policy recommendations, this exercise was implicitly intended to infom potential renegotiation discussions.
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9 – Kai Oppermann, ‘The politics of discretionary government commitments to European integration referendums’, Journal of European Public Policy 20: 5, 2013, pp. 684–701.
10 – Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’, p. 10. – 10 –
Each` of its 32 separate reports, organized thematically with different departmental leads, canvassed a variety of opinions to judge whether the EU should do more or less in specific policy areas.
Overall, this consultation has shied away from making significant claims about the need for a radical reconfiguration of the relationship between the UK and the EU.
In perhaps the most politically sensitive area, free movement of persons, the official conclusion is that ‘the Government considers that now is an appropriate time to review t .
He EU level rules with a view to modernisation and ensuring they are fit for purpose in the EU of today’.11
B. BREXIT: “FAIR DEAL” BETWEEN LONDON AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS
With victory going to the Conservatives and David Cameron in the most recent general elections in the UK the organisation of a referendum promised by the British Prime Minister in his Bloomberg speech of January 2013 on the UK remaining or exiting the European Union is no longer a hypothesis, but a certainty.
We already know the question that will be asked to the British population: “Should the UK remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” The result of the referendum is of course extremely hard to forecast today. The domestic political situation as well as the migratory crisis will have a major impact on the outcome: indeed the inflow of refugees in Europe might provide the with arguments if no solution is found to the current Europhobes with arguments if no solution is found to the current .
with arguments if no solution is found to the current crisis, in a context where confusion is maintained in the UK by Brexit supporters between free internal
circulation, external immigration and Europe.
Another interrogation is the referendum date which varies between autumn 2016 and spring 2017.
It will also depend on the negotiations which take place between London and its European partners.
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11. Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin, ‘Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51: 1, 2013, p. 8.
12. House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, p. 53.
13 – See Mori European Union membership trends, https://www.ipsos- mori.com/researchpublications/ researcharchive/2435/European-Union-membership-trends.aspx?view=wide, accessed 31 Oct. 2014. – 11 –
However although the power struggle between David Cameron and the Europhobes in his party appears to be vehement in the UK, he should also assess what other national governments are prepared to accept and adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards his European partners. Not only is this situation uncomfortable for the British Prime Minister from a domestic point of the British Prime Minister from a domestic point of view but it also causes problems on the external level.
On the one hand Mr Cameron could lose face and his referendum if he achieves too little in the renegotiation of the conditions governing the UK’s EU membership.
But on the other hand the “demands” (a term rejected by London) made by the British government could be too much to be deemed acceptable by his European partners.
When in December 2011 Mr Cameron asked for the exemption of the British financial the common rules in exchange for his country’s support for the services from Budgetary Pact his European partners saw this as simple blackmail and chose to ignore it.
Moreover in 2014 London’s isolation became even clearer when Berlin finally supported Jean-Claude Juncker for the appointment of the President of the European
Commission, then as they accepted the appointment of Donald Tusk as President of the European Council.
2-3.Eurosceptics.
Concessions alone, indeed, will be insufficient. Without sufficient flexibility in the new relationship, Britain and the EU could alike find themselves frustrated by a self-imposed straitjacket.14
From the EU’s perspective, it is worth recalling that the 1975 referendum followed a token renegotiation that did not address underlying problems, such as Britain’s budgetary contributions.
This issue was resolved only following acrimonious negotiations with Margaret Thatcher in
the 1980s, a time when the emergence of the single market, and Britain’s pivotal role in it, provided a sufficient incentive to keep Britain engaged.
More fundamentally, Britain’s relationship with the EU cannot be settled until there is some form of fixed end-point for wider European integration—a prospect that seems elusive, given the ambiguous nature of ‘ever closer union’.
Further political union beyond that proposed to deal with the eurozone crisis may become
necessary, especially if another crisis emerges.
If such steps encroached on Britain’s‘end-point’, then defence of it would become the benchmark against which a British prime minister’s success at EU summits was judged.
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14 – For further discussion of the problems facing the EU, see Paul Taylor, The end of European integration: anti- Europeanism examined (London: Routledge, 2008). – 12 –
The UK’s behaviour British prime minister’s success at EU summits was judged. The UK’s behaviour might also lead to a situation where the UK does not leave the EU, but the rest of the
EU leaves the UK behind by creating institutions and arrangements that bypass the UK .
This runs the risk, for both the UK and the EU, that Britain is pushed towards another referendum as its isolation becomes clearer.15
The referendum will have thus created a degree of inflexibility in policy positions, the breaching of which would provoke calls for another referendum.
Every possible future treaty very possible future treaty or transfer of powers would become a potentially paralysing in/out vote. Britain would have fallen into a cycle of ‘neverendums’.
The UK–EU relationship is also shaped by factors that go beyond either public opinion or
the details of any formal relationship.
It is in respect of Britain’s identity politics that a referendum vote to stay in the EU faces its biggest challenge.
A referendum and/or a renegotiated relationship cannot change Britain’s majoritarian political system and use of common law, as opposed to the more consensual political and Roman legal systems found throughout most of the rest of the EU—systems which defined the EU’s institutional structure before Britain joined.
Britain’s national identity draws heavily on memories of empire and global power, victory in the Second World War, a sense that separation and independence— mixed with a commitment to the Atlantic alliance and the ‘English-speaking peoples’—have served Britain well: a context in which joining the EU was seen as an abdication of a wider role. 16
The euro crisis has increased that sense that separation is in Britain’s interests, even if the UK has also struggled economically.
Europe has long been the ‘other’ against which British—and notably, but by no means exclusively, English identity is cast.
This impulse is so strong that the British can easily overlook their European identity; and yet even Cameron, in his Europe speech, made clear that ‘ours is not just an island story—it is also a continental story’.
Whether this opinion is shared sufficiently in the wider political class, media or public is another matter.
Having long avoided invasion, occupation, catastrophic defeat or revolution, Britain has not faced any critical juncture in its history that forced a re-evaluation of its identity, especially in relation to Europe.
In consequence, any such re-evaluation has been slow and incremental.
A referendum could boost this process, but given that the debate has been going on for most of the post-1945 era, we should not expect it to suddenly prompt the British political elite and public into deconstructing and reconstructing the givens of Britain’s national identity.
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15 – Tim Oliver, ‘The five routes to a Brexit: how the UK might leave the European Union’, LSE EUROPP blog, 27 June 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/06/27/the-five-routes-to-a-brexit-how-the-uk-mightleave- the-european-union/, accessed 30 Oct. 2014. Also, for further discussion of a core group pushing ahead of the rest of the EU, see Taylor, The end of European integration.
16 – William Wallace, ‘Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom’, International Affairs 67: 1, 1991, pp. 65–80
Indeed, rather than changing Britain’s attitude and debate about the EU, a referendum could entrench accepted views.
Membership of the EU has been seen, as Cameron admitted in his Europe speech, as ‘a means to an end … not an end in itself ’.
A renegotiated or renewed engagement would allow Britain to sustain a relationship that it tries to balance with that sought with the United States. But this But this is a balancing act that has caused successive prime ministers no end of problems.
It would also be largely dependent on how the US and EU change and relate to one another.
Domestically, any victorious pro-European campaign is likely to win on an agenda stressing practical, pragmatic, utilitarian involvement in the EU that benefits Britain’s economy, security and power.
The idea of political union is likely to be played down .17
An ‘in’ vote on this basis will be an endorsement of a relationship that remains more of a means to an end than an end in itself, likely to be played down.18
An ‘in’ vote on this basis will be an endorsement of a relationship that remains more of a means to an end than an end in itself.
• Britain will have voted for the maintenance of a status quo of ambivalence.
• Nor should we overlook developments beyond Europe.
In 1973, when Britain joined the then EEC, it was seen as the economic future.
Today the EU is viewed in Britain, but also to some extent around the world, as riven by crises and in relative decline. The emergence of a multipolar world has led to a resurgence in debates about the merits of relations between Britain and other countries and groupings.
In perhaps the most telling comment of all, Douglas Carswell, a Eurosceptic Conservative MP who defected to UKIP, declared that in joining the EU, ‘we shackled ourselves to a corpse’.19
A refusal to see Britain as part of the body Europe—as something to which Britain has attached itself and as something that holds Britain back—might be checked by a referendum campaign. Nevertheless, growing appeal of emerging powers and markets, a trend that is also attracting the attention of other EU members such as Germany, will increasingly raise questions
about the EU’s utility for achieving British ends.
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17 – Douglas Carswell, Hansard (Commons), 26 Oct. 2012, col. 1257, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121026/debtext/121026-0002.htm, accessed 30 Oct. 2014the.
18 – John Bruton and Tim Oliver, ‘Consent of a majority of the rest of the EU will be needed if there is to be a new UK–EU relationship’, LSE British Politics and Policy blog, 16 Jan. 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ archives/39020, accessed 30 Oct. 2014.
19 – Booth and Howarth, Trading places. 50 Sarah Wolff, ‘If not the EU, who will Britain blame for its democratic deficit?’, OpenDemocracy, 12 Feb. 2013,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/sarah-wolff/if-not-eu-who-will-britain-blame-
for-itsdemocratic- deficit, accessed 30 Oct. 2014. – 14 –
Chapter III.
3-1.update in negotiations between uk and eu.
Will voting to leave settle the question?
For its supporters, a vote to withdraw would democratically reassert Britain’s sovereignty, putting it in a position to build lasting relationships of its own choosing with both the EU and the rest of the world.
However, it is unlikely that a vote to withdraw would end Euroscepticism as a political issue, or create a fixed‘end-point’ in UK–EU relations, and doubts would remain about public consent
a vote to withdraw would end Euroscepticism as a political issue, or create a fixed‘end-point’ in UK–EU relations, and doubts would remain about public consent.
A vote to leave the EU could not produce a fixed UK–EU relationship because relations with the EU would remain contested. No party, not excepting UKIP, is clear about what an ‘out’ relationship would mean or cost.
Any ‘out’ campaign faces the challenge of articulating a united view of an ‘out’ relationship with the EU, an almost impossible task because it would rest in large part on what the EU is willing to grant, not simply what Britain wants.
A number of options present themselves, such as the Swiss or Norwegian models. Each has pros cons that would continue arguments about the role of the EU in British life and the meaning of sovereignty.
Whatever ‘out’ means, the relationship with the EU—as the dominant political and economic organization in Europe— would remain the most important of all Britain’s external relationships.
Neither continued membership of the Council of Europe (and therefore of the European on Human Rights and its Court, both also viewed by Eurosceptics Convention as an affront to British sovereignty) nor that of NATO could act as a substitute for Britain’s relations with the EU.
While Britain would remain an important European power and the EU’s relationship with the UK would be among the Union’s most important, the imbalance between the two would be more wideranging than that between Britain and the US.
Britain would find itself shut out of any formal role in EU decision-making; and in building a relationship that addresses this loss of participation, British governments would face problems notonly in the EU but also at home.
Having won a referendum, Eurosceptic groupswould be sensitive to any arrangement that undermined their fight to reclaimBritish sovereignty. At the same time, the EU would remain a powerful ‘other’ in UK political debate, one often accused of interfering in British life and blamedfor Britain’s problems.
At the same time, the EU would remain a powerful ‘other’ in UK political debate, one often accused of interfering in British life and blamedfor Britain’s problems.
Britain would struggle with its inability either to detach itself from Carswell’s European ‘corpse’ or to help bring it back to life.
Just as anti-Americanism has beset the UK–US relationship, so too anti-Europeanism would continue to strain UK–EU relations. – 15 –
Britain’s international position would also be unclear.
For the US and other powers, Britain would remain a valuable partner, but one reduced by its inability to influence the EU.
A British exit would change the EU itself, possibly in ways detrimental to Britain’s interests—it might become more inward-looking, more divided and less interested in British or transatlantic agendas; or it might become a divided and less interested in British or transatlantic agendas; or it might become a more united and powerful actor, from which Britain had excluded itself.
will share its relative decline in the international order with Europe and the wider West, and will continue to face the same kind of risks and opportunities as the EU and its members.
In facing these it will remain a power able to affect change to a certain degree, but compared to the EU and those within it, more than ever before it would be at the mercy of decisions by other powers.
Public consent would also remain a contested issue. Tensions within Britain that underlie the Europe question would remain unresolved, perhaps exacerbated by its exit.
If some areas of Britain voted to stay in, then the EU could become a powerful point of contention become a powerful point of contention in Britain’s intergovernmental politics.
While Scotland is a concern here, polling shows London and Wales as equally likely to vote to stay in.23
Complaints from London—the heart of the British economy—that the rest of Britain was undermining its wealth generation would grow stronger, as would calls to limit this.
Scottish and Welsh separatism could be reinvigorated.20
An ‘out’ vote could also be a vote to punish an incumbent government rather than about the issue of EU membershi Calls for further referendums could emerge if a withdrawal won only a slender majority.
There could also be calls for a second referendum to approve the withdrawal agreement
negotiated with the EU, for example over Britain’s membership of the European Free Trade Area or the European Economic Area.21
The Uk goals of negotiation to withdraw from the European Union
From this point of view it does not seem possible for London to achieve its goals in terms of what is deemed as a ”red line” by many European governments, notably by Berlin and Warsaw
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20 – Jeff Lightfoot and Tim Oliver, ‘A UK–EU divorce: bad news for America’, The National Interest online, 3 Dec. 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/uk-eu-divorce-bad-news-america-9487, accessed 31 Oct. 2014; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
695 (London: The Stationery Office, March 2014), pp. 38–40, http://www .
21 – Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe (Paris: Nagel, 1963), p. 43. – 16 –
It seems that David Cameron is aware of this.
However, if heads of State and government succeeded in defining a credible joint strategy to counter illegal immigration and at the same time responding to the confusion spread by Conservative Europhobes between internal freedom of movement, external immigration and Europe this might help to counter the anti-immigration and anti European discourse of the supporters of Brexit.22
Deepening the “single market/integration of the euro area”: A “fair deal”?
A compromise that would enable an agreement between London and its European partners – notably with those who are euro area members or who want to join – might lie in combining a programme to deepen the single market, notably from a financial point of view, with the project for the Capital Markets Union – digital, energy, and even defence, on the one hand, and an integration project at euro area level on the other, according to a general logic that is still a coherent articulation between the two main levels of integration: the single market and the EMU.
The deepening of the single market should go hand in hand with guarantees in return which are the necessary conditions for fair and healthy competition that falls in line with the foundations of the EU: first, the respect of the mutual recognition principle; second, the respect of the common rules in the single market.
As an example, it’s possible to accept, to a certain degree, tax competition, but on condition that it respects the principles and rules applied to competition in all other
areas: transparency, loyalty, fairness.
With this in view the project for the deepening of the single market must not lead to an uncooperative policy of the “lowest bidder” and alignment with the lowest denominator.
Moreover this compromise should include an EU democratisation programme that would enable response to the democratic issue as diagnosed in London and revealed by the Greek crisis.23
Democratisation means strengthening the role of the national parliaments– hich must not just be restricted to a negative role of censorship, but hich might be constructive, and also via the strengthening of the legitimacy of the European institutions.
3-2. This compromise has several advantages.
It would allow the UK to promote its agenda and to exert would allow the UK to promote its agenda and to exert influence within a deepened single market For their part the UK’s privileged partners (Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, etc.) would also be interested in the prospect of reviving the liberalisation process within the single market.
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22- David Cameron, ‘The future of the European Union’, speech at Bloomberg London, 23 Jan. 2013. 22- HM Government, Review of the balance of competences between the United
23 – Kingdom and the European Union. Single market: free movement of persons (London, 2014), p. 57. – 17 –
This would also be the case for Germany, which needs it to sell its surplus exports even though Berlin remains critical about the liberalisation of services.
Moreover the Economic and Monetary Union should be reformed and deepened, there should be greater euro area integration with financial solidarity, true banking union, the definition of a convergence strategy – notably from the fiscal and social points of view – all of which based on greater democratic legitimacy – notably with stronger involvement on the part of the national with stronger involvement on the part of the national parliaments and the European Parliament – whose parliaments and the European Parliament – whose prerogatives would be strengthened – in economic and.24
Brexit: What Fair Deal between UK and EU Member States ?
budgetary supervision. David Cameron himself also called for EMU to be deepened like this, which is also in the interest of the British economy.25
3-3.This compromise might be expressed in two protocols:
A protocol on subsidiarity and fair treatment within the single market which would aim to:
• Restate the revival of a programme to deepen the single market for growth and employment and set out in detail the guarantees which comprise the vital conditions for healthy, loyal competition which form the EU’s foundations, notably the respect of the principle of reciprocity and mutual acknowledgement as well as the respect of common rules on whose basis the single market is run: transparency, loyalty, fairness;
• Acknowledge the differentiated integration principle as a path to achieve the goal of “ever closer union” and on this occasion restate the opt-out the UK enjoys whilst respecting its national sovereignty just as that of the other Member States;
• Specify the changes that aim to improve the role played by national parliaments in terms of control over the subsidiarity principle;
• Specify the legal guarantees of the EMU Member States (see above) as well as the “pre-in” (EU Member States which want to adopt the euro) with the aim of protecting the rights of the non-euro area member and at the same time reassert the obligatory
of adopting the single currency as planned by the treaties, as well as the nature impossibility of acquiring new voting rights by States that are non-euro area members.
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24 – See the interview given to Le Monde by Benoît Coeuré, member of the board of the European Central Bank, 27th July 215 and the speech he gave at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris on 27th August 2015, “Drawing lessons from the crisis for the future of the euro area” http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/ key/date/2015/html/sp150827.
en.html
25 -« Britain in the EU Renegotiation Scorecard », European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2015- http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ RenegotiationScorecard-Final.pdf
A protocol on EMU that would aim to:
• Specify the main points of EMU reform which would aim to: consolidate the intergovernmental treaties created outside of the community framework (Fiscal Compact, European Stability Mechanism – ESM – treaty); specify the legal basis for the Single Resolution Mechanism of the Banking Union and the direct recapitalisation of the banks by the ESM;
• Also specify the functioning of the European institutions in the euro format (euro area committee within the European Parliament, the creation of a euro area Ministry of Finance combining the role of President of the Eurogroup and the Commissioner for the euro, the euro area institutions’ accountability – including the Troika, the Finance Minister and the ESM – to this committee);
• Adopt a procedure for the limited revision of the European Treaties by the EMU Member States, thereby facilitating the adoption of additional measures specific to the EMU if they are compatible with EU rules.
The States that are not members of the euro area would be free to join but not to oppose it.
The additional measures would be included in the EMU protocol annexed to the TFEU (cf. above).
The change of this protocol (therefore the addition of new measures specific to the euro area) would only require ratification by euro area countries (and in the Member States that decide to adopt the euro area’s acquis);
• Integrate modifications that aim to strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy not only via the enhancement of the role played by national parliaments but also by the democratisation of the functioning of the European institutions.
Initially these two protocols might take the form of a political declaration by the Heads of State and government, a declaration that might be made formal in a second phase on the occasion of the next change of treaty.
David Cameron promised the anti-Europeans in his party a referendum, but he wants to stay in the European Union.
He simply wants to achieve a certain number of reforms. He is going to find it difficult to maintain a balance between what is being demanded of him in Parliament and what his European partners are prepared to grant him. – 19 –
It is impossible to say now what the outcome of the negotiations and the referendum will bring.
The domestic situation, as well as that in25. 40% of the UK’s exports target the euro area.26
Brexit: What Fair Deal between UK and EU Member States ?
Europe, (Greek crisis, refugee crisis etc.) will have a major influence over the outcome of the process.
It is therefore vital for the EU to overcome the present crisis both from an internal point of view with the crisis both from an internal point of view with the refugee crisis.
• The “no” would precipitate the UK into the unknown.
Although “Brexit” is not necessarily likely, its possibility must be planned for and we have to think of the various scenarios that might result.
• This is the necessary condition to overcome the uncertainty weighing over the result.
On the one hand the possible outline of the compromise put forward in this text might promote a positive vote during the referendum and a positive outcome, with the UK remaining in the EU combined with a strengthening of the euro area.
On the other if the “no” were to win, the way the “two Europes” (the euro area and the single market), work together would have to be reconsidered.
Although the options of the European Economic Area and the Swiss model are not feasible for the UK as matters stand, it might be possible to revise the rules of the European Economic Area (EEA) in order to grant equal voting rights to EEA Member States which are not members of the EU in terms of the policies in which they take part, notably those involving the single market26.
• This would provide a response to a certain number of issues and enable the deepening of the euro area as well as a realignment of two major levels of integration:
participation in the single market and participation in the Economic and single market and participation in the Economic and Monetary Union.
3-4. Implications of a UK Withdrawal from the .
The main conclusions of the round-table discussion were that:
A . The political outlook is very fluid.
It is by no means certain that the Conservatives will be re-elected and be
able to deliver on the pledge to hold an EU referendum. If a referendum is held, then the likelihood is that the UK will vote to stay in the EU.
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26. Thierry Chopin and Jean- François Jamet, “David Cameron’s European Dilemma”, Project Syndicate, 18 January 2013; and also Thierry Chopin “Two Europes”, in Europe in search of a new Settlement. EU-UK Relations and the Politics of Integration, Policy Network, London, 2013. – 20 –
The referendum on Scottish independence demonstrated that peoplegenerally prefer the status quo and are reluctant to vote for the unknown.
B . It is difficult to know whether leaving the EU would do permanent long-term damage to the UK economy.
Much will depend on the terms of any new trade agreements, inward foreign investment, restrictions on migration, etc.
The UK’s net contribution to the EU budget is relatively small at less than 1% of GDP.
C . The period between a new Conservative government taking office and a referendum is likely to be marked by a great deal of uncertainty.
That period would be extended if the UK voted to leave the EU, as it would take some time to negotiate new arrangements with the EU and other countries.
In this environment, occupiers would probably hesitate to sign new leases.
It seems likely that those parts of the occupational market having the greatest exposure to the global economy would be most affected: the occupational market having the greatest exposure to the global economy would be London office market, the industrial market in towns and cities where export-oriented manufacturers are a major part of the local economy and student accommodation.
D . The announcement of a referendum could lead to a long period of stasis in the investment market, as foreign investors adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach. Inflows of foreign capital may slow immediately, but not necessarily go into reverse.
E . ven if the UK were to leave the EU, the outlook for remains relatively benign.
These are much bigger considerations than if we leave the EU or not.”
The pressure to remain open to the global economy and attract workers means immigration will remain a contentious issue.
European and international investment in Britain would mean increased dependence on and control from other markets.
Leaving the EU would not end the interdependence binding Britain and the rest of Europe together in a globalized economy, or the tensions this brings.
Finally, the idea of sovereignty would remain contested.
The debate has long been a confused one, filled with a multitude of terms such as popular sovereignty, economic sovereignty, legal sovereignty and parliamentary sovereignty. 27
Most discussion of restoring parliamentary sovereignty essentially means restoring powers to ‘the elected dictatorship’ of an executive operating largely unchecked through domination of the House of Commons.
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27 – Philip Lynch, ‘Party system change in Britain: multi-party politics in a multi-level polity’, British Politics 2: 3, 2007, pp. 323–46. – 21 –
Eurosceptic calls for a referendum highlight how difficult it is to constrain the executive in the British system of government. 28
Most discussion of restoring parliamentary sovereignty essentially means restoring powers to ‘the elected dictatorship’ of an executive operating largely unchecked through domination of the House of Commons.
Eurosceptic calls for a referendum highlight how difficult it is to constrain the executive in
Successive governments have been able to cede powers to the EU thanks to the existing system underpinning parliamentary sovereignty.
Leaving the EU will not change this unless it is accompanied by reforms of the parliamentary system, the royal prerogatives and the uncodified constitution.
Debates about sovereignty, then, cannot be confined to the relationship with the
EU or settled by leaving it.29
Conclusion
Britain’s European question is more than a question of whether to be or not to be in Europe.
• It is a question about party politics, Britain’s changing constitution, politics, political economy, globalization and a changing Europe.
An in/ out referendum that includes debate about these topics can be a means to the end of managing them, but not an end in itself, if by that is meant a settlement of the European question.
• A referendum campaign and debate could challenge many of the myths that surround the UK–EU relationship, and so start to cleanse British politics of the poison which so often infects the issue of Europe.
• But whether the decision is to stay in or leave the EU, in order not to raise false expectations in
both Britain and the EU the referendum must then be followed by better management of the European question.
• Failure to do so would allow the poison to return, meaning the referendum would have been nothing more than a placebo.
• So how can Britain’s European question be better managed? Here we might look to the debate in Scotland about its relationship with the rest of Britain.
• As James Mitchell has argued, the ‘Scottish question’—one of party politics, identity, constitution and political economy—can never be entirely answered.
In a similar way to the European question, the Scottish question will be reframed with each generation, something that is now happening following the vote in September 2014 to remain in the UK.
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2 8 – See Christopher Brooker and Richard North, The Great Deception: the secret history of the
29 – Brooker and North, ‘The Great Deception’, pp. 158–73. 40 Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’. – 22 –
As with the Scottish question, the obstacles to Britain answering its European question are considerable, but they can be managed through a wider debate about the type of country Britain is and wants to be.
It is also worth remembering that Britain is not the only European state to have difficulties in its relations with the EU.
It is perfectly in keeping with the politics of the EU that a member state pursues its national interests.
The key lies in ensuring that the relationship remains more congenial and stable over the longer term.
The EU has its part to play in this by maintaining its appeal.
For its part, British politics needs to avoid presenting the issue of UK–EU relations in terms of false choices that distract attention from underlying issues.
This will require sustained effort to counter misleading and inflammatory anti- European rhetoric, and openness on the part of pro-Europeans about the powerful role of the EU in British life.and openness on the part of pro-Europeans about the powerful role of the EU in British life.
It would be wrong to assume that opting for life outside the EU will make for an easier relationship between Britain and the Union; it could be just as acrimonious as now, presenting difficulties for both sides.30
A referendum cannot Union; it could be just as acrimonious as now, presenting difficulties for both longer-term political management in a Britain where both Euroscepticism and the EU are deeply embedded parts of national life; where a vote to stay in the EU can’t kill off Euroscepticism and Britain’s awkwardness in the EU, but a vote to leave can’t kic k the EU out of Britain. can’t kic k the EU out of Britain.
Results:
1. Developments in the UK have not passed unnoticed, but there are varying levels of understanding as to what is driving UK behavior as well as a great deal of uncertainty about the potential impact for the EU and the countries covered. While no country seems to be planning actively for a Brexit, many are aware that this step may become necessary because of developments in the UK’s domestic debate.
2. Awareness of the UK’s position is largely framed by wider concerns facing the EU, especially the euro zone. For many states, the UK is important, and the EU would be a lesser place without it. Yet while the UK’s reform agenda does appeal to some states, the real pressure for reform will remain within the euro zone. Reform agendas might happen to overlap with London’s, but with the euro zone continuing to move ahead, they might increasingly diverge. Countries within the euro zone, the pre-in countries, and even Denmark with its opt-out have focused on Germany and France for leadership and have tried to secure a place close to euro zone decision-making. London has become a bystander.
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30 – William Wallace, ‘What price interdependence? Sovereignty and independence in British politics’, International Affairs 62: 3, 1986, pp. 367–89; Wellings, ‘Losing the peace’. – 23 –
3. While there is some support for the UK’s positions on EU reform, conceptual clarity and language are crucial. States like the Netherlands and Germany seek better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not repatriation. A multispeed EU is considered a possibility, but not – as the UK might hope – in a pick-and-choose fashion; there is less and less appetite in Brussels for “third ways” like Switzerland. And because many EU members perceive the UK’s long-term EU agenda as opaque or unpredictable, they are hesitant to align with London.
4. Countries both inside and outside the EU are clearly concerned about the economic and, to a lesser degree, security consequences of a British exit. Britain’s economic approach – especially its free-market, liberal outlook – would be the most noticeable loss. Yet some countries note a growing “mercantilist” attitude in British thinking; its economic connections to some traditionally close countries have been in decline for some time; and some states will seek to exploit economically Britain’s marginalization, using this tactic to strengthen their appeal to global investors.
policies, the UK is not easily replaced, and the EU and Europe’s place in the world would lose from a British withdrawal: France would face Germany’s “culture of restraint” on external affairs, while for the United States a Brexit would further complicate transatlantic relations by stunting not only its long-sought improvements to the European arm of NATO but also a reduction in Europe’s dependence on the United States and efforts to make Europe take on a more global role. Furthermore, outside powers may seek to play on divisions, choosing between bilateral and multilateral relations when necessary.
5. While these economic and security concerns serve to remind other countries of the UK’s role in the EU, they do not necessarily generate sympathy for it, but rather exasperation at the country’s inability to offer leadership other than “negative leadership.” The UK’s debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct attack on the fundamental right of the free movement of people and labor in the single market.
EU countries fear the influence of British Euroskeptics on their own domestic debate and are frustrated with London for not successfully confronting the issue at home.
In view of previous episodes of UK-EU difficulties, the EU today is much larger and in parts much deeper.
Some member states have little if any attachment to the UK.
The British government’s rapprochement with Germany while neglecting, and in some areas abusing, relations with former close partners in central and eastern Europe and Scandinavia means it has found itself on the sidelines of EU politics.
Some of the UK’s criticisms of the EU and proposals for its reform are seen as legitimate.
What is not seen as legitimate is advancing these as a purely national interest and using the threat of a Brexit as leverage.
London will have to work harder and engage in more effective coalition-building if it wants to succeed in shaping the ongoing debates about EU reform. – 24 –
References.
1- A future in the EU? Reconciling the ‘Brexit’ debate with a more modern EU Page , www.dbresearch.com
2-‘Ed Miliband’s speech on Europe: full text’, Spectator, 12 March 2014, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/03/ed-milibands-speech-on-europe-full-text/, accessed 30 Oct. 2014.
3-Dr. Ahmed Sakr Ashour, a book of human behavior in the organization Page No. 6
Alexandria, the library, the university in 1989.
4 – Kai Oppermann argues See House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, 12th Report of Session 2009–10, HL Paper 9 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p.53.
5 – http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ ldconst/99/99.pdf, accessed 30 Oct. 2014.
6 – See Matt Qvortrup, A comparative study of referendums: government by the people (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Stephen Tierney, Constitutional referendums: the theory and practice of republican deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom.
7 – Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’, p .15.
8 – Evidence from Unlock Democracy to House of Lords, in House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, p. 18.
9 – Kai Oppermann, ‘The politics of discretionary government commitments to European integration referendums’, Journal of European Public Policy 20: 5, 2013, pp. 684–701.
10 – Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’, p. 10.
11. Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin, ‘Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51: 1, 2013, p. 8.
12. House of Lords, Referendums in the United Kingdom, p. 53.
13 – See Mori European Union membership trends, https://www.ipsos- mori.com/researchpublications/ researcharchive/2435/European-Union-membership-trends.aspx?view=wide, accessed 31 Oct. 2014.
14 – For further discussion of the problems facing the EU, see Paul Taylor, The end of European integration: anti- Europeanism examined (London: Routledge, 2008).
15 – Tim Oliver, ‘The five routes to a Brexit: how the UK might leave the European Union’, LSE EUROPP blog, 27 June 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/06/27/the-five-routes-to-a-brexit-how-the-uk-mightleave- the-european-union/, accessed 30 Oct. 2014. Also, for further discussion of a core group pushing ahead of the rest of the EU, see Taylor, The end of European integration.
16 – William Wallace, ‘Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom’, International Affairs 67: 1, 1991, pp. 65–80.
17 – Douglas Carswell, Hansard (Commons), 26 Oct. 2012, col. 1257, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121026/debtext/121026-0002.htm, accessed 30 Oct. 2014the.
18 – John Bruton and Tim Oliver, ‘Consent of a majority of the rest of the EU will be needed if there is to be a new UK–EU relationship’, LSE British Politics and Policy blog, 16 Jan. 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ archives/39020, accessed 30 Oct. 2014.
19 – Booth and Howarth, Trading places. 50 Sarah Wolff, ‘If not the EU, who will Britain blame for its democratic deficit?’, OpenDemocracy, 12 Feb. 2013, – 25 –
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/sarah-wolff/if-not-eu-who-will-britain-blame-
for-itsdemocratic- deficit, accessed 30 Oct. 2014.
20 – Jeff Lightfoot and Tim Oliver, ‘A UK–EU divorce: bad news for America’, The National Interest online, 3 Dec. 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/uk-eu-divorce-bad-news-america-9487, accessed 31 Oct. 2014; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
695 (London: The Stationery Office, March 2014), pp. 38–40, http://www .
21 – Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe (Paris: Nagel, 1963), p. 43.
22- David Cameron, ‘The future of the European Union’, speech at Bloomberg London, 23 Jan. 2013. 22- HM Government, Review of the balance of competences between the United
23 – Kingdom and the European Union. Single market: free movement of persons (London, 2014), p. 57.
24 – See the interview given to Le Monde by Benoît Coeuré, member of the board of the European Central Bank, 27th July 215 and the speech he gave at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris on 27th August 2015, “Drawing lessons from the crisis for the future of the euro area” http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/ key/date/2015/html/sp150827.
en.html
25 -« Britain in the EU Renegotiation Scorecard », European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2015- http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ RenegotiationScorecard-Final.pdf
26. Thierry Chopin and Jean- François Jamet, “David Cameron’s European Dilemma”, Project Syndicate, 18 January 2013; and also Thierry Chopin “Two Europes”, in Europe in search of a new Settlement. EU-UK Relations and the Politics of Integration, Policy Network, London, 2013.
27 – Philip Lynch, ‘Party system change in Britain: multi-party politics in a multi-level polity’, British Politics 2: 3, 2007, pp. 323–46.
2 8 – See Christopher Brooker and Richard North, The Great Deception: the secret history of the
29 – Brooker and North, ‘The Great Deception’, pp. 158–73. 40 Major, ‘The referendum on Europe’.
30 – William Wallace, ‘What price interdependence? Sovereignty and independence in British politics’, International Affairs 62: 3, 1986, pp. 367–89; Wellings, ‘Losing the peace
